People v. Meeken CA5

Filed 11/12/26 P. v. Meeken CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, F088829 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. BF194908A) v. DARRELL LAWRENCE MEEKEN, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Judith K. Dulcich, Judge. Robert L.S. Angres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Dina Petrushenko and Anna J. Benham, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo-  Darrell Lawrence Meeken (appellant) was convicted of human trafficking, pimping, and pandering. On appeal, he contends the trial court violated Penal Code section 6541 by imposing multiple punishments on his human trafficking and pimping convictions. We affirm. PROCEDURAL SUMMARY On August 8, 2024, the District Attorney of Kern County filed an amended information charging appellant with human trafficking (§ 236.1, subd. (b); count 1), pimping (§ 266h; count 2), and pandering (§ 266i, subd. (a)(1); count 3). It was further alleged appellant had suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c)–(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(e)). The amended information further alleged multiple aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a), (b)). On August 29, 2024, a jury found appellant guilty on all counts. After appellant waived the right to a jury trial on the sentencing allegations, the trial court held a bifurcated proceeding and found true the prior strike conviction allegation and several aggravating circumstances. The court sentenced appellant to the upper term of 20 years for count 1, consecutive to one year four months (one-third of the middle term) for count 2. The sentence on count 3 was stayed under section 654, and the court dismissed the prior strike under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. FACTUAL SUMMARY I. Prosecution Case A. Background Bakersfield Police Department Sergeant Bailey was a detective for the human trafficking unit of the department, and participated in “dozens” of investigations of human trafficking. A “date” is “when a commercial sex worker performs some type of 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2. sex act with the sex buyer in exchange for money.” The vast majority of sex workers have an exploiter, also known as a “pimp,” who arranges the dates and communicate with the sex buyers. Bailey testified that it was “very common” for a sex worker’s boyfriend to also be her pimp. It is common for the pimp to be near the sex worker while she is on the date. It is also common for pimps to post advertisements for the sex worker. And typically, the pimp provides a limited amount of condoms to the sex worker. This is so the pimp “can control the amount of dates the commercial sex worker can do” before having to return and provide the money to the pimp. When asked about a hypothetical scenario, Sergeant Bailey opined that a sex worker suffers the deprivation of her liberty when she receives threats of violence and has a reason to believe that, based on prior violence, the threatened violence will occur. According to Bailey, the sex worker “has a reason to be fearful that the threat will occur if they do not do whatever [the pimp] is saying.” Bailey further stated the sex worker is deprived of her liberty when she has no choice over the dates, including the acts the prices, and whether to go on the date. B. Law Enforcement Investigation On February 10, 2023, while investigating an incident of domestic violence, Sergeant Bailey made contact with Jane Doe2 and appellant in an area known for prostitution called “the Blade.” Appellant provided Bailey with his phone number and told Bailey that he and Jane Doe lived together. Bailey ran a records check on appellant and Doe, which revealed prior calls for service for domestic violence incidents. On April 28, 2023, while he was investigating sex crimes on the Blade, Sergeant Bailey observed Doe wearing revealing clothing and talking to drivers of vehicles over 2 At appellant’s trial, Jane Doe invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify despite the prosecution’s offer of use-immunity for her testimony. 3. the span of several hours. Bailey suspected Doe was working as a commercial sex worker, and made contact with her twice that night. As Bailey spoke with Doe the second time at around 10:39 p.m., Doe received multiple phone calls from a phone number later determined to be appellant’s phone number. Bailey detained Doe and had her sit on a street curb. Doe texted appellant two minutes later, “Police got us lol.” On August 2, 2023, law enforcement arrested appellant and seized his cell phone. During his interview, appellant stated he had been dating Doe for about five years, and admitted knowing Doe was engaged in prostitution. C. Appellant’s Phone Communications with Doe Text message conversations between appellant and Doe were obtained. Appellant managed Doe’s dates, including setting up her dates with the buyers and setting the prices for her “services.” He also set the amount of money he would take from her revenue. Appellant chose which “services” Doe would perform for buyers. Appellant instructed Doe to engage in certain acts, including “perform[ing] oral sex with no condom,” even if she expressed unwillingness. He controlled “when they begin sex dates, when they stop working for the day,” and “how many sex dates” Doe went on. Doe kept appellant updated on her dates, and appellant kept track of how much money she made. On February 3, 2023, an unknown person contacted appellant’s phone, stating, “Are you available.” Appellant replied, “Yes I am,” and discussed details of the date. The next day, on February 4, 2023, appellant set up another date with a buyer for $250. Appellant then messaged Doe and told her that he has a $250 date. On February 8, 2023, Doe messaged appellant that she made $80 from a sex date. On February 9, 2023, appellant told Doe, “I have the condom,” to which Doe replied, “Where.” Appellant then told Doe to “open [the] door on [the] floor.” Appellant told Doe that she either needed to put on the condom or charge more. On February 10, 2023, Doe messaged appellant: “Got a date” and “80.” She also messaged appellant “Head 40” that same day. 4.  