Full Opinion

Filed 11/16/26 In re J.C. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO In re J.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, E087601 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. INJ1300170) v. OPINION J.C., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark A. Mandio, Judge. Affirmed. Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Maxine Hart and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 1 In 2017, the juvenile court transferred defendant minor J.C. from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction, where a jury convicted him of first degree felony murder and attempted robbery. In 2023, our sister appellate court conditionally reversed that judgment and remanded for a new transfer hearing based on a change in the law. The trial court again found transferring J.C. to a court of criminal jurisdiction was appropriate. J.C. argues the transfer order is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm. BACKGROUND1 In May 2013 the district attorney for Riverside County filed a juvenile wardship petition against J.C. alleging he shoplifted (Pen. Code § 490.5, a misdemeanor), brandished a weapon other than a gun (Pen. Code § 417, subd. (a)(1), a misdemeanor) and brought a knife to school (Pen. Code § 626.10, subd. (a), a misdemeanor). J.C. admitted to the latter two allegations and was placed on probation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 725.2 In December 2013 probation alleged J.C. violated probation by failing to enroll in substance abuse counseling and anger management. It further alleged J.C. tested positive 1 The facts of the underlying offense are taken from the juvenile court’s transfer order, which itself relied on “a review of the court filings as well as the Remittitur filed March 1, 2023, the prosecutor’s Supplemental Sentencing brief filed on September 8, 2020 in case INF1500163, the Probation Officer’s Sentencing Recommendation filed on October 23, 2020 in case INF1500163.” “The Court also reviewed the probation officer’s reports filed March 4, 2024 and June 5, 2024, the People’s brief filed January 10, 2025 and the defense brief opposing transfer filed January 7, 2025.” 2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 for marijuana and admitted to smoking marijuana, among other violations. J.C admitted the violations and was declared a ward of the court. Between March 2014 and June 2014, J.C. admitted to five more offenses across four juvenile wardship petitions. In order, J.C. admitted to violating Vehicle Code section 10851 (taking or driving a car without consent, a felony) and Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a) (hit and run, a misdemeanor), Penal Code section 602, subdivision (m) (trespassing, a misdemeanor)., Penal Code section 836.6, subdivision (b) (escape after arrest, a misdemeanor) and Penal Code section 242 (battery, a misdemeanor).3 In 2015, J.C. visited a friend’s house and told the friend he and another friend (Kenneth) had a plan to “try to sell two bags halfway full of baking soda or another white substance as cocaine for $600 or $700. If they could not sell the fake cocaine, they would just take the money.” Kenneth then showed the friend “a silver 38 caliber revolver.” J.C. said the plan was Kenneth’s idea. Later that night, J.C. and the victim—who was looking to buy an ounce of cocaine—agreed on a time and place, and the victim arrived in a car with two others. J.C. approached the car on his bicycle and handed the victim two baggies of white powder. After inspecting them, the victim indicated to J.C. that he was not interested, and he and J.C. said goodbye. 3 The record does not establish when the misdemeanor battery allegation was made, though the parties state and we assume that at some point one of the petitions— possibly one that originally alleged J.C. committed attempted robbery—was amended to add the allegation. 3 J.C. initially rode away on his bike, then turned around and approached the victim’s car on foot. The car’s windows were rolled down. J.C. pulled a gun from his pocket as he approached, pointed it at the victim, and told the victim to “[g]ive me all your money.” J.C.’s “hand was shaking.” “When [J.C.] touched [the victim’s] head and neck with the gun, [the victim] pushed the gun away.” J.C. then fired a shot into the victim’s neck. “According to the prosecutor’s Supplemental Sentencing brief[, a]fter the murder, [J.C.] . . . helped destroy evidence connecting him to the crime.” A friend told investigators that other people took the gun, removed the bullet casings, then destroyed and buried the casings. J.C. took a shower, got rid of his clothing, and “used bleach to wash the blood and gunshot residue from,” his body. Another person “drilled out the barrel and discarded the gun in a storm drain.” J.C. then lay down in the backseat of another friend’s car while they drove him to Hemet. J.C. stayed in Hemet at his aunt’s house until investigating officers found him. Though initially charged in adult criminal court, following passage of Proposition 57, J.C. was remanded to juvenile court in 2017. The prosecution then filed two juvenile wardship petitions, collectively