In re J.C. CA4/2
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketE087601
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Filed 11/16/26 In re J.C. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re J.C., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
E087601
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super.Ct.No. INJ1300170)
v.
OPINION
J.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark A. Mandio, Judge.
Affirmed.
Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Maxine Hart and Daniel J.
Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
In 2017, the juvenile court transferred defendant minor J.C. from juvenile court to
a court of criminal jurisdiction, where a jury convicted him of first degree felony murder
and attempted robbery. In 2023, our sister appellate court conditionally reversed that
judgment and remanded for a new transfer hearing based on a change in the law. The
trial court again found transferring J.C. to a court of criminal jurisdiction was appropriate.
J.C. argues the transfer order is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND1
In May 2013 the district attorney for Riverside County filed a juvenile wardship
petition against J.C. alleging he shoplifted (Pen. Code § 490.5, a misdemeanor),
brandished a weapon other than a gun (Pen. Code § 417, subd. (a)(1), a misdemeanor)
and brought a knife to school (Pen. Code § 626.10, subd. (a), a misdemeanor). J.C.
admitted to the latter two allegations and was placed on probation under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 725.2
In December 2013 probation alleged J.C. violated probation by failing to enroll in
substance abuse counseling and anger management. It further alleged J.C. tested positive
1 The facts of the underlying offense are taken from the juvenile court’s transfer
order, which itself relied on “a review of the court filings as well as the Remittitur filed
March 1, 2023, the prosecutor’s Supplemental Sentencing brief filed on September 8,
2020 in case INF1500163, the Probation Officer’s Sentencing Recommendation filed on
October 23, 2020 in case INF1500163.” “The Court also reviewed the probation
officer’s reports filed March 4, 2024 and June 5, 2024, the People’s brief filed
January 10, 2025 and the defense brief opposing transfer filed January 7, 2025.”
2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
for marijuana and admitted to smoking marijuana, among other violations. J.C admitted
the violations and was declared a ward of the court.
Between March 2014 and June 2014, J.C. admitted to five more offenses across
four juvenile wardship petitions. In order, J.C. admitted to violating Vehicle Code
section 10851 (taking or driving a car without consent, a felony) and Vehicle Code
section 20002, subdivision (a) (hit and run, a misdemeanor), Penal Code section 602,
subdivision (m) (trespassing, a misdemeanor)., Penal Code section 836.6, subdivision (b)
(escape after arrest, a misdemeanor) and Penal Code section 242 (battery, a
misdemeanor).3
In 2015, J.C. visited a friend’s house and told the friend he and another friend
(Kenneth) had a plan to “try to sell two bags halfway full of baking soda or another white
substance as cocaine for $600 or $700. If they could not sell the fake cocaine, they
would just take the money.” Kenneth then showed the friend “a silver 38 caliber
revolver.” J.C. said the plan was Kenneth’s idea.
Later that night, J.C. and the victim—who was looking to buy an ounce of
cocaine—agreed on a time and place, and the victim arrived in a car with two others.
J.C. approached the car on his bicycle and handed the victim two baggies of white
powder. After inspecting them, the victim indicated to J.C. that he was not interested,
and he and J.C. said goodbye.
3 The record does not establish when the misdemeanor battery allegation was
made, though the parties state and we assume that at some point one of the petitions—
possibly one that originally alleged J.C. committed attempted robbery—was amended to
add the allegation.
3
J.C. initially rode away on his bike, then turned around and approached the
victim’s car on foot. The car’s windows were rolled down. J.C. pulled a gun from his
pocket as he approached, pointed it at the victim, and told the victim to “[g]ive me all
your money.” J.C.’s “hand was shaking.” “When [J.C.] touched [the victim’s] head and
neck with the gun, [the victim] pushed the gun away.” J.C. then fired a shot into the
victim’s neck.
“According to the prosecutor’s Supplemental Sentencing brief[, a]fter the murder,
[J.C.] . . . helped destroy evidence connecting him to the crime.” A friend told
investigators that other people took the gun, removed the bullet casings, then destroyed
and buried the casings. J.C. took a shower, got rid of his clothing, and “used bleach to
wash the blood and gunshot residue from,” his body. Another person “drilled out the
barrel and discarded the gun in a storm drain.” J.C. then lay down in the backseat of
another friend’s car while they drove him to Hemet. J.C. stayed in Hemet at his aunt’s
house until investigating officers found him.