Appellant also sent Doe threatening text messages on numerous occasions. Appellant told Doe that he would “slap da s[**]t outa [her]” for not answering his calls. He also threatened to slap her because she blocked his calls. In one conversation, appellant told Doe, “Girl stop talking and tell him he gota go if he not using the condom.” Doe told appellant she “got the condom on,” and appellant replied, “Yeah u better or I wuda broke yo face lickin anything the f[**]k.” Sergeant Bailey believed these text messages meant that there are consequences when a sex worker “breaks the rules of the game.” When Doe and appellant disagreed about the prices, appellant threatened to slap her. In another exchange, Doe told appellant that the buyer wanted to have sex without a condom, and that she did not want to. Appellant responded by telling her to charge the buyer more. Doe responded back, “I did.” Doe later stated: “Doing s[**]t I don’t do just for money that’s crazy you know a mother f[***]er do love me.” Appellant provided Doe with condoms to use, but she also knew where to obtain condoms. From February 2023 to April 25, 2023, appellant called Doe’s phone 333 times using one phone number, and 192 times between April 25 and April 28, 2023, from a different phone number. According to Sergeant Bailey, this was significant because this number of calls is consistent with the exploiter wanting “updates on what is occurring on the daily, updates on when they collect money, [and] updates on how the dates are going.” D. March 26, 2023 On March 26, 2023, Doe’s nine-year-old child called 9-1-1 because Doe and appellant were fighting. The child stated that appellant had slapped Doe, and that appellant “sometimes” hit Doe. That same day, at 5:05 a.m., appellant texted Doe, “It’s crazy’s kus u gone get slapped either way,” and “Ur getting beat up period.” 5.  E. Online Advertisements and Payment Transactions Appellant posted advertisements for Doe’s “services” on the internet because Doe was “not good with the [i]nternet,” and because appellant knew “sex buyer[s]” better than her. Sergeant Bailey found between 20 and 50 advertisements of Doe, which were posted by appellant and listed appellant’s phone number. Many of the advertisements were found on specific websites known for soliciting commercial sex work. Appellant communicated with sex buyers and forwarded the buyer’s phone number to Doe. One of the websites banned appellant’s account. Appellant wrote back to the website support team, stating: “Ok well this account is the real me. I need u guys to give me my account back. This how I pay bills .…” Appellant used a mobile phone application to electronically transfer money to Doe. Between January 17, 2023, and June 3, 2023, Doe sent $1,731 to appellant, and appellant sent $1,057 to Doe. Sergeant Bailey testified that it is common for the exploiter to take and manage the money, and then distribute money back to the sex worker. II. The Defense’s Case A. Appellant’s Testimony Appellant testified that he noticed Doe on the Blade while he was visiting Bakersfield in 2018. They talked over social media for over a year, and appellant eventually moved in with Doe. In 2020, appellant “was experimenting with cocaine” which had negative impacts on his relationship with Doe. Regarding the 9-1-1 call on March 26, 2023, appellant stated he “put [his] hands on [Doe’s] face” and slapped Doe after she grabbed his throat. Appellant knew Doe was a sex worker. Appellant “accept[ed] [Doe] for who she [was]” and “what she wants to do to make money” as long as no one “put hands on her.” Appellant sometimes was “around” for her safety, but denied monitoring Doe’s location or telling her to engage in sex work. Appellant did not consider himself to be a pimp. The money Doe made was “her money,” but she would give it to appellant if he asked for 6. it. He testified that he did not set the prices she charged, and that he only gave her suggestions or told her, “whatever she wanted [him] to tell her.” Although he texted the buyers for her, he did so “because she [was] at work, and she wanted [appellant] to post her ad to see if it [got] any hits before she [got] off work.” If the advertisement got a hit, appellant would then let her know that she has a date with the buyer’s contact information. B. L.C.’s Testimony Doe’s mother, L.C., testified she knew appellant for four or five years, and lived with Doe and appellant for “a couple years.” L.C. testified that appellant was a “good family man” and had a “good relationship” with Doe. L.C. was not “scared” of appellant. She did not ever see appellant “beat” Doe, and knew appellant would not do anything “like that.” C. Officer Ramirez Officer Ramirez of the Bakersfield Police Department responded to the 9-1-1 call on March 26, 2023. When he arrived at Doe’s residence, appellant and Doe were arguing with each other. Ramirez spoke with Doe and did not observe any injuries on her. He did not see any red marks on her face or anything indicating that Doe had been slapped. Ramirez observed two scratches on appellant’s neck. Both appellant and Doe refused any police assistance, and appellant left with his belongings. III. Rebuttal In another text message conversation between Doe and appellant, Doe told appellant, “I don’t give a f[**]k about none of ur boyfriend a[**] pimpin.” Appellant responded, “U think pimpin is all I do.” Bailey testified that, to him, this exchange meant that appellant “does do [pimping], but he does other things as well.” 7.  DISCUSSION Appellant contends the trial court violated section 654 by sentencing him to consecutive terms on counts 1 (human trafficking) and 2 (pimping). The People contend the trial court properly imposed separate punishments. We agree with the People. Additional Background At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution argued section 654 did not preclude separate punishment because the pimping charge in count 2 was a different crime than the human trafficking charge in count 1. The prosecution noted there is a monetary element in count 2 that was not an element of count 1. The trial court agreed with the prosecution. The court stated: “Count 1 is … clearly the term that – the crime that speaks to what was happening in this case, and it should be the term that is imposed. I also think [c]ount 2 also best represents the circumstances of this offense, and I concur that [c]ount 3 is based out of the same operative facts.