People v. Woodson CA2/2
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketB334504A
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Woodson CA2/2
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B334504
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA419591)
v.
THOMAS WOODSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Elizabeth Richardson-Royer, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Marc A. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2016, appellant and defendant Thomas Woodson
(defendant) was convicted by jury of second degree murder and
sentenced to an aggregate term of 40 years in prison. The
judgment was affirmed in People v. Williams (Oct. 24, 2018,
B281118) (nonpub. opn.). In 2022, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6. In 2023,
the trial court denied the petition finding defendant ineligible for
relief as a matter of law. Defendant appealed and another panel
of this court affirmed the trial court’s order. (People v. Woodson
(Feb. 26, 2025, B334504) [nonpub. opn.] (Woodson).) Our
Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back
to us with directions to vacate and reconsider our decision in
Woodson in light of People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639 (Lopez).
We have done so and affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Underlying conviction
Defendant and codefendants Berlinda Green, Ernest
Lamont Williams, and Anthony Boochee were charged by
amended information with the 1998 murder of Arlando Bryant
(§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and conspiracy to commit murder
(§ 182, subd. (a)(1), count 2). As to count 1, it was alleged the
murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain within
the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(1), and it was
intentional and committed by means of lying in wait within the
meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15). In both counts, it
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
was alleged the offenses were committed for the benefit of a gang
(§ 186.22), and a principal personally used and discharged a
firearm causing death (§ 12022.53).
In 2016, defendant was tried with Williams and Boochee,
but a separate jury was empaneled for defendant. Williams and
Boochee were convicted of both first degree murder and
conspiracy as charged. All the special allegations were found
true. Defendant was convicted of second degree murder,
acquitted of conspiracy, and the special circumstance of lying in
wait was found not true. The jury found the gang and firearm
allegations true. Defendant’s jury was unable to reach a verdict
regarding the financial gain special circumstance. On
February 23, 2017, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate
term of 40 years to life in prison.
II. Section 1172.6 petition
In September 2022, defendant filed a form petition
pursuant to former section 1170.95 (since renumbered as section
1172.6).2 He requested the appointment of counsel and checked
the boxes alleging required conditions for relief, including the
allegation the charging document “allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
2 Defendant filed a petition in 2020, before Senate Bill
No. 775 (2021−2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 775) extended
the availability of relief to any “other theory under which malice
is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation
in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court denied the
2020 petition after finding defendant ineligible for relief as a
matter of law because the jury was not instructed regarding the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or the felony-murder
rule.
3
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime … .”
The trial court appointed counsel for defendant, received
briefing, and held a hearing to determine whether defendant had
made a prima facie showing of eligibility. On September 14,
2023, the trial court denied the petition. The court stated it had
read and considered the entire file including the petition and jury
instructions and found defendant ineligible for relief as a matter
of law. Specifically, the court found defendant’s reliance on
People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi) was misplaced
because “the aiding and abetting instruction, CALJIC [No.] 3.00,
… had been modified,” and the instruction in defendant’s case “is
different than the instruction that was given in Langi.” The
court further noted instructions regarding felony murder and
natural and probable consequences were not given, “no
instructions relating to imputed malice [were given, and] the sole
theory of liability in this case was implied malice.” We affirmed
the trial court’s order in Woodson.
On May 14, 2025, the California Supreme Court granted
defendant’s petition for review and held the case “pending
consideration and disposition of a related issue in People v. Lopez
… .” (People v. Woodson (May 14, 2025, S290018).) On June 24,
2026, the matter was transferred back to us with directions to
vacate our prior opinion in Woodson and reconsider the matter in
light of Lopez. We do that now.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
In Woodson, defendant, relying on Langi and People v.
Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257 (Maldonado), argued the
jury instructions given in his case “permitted the jury to impute
malice to [him] based solely on his participation in the crime” and
4
failed to convey the idea that to be guilty of implied malice
murder as an aider and abettor he must have personally known
the act he aided was life threatening or he must himself have
acted with conscious disregard for human life.
In Woodson, we found Langi and Maldonado
distinguishable from the specific facts of defendant’s case and
also found those cases “distinguishable because a review of other
instructions given to defendant’s jury … either clarified or
avoided the ambiguity of the required mental state for aiding and
abetting.” (Woodson, supra, B334504.) Specifically, “[s]ince the
target offense was murder it was enough for the jury to be
instructed defendant knew the perpetrator’s purpose and
intended to aid, facilitate, or encourage the crime[, and] CALJIC
Nos. 3.00 and 3.01 accomplished this by clarifying the aider and
abettor’s guilt must be determined from his own mental state and
by instructing that an aider and abettor must act with knowledge
of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, with the intent or
purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the
commission of the crime.” (Ibid.) “In sum, we … found the
instructions regarding aiding and abetting and implied malice to
have been sufficiently clear and adequate.” (Ibid.)