Though initially charged in adult criminal court, following passage of
Proposition 57, J.C. was remanded to juvenile court in 2017. The prosecution then filed
two juvenile wardship petitions, collectively alleging J.C violated Penal Code
section 187, subdivision (a) (murder), Penal Code sections 664/211 (attempted robbery),
Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4) (felony assault by means likely to produce
great bodily injury), Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d) (an enhancement for
personal and intentional discharge of a firearm proximately causing death) and Penal
4
Code section 190.2 (murder committed during the commission of an attempted robbery).
In June 2017 the probation department prepared a report recommending the juvenile
court transfer J.C. back to a court of criminal jurisdiction, and in August 2017 the
juvenile court followed that recommendation.
After the juvenile court transferred J.C. to criminal court, a jury convicted him of
first degree felony murder and attempted robbery, and it found true that he personally
discharged a weapon causing death in relation to both counts. (People v. Wilson (Mar. 1,
2023, B322501) [nonpub. opn.] (Wilson); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(b)(2).) J.C.
appealed. (Id. at p. *6.)
In January 2023, while J.C.’s appeal was pending, Assembly Bill No. 2361 went
into effect, changing the standard of proof required to transfer a juvenile to a court of
criminal jurisdiction to “clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Stats 2022, ch. 330,
§ 1, approved Sept. 15, 2022, eff. Jan. 1, 2023; see Wilson, supra, B322501.) Our
colleagues in the Second District found this change retroactively applied to J.C. (Wilson,
supra, B322501.) Accordingly, they conditionally reversed J.C.’s judgment and
remanded the matter to the juvenile court so it could conduct a new transfer hearing.
(Ibid.)
The juvenile court held the new transfer hearing in November 2025. Following
that hearing, the juvenile court ordered J.C. to be transferred to a court of criminal
jurisdiction once again. The court explained its reasoning in a 16-page statement of
5
decision. The court concluded on “the totality of the record, including [J.C.]’ s previous
delinquent behavior, the failure of previous efforts to rehabilitate [J.C.], and the
extremely low probability [J.C.] could be rehabilitated in a secure setting within the
2 years permitted by law,” transfer to a criminal court was warranted.
DISCUSSION
J.C. argues the juvenile court erred in analyzing his amenability to rehabilitation,
and therefore whether transfer was appropriate. We disagree.
Section 707 governs the transfer of minors from juvenile court to criminal court.
Effective January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill No. 2361 amended section 707 to, in part,
increase the standard that the prosecution must meet to support a transfer. Section 707
now requires that “[i]n order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of
criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor
is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
(Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1.) Assembly Bill No. 2361 also requires that a juvenile court’s
on-the-record explanation for any decision to transfer “include the reasons supporting the
court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Ibid.)
Both before and after Assembly Bill 2361, section 707 required juvenile courts to
consider five statutory factors. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) These factors are: (1) the minor’s
degree of criminal sophistication, (2) whether the minor can be rehabilitated before the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction expires, (3) the minor’s prior delinquent history, (4) whether
6
previous rehabilitation efforts were successful, and (5) the circumstances and gravity of
the present offense. (§ 707, subds. (a)(3)(A)-(E).) Though Assembly Bill No. 2361 did
not change the factors courts must consider, it clarified that “[t]he analysis of the five
criteria set forth in the statute should be focused through the lens of amenability to
rehabilitation.” (In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1288.)
“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion.
[Citation.] ‘The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it
calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial
court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.’ [Citation.] The juvenile court’s findings with respect to each of
section 707’s five criteria are findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence.
[Citation.] In conducting substantial evidence review, we draw all reasonable inferences
in support of the court’s findings.” (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165
(Miguel R.).)
We conclude there was ample evidence to support the juvenile court’s
determinations on each of the five criteria, and therefore substantial evidence to support
its overall determination that J.C. was not amenable to rehabilitation.
