People v. Schultz CA5
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketF089167
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Schultz CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089167
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF176407A)
v.
MARIAN P. SCHULTZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John W. Lua,
Judge.
Richard Oberto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ian Whitney and Chung Mi
Choi, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Marian P. Schultz of driving under the influence
causing great bodily injury after he drove his truck into a motorcycle and a car while
performing “doughnuts” in the middle of the street. Defendant appeals, arguing that the
prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument by urging the jury to consider
defendant’s refusal to perform field sobriety tests as consciousness of guilt and
responding to defense counsel’s argument that the prosecutor failed to introduce certain
evidence by arguing that the defense could have introduced the evidence. Defendant also
argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to strike the great bodily injury
enhancements and by staying rather than dismissing the multiple victim enhancements.
We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The District Attorney of Kern County filed an amended information on
November 29, 2023, charging defendant with driving under the influence causing bodily
injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 1) and driving with a blood-alcohol content
(BAC) of 0.08 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count 2). As to both
counts, the amended information further alleged that defendant personally inflicted great
bodily injury causing one victim to become comatose or suffer permanent paralysis (Pen.
Code, § 12022.7, subd. (b)), 1 defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on two
victims (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), defendant proximately caused bodily injury to more than
one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558), and the crime involved great violence disclosing a high
degree of cruelty and a victim who was particularly vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1), (3)). Defendant pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations.
A jury convicted defendant of both charges on December 15, 2023, and found true
all allegations, except the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancements as to one victim.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
Defense counsel raised doubt as to defendant’s competency pursuant to section 1368 after
the clerk read the verdict, and the trial court suspended proceedings and appointed a
mental health expert to determine whether defendant was mentally competent to stand
trial. After a competency trial, the court found defendant competent and reinstated the
charges. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial as to the aggravating sentencing
factors, and the court found the allegations pursuant to California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1) and (3) to be true.
At the sentencing hearing on November 24, 2024, the trial court enumerated the
mitigating and aggravating sentencing factors and explained that it would exercise its
discretion to deny defendant a probationary term but select the low prison term and strike
the punishment for the multiple victim enhancement. The court pronounced a sentence of
16 months in prison, plus five years (§ 12022.7, subd. (b)), a stayed three-year term
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and struck the punishment for the one-year enhancement (Veh.
Code, § 23558), for a total term of six years four months in prison as to count 1. The
court imposed and stayed sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654.
The court also ordered defendant to pay $300 restitution and parole revocation
restitution fines (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b), 1202.45), a $40 court operations assessment
(§ 1465.8), a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), a $390 fine
(Veh. Code, § 23554), a $50 alcohol abuse education and prevention penalty assessment
(Veh. Code, § 23645), a $4 penalty assessment (former Gov. Code, § 76000.10), and
other penalty assessments totaling $1,209.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 8, 2025.
FACTS
Jerry DeGuzman picked up his two children from his brother-in-law’s house after
he left work at 10:00 p.m. on April 13, 2019. While in the intersection of Hosking
Avenue and Wible Road, he saw a truck doing doughnuts in the middle of the street
ahead. As he drove his car through the intersection, DeGuzman saw the truck had pulled
3.
over to the right curb at Aspen Creek Drive. As he approached, however, the truck
quickly turned left across the lane. DeGuzman noticed a motorcycle in the right lane next
to him as the truck hit them both. The left front side of defendant’s truck hit the right
front side of DeGuzman’s car, and the car was totaled.
DeGuzman saw the truck stopped on the other side of the street, and the driver got
out and sat on the curb. He and his children suffered whiplash from the accident.
Twenty-year-old Armandeep Singh had spent the day at a religious celebration
with his family, including his cousin, Arshdeep Gill. He left the event on his motorcycle
with Gill as his passenger and eventually turned into the right lane of Hosking Avenue.
