Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Schultz CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, F089167 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. BF176407A) v. MARIAN P. SCHULTZ, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John W. Lua, Judge. Richard Oberto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ian Whitney and Chung Mi Choi, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- INTRODUCTION A jury convicted defendant Marian P. Schultz of driving under the influence causing great bodily injury after he drove his truck into a motorcycle and a car while performing “doughnuts” in the middle of the street. Defendant appeals, arguing that the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument by urging the jury to consider defendant’s refusal to perform field sobriety tests as consciousness of guilt and responding to defense counsel’s argument that the prosecutor failed to introduce certain evidence by arguing that the defense could have introduced the evidence. Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to strike the great bodily injury enhancements and by staying rather than dismissing the multiple victim enhancements. We affirm. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The District Attorney of Kern County filed an amended information on November 29, 2023, charging defendant with driving under the influence causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 1) and driving with a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count 2). As to both counts, the amended information further alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury causing one victim to become comatose or suffer permanent paralysis (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (b)), 1 defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on two victims (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), defendant proximately caused bodily injury to more than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558), and the crime involved great violence disclosing a high degree of cruelty and a victim who was particularly vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (3)). Defendant pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations. A jury convicted defendant of both charges on December 15, 2023, and found true all allegations, except the section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancements as to one victim. 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2. Defense counsel raised doubt as to defendant’s competency pursuant to section 1368 after the clerk read the verdict, and the trial court suspended proceedings and appointed a mental health expert to determine whether defendant was mentally competent to stand trial. After a competency trial, the court found defendant competent and reinstated the charges. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial as to the aggravating sentencing factors, and the court found the allegations pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1) and (3) to be true. At the sentencing hearing on November 24, 2024, the trial court enumerated the mitigating and aggravating sentencing factors and explained that it would exercise its discretion to deny defendant a probationary term but select the low prison term and strike the punishment for the multiple victim enhancement. The court pronounced a sentence of 16 months in prison, plus five years (§ 12022.7, subd. (b)), a stayed three-year term (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and struck the punishment for the one-year enhancement (Veh. Code, § 23558), for a total term of six years four months in prison as to count 1. The court imposed and stayed sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654. The court also ordered defendant to pay $300 restitution and parole revocation restitution fines (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b), 1202.45), a $40 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8), a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), a $390 fine (Veh. Code, § 23554), a $50 alcohol abuse education and prevention penalty assessment (Veh. Code, § 23645), a $4 penalty assessment (former Gov. Code, § 76000.10), and other penalty assessments totaling $1,209. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 8, 2025. FACTS Jerry DeGuzman picked up his two children from his brother-in-law’s house after he left work at 10:00 p.m. on April 13, 2019. While in the intersection of Hosking Avenue and Wible Road, he saw a truck doing doughnuts in the middle of the street ahead. As he drove his car through the intersection, DeGuzman saw the truck had pulled 3. over to the right curb at Aspen Creek Drive. As he approached, however, the truck quickly turned left across the lane. DeGuzman noticed a motorcycle in the right lane next to him as the truck hit them both. The left front side of defendant’s truck hit the right front side of DeGuzman’s car, and the car was totaled. DeGuzman saw the truck stopped on the other side of the street, and the driver got out and sat on the curb. He and his children suffered whiplash from the accident. Twenty-year-old Armandeep Singh had spent the day at a religious celebration with his family, including his cousin, Arshdeep Gill. He left the event on his motorcycle with Gill as his passenger and eventually turned into the right lane of Hosking Avenue. Singh did not recall seeing the truck until it hit the side of his motorcycle. His right leg was stuck under the motorcycle as it dragged him over 20 feet. Suffering severe pain, Singh saw a lot of blood, one of his testicles that had been expelled from his body, and his right leg bent outward at a 90-degree angle at the knee. Singh went in and out of consciousness. 