1. Criminal Sophistication
First, we agree with the juvenile court that J.C.’s offenses showed a level of
criminal sophistication. The record demonstrates J.C. planned to pass off fake drugs as
7
real drugs, and planned the robbery as a contingency plan if that did not work. He
obtained a firearm beforehand, bragged about his plan to a friend, and then carried out the
plan. Afterwards he and others engaged in a sophisticated attempt to cover up J.C’s
involvement, including trying to render the firearm and ammunition untraceable, using
bleach to destroy evidence, and smuggling J.C. out of the area.
J.C. argues that this determination does not reflect all relevant factors, including
J.C.’s “maturity, intellectual capacity . . . the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on
the minor’s actions . . . the effect of the minor’s family and community environment,”
and “the existence of childhood trauma.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) J.C. argues the
evidence shows he was a traumatized, impulsive, possibly neurologically impaired
teenager being pressured into a violent plan by friends, that he shot the victim
accidentally, and that the court erred by giving insufficient weight to factors that could
weigh in favor of this conclusion.
J.C. does not argue the juvenile court failed to consider these mitigating
circumstances. Indeed, the court agreed that J.C. “suffered trauma from his family, and
his emotional and mental health at the time of the robbery were impaired.” It also noted
J.C. was born prematurely, suffered from seizures, had ADHD, grew up with an alcoholic
and abusive father who eventually abandoned the family, had PTSD, and that J.C.’s
mother suffered from “debilitating Multiple Sclerosis,” which made her already lax
supervision of him worse.
8
Because the court considered these mitigating circumstances, J.C.’s only argument
on appeal is that it did not find them dispositive. However, as discussed above, when
reviewing the juvenile court’s findings on the five factors “we draw all reasonable
inferences in support of the court’s findings.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 165.) The juvenile court’s weighing of the evidence was well within the bounds of
reason, even if the evidence could support a different finding. There was ample evidence
of sophistication in the planning, execution, and attempted cover-up of the offense, and
the juvenile court reasonably concluded that “none of the above considerations appear to
impact [J.C.’s] criminal sophistication,” and ultimately “the evidence does support a
finding that [J.C.] knew what he was doing, participated willingly, and knowingly
planned and executed a brutal crime.” Because that conclusion was supported by
substantial evidence, we cannot say the court erred in this finding.
2. Prior Delinquent History
We also conclude there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s
finding that J.C.’s prior delinquent history weighed in favor of transfer. As the juvenile
court acknowledged, J.C. had a brief but busy and escalating history of delinquency. In
less than two years from 2013 to 2015, J.C. accrued five different petitions alleging he
had violated the law, and he admitted to seven different offenses. Moreover, the offenses
were escalating in severity, starting with shoplifting and brandishing a weapon, then
stealing a car and engaging in a hit and run, attempted robbery, and battery. As the
juvenile court said, J.C.’s “documented delinquent history demonstrates that his behavior
9
was marked by a series of frequent but moderately serious to low-level crimes.” Even
still, the juvenile court also acknowledged that his “childhood trauma and family
environment were serious contributing factors to his delinquency,” deferred concluding
that this factor weighed in favor of transfer on its own, and only found that it did in
context with every other factor. Thus, once again the juvenile court considered
mitigating circumstances when making its findings on this factor, and reasonably
concluded that J.C.’s previous delinquency history outweighed those circumstances. It is
not our role to reweigh the mitigating factors J.C. emphasizes.
3. Previous Rehabilitation Attempts
We also conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
previous attempts to rehabilitate J.C. failed. J.C. failed to participate in any programs
while under probation, and even after being made a ward “continued to use drugs and not
participate in substance abuse counseling.” There is no history of previous rehabilitation
efforts, because J.C. avoided using those offered to him.
J.C. argues he was not offered adequate services, and that the juvenile court did
not properly consider “the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the
minor’s needs” as required by section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(D). J.C points out that
before the original transfer hearing “probation conceded that this factor weighs in favor
of appellant because probation failed to exhaust available services.” J.C. also notes that
both the juvenile court and probation suggested more intensive services may have
benefited J.C., but were not provided.
