Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Woodson CA2/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, B334504 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA419591) v. THOMAS WOODSON, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed. Elizabeth Richardson-Royer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Marc A. Kohm, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. In 2016, appellant and defendant Thomas Woodson (defendant) was convicted by jury of second degree murder and sentenced to an aggregate term of 40 years in prison. The judgment was affirmed in People v. Williams (Oct. 24, 2018, B281118) (nonpub. opn.). In 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6. In 2023, the trial court denied the petition finding defendant ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Defendant appealed and another panel of this court affirmed the trial court’s order. (People v. Woodson (Feb. 26, 2025, B334504) [nonpub. opn.] (Woodson).) Our Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to us with directions to vacate and reconsider our decision in Woodson in light of People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639 (Lopez). We have done so and affirm. BACKGROUND I. Underlying conviction Defendant and codefendants Berlinda Green, Ernest Lamont Williams, and Anthony Boochee were charged by amended information with the 1998 murder of Arlando Bryant (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1), count 2). As to count 1, it was alleged the murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(1), and it was intentional and committed by means of lying in wait within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15). In both counts, it 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 was alleged the offenses were committed for the benefit of a gang (§ 186.22), and a principal personally used and discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53). In 2016, defendant was tried with Williams and Boochee, but a separate jury was empaneled for defendant. Williams and Boochee were convicted of both first degree murder and conspiracy as charged. All the special allegations were found true. Defendant was convicted of second degree murder, acquitted of conspiracy, and the special circumstance of lying in wait was found not true. The jury found the gang and firearm allegations true. Defendant’s jury was unable to reach a verdict regarding the financial gain special circumstance. On February 23, 2017, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 40 years to life in prison. II. Section 1172.6 petition In September 2022, defendant filed a form petition pursuant to former section 1170.95 (since renumbered as section 1172.6).2 He requested the appointment of counsel and checked the boxes alleging required conditions for relief, including the allegation the charging document “allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory 2 Defendant filed a petition in 2020, before Senate Bill No. 775 (2021−2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 775) extended the availability of relief to any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court denied the 2020 petition after finding defendant ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the jury was not instructed regarding the natural and probable consequences doctrine or the felony-murder rule. 3 under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime … .” The trial court appointed counsel for defendant, received briefing, and held a hearing to determine whether defendant had made a prima facie showing of eligibility. On September 14, 2023, the trial court denied the petition. The court stated it had read and considered the entire file including the petition and jury instructions and found defendant ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Specifically, the court found defendant’s reliance on People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi) was misplaced because “the aiding and abetting instruction, CALJIC [No.] 3.00, … had been modified,” and the instruction in defendant’s case “is different than the instruction that was given in Langi.” The court further noted instructions regarding felony murder and natural and probable consequences were not given, “no instructions relating to imputed malice [were given, and] the sole theory of liability in this case was implied malice.” We affirmed the trial court’s order in Woodson. On May 14, 2025, the California Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for review and held the case “pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in People v. Lopez … .” (People v. Woodson (May 14, 2025, S290018).) On June 24, 2026, the matter was transferred back to us with directions to vacate our prior opinion in Woodson and reconsider the matter in light of Lopez. We do that now. ISSUES ON APPEAL In Woodson, defendant, relying on Langi and People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257 (Maldonado), argued the jury instructions given in his case “permitted the jury to impute malice to [him] based solely on his participation in the crime” and 4 failed to convey the idea that to be guilty of implied malice murder as an aider and abettor he must have personally known the act he aided was life threatening or he must himself have acted with conscious disregard for human life. In Woodson, we found Langi and Maldonado distinguishable from the specific facts of defendant’s case and also found those cases “distinguishable because a review of other instructions given to defendant’s jury … either clarified or avoided the ambiguity of the required mental state for aiding and abetting.” (Woodson, supra, B334504.) Specifically, “[s]ince