Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Hernandez CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR THE PEOPLE, B346692 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24CMCF01842) v. EDGAR HERNANDEZ, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Teresa P. Magno, Judge. Affirmed. Micah R. Reyner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Defendant Edgar Hernandez shot and killed his neighbor in their homeless encampment. A jury convicted defendant of second degree murder and possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction. He raises three issues on appeal. First, defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s alleged misstatement of law in rebuttal argument. Second, he asserts there was insufficient evidence to support possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction. He also contends the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on that charge. We are not persuaded by defendant’s contentions and affirm the judgment. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In June 2023, defendant and his girlfriend, Vivian Jauregui, lived in a homeless encampment. Defendant wrote his nickname “Goofy” on his property, including the makeshift structure he lived in. Michael Munguia, Kristen Davis, Otoniel (aka “Tony”) Gomez also lived in the encampment. One evening, while inside her shelter with Juaregui, Sandy Mendoza, and another individual, Davis heard defendant and Gomez arguing. Davis then heard “like three” gunshots in rapid succession. Mendoza went outside, came back crying, and said, “Oh my god. Goofy just shot Tony.” When Davis looked outside, she saw Gomez lying on the ground and defendant striking Gomez on the head with the handle of a gun. As Davis gathered her belongings to leave the encampment, defendant ran by and Jauregui followed suit. Law enforcement found Gomez’s body near defendant’s structure. An expended cartridge casing was found a few feet from Gomez’s body, another was found just outside the structure, and a third was found inside. A live .22-caliber bullet was also recovered from the structure. Munguia testified he had previously seen defendant with a .22-caliber gun. No weapons were 2 found on Gomez’s body. Gomez had sustained nine gunshot wounds: three to the front torso and six to the back of his body. Several of the gunshot wounds were individually fatal. Gomez died within minutes of being shot. PROCEUDRAL HISTORY A jury convicted defendant of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1)1 and possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction (§ 29900, subd. (a)(1); count 2). As to the murder, the jury found true the firearm allegation (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found the prior conviction allegations, including those in count 2 (assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury; § 245, subd. (a)(4)), true beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also found multiple factors in aggravation true beyond a reasonable doubt. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.421(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5).) Defendant was sentenced to a total of 40 years to life in state prison. Defendant timely appealed. DISCUSSION I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s alleged misstatement of the law in rebuttal argument. Specifically, defendant asserts that the prosecutor suggested that the jury could not consider the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter until it reached a verdict on the greater offense of murder. A. Additional Background At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury: “You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you disagree with it. If you 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 believe that the attorneys’ arguments or comments on the law conflict with my instructions, you must follow my instructions.” The trial court also instructed the jury on murder and the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The court further instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 640, which provided, in part: “You’ll be given verdict forms for guilty and not guilty of first-degree murder[,] second-degree murder and voluntar[]y manslaughter. [¶] You may consider these different kinds of homicide in whatever order you wish but I can accept a verdict of guilty or not guilty of second-degree murder only if all of you have found the defendant not guilty of first-degree murder, and I can accept a verdict of guilty or not guilty of voluntary manslaughter only if all of you have found . . . the defendant not guilty of both first-and second-degree murder.” (Italics added.) Later, in rebuttal to the defense closing argument, the prosecutor asserted: “You’re going to get a verdict form – one verdict form for murder. That verdict form will say ‘guilty or not guilty of murder.’ [¶] It will have below it ‘what degree do you find? First or second.’ [¶] You’ll go through it by guilty of murder and then move on to first or second degree. [¶] . . . If you don’t find that it’s willful, deliberate and premediated in this case, it is still murder . . . .You’ll still find [defendant] guilty of murder, which would be of the second degree. Okay? [¶] You don’t get to move on to the voluntary manslaughter charge until – if you find the defendant not guilty of murder and that it was neither first or second degree. Okay? That’s when you get to move on to voluntary manslaughter.” Defendant’s counsel did not object. B. Analysis “Advocates are given significant leeway in discussing the legal and factual merits of a case during argument. [Citation.] However, ‘it is improper for the prosecutor to misstate the law generally.’ ” (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 666 (Centeno).) It is a well-established principle of law that a trial court may not instruct a jury to not deliberate on or consider a lesser included offense until unanimously agreeing to acquit on 4 the greater offense. (People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 335 (Kurtzman).) Here, the prosecutor’s argument in rebuttal—that the jury cannot “move on to the voluntary manslaughter charge” unless it found defendant not guilty of murder—erroneously suggested to the jury that it could not consider the lesser included offense until it had reached a verdict on the greater offense. Therefore, we agree with defendant that the prosecutor misstated the law. As defendant acknowledges, his trial counsel did not object to this argument below. Therefore, defendant forfeited the argument on appeal. (See People v. Williams (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1166, 1188 [“defendant forfeits prosecutorial misconduct claims by failing to object and request an admonition”]; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 577 [same]; People v. O'Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 1010.) However, in an attempt to avoid forfeiture, defendant argues that the failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 674 [“ ‘[a] defendant whose counsel did not object at trial to alleged prosecutorial misconduct can argue on appeal that counsel’s inaction violated the defendant’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel’ ”]; People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 347 [same].) We apply the principles governing claims of ineffective assistance. That is, defendant must establish both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that he suffered prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, 691–692 (Strickland).) To demonstrate deficient performance, a defendant must show that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” (Id. at p. 688.) As for prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Id. at p. 694.) Even assuming counsel lacked a reasonable basis for not objecting, defendant cannot demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability he would have received a more favorable verdict absent error. The jury here was instructed, in line with Kurtzman, that it was up to them to decide the order in which to consider each homicide. (CALCRIM No. 640.) And the jury was 5 further instructed that it must follow the law as instructed by the court, and if it found conflicts between the attorneys’ arguments and the court’s instructions, the instructions would control. On appeal, defendant “acknowledges the jury was properly instructed on the correct order to dispose of the murder and manslaughter charges on the verdict forms, and that there is a general presumption that the jury follows the court’s instructions.” “[A]rguments of counsel ‘generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from the court. The former are usually billed in advance to the jury as matters of argument, not evidence, [citation], and are likely viewed as the statements of advocates; the latter, we have often recognized, are viewed as definitive and binding statements of the law.’ ” (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 676.) Furthermore, “ ‘[w]hen argument runs counter to instructions given a jury, we will ordinarily conclude that the jury followed the latter and disregarded the former, for “[w]e presume that jurors treat the court’s instructions as a statement of the law by a judge, and the prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to persuade.” [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid.) Since the jury here was correctly instructed with CALCRIM No. 640, we must “presume that the jury understood and followed the trial court’s instructions” during its deliberations and decided for itself the order in which to consider the lesser and greater offenses. (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 202; see also People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 223 [holding that similar language in CALCRIM No. 3517 mitigated failure to object to prosecutor’s misstatement under Kurtzman, given presumption that the jury followed the court’s instructions].) Accordingly, defendant has not met his burden to demonstrate that absent error, it is reasonably probable that he would have received a more favorable outcome. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) II. Possession of a Firearm with Prior Conviction Defendant contends substantial evidence did not support the prior conviction element in count 2 because his stipulation to the prior conviction did not include an admission that it was for a violent offense as required by 6 section 29900.2 In addition, defendant argues the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on this element. A. Additional Background Count 2 of the amended information charged defendant with possession of a firearm by a felon with a prior conviction for a violent felony (§2900, subd. (a)(1)). The information alleged defendant was convicted in 2017 of two counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) in Los Angeles County Superior Court case number BA449373. There is no dispute that defendant’s prior conviction was a listed violent offense under section 29900. Before jury selection, the trial court noted that as to count 2, defense counsel likely would not want to disclose the substance of his prior convictions. The court stated that the “case law says it’s the nature of the charges that is prejudicial.” The court offered to “sanitize” the nature of the charge by simply stating the charge was for possession of a firearm with a prior conviction. The court further stated that it found “that saying ‘prior violent conviction’ [was] prejudicial.” Defense counsel agreed and was amenable to the court describing the charge as “possession of [a] firearm with a prior conviction.” Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s suggestion that the court should instruct the jury that defendant has a prior felony conviction. Defense counsel explained that “it could be unduly prejudicial to add the term ‘felony,’ just like it would be unduly prejudicial to add the term ‘violent.’” Therefore, defense counsel requested that the court “sanitize” count 2 so “that the jury knows there’s a prior conviction” because it is an element of the offense. 2 Section 29900, subdivision (a)(1) provides that, “[n]otwithstanding subdivision (a) of Section 29800 [(possession of a firearm by a felon)], any person who has been previously convicted of any of the offenses listed in Section 29905 and who owns or has in possession or under custody or control any firearm is guilty of a felony.” Section 29905 lists various “violent offenses,” including assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (§ 29905, subd. (a)(24).) 