· I do believe [c]ounts 1 and 2 are not [section ]654 for the reasons stated by the prosecution, and I would only stay [c]ount 3 under [section] 654.” The court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms on counts 1 and 2. The court further noted that the crimes’ objectives were “independent of each other, and they were also committed at different times or places, and they were not a single course of action.” Applicable Law and Standard of Review Section 654, subdivision (a) provides: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.” “Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an ‘act or omission’ may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of conduct encompassing several 8. acts pursued with a single objective.” (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) “We first consider if the different crimes were completed by a ‘single physical act.’ If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider whether that course of conduct reflects a single ‘intent and objective’ or multiple intents and objectives.” (Ibid.) “ ‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.’ ” (People v. Britt (2004) 32 Cal.4th 944, 951–952.) “If, on the other hand, defendant harbored ‘multiple criminal objectives,’ which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, ‘even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) “[C]ases have sometimes found separate objectives when the objectives were either (1) consecutive even if similar or (2) different even if simultaneous. In those cases, multiple punishment was permitted.” (People v. Britt, at p. 952.) “ ‘The trial court has broad latitude in determining whether section 654, subdivision (a) applies in a given case.’ ” (People v. Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732, 737.) “In analyzing whether section 654 bars the imposition of multiple sentences, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and affirm the trial court’s sentencing decision—whether express or implied—if it is supported by substantial evidence.” (Ibid.) Analysis Appellant argues the trial court was required to stay the punishment of either count 1 (human trafficking) or count 2 (pimping) because the offenses shared the same 9. criminal objective. Not so. Separate punishments were warranted because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s express finding that the convictions were based upon more than one physical act. “A person who deprives or violates the personal liberty of another with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of Section 266, 266h, 266i, 266j, 267, 311.1, 311.2, 311.3, 311.4, 311.5, 311.6, or 518 is guilty of human trafficking .…” (§ 236.1, subd. (b).) Section 266h, subdivision (a) states, in relevant part: “[A]ny person who, knowing another person is a prostitute, lives or derives support or maintenance in whole or in part from the earnings or proceeds of the person’s prostitution …, or who solicits or receives compensation for soliciting for the person, is guilty of pimping .…” Here, the offenses involved multiple discrete acts of violence and threats spanning multiple months. The evidence in the record demonstrates that appellant acted as Doe’s pimp for approximately three months, from February 2023 through April 2023. Over that period, appellant continuously managed Doe’s prostitution, including setting up her dates, selecting her services and prices, and, at times, threatening Doe with violence if she showed resistance to his commands. The course of conduct here was therefore temporally divisible. (People v. Leonard (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 465, 499 [“[A] course of conduct divisible in time, although directed to one objective, may [also] give rise to multiple violations and punishment.”].) Thus, even if appellant possessed the same objective in the offenses in counts 1 and 2, the temporal separation of the discrete acts within the three-month period of time permitted multiple punishments under section 654. (See People v. Gaio (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 919, 935 [multiple punishments permissible particularly “where the offenses are temporally separated in such a way as to afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and to renew his or her intent before committing the next one, thereby aggravating the violation of public security or policy already undertaken”].) Appellant relies on People v. Dearborne (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 250 (Dearborne). In Dearborne, the defendant’s convictions for human trafficking and pimping, among 10. other offenses, resulted from a single activity occurring on a single night. (Dearborne, at pp. 254–256.) The Court of Appeal determined that the human trafficking and pimping acts constituted a single course of conduct with one and the same intent and objective. (Id. at pp. 263–264.) In doing so, the Court highlighted that there was only a single pimping activity relevant to these two offenses. (Ibid.) Thus, since the human trafficking charge contained an element of an intent to pimp, the Dearborne court reasoned the human trafficking charge was necessarily part of the same intent and objective as the pimping charge. (Ibid.) Here, appellant acted as Doe’s pimp for three months. During that time, appellant engaged in multiple discrete acts of pimping relevant to these offenses. While human trafficking contains the intent to pimp as an element, Dearborne does not hold that pimping and human trafficking can never be separately punished. (See Dearborne, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 264 [“Each case must be analyzed on its own facts.”].) Unlike in Dearborne, the offenses here were not part of a single course of action on a single night. The acts relevant to the offenses occurred on numerous nights within the three month period, permitting separate punishment. (See People v. Leonard, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 499.) Dearborne is thus distinguishable from the instant record. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. SANDHU, J. WE CONCUR: HILL, P. J. DESANTOS, J. 11.