the target offense was murder it was enough for the jury to be instructed defendant knew the perpetrator’s purpose and intended to aid, facilitate, or encourage the crime[, and] CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and 3.01 accomplished this by clarifying the aider and abettor’s guilt must be determined from his own mental state and by instructing that an aider and abettor must act with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, with the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime.” (Ibid.) “In sum, we … found the instructions regarding aiding and abetting and implied malice to have been sufficiently clear and adequate.” (Ibid.) Relying on People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 936 (Berry-Vierwinden), and People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 868 (Burns), we also found, “to the extent that the instructions given to defendant’s jury might have been potentially confusing regarding the required mens rea, at the time of defendant’s trial it ‘amount[ed] to “a routine claim of instructional error” that “could have been asserted on appeal from the judgment of conviction.”’” (Woodson, supra, B334504 5 [“[d]efendant’s claim of instructional error was available to him at the time of his appeal from the judgment”].) In supplemental briefing upon transfer, defendant contends our opinion in Woodson should be reversed because “this Court found him ineligible largely” on the basis he failed to raise a claim of instructional error on direct appeal, which is reasoning “the California Supreme Court rejected” in Lopez. The People note “this Court relied on multiple grounds in affirming the judgment” and assert “[t]here is no reasonable likelihood that the jury construed its instructions as allowing it to convict [defendant] of murder by imputing malice to him.” Defendant contends the use of the “reasonable likelihood” standard is inappropriate and instead urges “the better standard is whether the jury instructions, read together, ‘conclusively negate the possibility’ that the jury’s verdict rested on a now-invalid theory.” Upon reconsideration, we affirm Woodson’s conclusion Langi and Maldonado are distinguishable, though we do not rely on the “target offense” rationale stated in our prior opinion. As discussed in part II, post, our Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 (Reyes) supplies the proper framework for that analysis. DISCUSSION I. Senate Bill No. 1437 and section 1172.6 Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017−2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437) was enacted to “amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 6 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The statute’s text and legislative history “clearly indicate that the Legislature intended to restrict culpability for murder outside the felony-murder rule to persons who personally possess malice aforethought.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 847 (Gentile), superseded on other grounds by § 1172.6, subd. (g).) It accomplished this by amending section 188, subdivision (a)(3), to require all principals must act with express or implied malice to be convicted of that crime, with the exception of felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e). (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) For a felony-murder conviction under section 189, subdivision (e), Senate Bill No. 1437 required the defendant be the actual killer, an aider and abettor to the underlying felony who acted with the intent to kill, or a major participant in the felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.) Senate Bill No. 1437 also created section 1172.6, which established a procedure for defendants already convicted of murder under the old law to seek resentencing in the trial court if they believed they could not be convicted of that crime given the above amendments to sections 188 and 189. Section 1172.6, subdivision (c), requires the court to appoint counsel for properly pleaded petitions, and then conduct a prima facie analysis, with briefing by the parties, as to the petitioner’s eligibility before determining whether to issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961−970 (Lewis).) Senate Bill No. 775 amended section 1172.6, effective January 1, 2022, to permit relief if a murder conviction was based on a natural and probable consequences theory, a felony-murder theory predating Senate Bill No. 1437, or, relevant here, some “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based 7 solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) At the prima facie stage of the petition process, “‘“the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In making this determination, courts may examine portions of the record of conviction but may not “engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion’” or make “credibility determinations.” (Id. at pp. 972, 974.) “At this preliminary stage, denial of a section 1172.6 petition is proper only ‘[i]f the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief.’” (Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 658.) In this regard, “the jury instructions will be critical.” (People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 731 (Antonelli).) On review, an appellate court considers de novo whether a petitioner was ineligible for relief as a matter of law at the prima facie stage, such that he or she was not entitled to an order to show cause. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251 (Williams).) II. Aiding and abetting second degree implied malice murder Second degree implied malice murder exists where “‘the killing is proximately caused by “‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’”’” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988, quoting 8 People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143.) Aiding and abetting implied malice murder remains a valid theory of murder liability notwithstanding the changes made by Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 850; see also People v. Gudiel (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 848, 859.) An aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing “‘can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life.’” (Gudiel, supra, at p. 859.) “‘[T]o be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.’” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991, quoting People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 713 (Powell).) Therefore, the relevant inquiry for a direct aider and abettor of implied malice murder does not turn on the “target offense” the defendant intended to facilitate. Instead, it turns on whether the defendant aided the life-endangering act itself while personally harboring the requisite mens rea as described in Reyes and Powell. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991; see also Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 655 [describing Reyes as confirming that “it is the fatal act, not any underlying crime, that an aider and abettor of second degree murder must aid or abet”].) 9 III. The Lopez decision In Lopez, the Supreme Court disapproved of Burns, Berry- Vierwinden, and People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164 “and their importation of a Dixon[3]-like procedural bar” because to do so “conflicts with [section 1172.6’s] text and fundamental purpose” and “the procedural bar these decisions read into section 1172.6 aligns with neither the doctrine of issue preclusion that informs analysis of prima facie ineligibility nor the purposes that the Dixon bar serves in the habeas corpus context.” (Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 658.) As a result, the Lopez court “reverse[d] and remande[d] the matter to enable the Court of Appeal to address in the first instance the merits of Lopez’s claim that the jury instructions allowed him to be convicted on a now- invalid theory.” (Ibid.) Also relevant here, the Supreme Court declined to address “[t]he question of whether satisfaction of the Boyde[4] standard is necessary to establish prima facie eligibility under section 1172.6.” (Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 670.) The Boyde standard is used when there is a claim a given jury instruction is ambiguous and, as a result, subject to an erroneous interpretation. In such a case, the court asks “‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in [a constitutionally improper] way.’” (Ibid.) 3 In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 (Dixon) established the rule a writ of habeas corpus “will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction.” 4 Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 (Boyde). 10 IV. Relevant jury instructions at defendant’s trial CALJIC No. 3.00 read: “Persons who are involved in committing a crime are referred to as principals in that crime. Each principal, regardless of the extent or manner of participation is guilty of a crime. Principals include: [¶] 1. [t]hose who directly and actively commit the act constituting the crime, or [¶] 2. [t]hose who aid and abet the commission of the crime. [¶] When the crime charged is murder, the aider and abettor’s guilt is determined by the combined acts of all the participants as well as that persons [sic] own mental state. If the aider and abettor’s mental state is more culpable than that of the actual perpetrator, that person’s guilt may be greater than that of the actual perpetrator. Similarly, that aider and abettor’s guilt may be less than the perpetrator’s, if the aider and abettor has a less culpable mental state.” (Italics added.) CALJIC No. 3.01 read, in relevant part: “A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she: [¶] (1) [w]ith knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and [¶] (2)[w]ith the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and [¶] (3) By act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.” It further instructed, “[m]ere presence at the scene of the crime which does not itself assist the commission of the crime does not amount to aiding and abetting” and “[m]ere knowledge that a crime is being committed and the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting.” CALJIC No. 8.10 explained “[e]very person who unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, is guilty of murder.” CALJIC No. 8.11 defined “malice” as “either express or implied.” The instruction explained “[m]alice is implied when: 11 [¶] 1. [t]he killing resulted from an intentional act; [¶] 2. [t]he natural and probable consequences of the act are dangerous to human life; and [¶] 3. [t]he act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life.” CALJIC No. 8.11 also explained: “When it is shown that a killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act with express or implied malice, no other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of malice aforethought.” CALJIC No. 8.31 explained second degree murder is “the unlawful killing of a human being when: [¶] 1. [t]he killing resulted from an intentional act … ; [¶] 2. [t]he natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and [¶] 3. [t]he act … was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life. [¶] When the killing is the direct result of such an intentional act it is not necessary to prove that the defendant intended that the act