2 Singh spent approximately nine months in the hospital and had more than 59 surgeries. He was left with no right hip, causing intense pain and requiring him to use a walker. Singh required a colostomy bag at the time of his testimony and required a catheter for two years after the accident. Surgeons removed Singh’s testicle and harvested muscle from his thighs to reconstruct the destroyed pelvic area. His left arm was injured, and he could no longer raise it above shoulder level. Singh experienced constant pain from his lower back, and a wound in his left thigh remained open as it 2 Singh remembered that his motorcycle slid approximately 20 to 25 feet down the street and that defendant ran over him before crashing into a fence. He also testified that when he returned to consciousness, a group of people were removing defendant from his truck to prevent him from leaving the scene. However, the officer who conducted the investigation testified that the truck never left the sidewalk to crash into any fence and the circumstances of the crash made it unlikely that defendant’s truck ran over Singh after hitting him because the motorcycle collided and then glanced past the truck. DeGuzman saw defendant on the sidewalk and did not testify that defendant had to be restrained to prevent him from leaving. 4. never fully healed. Before the crash, Singh walked 22,000 to 25,000 steps a day, worked out daily, attended college, and helped his family around the house. After the accident, he could not be left alone, was always in pain, and only left his home for medical appointments. He described his life since the collision as living in a jail, and his sister put medical school on hold to care for Singh. Gill sustained a complex fracture to his right wrist that required surgery and fractures to his right two outside toes. He also had a concussion but no evidence of fractures or bleeding. Officer Rodolfo Diaz responded to the accident at approximately 10:33 p.m., having been dispatched to the location five minutes prior. He contacted defendant who appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. Defendant smelled of alcohol, swayed, and had red and watery eyes. Officer Diaz handcuffed defendant and detained him in Diaz’s patrol vehicle. Detective Marc Lugo trained to investigate drivers under the influence of alcohol and participated in approximately 50 investigations during his career. Lugo testified that during such investigations, he routinely engages the suspect in a 15-minute conversation, after Miranda 3 warnings if the suspect has been detained. After the elapsed time, Lugo inquires if the suspect will perform field sobriety tests, such as the walk and turn, horizontal gaze nystagmus, and one-leg stand, but the tests are solely voluntary. Thereafter, Lugo provides the standard preliminary breath test admonition and explains to the suspect that the test is purely voluntary, and his breath sample will not be saved. If Lugo has sufficient information for an arrest, he provides the implied consent admonition, advising that the suspect is required to provide a blood or breath sample for testing. 3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. 5. Lugo arrived at the accident scene at approximately 10:57 p.m. He contacted defendant when he arrived and provided him with Miranda warnings. Lugo immediately noticed an overpowering odor of alcohol and objective signs of alcohol intoxication, such as red watery eyes and slurred speech. Defendant was polite, and although he did not answer all questions, he did say he had had three to four light beers, the last of which occurred approximately 30 minutes prior. Defendant also stated that he is usually okay to drive when he drinks and did not recall drinking that much. In response to questioning, defendant told Lugo that defendant did not have any health problems, he was not injured or sick, he was not seeing a doctor or taking medicine or drugs, he did not wear glasses or contacts, and his truck had no mechanical issues. Lugo asked defendant if he would perform field sobriety tests, and defendant responded that he knew what would happen next and would prefer to just provide a breath sample. Lugo then provided defendant with a preliminary alcohol screening admonition that advised him the test was voluntary, and defendant agreed. The initial breath sample at 11:23 p.m. was not sufficient for testing but, thereafter, defendant provided a sufficient sample that indicated a BAC of 0.147 percent, just under twice the legal limit. Lugo concluded that defendant was under the influence of alcohol and was too impaired to drive safely. Lugo advised defendant that he was required to provide either a blood or breath sample pursuant to California’s implied consent law. Defendant selected the breath test and provided the first evidentiary sample at 11:35 p.m. Defendant’s first breath sample tested at 0.146 percent; his second breath sample tested at 0.145 percent at 11:38 p.m. Lugo arrested defendant. Officer