10
However, as the juvenile court explained, many of the programs J.C. might have
benefited from—such as Pathways for Success—are only available after a juvenile has
committed a very serious offense. Prior to the murder, all of J.C.’s admitted offenses
save one were for misdemeanors, and the remaining one was for vehicle theft. The court
also explained that less restrictive services—such as Multi-Dimensional Family Therapy
(“MDFT”) or Wrap Around services—require parental participation, and “the
descriptions of his mother’s attitudes and behavior and her desire and ability to supervise
[J.C.] . . . indicate that (MDFT) and Wrap Around services were unlikely to be
successful.” J.C. has not disputed this analysis.
J.C. also claims transportation issues prevented him from attending the services
that were offered. But at the transfer hearing a probation officer testified that probation
can offer transportation, and that the substance abuse counseling service probation
referred J.C to also offered transportation.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
previous rehabilitation efforts were adequate but had failed. However, even if we agreed
with J.C that the services provided were not adequate, that would not be fatal to the
juvenile court’s final decision to transfer jurisdiction. “[A] minor’s amenability to
rehabilitation is the central and ‘dispositive’ question in proceedings under section 707
[citation] and the juvenile court’s analysis of the section 707 criteria must be ‘focused
through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation.’ ” (In re O.F. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th
133, 162.) Thus, even if we concluded the juvenile court’s finding on this criterion was
11
not supported by substantial evidence, that does not mean its ultimate finding that J.C.
was not amenable to rehabilitation was erroneous.
4. Likelihood of Rehabilitation
Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court’s determination that J.C.
could not be rehabilitated before it lost jurisdiction over him. According to probation,
J.C. is only eligible for Riverside County’s secure youth treatment facility, Pathways to
Success. Under section 875 subdivision (c)(1)(A) “if the ward has been committed to a
secure youth treatment facility based on adjudication for an offense or offenses for which
the ward, if convicted in adult criminal court, would face an aggregate sentence of seven
or more years, the ward shall not be held in secure confinement beyond 25 years of age,
or two years from the date of commitment, whichever occurs later.” Thus, if the juvenile
court declined to transfer J.C., it would retain jurisdiction for two years at most.
The minimum term for a murderer in the Pathways to Success program, however,
is four to seven years. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.806(d).) Even if the court found J.C.
qualified for the lowest term, he would still be unable to complete the program within
two years. Thus, the trial court was correct that there was not “sufficient time . . . to
provide [J.C.] with successful rehabilitative services.”
J.C. responds by arguing that two years of Pathways to Success would be
cumulative with the 11 years of custody he has already experienced, and therefore those
two years would be sufficient to rehabilitate him. However, the juvenile court considered
this argument, and reasonably rejected it. In particular, the court expressed concern that
12
J.C. continued to engage in violent behavior while confined, with the latest incident as
recent as 2022. Moreover, it’s undisputed that during his 11 years, J.C. has made
minimal progress in rehabilitating himself. He has completed an anger management
program and started working towards graduating high school, but as of the date of the
transfer hearing he had not actually graduated. We agree with the juvenile court that this
“is only scratching the surface of the rehabilitative work that is necessary.” With such
little progress in the previous 11 years, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude
two years in Pathways to Success would not be sufficient.
J.C. also argues the juvenile court could have committed him to an adult facility to
receive rehabilitative services there. The People object, arguing J.C. did not raise this
argument below, and introduces extra-record evidence to make the argument here. We
need not address these procedural objections, because the argument fails on the merits.
As the People correctly point out, J.C. has already spent years in adult custody with little
to show for it. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order even
considering this argument, because there is no reason to conclude that commitment to an
adult facility for another two years was likely to accomplish what the previous 11 had
not.
5. Gravity and Circumstances of the Offense
Finally, there is no question that J.C.’s offenses—including and especially
murder—were extraordinarily serious. As the juvenile court said “[J.C.] alone confronted
the victim . . . and [J.C.] alone shot the victim.” Those actions “left a grieving family
13
behind including [the victim’s] mother and siblings,” who “are still in visible pain from
the loss.” The gravity and circumstances of J.C.’s offenses weigh strongly in favor of
transfer.
Given that we hold substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings
that at least four of the five factors weighed in favor of transfer, we similarly conclude
that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s overall determination that J.C.
was not amenable to rehabilitation and that transfer was therefore appropriate.
Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order.
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
Acting P. J.
We concur:
MENETREZ
J.
LEE
J.
14