Relying on People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 921, 936 (Berry-Vierwinden), and People v. Burns
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 868 (Burns), we also found, “to the
extent that the instructions given to defendant’s jury might have
been potentially confusing regarding the required mens rea, at
the time of defendant’s trial it ‘amount[ed] to “a routine claim of
instructional error” that “could have been asserted on appeal
from the judgment of conviction.”’” (Woodson, supra, B334504
5
[“[d]efendant’s claim of instructional error was available to him
at the time of his appeal from the judgment”].)
In supplemental briefing upon transfer, defendant contends
our opinion in Woodson should be reversed because “this Court
found him ineligible largely” on the basis he failed to raise a
claim of instructional error on direct appeal, which is reasoning
“the California Supreme Court rejected” in Lopez. The People
note “this Court relied on multiple grounds in affirming the
judgment” and assert “[t]here is no reasonable likelihood that the
jury construed its instructions as allowing it to convict
[defendant] of murder by imputing malice to him.” Defendant
contends the use of the “reasonable likelihood” standard is
inappropriate and instead urges “the better standard is whether
the jury instructions, read together, ‘conclusively negate the
possibility’ that the jury’s verdict rested on a now-invalid theory.”
Upon reconsideration, we affirm Woodson’s conclusion
Langi and Maldonado are distinguishable, though we do not rely
on the “target offense” rationale stated in our prior opinion. As
discussed in part II, post, our Supreme Court’s opinion in People
v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 (Reyes) supplies the proper
framework for that analysis.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 1437 and section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017−2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 1437) was enacted to “amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch.
6
1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The statute’s text and legislative history
“clearly indicate that the Legislature intended to restrict
culpability for murder outside the felony-murder rule to persons
who personally possess malice aforethought.” (People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 847 (Gentile), superseded on other grounds
by § 1172.6, subd. (g).) It accomplished this by amending section
188, subdivision (a)(3), to require all principals must act with
express or implied malice to be convicted of that crime, with the
exception of felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e).
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) For a felony-murder conviction under
section 189, subdivision (e), Senate Bill No. 1437 required the
defendant be the actual killer, an aider and abettor to the
underlying felony who acted with the intent to kill, or a major
participant in the felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created section 1172.6, which
established a procedure for defendants already convicted of
murder under the old law to seek resentencing in the trial court if
they believed they could not be convicted of that crime given the
above amendments to sections 188 and 189. Section 1172.6,
subdivision (c), requires the court to appoint counsel for properly
pleaded petitions, and then conduct a prima facie analysis, with
briefing by the parties, as to the petitioner’s eligibility before
determining whether to issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961−970 (Lewis).)
Senate Bill No. 775 amended section 1172.6, effective
January 1, 2022, to permit relief if a murder conviction was based
on a natural and probable consequences theory, a felony-murder
theory predating Senate Bill No. 1437, or, relevant here, some
“other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
7
solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(1).)
At the prima facie stage of the petition process, “‘“the court
takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would
be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.”’”
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In making this
determination, courts may examine portions of the record of
conviction but may not “engage in ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion’” or make
“credibility determinations.” (Id. at pp. 972, 974.) “At this
preliminary stage, denial of a section 1172.6 petition is proper
only ‘[i]f the petition and record in the case establish conclusively
that the defendant is ineligible for relief.’” (Lopez, supra, 19
Cal.5th at p. 658.) In this regard, “the jury instructions will be
critical.” (People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 731
(Antonelli).)
On review, an appellate court considers de novo whether a
petitioner was ineligible for relief as a matter of law at the prima
facie stage, such that he or she was not entitled to an order to
show cause. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244,
1251 (Williams).)
II. Aiding and abetting second degree implied malice
murder
Second degree implied malice murder exists where “‘the
killing is proximately caused by “‘an act, the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was
deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct
endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious
disregard for life.’”’” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988, quoting
8
People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143.) Aiding and
abetting implied malice murder remains a valid theory of murder
liability notwithstanding the changes made by Senate Bill Nos.