Singh did not recall seeing the truck until it hit the side of his motorcycle. His right leg
was stuck under the motorcycle as it dragged him over 20 feet. Suffering severe pain,
Singh saw a lot of blood, one of his testicles that had been expelled from his body, and
his right leg bent outward at a 90-degree angle at the knee. Singh went in and out of
consciousness. 2
Singh spent approximately nine months in the hospital and had more than
59 surgeries. He was left with no right hip, causing intense pain and requiring him to use
a walker. Singh required a colostomy bag at the time of his testimony and required a
catheter for two years after the accident. Surgeons removed Singh’s testicle and
harvested muscle from his thighs to reconstruct the destroyed pelvic area. His left arm
was injured, and he could no longer raise it above shoulder level. Singh experienced
constant pain from his lower back, and a wound in his left thigh remained open as it
2 Singh remembered that his motorcycle slid approximately 20 to 25 feet down the street
and that defendant ran over him before crashing into a fence. He also testified that when he
returned to consciousness, a group of people were removing defendant from his truck to prevent
him from leaving the scene. However, the officer who conducted the investigation testified that
the truck never left the sidewalk to crash into any fence and the circumstances of the crash made
it unlikely that defendant’s truck ran over Singh after hitting him because the motorcycle
collided and then glanced past the truck. DeGuzman saw defendant on the sidewalk and did not
testify that defendant had to be restrained to prevent him from leaving.
4.
never fully healed. Before the crash, Singh walked 22,000 to 25,000 steps a day, worked
out daily, attended college, and helped his family around the house. After the accident,
he could not be left alone, was always in pain, and only left his home for medical
appointments. He described his life since the collision as living in a jail, and his sister
put medical school on hold to care for Singh.
Gill sustained a complex fracture to his right wrist that required surgery and
fractures to his right two outside toes. He also had a concussion but no evidence of
fractures or bleeding.
Officer Rodolfo Diaz responded to the accident at approximately 10:33 p.m.,
having been dispatched to the location five minutes prior. He contacted defendant who
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. Defendant smelled of alcohol, swayed,
and had red and watery eyes. Officer Diaz handcuffed defendant and detained him in
Diaz’s patrol vehicle.
Detective Marc Lugo trained to investigate drivers under the influence of alcohol
and participated in approximately 50 investigations during his career. Lugo testified that
during such investigations, he routinely engages the suspect in a 15-minute conversation,
after Miranda 3 warnings if the suspect has been detained. After the elapsed time, Lugo
inquires if the suspect will perform field sobriety tests, such as the walk and turn,
horizontal gaze nystagmus, and one-leg stand, but the tests are solely voluntary.
Thereafter, Lugo provides the standard preliminary breath test admonition and explains to
the suspect that the test is purely voluntary, and his breath sample will not be saved. If
Lugo has sufficient information for an arrest, he provides the implied consent
admonition, advising that the suspect is required to provide a blood or breath sample for
testing.
3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
5.
Lugo arrived at the accident scene at approximately 10:57 p.m. He contacted
defendant when he arrived and provided him with Miranda warnings. Lugo immediately
noticed an overpowering odor of alcohol and objective signs of alcohol intoxication, such
as red watery eyes and slurred speech. Defendant was polite, and although he did not
answer all questions, he did say he had had three to four light beers, the last of which
occurred approximately 30 minutes prior. Defendant also stated that he is usually okay to
drive when he drinks and did not recall drinking that much. In response to questioning,
defendant told Lugo that defendant did not have any health problems, he was not injured
or sick, he was not seeing a doctor or taking medicine or drugs, he did not wear glasses or
contacts, and his truck had no mechanical issues.
Lugo asked defendant if he would perform field sobriety tests, and defendant
responded that he knew what would happen next and would prefer to just provide a
breath sample. Lugo then provided defendant with a preliminary alcohol screening
admonition that advised him the test was voluntary, and defendant agreed. The initial
breath sample at 11:23 p.m. was not sufficient for testing but, thereafter, defendant
provided a sufficient sample that indicated a BAC of 0.147 percent, just under twice the
legal limit. Lugo concluded that defendant was under the influence of alcohol and was
too impaired to drive safely. Lugo advised defendant that he was required to provide
either a blood or breath sample pursuant to California’s implied consent law. Defendant
selected the breath test and provided the first evidentiary sample at 11:35 p.m.
Defendant’s first breath sample tested at 0.146 percent; his second breath sample tested at
0.145 percent at 11:38 p.m. Lugo arrested defendant.