would result in the death of a human being.” CALJIC No. 8.30 added “[m]urder of the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought when the perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and premeditation or lying in wait.” V. Evaluating ambiguity at the prima facie stage As discussed ante, the parties dispute the appropriate standard to be used when the court is faced with ambiguous jury instructions at the prima facie stage. Citing Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 984, defendant asserts the appropriate standard “is whether the jury instructions, read together, ‘conclusively negate the possibility’ that the jury’s verdict rested on a now-invalid theory.” The People assert the appropriate 12 standard is derived from Boyde and asks, “whether there exists a reasonable likelihood that the jury relied upon an invalid theory of murder liability.” As noted, the court in Lopez declined to address this question. We undertake it here. We conclude the correct standard is the one developed beginning in Lewis and refined through Strong5 and Curiel6. That is, a section 1172.6 petition may be denied at the prima facie stage only where the record of conviction, including the jury instructions, conclusively establishes the defendant is ineligible for relief. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470 [“the question is not whether it is likely a defendant could have felt and acted” in a manner consistent with an invalid theory, “but whether the court’s jury instructions foreclose that possibility as a matter of law”]; Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708 [“If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition”].) Boyde’s reasonable likelihood test was developed to assist in assessing whether instructional ambiguity requires reversal of a final judgment on direct appeal. In that setting, courts must balance the “strong policy in favor of accurate determination of the appropriate sentence [against] an equally strong policy against retrials years after the first trial where the claimed error amounts to no more than speculation.” (Boyde, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 380.) Neither of those competing interests is implicated at the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 proceeding. The finding of a prima facie case does not disturb the judgment or grant relief to the defendant; it only triggers an evidentiary hearing under 5 People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). 6 People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 (Curiel). 13 section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 559.) The finality concerns that justify tolerance for potential ambiguity under Boyde on direct appeal have no application to a threshold screening determination that merely opens the door to further proceedings on the section 1172.6 petition. Moreover, the “conclusively establish” standard reflects the Legislature’s deliberate choice to set the prima facie bar “very low.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) Section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1) requires only that the charging document “allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory … under which malice is imputed to a person.” Where ambiguity leaves open the possibility the jury convicted the defendant on an invalid theory, the charging document necessarily “allowed” that theory to reach the jury, regardless of whether a reviewing court believes it more or less likely the jury actually relied on it. The cases relied upon by the People do not establish the Boyde reasonable likelihood standard as governing at this stage. In People v. Rushing (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1025 (Rushing), the phrase “‘reasonable possibility’” appears only in the court’s recitation of the defendant’s own argument, which the court rejected (id. at p. 1032) and, ultimately, the court concluded, pursuant to Strong, the record “conclusively establishe[d]” Rushing’s ineligibility for relief (id. at pp. 1034–1035). In People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389 (Allen), the court concluded the conspiracy instructions required jurors to find defendant harbored the intent to kill as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 396.) Then, while addressing defendant’s other arguments, the court cited People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941 (Estrada) in finding, “[i]t was also not reasonably likely that jurors imputed 14 malice to Allen” because there was “nothing in the evidence or jury instructions that would have suggested such a theory.” (Allen, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 397, citing Estrada, supra, at pp. 948−949.) There was no instructional ambiguity to settle and Allen’s use of the “reasonably likely” language to reject the defendant’s unsupported theory is distinct from the question we address today. Nor does Williams support the People’s position. In Williams, there was no instructional ambiguity or reference to Boyde and the reasonable likelihood principle it propounded. Instead, in Williams, the court discussed the general principle of appellate review a reviewing court “‘must consider the instructions together as a whole, to determine whether it is reasonably likely a jury would interpret an instruction in a particular way, because we presume jurors understand and correlate all of the instructions’ [citation] and the jurors are ‘presumed to have followed the court’s instructions.’” (Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1255–1256, italics added, citing People v. Burton (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 917, 925 & People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.) After the court considered the unambiguous jury instructions and the jury’s findings, it concluded “the record of conviction conclusively demonstrates the jury found he had acted with the requisite intent.” (Williams, at p. 1257, italics added.) This is Curiel’s standard, not Boyde’s. The People do not cite People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, but it is worth a brief discussion. Decided before Strong and Curiel set forth the standard to be used to determine whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing, Ervin applied a reasonable likelihood analysis to ambiguous jury instructions and found the ambiguity there sufficiently favored 15 the defendant, such that reversal was in order. (Ervin, at pp. 107–109, 111.) As applied by the court in Ervin, any reasonably likely ambiguity would be resolved in defendant’s favor and would be sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing. This is an outcome fully consistent with Strong and Curiel. Estrada, on which Rushing and Allen relied, also did not employ the Boyde standard. Instead, it quoted reasonable likelihood language from People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600 and People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, both of which were direct appeals dealing with the same instructional issues presented in Estrada. The Estrada court simply restated the “determinative” holdings of those cases where, on direct appeal, each found “there was no reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood” the instructional language. (Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 947−948.) At no point did the Estrada court announce it as the proper standard to be used when evaluating an instructional ambiguity for purposes of section 1172.6 prima facie determinations. Furthermore, Estrada, along with Williams, was decided before our Supreme Court’s decision in Curiel, which made clear the prima facie inquiry asks whether the instructions “foreclose th[e] possibility [of an invalid theory] as a matter of law,” not whether it was reasonably likely the jury misapplied them. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470; see also Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) Thus, as explained, none of the authority cited by the People actually confronts or resolves the choice between these two standards (see Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [“an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered”]), and each reaches its result through instructional analysis consistent with Curiel and Strong. 16 Based on the foregoing, we conclude a section 1172.6 petition may be denied at the prima facie stage only where the jury instructions, considered as a whole and together with the rest of the record of conviction, conclusively and unambiguously establish the defendant is ineligible for relief; that is, where the instructions conclusively foreclose the possibility that the jury convicted the defendant on a theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on his participation in the crime. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470; Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972; see also Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 658.) VI. Defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law Defendant characterizes Woodson as having found him ineligible “largely on th[e] basis” ultimately disapproved of in Lopez. Not so. Woodson concluded first that Langi and Maldonado were distinguishable because the instructions given at defendant’s trial “either clarified or avoided the ambiguity of the required mental state for aiding and abetting.” (Woodson, supra, B334504.) Only after reaching that conclusion did we rely additionally on the forfeiture principle disapproved of in Lopez. Because our first ground was not disapproved in Lopez, it remains undisturbed. As noted, ante, however, we do not rely on the target-offense rationale Woodson used to reach our conclusion. After reconsideration, we nonetheless reach the same result. As explained in part II of the Discussion, ante, the relevant inquiry for a direct aider and abettor of implied malice murder does not turn on the “target offense.” With this in mind, we agree with the People that Langi and Maldonado are distinguishable. 17 In Langi, the victim died after a punch caused him to fall and hit his head. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 975–977.) “[W]hile the perpetrator must have deliberately performed the fatal act ‘with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life’ (CALJIC No. 8.31), his purpose may have been only to strike or to injure, or conceivably only to embarrass, the victim.” (Id. at p. 982.) Accordingly, “under the instructions that were given, the jury was entitled to conclude that, to be guilty as an aider and abettor of second degree murder, [Langi] need only have intended to encourage the perpetrator’s intentional act—in this case, punching [the victim]—whether or not [he] intended to aid or encourage [the victim’s] killing, and whether or not he personally knew of and disregarded the risk of such a killing.” (Ibid.) In Maldonado, the jury was given the same instructions without tailoring them to the specifics of the charged offense. Specifically, in a case involving aiding and abetting lying in wait murder, the court found the “lying in wait instruction did not instruct the jury that the perpetrator needed to intend to cause death. While the perpetrator must have concealed his purpose from the victim, waited and watched for an opportunity to act, intentionally made a surprise attack from a position of