1437 and 775. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 850; see also
People v. Gudiel (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 848, 859.) An aider and
abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing “‘can still be
convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that his or
her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious
disregard for life.’” (Gudiel, supra, at p. 859.)
“‘[T]o be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct
aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission
of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens
rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and
abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the
act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act,
knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in
conscious disregard for human life.’” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 991, quoting People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 713
(Powell).)
Therefore, the relevant inquiry for a direct aider and
abettor of implied malice murder does not turn on the “target
offense” the defendant intended to facilitate. Instead, it turns on
whether the defendant aided the life-endangering act itself while
personally harboring the requisite mens rea as described in Reyes
and Powell. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991; see also Lopez,
supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 655 [describing Reyes as confirming that
“it is the fatal act, not any underlying crime, that an aider and
abettor of second degree murder must aid or abet”].)
9
III. The Lopez decision
In Lopez, the Supreme Court disapproved of Burns, Berry-
Vierwinden, and People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164 “and
their importation of a Dixon[3]-like procedural bar” because to do
so “conflicts with [section 1172.6’s] text and fundamental
purpose” and “the procedural bar these decisions read into
section 1172.6 aligns with neither the doctrine of issue preclusion
that informs analysis of prima facie ineligibility nor the purposes
that the Dixon bar serves in the habeas corpus context.” (Lopez,
supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 658.) As a result, the Lopez court
“reverse[d] and remande[d] the matter to enable the Court of
Appeal to address in the first instance the merits of Lopez’s claim
that the jury instructions allowed him to be convicted on a now-
invalid theory.” (Ibid.)
Also relevant here, the Supreme Court declined to address
“[t]he question of whether satisfaction of the Boyde[4] standard is
necessary to establish prima facie eligibility under section
1172.6.” (Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 670.) The Boyde
standard is used when there is a claim a given jury instruction is
ambiguous and, as a result, subject to an erroneous
interpretation. In such a case, the court asks “‘whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged
instruction in [a constitutionally improper] way.’” (Ibid.)
3 In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 (Dixon) established
the rule a writ of habeas corpus “will not lie where the claimed
errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal
from a judgment of conviction.”
4 Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 (Boyde).
10
IV. Relevant jury instructions at defendant’s trial
CALJIC No. 3.00 read: “Persons who are involved in
committing a crime are referred to as principals in that crime.
Each principal, regardless of the extent or manner of
participation is guilty of a crime. Principals include: [¶] 1.
[t]hose who directly and actively commit the act constituting the
crime, or [¶] 2. [t]hose who aid and abet the commission of the
crime. [¶] When the crime charged is murder, the aider and
abettor’s guilt is determined by the combined acts of all the
participants as well as that persons [sic] own mental state. If the
aider and abettor’s mental state is more culpable than that of the
actual perpetrator, that person’s guilt may be greater than that
of the actual perpetrator. Similarly, that aider and abettor’s guilt
may be less than the perpetrator’s, if the aider and abettor has a
less culpable mental state.” (Italics added.)
CALJIC No. 3.01 read, in relevant part: “A person aids and
abets the commission of a crime when he or she: [¶] (1) [w]ith
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and [¶]
(2)[w]ith the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or
facilitating the commission of the crime, and [¶] (3) By act or
advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission
of the crime.” It further instructed, “[m]ere presence at the scene
of the crime which does not itself assist the commission of the
crime does not amount to aiding and abetting” and “[m]ere
knowledge that a crime is being committed and the failure to
prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting.”
CALJIC No. 8.10 explained “[e]very person who unlawfully
kills a human being with malice aforethought, is guilty of
murder.” CALJIC No. 8.11 defined “malice” as “either express or
implied.” The instruction explained “[m]alice is implied when:
11
[¶] 1. [t]he killing resulted from an intentional act; [¶] 2. [t]he
natural and probable consequences of the act are dangerous to
human life; and [¶] 3. [t]he act was deliberately performed with
knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for,
human life.” CALJIC No. 8.11 also explained: “When it is shown
that a killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act with
express or implied malice, no other mental state need be shown
to establish the mental state of malice aforethought.”
CALJIC No. 8.31 explained second degree murder is “the
unlawful killing of a human being when: [¶] 1. [t]he killing
resulted from an intentional act … ; [¶] 2. [t]he natural
consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and [¶] 3.
[t]he act … was deliberately performed with knowledge of the
danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life. [¶]
When the killing is the direct result of such an intentional act it
is not necessary to prove that the defendant intended that the act
would result in the death of a human being.” CALJIC No. 8.30
added “[m]urder of the second degree is the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought when the perpetrator
intended unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is
insufficient to prove deliberation and premeditation or lying in
wait.”