Zachary Burdick responded to the accident location and was trained in traffic collision reconstruction. He examined the truck, which was parked partially on the sidewalk and had minor damage to the front driver’s side, the car parked in the street near the rear of the truck, exhibiting minor damage to the front passenger side, and the 6. motorcycle that had been moved from its original position and had scrapes and minor damage to its front end. Lugo eventually spoke with defendant, who appeared intoxicated, and asked him to describe what had happened. Defendant said that he backed out of his driveway and performed two or three counterclockwise doughnuts in the roadway; then he felt an impact and realized that the collision occurred. He did not see either the car or the motorcycle before the crash. DeGuzman told Lugo that DeGuzman saw the truck driving in circles in the road, and when the truck pulled to the curb, DeGuzman felt it was safe to proceed, but the truck turned left in front of DeGuzman across the lanes of traffic and hit him. DeGuzman indicated that a motorcycle was travelling in the lane to the right and collided with the truck slightly before him. Evidence at the scene and witness statements indicated that the truck pulled from the curb line and initiated another set of doughnuts in the roadway, and the tire marks indicated that the truck did not intentionally reduce its speed before coming to a stop. Doughnuts are an unlawful maneuver and were a contributing factor to the collision. The motorcycle appeared to have contacted the front corner of the truck and travelled 100 to 150 feet before stopping. The car contacted the truck in the same area after the motorcycle, causing it to veer to the left, and skidded 30 to 60 feet. Burdick concluded defendant’s alcohol impairment and unsafe turning movement were the primary and contributing factors to the accident. The breath testing device was checked for accuracy on April 10, 2019, and passed. California regulations require the accuracy of the device to be checked every 10 days, which did not always happen. However, if the device was not checked, it would not operate until an accuracy test had been performed. Essentially, every breath test conducted on the device was proceeded by an accuracy test within the previous 10-day period, even though the accuracy tests were not performed every 10 days. 7. If an individual weighing 190 pounds (defendant’s driver license showed his weight as 190 pounds) consumed between three and four 12-ounce light beers (36 to 48 ounces), his BAC would be between 0.05 and 0.109 percent. A 190-pound individual with a BAC of 0.145 percent would have consumed 63 to 102 ounces of light beer. Burdick concluded that defendant was impaired for purposes of driving a vehicle based upon his involvement in a multi-vehicle accident at 10:29 p.m., the preliminary alcohol screen test of 0.147 percent at 11:23 p.m., evidentiary chemical test results of 0.146 percent at 11:35 p.m. and 0.145 percent at 11:38 p.m., and his admission to drinking alcohol 30 minutes before contact with an officer. DISCUSSION I. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct in his closing argument and, even if his arguments were improper, defendant was not prejudiced. A. Background In closing, the prosecutor argued, “You can have that abiding conviction knowing his own admission that he made that choice to drink and drive. He thought he was fine. Well, he wasn’t. You can rest easy because [] defendant knew he was impaired. And we know this because he did not participate in the field sobriety tests.” Defense counsel objected, “That’s voluntary action not a consciousness of guilty [sic].” The court sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor to rephrase his argument. The prosecutor argued, “[D]efendant made a conscious decision not to participate in Officer Lugo’s field sobriety tests. Ask yourself, why would someone who is not impaired—why would someone who is not involved in a horrific collision, why would that person not offer up additional evidence? Well, that’s what [] defendant did .… He declined field sobriety tests. You can have that abiding conviction because [] defendant’s BAC was almost twice the legal limit.” Defense counsel did not object. During defendant’s closing argument, defense counsel argued that law enforcement failed to perform regular accuracy tests of the breath testing device as 8. required by law. He argued that the jury could not trust the device to work because it had not been calibrated since 2015, the prosecution failed to explain why police records regarding the testing device differed from the crime laboratory’s records, the jury had not seen the calibration certificate, the testing device was not brought to court, and the prosecution failed to disprove that radio frequencies interfered with the function of the device. Additionally, defense counsel attacked the quality of the investigation, arguing that law enforcement did not acquire data recordings from the vehicles as to their speed during the accident and the prosecutor failed to call Gill (Singh’s passenger) to testify. The prosecutor responded to defense counsel’s argument, “The evidence is absolutely on the People. But when defense makes an argument saying you should have heard ‘X.’ You should have heard ‘Y.’ You can ask yourself, well, how come we didn’t hear that from the defense?” Defense counsel objected, “Burden shifting, Your Honor.” The court sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor to rephrase. The prosecutor then argued, “The burden is absolutely on the People. And when the defense has a theory of the case, you can ask yourself about this idea of failure to call logical witnesses. And so if there is a defense belief that certain things should have been proven, such as [radio frequency] interference, when the calibration should have been performed, ask yourself, I didn’t hear a defense expert say that that was necessary.” Defense counsel again objected, “Your Honor, burden shifting again. I have no duty to call a single witness.” Following a sidebar, the court sustained the last objection and admonished the jury: “Ladies and gentlemen, I just want to take this opportunity to remind you that the party that has the burden of proof in this case and the only burden of proving anything to you folks rests with [the prosecutor] representing the prosecution or the People. By contrast, [defense counsel], representing the defense, does not have a burden of proving anything to you. [¶] The last comments regarding lack of calling logical witnesses, those 9. have been objected to and sustained. So I will order that you disregard any comments regarding that aspect entirely.” During subsequent rebuttal argument, the prosecutor compared defendant’s refusal to participate in field sobriety tests to a customer who is accused of shop lifting, “What do you do? Get out your receipt.” Defense counsel objected, “Burden shifting. Improper argument.” The court responded, “Well, the objection is sustained regarding reference to the field sobriety tests. The Court will order that the jurors disregard those arguments by the prosecution in that manner. [¶] I will also remind you folks that argument is not evidence. You folks have already heard all of the evidence and will make your determinations on what the facts are based on the evidence already presented and not based necessarily on arguments by either counsel.” The prosecutor then argued, “Those field sobriety tests are designed to give law enforcement officers clues in which to conduct their DUI investigation. And [] defendant, when presented with that opportunity, said, no, I know where this is going. The initial test reveals a .147 and the two subsequent tests .146 and .145.” Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by arguing defendant’s refusal to perform sobriety tests was evidence of consciousness of guilt and shifting the burden of proof by commenting on defendant’s failure to produce its own expert to support the accuracy of the breath testing device. B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law A prosecutor’s actions violate the federal Constitution if they involve a pattern of egregious conduct that infects the trial with such unfairness as to deny due process. (People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 149.) Even if not fundamentally unfair, a prosecutor’s conduct violates state law if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods in attempting to persuade either the trial court or the jury. (Ibid.) “A defendant asserting prosecutorial misconduct must … establish a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion.” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 10. 527, 568; see People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 522 [“whether the prosecutor has employed deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade either the court or the jury”].) A prosecutor commits misconduct by misstating the law (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 130) but “enjoys wide latitude in commenting on the evidence, including the reasonable inferences and deductions that can be drawn therefrom” (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 928; see People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 277 [“hyperbolic and tendentious” comments, even if “harsh and unbecoming,” may be reasonable if they can be inferred from the evidence]). We discuss each claim of alleged prosecutorial misconduct in turn. C. Analysis (1) The prosecutor’s use of defendant’s refusal to perform field sobriety tests as consciousness of guilt did not misstate the law and was not misconduct. The prosecutor argued that defendant demonstrated consciousness of guilt when he refused to perform field sobriety tests. Defendant objected to permitting that inference because the tests were “voluntary.” However, we conclude the prosecutor did not misstate the law, nor did this argument shift the burden of proof. A driver’s refusal to perform field sobriety tests is evidence of guilt and can be used to establish probable cause for arrest. (Marvin v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 717, 720.) Evidence of a refusal to perform field sobriety tests is also admissible as evidence at trial to show consciousness of guilt. (People v. McGinnis (1953) 123 Cal.App.2d Supp. 945, 947 [it does not “do violence to reason” for jury to conclude that refusal is motivated by risk that test would furnish evidence of “the condition in which he knew himself to be”].) Our Supreme Court applied these principles in People v. Sudduth (1966) 65 Cal.2d 543, 545–548. In that case, after Sudduth had been advised of his rights to counsel and to remain silent, the officer