alleging J.C violated Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a) (murder), Penal Code sections 664/211 (attempted robbery), Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4) (felony assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury), Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d) (an enhancement for personal and intentional discharge of a firearm proximately causing death) and Penal 4 Code section 190.2 (murder committed during the commission of an attempted robbery). In June 2017 the probation department prepared a report recommending the juvenile court transfer J.C. back to a court of criminal jurisdiction, and in August 2017 the juvenile court followed that recommendation. After the juvenile court transferred J.C. to criminal court, a jury convicted him of first degree felony murder and attempted robbery, and it found true that he personally discharged a weapon causing death in relation to both counts. (People v. Wilson (Mar. 1, 2023, B322501) [nonpub. opn.] (Wilson); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(b)(2).) J.C. appealed. (Id. at p. *6.) In January 2023, while J.C.’s appeal was pending, Assembly Bill No. 2361 went into effect, changing the standard of proof required to transfer a juvenile to a court of criminal jurisdiction to “clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Stats 2022, ch. 330, § 1, approved Sept. 15, 2022, eff. Jan. 1, 2023; see Wilson, supra, B322501.) Our colleagues in the Second District found this change retroactively applied to J.C. (Wilson, supra, B322501.) Accordingly, they conditionally reversed J.C.’s judgment and remanded the matter to the juvenile court so it could conduct a new transfer hearing. (Ibid.) The juvenile court held the new transfer hearing in November 2025. Following that hearing, the juvenile court ordered J.C. to be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction once again. The court explained its reasoning in a 16-page statement of 5 decision. The court concluded on “the totality of the record, including [J.C.]’ s previous delinquent behavior, the failure of previous efforts to rehabilitate [J.C.], and the extremely low probability [J.C.] could be rehabilitated in a secure setting within the 2 years permitted by law,” transfer to a criminal court was warranted. DISCUSSION J.C. argues the juvenile court erred in analyzing his amenability to rehabilitation, and therefore whether transfer was appropriate. We disagree. Section 707 governs the transfer of minors from juvenile court to criminal court. Effective January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill No. 2361 amended section 707 to, in part, increase the standard that the prosecution must meet to support a transfer. Section 707 now requires that “[i]n order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1.) Assembly Bill No. 2361 also requires that a juvenile court’s on-the-record explanation for any decision to transfer “include the reasons supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Ibid.) Both before and after Assembly Bill 2361, section 707 required juvenile courts to consider five statutory factors. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) These factors are: (1) the minor’s degree of criminal sophistication, (2) whether the minor can be rehabilitated before the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expires, (3) the minor’s prior delinquent history, (4) whether 6 previous rehabilitation efforts were successful, and (5) the circumstances and gravity of the present offense. (§ 707, subds. (a)(3)(A)-(E).) Though Assembly Bill No. 2361 did not change the factors courts must consider, it clarified that “[t]he analysis of the five criteria set forth in the statute should be focused through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation.” (In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1288.) “We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ‘The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ [Citation.] The juvenile court’s findings with respect to each of section 707’s five criteria are findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.] In conducting substantial evidence review, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s findings.” (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165 (Miguel R.).) We conclude there was ample evidence to support the juvenile court’s determinations on each of the five criteria, and therefore substantial evidence to support its overall determination that J.C. was not amenable to rehabilitation. 1. Criminal Sophistication First, we agree with the juvenile court that J.C.’s offenses showed a level of criminal sophistication. The record demonstrates J.C. planned to pass off fake drugs as 7 real drugs, and planned the robbery as a contingency plan if that did not work. He obtained a firearm beforehand, bragged about his plan to a friend, and then carried out the plan. Afterwards he and others engaged in a sophisticated attempt to cover up J.C’s involvement, including trying to render the firearm and ammunition untraceable, using bleach to destroy evidence, and smuggling J.C. out of the area. J.C. argues that this determination does not reflect all relevant factors, including J.C.’s “maturity, intellectual capacity . . . the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions . . . the effect of the minor’s family and community environment,” and “the existence of childhood trauma.