Officer Zachary Burdick responded to the accident location and was trained in
traffic collision reconstruction. He examined the truck, which was parked partially on the
sidewalk and had minor damage to the front driver’s side, the car parked in the street near
the rear of the truck, exhibiting minor damage to the front passenger side, and the
6.
motorcycle that had been moved from its original position and had scrapes and minor
damage to its front end.
Lugo eventually spoke with defendant, who appeared intoxicated, and asked him
to describe what had happened. Defendant said that he backed out of his driveway and
performed two or three counterclockwise doughnuts in the roadway; then he felt an
impact and realized that the collision occurred. He did not see either the car or the
motorcycle before the crash. DeGuzman told Lugo that DeGuzman saw the truck driving
in circles in the road, and when the truck pulled to the curb, DeGuzman felt it was safe to
proceed, but the truck turned left in front of DeGuzman across the lanes of traffic and hit
him. DeGuzman indicated that a motorcycle was travelling in the lane to the right and
collided with the truck slightly before him.
Evidence at the scene and witness statements indicated that the truck pulled from
the curb line and initiated another set of doughnuts in the roadway, and the tire marks
indicated that the truck did not intentionally reduce its speed before coming to a stop.
Doughnuts are an unlawful maneuver and were a contributing factor to the collision. The
motorcycle appeared to have contacted the front corner of the truck and travelled 100 to
150 feet before stopping. The car contacted the truck in the same area after the
motorcycle, causing it to veer to the left, and skidded 30 to 60 feet. Burdick concluded
defendant’s alcohol impairment and unsafe turning movement were the primary and
contributing factors to the accident.
The breath testing device was checked for accuracy on April 10, 2019, and passed.
California regulations require the accuracy of the device to be checked every 10 days,
which did not always happen. However, if the device was not checked, it would not
operate until an accuracy test had been performed. Essentially, every breath test
conducted on the device was proceeded by an accuracy test within the previous 10-day
period, even though the accuracy tests were not performed every 10 days.
7.
If an individual weighing 190 pounds (defendant’s driver license showed his
weight as 190 pounds) consumed between three and four 12-ounce light beers (36 to
48 ounces), his BAC would be between 0.05 and 0.109 percent. A 190-pound individual
with a BAC of 0.145 percent would have consumed 63 to 102 ounces of light beer.
Burdick concluded that defendant was impaired for purposes of driving a vehicle
based upon his involvement in a multi-vehicle accident at 10:29 p.m., the preliminary
alcohol screen test of 0.147 percent at 11:23 p.m., evidentiary chemical test results of
0.146 percent at 11:35 p.m. and 0.145 percent at 11:38 p.m., and his admission to
drinking alcohol 30 minutes before contact with an officer.
DISCUSSION
I. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct in his closing argument and, even if
his arguments were improper, defendant was not prejudiced.
A. Background
In closing, the prosecutor argued, “You can have that abiding conviction knowing
his own admission that he made that choice to drink and drive. He thought he was fine.
Well, he wasn’t. You can rest easy because [] defendant knew he was impaired. And we
know this because he did not participate in the field sobriety tests.” Defense counsel
objected, “That’s voluntary action not a consciousness of guilty [sic].” The court
sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor to rephrase his argument.
The prosecutor argued, “[D]efendant made a conscious decision not to participate
in Officer Lugo’s field sobriety tests. Ask yourself, why would someone who is not
impaired—why would someone who is not involved in a horrific collision, why would
that person not offer up additional evidence? Well, that’s what [] defendant did .… He
declined field sobriety tests. You can have that abiding conviction because [] defendant’s
BAC was almost twice the legal limit.” Defense counsel did not object.
During defendant’s closing argument, defense counsel argued that law
enforcement failed to perform regular accuracy tests of the breath testing device as
8.
required by law. He argued that the jury could not trust the device to work because it had
not been calibrated since 2015, the prosecution failed to explain why police records
regarding the testing device differed from the crime laboratory’s records, the jury had not
seen the calibration certificate, the testing device was not brought to court, and the
prosecution failed to disprove that radio frequencies interfered with the function of the
device. Additionally, defense counsel attacked the quality of the investigation, arguing
that law enforcement did not acquire data recordings from the vehicles as to their speed
during the accident and the prosecutor failed to call Gill (Singh’s passenger) to testify.