explained the physical tests associated with a field sobriety 11. examination, but Sudduth refused to take the tests and later refused a breathalyzer test, both facts the prosecutor commented upon in closing argument. (Id. at p. 545.) Sudduth noted that while a rule preventing comment on a failure to testify is necessary to protect the exercise of the right to remain silent, “[a] wrongful refusal to cooperate with law enforcement officers does not qualify for such protection.” (Id. at p. 546.) Where a statute specifically grants the suspect the right to refuse the test, courts have held that evidence of such a refusal may not be used as consciousness of guilt because it would render the right valueless. (See People v. Zavala (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 732, 741 [exercise of a statutory right to refuse a chemical test for drug use not admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt].) Relying upon People v. Zavala, another court held that a driver’s refusal to submit to a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test could not be admitted as evidence to demonstrate consciousness of guilt because the Legislature conferred upon citizens a right to refuse the test (Veh. Code, § 23612) and “it makes little sense to grant a right of refusal yet allow the prosecution to admit evidence of that refusal to establish consciousness of guilt.” (People v. Jackson (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1467–1468.) In doing so, the court distinguished the PAS test “from the standard [field sobriety tests] because it carries a statutory right to refuse the test. Thus, Marvin [v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d 717] and the cases cited therein, which stand for the general principle that evidence of a refusal to submit to a standard [field sobriety test] is admissible as consciousness of guilt, do not govern the more specific issue we confront here of whether evidence of a person’s refusal to submit to a PAS [field sobriety test] is similarly admissible where the right to refuse the test is granted by statute.” (Id. at p. 1469.) Therefore, we conclude that the prosecutor did not misstate the law in suggesting to the jury that defendant was aware he was inebriated when he declined to perform the standard field sobriety tests. 12. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor’s argument “implied that [defendant] had an obligation to prove his own innocence, in this instance by performing the voluntary exercises to demonstrate his sobriety,” which had the effect of shifting the burden of proof. However, we note the prosecutor did not argue that defendant bore the burden at trial to prove his innocence. In context, the prosecutor’s comment referred to defendant’s refusal to submit to the field sobriety tests because he believed he was under the influence. As we have discussed, there was nothing improper in that, especially given that the jury was properly instructed on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, discussed more fully below. Our Supreme Court rejected an argument that using a defendant’s pretrial conduct as evidence of consciousness of guilt shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, in the context of a stolen property case, where the defendant provides a false explanation of the goods or remains silent. (People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 756.) “It should be emphasized that the rule in no way shifts the burden of proof or destroys the presumption of innocence; the prosecution must still satisfy the jury of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) McFarland further explained that a defendant’s silence may not be used where it appears that he is acting on the basis of his right not to incriminate himself, but otherwise, the burden with respect to the truth or falsity of a defendant’s statement lies with the prosecution to show it is not believable in the light of the circumstances. (Id. at pp. 756–757.) In discussing analogous other contexts, our Supreme Court also pointed out that pretrial silence upon questioning by the police, where not based on a claim of right, may be introduced against a defendant to show consciousness of guilt or an admission. (Id. at p. 757.) We also conclude that any prejudice from the prosecutor’s argument is offset by other evidence of defendant’s consciousness of guilt. The inference that defendant declined to perform the physical field sobriety tests to minimize the evidence of his alcohol use seems contradicted by his agreement to take a breath test even though he had 13. been advised that he could refuse that test. But, in this case, the language of defendant’s refusal itself was admissible, and his statement to the officer that “he knew what would happen next and would prefer to just provide a breath sample” could be interpreted as an admission that he knew the breath test was inevitable and would show he was inebriated. A jury could properly infer that defendant dispensed with the physical field sobriety tests and proceeded to the breath test because he knew he could not avoid discovery of the extent of his inebriation, and, therefore, exhibited consciousness of his guilt. Since the jury could have drawn inference from defendant’s statement that he was aware of his guilt, the prosecutor’s reliance on defendant’s refusal to perform the physical field sobriety tests could not have prejudiced defendant. (2) Defendant was not prejudiced when the prosecutor commented to the jury that defense counsel did not support his attacks on the accuracy of the testing device with an expert witness. The rule against burden shifting does not mean that a prosecutor may not comment on the fact the defense has failed to produce evidence or witnesses that would be reasonable to expect the defendant to produce in support of their defense. To the contrary, “ ‘[a] distinction clearly exists between the permissible comment that a defendant has not produced any evidence, and … an improper statement that a defendant has a duty or burden to produce evidence, or a duty or burden to prove his or her innocence.’ ” (People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 352, quoting People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1340; accord, People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 939.) It is absolutely permissible for a prosecutor to point out that the defendant failed to produce evidence or witnesses when to do so would be reasonable and also to ask the jury to draw a negative inference from that failure. This does not constitute “burden shifting.” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 788; People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1304; see also People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 434 [for a prosecutor to point out there is no corroboration of a defendant’s testimony is not 14. burden shifting; it is simply an argument that a defendant’s story is less believable because of lack of corroboration]; People v. Gaines (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 821, 825 [“ ‘a prosecutor may argue to a jury that a defendant has not brought forth evidence to corroborate an essential part of his defensive story’ ”].) Here, the prosecutor argued that the defense failed to present an expert to support the argument that certain failures in maintaining the device actually affected its accuracy. Notably, the prosecutor did not argue defendant had a burden to produce any evidence or to prove his innocence and, rather, reiterated that the prosecution bore the burden of establishing defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The brief comments referring to defendant’s failure to introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses were proper. (See People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 263 [“prosecutorial comment upon a defendant’s failure ‘to introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses’ is not improper”]; People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 691 [rule of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 does not extend to comments on the state of the evidence or on the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses].) Defendant argues, however, that the prosecutor’s comments regarding the failure to call a defense expert to support defense counsel’s attack on the breath testing device crossed the line by asking the jury to infer that the failure to call such a witness “attested to the soundness of the prosecution evidence.” We need not address whether the trial court correctly sustained objections both times the prosecutor made this argument. In this case, the trial court did sustain the objections, admonished the jury to disregard them, and instructed the jury that defendant did not have any burden to produce evidence and the prosecution had the burden to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if we presume prosecutorial misconduct occurred, reversal is not warranted. The court’s initial instructions properly instructed the jury that the prosecution bore the burden to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. During closing argument, both the prosecutor and defendant addressed the prosecution’s burden to prove 15. defendant’s guilt. Additionally, the prosecutor prefaced the objectionable comments by stating, “The burden is absolutely on the People.” Thereafter, when sustaining defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s comments as shifting the burden of proof, the court instructed the jury that defendant did not have the burden of proving anything and that burden was on the prosecutor. The court further instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s argument in that regard “entirely.” The jurors were also instructed that the court’s instructions take precedence over any contrary comments by the attorneys and the questions and arguments of counsel are not evidence, a concept that was also addressed by the prosecutor in rebuttal argument and by the trial court in response to defendant’s objection. We presume that the jurors understood and followed these instructions. (See People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 34, overruled on other grounds in People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 17; People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 674 [noting the defendant had not established prejudice from prosecutorial misconduct or error in denying mistrial motion on that basis where record did not “disclose any reason for [the] court to cast aside the presumption that the jurors followed the court’s repeated admonishments” to disregard the improper evidence].) Additionally, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. Two