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) J.C. argues the evidence shows he was a traumatized, impulsive, possibly neurologically impaired teenager being pressured into a violent plan by friends, that he shot the victim accidentally, and that the court erred by giving insufficient weight to factors that could weigh in favor of this conclusion. J.C. does not argue the juvenile court failed to consider these mitigating circumstances. Indeed, the court agreed that J.C. “suffered trauma from his family, and his emotional and mental health at the time of the robbery were impaired.” It also noted J.C. was born prematurely, suffered from seizures, had ADHD, grew up with an alcoholic and abusive father who eventually abandoned the family, had PTSD, and that J.C.’s mother suffered from “debilitating Multiple Sclerosis,” which made her already lax supervision of him worse. 8 Because the court considered these mitigating circumstances, J.C.’s only argument on appeal is that it did not find them dispositive. However, as discussed above, when reviewing the juvenile court’s findings on the five factors “we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s findings.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) The juvenile court’s weighing of the evidence was well within the bounds of reason, even if the evidence could support a different finding. There was ample evidence of sophistication in the planning, execution, and attempted cover-up of the offense, and the juvenile court reasonably concluded that “none of the above considerations appear to impact [J.C.’s] criminal sophistication,” and ultimately “the evidence does support a finding that [J.C.] knew what he was doing, participated willingly, and knowingly planned and executed a brutal crime.” Because that conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, we cannot say the court erred in this finding. 2. Prior Delinquent History We also conclude there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that J.C.’s prior delinquent history weighed in favor of transfer. As the juvenile court acknowledged, J.C. had a brief but busy and escalating history of delinquency. In less than two years from 2013 to 2015, J.C. accrued five different petitions alleging he had violated the law, and he admitted to seven different offenses. Moreover, the offenses were escalating in severity, starting with shoplifting and brandishing a weapon, then stealing a car and engaging in a hit and run, attempted robbery, and battery. As the juvenile court said, J.C.’s “documented delinquent history demonstrates that his behavior 9 was marked by a series of frequent but moderately serious to low-level crimes.” Even still, the juvenile court also acknowledged that his “childhood trauma and family environment were serious contributing factors to his delinquency,” deferred concluding that this factor weighed in favor of transfer on its own, and only found that it did in context with every other factor. Thus, once again the juvenile court considered mitigating circumstances when making its findings on this factor, and reasonably concluded that J.C.’s previous delinquency history outweighed those circumstances. It is not our role to reweigh the mitigating factors J.C. emphasizes. 3. Previous Rehabilitation Attempts We also conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that previous attempts to rehabilitate J.C. failed. J.C. failed to participate in any programs while under probation, and even after being made a ward “continued to use drugs and not participate in substance abuse counseling.” There is no history of previous rehabilitation efforts, because J.C. avoided using those offered to him. J.C. argues he was not offered adequate services, and that the juvenile court did not properly consider “the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs” as required by section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(D). J.C points out that before the original transfer hearing “probation conceded that this factor weighs in favor of appellant because probation failed to exhaust available services.” J.C. also notes that both the juvenile court and probation suggested more intensive services may have benefited J.C., but were not provided. 