The prosecutor responded to defense counsel’s argument, “The evidence is
absolutely on the People. But when defense makes an argument saying you should have
heard ‘X.’ You should have heard ‘Y.’ You can ask yourself, well, how come we didn’t
hear that from the defense?” Defense counsel objected, “Burden shifting, Your Honor.”
The court sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor to rephrase.
The prosecutor then argued, “The burden is absolutely on the People. And when
the defense has a theory of the case, you can ask yourself about this idea of failure to call
logical witnesses. And so if there is a defense belief that certain things should have been
proven, such as [radio frequency] interference, when the calibration should have been
performed, ask yourself, I didn’t hear a defense expert say that that was necessary.”
Defense counsel again objected, “Your Honor, burden shifting again. I have no duty to
call a single witness.”
Following a sidebar, the court sustained the last objection and admonished the
jury: “Ladies and gentlemen, I just want to take this opportunity to remind you that the
party that has the burden of proof in this case and the only burden of proving anything to
you folks rests with [the prosecutor] representing the prosecution or the People. By
contrast, [defense counsel], representing the defense, does not have a burden of proving
anything to you. [¶] The last comments regarding lack of calling logical witnesses, those
9.
have been objected to and sustained. So I will order that you disregard any comments
regarding that aspect entirely.”
During subsequent rebuttal argument, the prosecutor compared defendant’s refusal
to participate in field sobriety tests to a customer who is accused of shop lifting, “What
do you do? Get out your receipt.” Defense counsel objected, “Burden shifting.
Improper argument.” The court responded, “Well, the objection is sustained regarding
reference to the field sobriety tests. The Court will order that the jurors disregard those
arguments by the prosecution in that manner. [¶] I will also remind you folks that
argument is not evidence. You folks have already heard all of the evidence and will make
your determinations on what the facts are based on the evidence already presented and
not based necessarily on arguments by either counsel.” The prosecutor then argued,
“Those field sobriety tests are designed to give law enforcement officers clues in which
to conduct their DUI investigation. And [] defendant, when presented with that
opportunity, said, no, I know where this is going. The initial test reveals a .147 and the
two subsequent tests .146 and .145.”
Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by
arguing defendant’s refusal to perform sobriety tests was evidence of consciousness of
guilt and shifting the burden of proof by commenting on defendant’s failure to produce its
own expert to support the accuracy of the breath testing device.
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A prosecutor’s actions violate the federal Constitution if they involve a pattern of
egregious conduct that infects the trial with such unfairness as to deny due process.
(People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 149.) Even if not fundamentally unfair, a
prosecutor’s conduct violates state law if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible
methods in attempting to persuade either the trial court or the jury. (Ibid.) “A defendant
asserting prosecutorial misconduct must … establish a reasonable likelihood the jury
construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion.” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th
10.
527, 568; see People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 522 [“whether the prosecutor has
employed deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade either the court or the jury”].)
A prosecutor commits misconduct by misstating the law (People v. Cortez (2016)
63 Cal.4th 101, 130) but “enjoys wide latitude in commenting on the evidence, including
the reasonable inferences and deductions that can be drawn therefrom” (People v.
Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 928; see People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 277
[“hyperbolic and tendentious” comments, even if “harsh and unbecoming,” may be
reasonable if they can be inferred from the evidence]).
We discuss each claim of alleged prosecutorial misconduct in turn.
C. Analysis
(1) The prosecutor’s use of defendant’s refusal to perform field sobriety
tests as consciousness of guilt did not misstate the law and was not
misconduct.
The prosecutor argued that defendant demonstrated consciousness of guilt when
he refused to perform field sobriety tests. Defendant objected to permitting that inference
because the tests were “voluntary.” However, we conclude the prosecutor did not
misstate the law, nor did this argument shift the burden of proof.