witnesses testified that defendant hit them with his truck. Defendant and his truck were present at the scene, and defendant’s truck showed signs of having been in an accident. Defendant waived his rights and admitted to the officer that he was driving, did not see the vehicles, and was performing doughnuts in the road. Defendant also admitted that he was drinking, a fact corroborated by several officers who described that defendant had red and watery eyes, swayed, and smelled of alcohol. An officer conducted three breath tests at separate intervals, each of which proved defendant’s BAC was 0.14 percent. While the defense pointed out that the breath test device was not regularly tested for accuracy every 10 days as legally required, the technical violation did not affect the accuracy of the 16. device, and law enforcement could not use it again until an accuracy test was performed. The device was tested for accuracy three days before the accident. Given the strength of the evidence against defendant, the prosecutor’s relatively few remarks could not have prejudiced defendant. (See People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1344 [finding prosecutorial misconduct harmless because the improper remarks were limited and the evidence of guilt was strong]; see also People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1407 [finding misconduct harmless because “the prosecutor’s passing remark could not have prejudiced defendant, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt”].) Based on this record, it is not reasonably probable that the verdict would have been more favorable if the prosecutor had not made the challenged comments, and defendant was not prejudiced by them. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837.) We can also declare beyond any reasonable doubt that any presumed prosecutorial misconduct was harmless. Even if federal constitutional error occurred, reversal is not required. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it enhanced defendant’s sentence five years for great bodily injury, causing one victim to become comatose or suffer permanent paralysis, and striking punishment for the multiple victim enhancement. A. Background The probation report included recommendations that the court (1) grant defendant a term of probation, conditioned upon serving one year in county jail, (2) impose standard and special probation terms to address defendant’s alcohol use and mental health, and (3) select the low term should a prison term become necessary. At the sentencing hearing on November 12, 2024, the trial court acknowledged that it had reviewed and considered the probation report and the sentencing statements filed by the People and defendant. Unfortunately, defendant’s sentencing statement is not part of the superior court’s file, and defense counsel, having submitted on the sentencing 17. statement during the hearing, did not make the arguments orally. 4 In responding to defendant’s sentencing statement, the prosecutor discussed parts of its content, such as the alleged weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, 5 use of defendant’s statements to mental competency experts, and reference to jail calls (introduced during competency proceedings as evidence of defendant’s competence). The prosecutor requested a prison sentence and argued that defendant had failed to accept responsibility for his actions. Defense counsel responded that issues raised in his sentencing statement were mitigating factors as to how the accident occurred and argued that “additional terms set forth and offered by the defense as a continuation of rehabilitation, including counseling—private counseling” demonstrated defendant’s remorse. The court advised that it had “thought long and hard about the appropriate sentence in this case,” including the trial evidence and procedural history of the case. The trial court recognized that the competency issues caused suspension of criminal proceedings for a significant period of time and defendant had been in custody during that period. The court indicated it had weighed the circumstances in mitigation and aggravation in evaluating defendant’s probation suitability and the appropriate prison term. The court also recognized that defendant had no prior record and his case included multiple enhancements as factors in mitigation and weighed them against its findings that 4 Defendant failed to either move or obtain a stipulation for this court to order the correction or certification of any part of the record, such as ordering the superior court to settle any dispute concerning the content of defendant’s sentencing statement and omission from the record. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(c).) If such had been requested, presumably the superior court could have obtained a copy of the sentencing statement from either the prosecution or defense counsel’s records and conducted a hearing to determine whether it was reviewed by the trial court and should become part of the court’s record. 5 The defense apparently claimed issues with the breath testing device, lack of corroborating evidence, absence of accident reconstruction, and other possible factors that contributed to the accident. 18. the offense involved great violence and callousness, a particularly vulnerable victim, and defendant’s BAC was twice the legal limit.