V. Evaluating ambiguity at the prima facie stage
As discussed ante, the parties dispute the appropriate
standard to be used when the court is faced with ambiguous jury
instructions at the prima facie stage. Citing Langi, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at p. 984, defendant asserts the appropriate
standard “is whether the jury instructions, read together,
‘conclusively negate the possibility’ that the jury’s verdict rested
on a now-invalid theory.” The People assert the appropriate
12
standard is derived from Boyde and asks, “whether there exists a
reasonable likelihood that the jury relied upon an invalid theory
of murder liability.” As noted, the court in Lopez declined to
address this question. We undertake it here.
We conclude the correct standard is the one developed
beginning in Lewis and refined through Strong5 and Curiel6.
That is, a section 1172.6 petition may be denied at the prima
facie stage only where the record of conviction, including the jury
instructions, conclusively establishes the defendant is ineligible
for relief. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470 [“the question is not
whether it is likely a defendant could have felt and acted” in a
manner consistent with an invalid theory, “but whether the
court’s jury instructions foreclose that possibility as a matter of
law”]; Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708 [“If the petition and
record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is
ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition”].)
Boyde’s reasonable likelihood test was developed to assist
in assessing whether instructional ambiguity requires reversal of
a final judgment on direct appeal. In that setting, courts must
balance the “strong policy in favor of accurate determination of
the appropriate sentence [against] an equally strong policy
against retrials years after the first trial where the claimed error
amounts to no more than speculation.” (Boyde, supra, 494 U.S. at
p. 380.) Neither of those competing interests is implicated at the
prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 proceeding. The finding of a
prima facie case does not disturb the judgment or grant relief to
the defendant; it only triggers an evidentiary hearing under
5 People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong).
6 People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 (Curiel).
13
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3);
People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 559.) The finality
concerns that justify tolerance for potential ambiguity under
Boyde on direct appeal have no application to a threshold
screening determination that merely opens the door to further
proceedings on the section 1172.6 petition.
Moreover, the “conclusively establish” standard reflects the
Legislature’s deliberate choice to set the prima facie bar “very
low.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) Section 1172.6,
subdivision (a)(1) requires only that the charging document
“allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory … under
which malice is imputed to a person.” Where ambiguity leaves
open the possibility the jury convicted the defendant on an
invalid theory, the charging document necessarily “allowed” that
theory to reach the jury, regardless of whether a reviewing court
believes it more or less likely the jury actually relied on it.
The cases relied upon by the People do not establish the
Boyde reasonable likelihood standard as governing at this stage.
In People v. Rushing (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1025 (Rushing), the
phrase “‘reasonable possibility’” appears only in the court’s
recitation of the defendant’s own argument, which the court
rejected (id. at p. 1032) and, ultimately, the court concluded,
pursuant to Strong, the record “conclusively establishe[d]”
Rushing’s ineligibility for relief (id. at pp. 1034–1035). In People
v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389 (Allen), the court concluded
the conspiracy instructions required jurors to find defendant
harbored the intent to kill as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 396.)
Then, while addressing defendant’s other arguments, the court
cited People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941 (Estrada) in
finding, “[i]t was also not reasonably likely that jurors imputed
14
malice to Allen” because there was “nothing in the evidence or
jury instructions that would have suggested such a theory.”
(Allen, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 397, citing Estrada, supra, at
pp. 948−949.) There was no instructional ambiguity to settle and
Allen’s use of the “reasonably likely” language to reject the
defendant’s unsupported theory is distinct from the question we
address today.
Nor does Williams support the People’s position. In
Williams, there was no instructional ambiguity or reference to
Boyde and the reasonable likelihood principle it propounded.
Instead, in Williams, the court discussed the general principle of
appellate review a reviewing court “‘must consider the
instructions together as a whole, to determine whether it is
reasonably likely a jury would interpret an instruction in a
particular way, because we presume jurors understand and
correlate all of the instructions’ [citation] and the jurors are
‘presumed to have followed the court’s instructions.’” (Williams,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1255–1256, italics added, citing
People v. Burton (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 917, 925 & People v.
Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.) After the court considered
the unambiguous jury instructions and the jury’s findings, it
concluded “the record of conviction conclusively demonstrates the
jury found he had acted with the requisite intent.” (Williams, at
p. 1257, italics added.) This is Curiel’s standard, not Boyde’s.