A driver’s refusal to perform field sobriety tests is evidence of guilt and can be
used to establish probable cause for arrest. (Marvin v. Department of Motor Vehicles
(1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 717, 720.) Evidence of a refusal to perform field sobriety tests is
also admissible as evidence at trial to show consciousness of guilt. (People v. McGinnis
(1953) 123 Cal.App.2d Supp. 945, 947 [it does not “do violence to reason” for jury to
conclude that refusal is motivated by risk that test would furnish evidence of “the
condition in which he knew himself to be”].)
Our Supreme Court applied these principles in People v. Sudduth (1966) 65 Cal.2d
543, 545–548. In that case, after Sudduth had been advised of his rights to counsel and to
remain silent, the officer explained the physical tests associated with a field sobriety
11.
examination, but Sudduth refused to take the tests and later refused a breathalyzer test,
both facts the prosecutor commented upon in closing argument. (Id. at p. 545.) Sudduth
noted that while a rule preventing comment on a failure to testify is necessary to protect
the exercise of the right to remain silent, “[a] wrongful refusal to cooperate with law
enforcement officers does not qualify for such protection.” (Id. at p. 546.)
Where a statute specifically grants the suspect the right to refuse the test, courts
have held that evidence of such a refusal may not be used as consciousness of guilt
because it would render the right valueless. (See People v. Zavala (1966)
239 Cal.App.2d 732, 741 [exercise of a statutory right to refuse a chemical test for drug
use not admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt].) Relying upon People v.
Zavala, another court held that a driver’s refusal to submit to a preliminary alcohol
screening (PAS) test could not be admitted as evidence to demonstrate consciousness of
guilt because the Legislature conferred upon citizens a right to refuse the test (Veh. Code,
§ 23612) and “it makes little sense to grant a right of refusal yet allow the prosecution to
admit evidence of that refusal to establish consciousness of guilt.” (People v. Jackson
(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1467–1468.) In doing so, the court distinguished the PAS
test “from the standard [field sobriety tests] because it carries a statutory right to refuse
the test. Thus, Marvin [v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d 717] and
the cases cited therein, which stand for the general principle that evidence of a refusal to
submit to a standard [field sobriety test] is admissible as consciousness of guilt, do not
govern the more specific issue we confront here of whether evidence of a person’s refusal
to submit to a PAS [field sobriety test] is similarly admissible where the right to refuse
the test is granted by statute.” (Id. at p. 1469.)
Therefore, we conclude that the prosecutor did not misstate the law in suggesting
to the jury that defendant was aware he was inebriated when he declined to perform the
standard field sobriety tests.
12.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor’s argument “implied that [defendant]
had an obligation to prove his own innocence, in this instance by performing the
voluntary exercises to demonstrate his sobriety,” which had the effect of shifting the
burden of proof. However, we note the prosecutor did not argue that defendant bore the
burden at trial to prove his innocence. In context, the prosecutor’s comment referred to
defendant’s refusal to submit to the field sobriety tests because he believed he was under
the influence. As we have discussed, there was nothing improper in that, especially given
that the jury was properly instructed on the presumption of innocence and the burden of
proof, discussed more fully below.
Our Supreme Court rejected an argument that using a defendant’s pretrial conduct
as evidence of consciousness of guilt shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, in the
context of a stolen property case, where the defendant provides a false explanation of the
goods or remains silent. (People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 756.) “It should be
emphasized that the rule in no way shifts the burden of proof or destroys the presumption
of innocence; the prosecution must still satisfy the jury of a defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) McFarland further explained that a defendant’s silence may
not be used where it appears that he is acting on the basis of his right not to incriminate
himself, but otherwise, the burden with respect to the truth or falsity of a defendant’s
statement lies with the prosecution to show it is not believable in the light of the
circumstances. (Id. at pp. 756–757.) In discussing analogous other contexts, our
Supreme Court also pointed out that pretrial silence upon questioning by the police,
where not based on a claim of right, may be introduced against a defendant to show
consciousness of guilt or an admission. (Id. at p. 757.)
We also conclude that any prejudice from the prosecutor’s argument is offset by
other evidence of defendant’s consciousness of guilt. The inference that defendant
declined to perform the physical field sobriety tests to minimize the evidence of his
alcohol use seems contradicted by his agreement to take a breath test even though he had
13.
been advised that he could refuse that test. But, in this case, the language of defendant’s
refusal itself was admissible, and his statement to the officer that “he knew what would
happen next and would prefer to just provide a breath sample” could be interpreted as an
admission that he knew the breath test was inevitable and would show he was inebriated.