7 The trial court then granted defense counsel’s request to bifurcate the prior conviction allegations. The court indicated that it would inform the jury that as to count 2, defendant was charged with possession of a firearm with a prior conviction, and it would not specify that the conviction had to be a “violent” offense. During a discussion about jury instructions, the trial court told defense counsel that it would give CALCRIM No. 2511 based on their discussion about stipulating to a prior conviction. The court reiterated that such a stipulation would sanitize the substance of the prior conviction from the jury. Defense counsel confirmed that if defendant did not stipulate, the court would allow the prosecution to reopen its case and present evidence of his prior conviction by “present[ing] the jury with his rap sheet.” Counsel told the court that he “just wanted to make the record for appellate reasons,” and “this is why we’re stipulating.” After conferring with defendant, defense counsel said, “in light of the discussion we just had, I reviewed it with [defendant] and he stipulates.” The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 2511, which was titled “Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction – Stipulation to Conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900).” The instruction stated that defendant was charged “with unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 29900(a)(1).” To find defendant guilty of the charged crime, the People had to prove: (1) defendant possessed a firearm; (2) defendant knew that he possessed the firearm; and (3) defendant had previously been convicted of a felony. The instruction notified the jury that defendant “and the People have stipulated, or agreed, that [defendant] was previously convicted of a felony. This stipulation means that you must accept this fact as proved. [¶] Do not consider this fact for any other purpose. Do not speculate about or discuss the nature of the conviction.” During a break between closing arguments and out of the presence of the jury, the court addressed the verdict forms. The court noted that, as to count 2, the verdict form listed “the crime of possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction.” The court indicated its intent to strike the word “violent” and replace it with “felony conviction,” which “would be consistent 8 with the corresponding jury instruction.” There was no objection by defense counsel. B. Substantial Evidence When a prior conviction is a substantive element of a current charge, trial courts have two options: either the prosecution proves each element of the offense to the jury; or the defendant stipulates to the conviction and the court “sanitizes” the prior by telling the jury that the defendant had a prior conviction, without specifying the nature of the offense committed. (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 262, citing People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170.) Here, defendant contends he did not stipulate that his prior conviction was for a violent offense as defined in section 29900. His contention is belied by the record. At no point did defense counsel dispute the offense was for a violent felony or attempt to limit the scope of the stipulation in any way. Upon reviewing the colloquy with the court, we find it is readily apparent that defendant would and did stipulate that he had a prior conviction for a violent offense under section 29900. After noting the prejudicial nature of instructing the jury that defendant had a prior violent conviction, the court sanitized the jury instruction for defendant’s benefit and at defense counsel’s request. Thus, by stipulation, this element of section 29900 was taken out of the jury’s hands and set to be later adjudicated by the court. (People v. Hopkins (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1699, 1704 [“[i]f a defendant is prepared to stipulate to the fact of his conviction . . . . the nature of the conviction is irrelevant” to the questions the trier of fact must determine].) Defendant cannot have it both ways. By stipulating to the prior conviction element below, he is now foreclosed from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. At the bifurcated trial, the court found true the prior convictions as to count 2. Defendant does not dispute assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury qualifies as a violent offense in section 29900 as a matter of law. (See § 29905, subd. (a)(24).) Nor does defendant challenge the sufficiency of the evidence before the trial court in the bifurcated proceeding for the qualifying violent offense. 9 Therefore, substantial evidence supports possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction. C. Jury Instruction Next, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct that the prior conviction was for a violent offense. However, defendant requested the instruction given by the court. He therefore invited the error of which he now complains. “The doctrine of invited error is designed to prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on appeal because of an error made by the trial court at his behest.” (People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 330.) “[This] doctrine ... bars a defendant from challenging an instruction given by the trial court when the defendant has made a conscious and deliberate tactical choice to request the instruction.” (People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 723.) Defendant made a deliberate, tactical choice not to contest the prior conviction element of the charged offense in order to keep the jury from hearing damaging evidence. (See People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 261.) The requested instruction was consistent with this strategy. Indeed, defendant, having chosen a course of action designed to keep from the jury evidence regarding the nature of his prior conviction, could not legitimately have taken any other position than to request, or at least accept, the instruction he now challenges. Therefore, the doctrine of invited error precludes a successful challenge to that instruction on appeal. 10 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS ZUKIN, P. J. We concur: MORI, J. TAMZARIAN, J. 11