The People do not cite People v. Ervin (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 90, but it is worth a brief discussion. Decided before
Strong and Curiel set forth the standard to be used to determine
whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing, Ervin
applied a reasonable likelihood analysis to ambiguous jury
instructions and found the ambiguity there sufficiently favored
15
the defendant, such that reversal was in order. (Ervin, at
pp. 107–109, 111.) As applied by the court in Ervin, any
reasonably likely ambiguity would be resolved in defendant’s
favor and would be sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing.
This is an outcome fully consistent with Strong and Curiel.
Estrada, on which Rushing and Allen relied, also did not
employ the Boyde standard. Instead, it quoted reasonable
likelihood language from People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600
and People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, both of
which were direct appeals dealing with the same instructional
issues presented in Estrada. The Estrada court simply restated
the “determinative” holdings of those cases where, on direct
appeal, each found “there was no reasonable likelihood the jury
misunderstood” the instructional language. (Estrada, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 947−948.) At no point did the Estrada
court announce it as the proper standard to be used when
evaluating an instructional ambiguity for purposes of section
1172.6 prima facie determinations. Furthermore, Estrada, along
with Williams, was decided before our Supreme Court’s decision
in Curiel, which made clear the prima facie inquiry asks whether
the instructions “foreclose th[e] possibility [of an invalid theory]
as a matter of law,” not whether it was reasonably likely the jury
misapplied them. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470; see also
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) Thus, as explained, none of
the authority cited by the People actually confronts or resolves
the choice between these two standards (see Ginns v. Savage
(1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [“an opinion is not authority for a
proposition not therein considered”]), and each reaches its result
through instructional analysis consistent with Curiel and Strong.
16
Based on the foregoing, we conclude a section 1172.6
petition may be denied at the prima facie stage only where the
jury instructions, considered as a whole and together with the
rest of the record of conviction, conclusively and unambiguously
establish the defendant is ineligible for relief; that is, where the
instructions conclusively foreclose the possibility that the jury
convicted the defendant on a theory under which malice was
imputed to him based solely on his participation in the crime.
(See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470; Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 708; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972; see also Lopez,
supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 658.)
VI. Defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law
Defendant characterizes Woodson as having found him
ineligible “largely on th[e] basis” ultimately disapproved of in
Lopez. Not so. Woodson concluded first that Langi and
Maldonado were distinguishable because the instructions given
at defendant’s trial “either clarified or avoided the ambiguity of
the required mental state for aiding and abetting.” (Woodson,
supra, B334504.) Only after reaching that conclusion did we rely
additionally on the forfeiture principle disapproved of in Lopez.
Because our first ground was not disapproved in Lopez, it
remains undisturbed. As noted, ante, however, we do not rely on
the target-offense rationale Woodson used to reach our
conclusion. After reconsideration, we nonetheless reach the same
result.
As explained in part II of the Discussion, ante, the relevant
inquiry for a direct aider and abettor of implied malice murder
does not turn on the “target offense.” With this in mind, we agree
with the People that Langi and Maldonado are distinguishable.
17
In Langi, the victim died after a punch caused him to fall
and hit his head. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 975–977.)
“[W]hile the perpetrator must have deliberately performed the
fatal act ‘with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious
disregard for, human life’ (CALJIC No. 8.31), his purpose may
have been only to strike or to injure, or conceivably only to
embarrass, the victim.” (Id. at p. 982.) Accordingly, “under the
instructions that were given, the jury was entitled to conclude
that, to be guilty as an aider and abettor of second degree
murder, [Langi] need only have intended to encourage the
perpetrator’s intentional act—in this case, punching [the
victim]—whether or not [he] intended to aid or encourage [the
victim’s] killing, and whether or not he personally knew of and
disregarded the risk of such a killing.” (Ibid.)
In Maldonado, the jury was given the same instructions
without tailoring them to the specifics of the charged offense.
Specifically, in a case involving aiding and abetting lying in wait
murder, the court found the “lying in wait instruction did not
instruct the jury that the perpetrator needed to intend to cause
death. While the perpetrator must have concealed his purpose
from the victim, waited and watched for an opportunity to act,
intentionally made a surprise attack from a position of
advantage, and have lain in wait for a substantial enough
duration to show a state of mind equivalent to deliberation or
premeditation, the jury may have found the perpetrator’s purpose
was only to injure or intimidate the victim in a surprise attack.”
(Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1266.)