A jury could properly infer that defendant dispensed with the physical field sobriety tests
and proceeded to the breath test because he knew he could not avoid discovery of the
extent of his inebriation, and, therefore, exhibited consciousness of his guilt. Since the
jury could have drawn inference from defendant’s statement that he was aware of his
guilt, the prosecutor’s reliance on defendant’s refusal to perform the physical field
sobriety tests could not have prejudiced defendant.
(2) Defendant was not prejudiced when the prosecutor commented to the
jury that defense counsel did not support his attacks on the accuracy
of the testing device with an expert witness.
The rule against burden shifting does not mean that a prosecutor may not comment
on the fact the defense has failed to produce evidence or witnesses that would be
reasonable to expect the defendant to produce in support of their defense. To the
contrary, “ ‘[a] distinction clearly exists between the permissible comment that a
defendant has not produced any evidence, and … an improper statement that a defendant
has a duty or burden to produce evidence, or a duty or burden to prove his or her
innocence.’ ” (People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 352, quoting People v. Bradford
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1340; accord, People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 939.) It
is absolutely permissible for a prosecutor to point out that the defendant failed to produce
evidence or witnesses when to do so would be reasonable and also to ask the jury to draw
a negative inference from that failure. This does not constitute “burden shifting.”
(People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 788; People v. Lewis
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1304; see also People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 434 [for
a prosecutor to point out there is no corroboration of a defendant’s testimony is not
14.
burden shifting; it is simply an argument that a defendant’s story is less believable
because of lack of corroboration]; People v. Gaines (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 821, 825 [“ ‘a
prosecutor may argue to a jury that a defendant has not brought forth evidence to
corroborate an essential part of his defensive story’ ”].)
Here, the prosecutor argued that the defense failed to present an expert to support
the argument that certain failures in maintaining the device actually affected its accuracy.
Notably, the prosecutor did not argue defendant had a burden to produce any evidence or
to prove his innocence and, rather, reiterated that the prosecution bore the burden of
establishing defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The brief comments referring
to defendant’s failure to introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses were
proper. (See People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 263 [“prosecutorial comment upon a
defendant’s failure ‘to introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses’ is not
improper”]; People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 691 [rule of Griffin v. California
(1965) 380 U.S. 609 does not extend to comments on the state of the evidence or on the
failure of the defense to introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses].)
Defendant argues, however, that the prosecutor’s comments regarding the failure
to call a defense expert to support defense counsel’s attack on the breath testing device
crossed the line by asking the jury to infer that the failure to call such a witness “attested
to the soundness of the prosecution evidence.” We need not address whether the trial
court correctly sustained objections both times the prosecutor made this argument. In this
case, the trial court did sustain the objections, admonished the jury to disregard them, and
instructed the jury that defendant did not have any burden to produce evidence and the
prosecution had the burden to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if
we presume prosecutorial misconduct occurred, reversal is not warranted.
The court’s initial instructions properly instructed the jury that the prosecution
bore the burden to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. During closing
argument, both the prosecutor and defendant addressed the prosecution’s burden to prove
15.
defendant’s guilt. Additionally, the prosecutor prefaced the objectionable comments by
stating, “The burden is absolutely on the People.” Thereafter, when sustaining
defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s comments as shifting the burden of proof, the
court instructed the jury that defendant did not have the burden of proving anything and
that burden was on the prosecutor. The court further instructed the jury to disregard the
prosecutor’s argument in that regard “entirely.”
The jurors were also instructed that the court’s instructions take precedence over
any contrary comments by the attorneys and the questions and arguments of counsel are
not evidence, a concept that was also addressed by the prosecutor in rebuttal argument
and by the trial court in response to defendant’s objection.
We presume that the jurors understood and followed these instructions.
(See People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 34, overruled on other grounds in People v.
Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 17; People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 674 [noting the
defendant had not established prejudice from prosecutorial misconduct or error in
denying mistrial motion on that basis where record did not “disclose any reason for [the]
court to cast aside the presumption that the jurors followed the court’s repeated
admonishments” to disregard the improper evidence].)