10 However, as the juvenile court explained, many of the programs J.C. might have benefited from—such as Pathways for Success—are only available after a juvenile has committed a very serious offense. Prior to the murder, all of J.C.’s admitted offenses save one were for misdemeanors, and the remaining one was for vehicle theft. The court also explained that less restrictive services—such as Multi-Dimensional Family Therapy (“MDFT”) or Wrap Around services—require parental participation, and “the descriptions of his mother’s attitudes and behavior and her desire and ability to supervise [J.C.] . . . indicate that (MDFT) and Wrap Around services were unlikely to be successful.” J.C. has not disputed this analysis. J.C. also claims transportation issues prevented him from attending the services that were offered. But at the transfer hearing a probation officer testified that probation can offer transportation, and that the substance abuse counseling service probation referred J.C to also offered transportation. We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that previous rehabilitation efforts were adequate but had failed. However, even if we agreed with J.C that the services provided were not adequate, that would not be fatal to the juvenile court’s final decision to transfer jurisdiction. “[A] minor’s amenability to rehabilitation is the central and ‘dispositive’ question in proceedings under section 707 [citation] and the juvenile court’s analysis of the section 707 criteria must be ‘focused through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation.’ ” (In re O.F. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133, 162.) Thus, even if we concluded the juvenile court’s finding on this criterion was 11 not supported by substantial evidence, that does not mean its ultimate finding that J.C. was not amenable to rehabilitation was erroneous. 4. Likelihood of Rehabilitation Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court’s determination that J.C. could not be rehabilitated before it lost jurisdiction over him. According to probation, J.C. is only eligible for Riverside County’s secure youth treatment facility, Pathways to Success. Under section 875 subdivision (c)(1)(A) “if the ward has been committed to a secure youth treatment facility based on adjudication for an offense or offenses for which the ward, if convicted in adult criminal court, would face an aggregate sentence of seven or more years, the ward shall not be held in secure confinement beyond 25 years of age, or two years from the date of commitment, whichever occurs later.” Thus, if the juvenile court declined to transfer J.C., it would retain jurisdiction for two years at most. The minimum term for a murderer in the Pathways to Success program, however, is four to seven years. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.806(d).) Even if the court found J.C. qualified for the lowest term, he would still be unable to complete the program within two years. Thus, the trial court was correct that there was not “sufficient time . . . to provide [J.C.] with successful rehabilitative services.” J.C. responds by arguing that two years of Pathways to Success would be cumulative with the 11 years of custody he has already experienced, and therefore those two years would be sufficient to rehabilitate him. However, the juvenile court considered this argument, and reasonably rejected it. In particular, the court expressed concern that 12 J.C. continued to engage in violent behavior while confined, with the latest incident as recent as 2022. Moreover, it’s undisputed that during his 11 years, J.C. has made minimal progress in rehabilitating himself. He has completed an anger management program and started working towards graduating high school, but as of the date of the transfer hearing he had not actually graduated. We agree with the juvenile court that this “is only scratching the surface of the rehabilitative work that is necessary.” With such little progress in the previous 11 years, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude two years in Pathways to Success would not be sufficient. J.C. also argues the juvenile court could have committed him to an adult facility to receive rehabilitative services there. The People object, arguing J.C. did not raise this argument below, and introduces extra-record evidence to make the argument here. We need not address these procedural objections, because the argument fails on the merits. As the People correctly point out, J.C. has already spent years in adult custody with little to show for it. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order even considering this argument, because there is no reason to conclude that commitment to an adult facility for another two years was likely to accomplish what the previous 11 had not. 5. Gravity and Circumstances of the Offense Finally, there is no question that J.C.’s offenses—including and especially murder—were extraordinarily serious. As the juvenile court said “[J.C.] alone confronted the victim . . . and [J.C.] alone shot the victim.” Those actions “left a grieving family 13 behind including [the victim’s] mother and siblings,” who “are still in visible pain from the loss.” The gravity and circumstances of J.C.’s offenses weigh strongly in favor of transfer. Given that we hold substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings that at least four of the five factors weighed in favor of transfer, we similarly conclude that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s overall determination that J.C. was not amenable to rehabilitation and that transfer was therefore appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order. DISPOSITION We affirm. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAPHAEL Acting P. J. We concur: MENETREZ J. LEE J. 14