Here, the required instructions were supplied. CALJIC
No. 3.00, as given to defendant’s jury, expressly instructed:
“When the crime charged is murder, the aider and abettor’s guilt
18
is determined by the combined acts of all the participants as well
as that person’s own mental state. If the aider and abettor’s
mental state is more culpable than that of the actual perpetrator,
that person’s guilt may be greater than that of the actual
perpetrator. Similarly, that aider and abettor’s guilt may be less
than the perpetrator’s if the aider and abettor has a less culpable
mental state.” (Italics added.) Notably, the version of CALJIC
No. 3.00 given to Langi’s jury lacked this language and
instructed, “‘[e]ach principal [in a crime], regardless of the extent
or manner of participation[,] is equally guilty.’” (Langi, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at p. 981, fn. 8, italics added.) The “‘own mental
state’” language, used at defendant’s trial, was added to CALJIC
No. 3.00 three years after Langi’s trial. (Langi, at p. 983, fn. 13,
italics omitted.)
CALJIC No. 3.00’s “own mental state” language is not a
meaningless clarification. It tracks the Supreme Court’s own
articulation of the required mens rea for an aider and abettor as
explained in People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111 (McCoy).
There, the court explained that “when a person, with the mental
state necessary for an aider and abettor, helps or induces another
to kill, that person’s guilt is determined by the combined acts of
all the participants as well as that person’s own mens rea.” (Id.
at p. 1122.) In Curiel, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Senate
Bill No. 1437 “did not entail dispensing with the traditional mens
rea required for aiding and abetting murder” articulated in
McCoy. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 469.) As noted, the
version of CALJIC No. 3.00 given to defendant’s jury
incorporated this rule. Thus, unlike Langi’s “equally guilty”
instruction, the instruction used here directed the jury to
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determine each participant’s culpability independently, based on
that person’s “own mental state.”
Maldonado is even more problematic in this regard. It
appears no comparable instruction was given at all. The
instructions there consisted of CALCRIM No. 520, defining
malice; CALCRIM No. 521, a lying-in-wait murder instruction
that did not require the perpetrator to have intended to cause
death; and CALCRIM No. 401, the aiding and abetting language,
which conditions liability on the defendant’s knowledge of the
perpetrator’s “unlawful purpose” and intent to aid, encourage, or
facilitate “the crime,” without requiring a finding the defendant
knew the act was dangerous to human life and personally acted
with conscious disregard for that danger. This is the defect
identified in Reyes and Powell. (Maldonado, supra, at pp. 1264–
1266; see Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991; Powell, supra, 63
Cal.App.5th at pp. 711−714.) Nothing in Maldonado’s
instructional package directed the jury to assess the aider and
abettor’s culpability independent of the perpetrator’s, as CALJIC
No. 3.00 does here.
CALJIC No. 3.01, as given to defendant’s jury, reinforced
this individualized approach by further instructing that “[m]ere
presence” or “[m]ere knowledge,” without more, does not
constitute aiding and abetting. While these instructions alone do
not resolve the issues identified in Langi and Maldonado, they
add further confidence the instructions as a whole directed the
jury to assess defendant’s own conduct and knowledge in
assessing his liability as an aider and abettor, rather than
treating his presence or knowledge as sufficient for liability.
We note, CALJIC No. 8.31, like the analogous instruction
given in Langi, does not specify whose knowledge and conscious
20
disregard must be shown. Instead, it refers only to “the act,”
without naming either the perpetrator or the aider and abettor.
Standing alone, this instruction presents the same ambiguity
identified in Langi. However, CALJIC No. 3.00’s express
direction “the aider and abettor’s guilt is determined by … that
person’s own mental state” resolves any ambiguity by supplying
the object CALJIC No. 8.31 does not.
Reading CALJIC Nos. 3.00, 3.01, 8.10, 8.11, and 8.31
together, the jury had to find defendant personally knew the
perpetrator’s act was dangerous to human life and personally
acted with conscious disregard for that danger. Defendant’s jury
rejected the first degree murder theory and, instead, convicted
him of second degree murder. This is consistent with the
individualized evaluation CALJIC No. 3.00 required.
Applying the standard set forth in part V, ante, we find the
instructions as given conclusively foreclose the possibility the
jury convicted defendant by imputing malice to him based solely
on his participation in the crime. As a result, we find “‘the record
of conviction ‘establish[es] conclusively that the defendant is
ineligible for relief.’” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470, quoting
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708; accord Lopez, supra, 19
Cal.5th at p. 658; Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 724.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s section 1172.6
petition for resentencing is affirmed.
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CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.
22