Additionally, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. Two witnesses
testified that defendant hit them with his truck. Defendant and his truck were present at
the scene, and defendant’s truck showed signs of having been in an accident. Defendant
waived his rights and admitted to the officer that he was driving, did not see the vehicles,
and was performing doughnuts in the road. Defendant also admitted that he was
drinking, a fact corroborated by several officers who described that defendant had red and
watery eyes, swayed, and smelled of alcohol. An officer conducted three breath tests at
separate intervals, each of which proved defendant’s BAC was 0.14 percent. While the
defense pointed out that the breath test device was not regularly tested for accuracy every
10 days as legally required, the technical violation did not affect the accuracy of the
16.
device, and law enforcement could not use it again until an accuracy test was performed.
The device was tested for accuracy three days before the accident.
Given the strength of the evidence against defendant, the prosecutor’s relatively
few remarks could not have prejudiced defendant. (See People v. Seumanu (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1293, 1344 [finding prosecutorial misconduct harmless because the improper
remarks were limited and the evidence of guilt was strong]; see also People v. Leonard
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1407 [finding misconduct harmless because “the prosecutor’s
passing remark could not have prejudiced defendant, given the overwhelming evidence of
guilt”].)
Based on this record, it is not reasonably probable that the verdict would have
been more favorable if the prosecutor had not made the challenged comments, and
defendant was not prejudiced by them. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
837.) We can also declare beyond any reasonable doubt that any presumed prosecutorial
misconduct was harmless. Even if federal constitutional error occurred, reversal is not
required. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it enhanced defendant’s
sentence five years for great bodily injury, causing one victim to become
comatose or suffer permanent paralysis, and striking punishment for the
multiple victim enhancement.
A. Background
The probation report included recommendations that the court (1) grant defendant
a term of probation, conditioned upon serving one year in county jail, (2) impose standard
and special probation terms to address defendant’s alcohol use and mental health, and
(3) select the low term should a prison term become necessary.
At the sentencing hearing on November 12, 2024, the trial court acknowledged
that it had reviewed and considered the probation report and the sentencing statements
filed by the People and defendant. Unfortunately, defendant’s sentencing statement is not
part of the superior court’s file, and defense counsel, having submitted on the sentencing
17.
statement during the hearing, did not make the arguments orally. 4 In responding to
defendant’s sentencing statement, the prosecutor discussed parts of its content, such as
the alleged weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, 5 use of defendant’s statements to mental
competency experts, and reference to jail calls (introduced during competency
proceedings as evidence of defendant’s competence). The prosecutor requested a prison
sentence and argued that defendant had failed to accept responsibility for his actions.
Defense counsel responded that issues raised in his sentencing statement were mitigating
factors as to how the accident occurred and argued that “additional terms set forth and
offered by the defense as a continuation of rehabilitation, including counseling—private
counseling” demonstrated defendant’s remorse.
The court advised that it had “thought long and hard about the appropriate
sentence in this case,” including the trial evidence and procedural history of the case.
The trial court recognized that the competency issues caused suspension of criminal
proceedings for a significant period of time and defendant had been in custody during
that period.
The court indicated it had weighed the circumstances in mitigation and
aggravation in evaluating defendant’s probation suitability and the appropriate prison
term. The court also recognized that defendant had no prior record and his case included
multiple enhancements as factors in mitigation and weighed them against its findings that
4 Defendant failed to either move or obtain a stipulation for this court to order the
correction or certification of any part of the record, such as ordering the superior court to settle
any dispute concerning the content of defendant’s sentencing statement and omission from the
record. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(c).) If such had been requested, presumably the
superior court could have obtained a copy of the sentencing statement from either the
prosecution or defense counsel’s records and conducted a hearing to determine whether it was
reviewed by the trial court and should become part of the court’s record.
5 The defense apparently claimed issues with the breath testing device, lack of
corroborating evidence, absence of accident reconstruction, and other possible factors that
contributed to the accident.
18.
the offense involved great violence and callousness, a particularly vulnerable victim, and
defendant’s BAC was twice the legal limit.