advantage, and have lain in wait for a substantial enough duration to show a state of mind equivalent to deliberation or premeditation, the jury may have found the perpetrator’s purpose was only to injure or intimidate the victim in a surprise attack.” (Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1266.) Here, the required instructions were supplied. CALJIC No. 3.00, as given to defendant’s jury, expressly instructed: “When the crime charged is murder, the aider and abettor’s guilt 18 is determined by the combined acts of all the participants as well as that person’s own mental state. If the aider and abettor’s mental state is more culpable than that of the actual perpetrator, that person’s guilt may be greater than that of the actual perpetrator. Similarly, that aider and abettor’s guilt may be less than the perpetrator’s if the aider and abettor has a less culpable mental state.” (Italics added.) Notably, the version of CALJIC No. 3.00 given to Langi’s jury lacked this language and instructed, “‘[e]ach principal [in a crime], regardless of the extent or manner of participation[,] is equally guilty.’” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 981, fn. 8, italics added.) The “‘own mental state’” language, used at defendant’s trial, was added to CALJIC No. 3.00 three years after Langi’s trial. (Langi, at p. 983, fn. 13, italics omitted.) CALJIC No. 3.00’s “own mental state” language is not a meaningless clarification. It tracks the Supreme Court’s own articulation of the required mens rea for an aider and abettor as explained in People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111 (McCoy). There, the court explained that “when a person, with the mental state necessary for an aider and abettor, helps or induces another to kill, that person’s guilt is determined by the combined acts of all the participants as well as that person’s own mens rea.” (Id. at p. 1122.) In Curiel, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Senate Bill No. 1437 “did not entail dispensing with the traditional mens rea required for aiding and abetting murder” articulated in McCoy. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 469.) As noted, the version of CALJIC No. 3.00 given to defendant’s jury incorporated this rule. Thus, unlike Langi’s “equally guilty” instruction, the instruction used here directed the jury to 19 determine each participant’s culpability independently, based on that person’s “own mental state.” Maldonado is even more problematic in this regard. It appears no comparable instruction was given at all. The instructions there consisted of CALCRIM No. 520, defining malice; CALCRIM No. 521, a lying-in-wait murder instruction that did not require the perpetrator to have intended to cause death; and CALCRIM No. 401, the aiding and abetting language, which conditions liability on the defendant’s knowledge of the perpetrator’s “unlawful purpose” and intent to aid, encourage, or facilitate “the crime,” without requiring a finding the defendant knew the act was dangerous to human life and personally acted with conscious disregard for that danger. This is the defect identified in Reyes and Powell. (Maldonado, supra, at pp. 1264– 1266; see Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991; Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 711−714.) Nothing in Maldonado’s instructional package directed the jury to assess the aider and abettor’s culpability independent of the perpetrator’s, as CALJIC No. 3.00 does here. CALJIC No. 3.01, as given to defendant’s jury, reinforced this individualized approach by further instructing that “[m]ere presence” or “[m]ere knowledge,” without more, does not constitute aiding and abetting. While these instructions alone do not resolve the issues identified in Langi and Maldonado, they add further confidence the instructions as a whole directed the jury to assess defendant’s own conduct and knowledge in assessing his liability as an aider and abettor, rather than treating his presence or knowledge as sufficient for liability. We note, CALJIC No. 8.31, like the analogous instruction given in Langi, does not specify whose knowledge and conscious 20 disregard must be shown. Instead, it refers only to “the act,” without naming either the perpetrator or the aider and abettor. Standing alone, this instruction presents the same ambiguity identified in Langi. However, CALJIC No. 3.00’s express direction “the aider and abettor’s guilt is determined by … that person’s own mental state” resolves any ambiguity by supplying the object CALJIC No. 8.31 does not. Reading CALJIC Nos. 3.00, 3.01, 8.10, 8.11, and 8.31 together, the jury had to find defendant personally knew the perpetrator’s act was dangerous to human life and personally acted with conscious disregard for that danger. Defendant’s jury rejected the first degree murder theory and, instead, convicted him of second degree murder. This is consistent with the individualized evaluation CALJIC No. 3.00 required. Applying the standard set forth in part V, ante, we find the instructions as given conclusively foreclose the possibility the jury convicted defendant by imputing malice to him based solely on his participation in the crime. As a result, we find “‘the record of conviction ‘establish[es] conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief.’” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470, quoting Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708; accord Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 658; Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 724.) DISPOSITION The trial court’s order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is affirmed. 21 CHAVEZ, J. We concur: LUI, P. J. GOORVITCH, J. 22