People v. Thompson

Filed 10/26/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, B349601 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. 25SFCF00761) JESSE JAMES THOMPSON, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, David W. Stuart, Judge. Affirmed. Nathan J. Hochman, District Attorney, Cassandra Thorp and Matthew Brown, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Ricardo D. Garcia, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Head Deputy Public Defender, and Michael Pentz, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Respondent. ____________________________________  The People of the State of California (People) appeal from an order denying reinstatement of a felony complaint pursuant to Penal Code 1 section 871.5. The superior court previously dismissed the complaint under section 859b after denying the People’s motion to continue a motion to suppress evidence made by defendant and respondent Jesse James Thompson (defendant) at the preliminary hearing. The reason for the requested continuance was the unavailability of a detective whose testimony was needed to oppose the suppression motion. The detective was on medical leave for surgery. The People’s continuance motion was heard on the last day for commencing the preliminary hearing under section 859b, and defendant would not waive time. The court ruled that the suppression motion must be heard at the preliminary hearing within the time limit prescribed by section 859b; denied continuance of the suppression hearing; granted the motion to suppress; and dismissed the felony complaint. The court denied the People’s subsequent motion to reinstate the complaint for the same reasons. We affirm the superior court’s order denying the People’s motion to reinstate the complaint. BACKGROUND On March 26, 2025, Los Angeles Police Department Detective Bolan saw two men in a Food 4 Less parking lot. Both men looked in Bolan’s direction and appeared startled. One of the men, defendant, handed something to the other man, Petties. Petties then appeared to light and smoke something from a 1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless stated otherwise. 2 narcotics pipe. Petties began behaving erratically and rode his bicycle toward Bolan, who observed Petties to have dilated pupils. Bolan formed the opinion that Petties was under the influence of narcotics and that defendant had furnished Petties with narcotics. Bolan detained defendant and noticed a scale in a pouch on defendant’s waistband. A further search of defendant’s person uncovered drugs and related paraphernalia. The People charged defendant with possession of fentanyl for sale and possession of a drug with prior convictions. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11395, subd. (b)(1).) Defendant was arraigned on April 24, 2025, remanded into custody, and bail set at $100,000. The court set a preliminary hearing for May 6, 2025, as day 8 of 10. At the defense’s request, the case was continued until July 23, 2025, as day 0 of 11. On July 3, 2025, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5. On July 23, 2025, upon the defense’s motion, the court continued the preliminary hearing and the hearing on the suppression motion to August 13, 2025, as day 8 of 10. On August 13, 2025, the People moved to continue the hearing on the motion to suppress. The People explained that Detective Bolan, the only witness who could justify defendant’s detention, was on medical leave for surgery. Bolan had a doctor appointment scheduled for August 21, 2025, and could return to work as early as August 24, 2025. The People proposed holding the preliminary hearing as scheduled, as testimony from other officers could provide probable cause to hold defendant to answer. The People argued there would be no violation of defendant’s speedy trial right, which would not accrue until 60 days after the filing of the information. If Detective Bolan was then still 3 unavailable, the People would move to dismiss. The matter was trailed to August 14, 2025, at the People’s request. On August 14, 2025, the court heard the People’s motion to continue. The court inquired whether the People could proceed if the contested evidence were suppressed. The People replied they could not. The defense argued that section 1538.5, subdivision (f)(1) accorded defendant a statutory right to have the suppression motion heard concurrently with the preliminary hearing. When asked how defendant would be prejudiced, defense counsel argued that defendant would remain in custody even though the evidence to prove his crime was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that the People had shown good cause for a continuance. Defense counsel argued that even with a good cause finding, the suppression motion could not be bifurcated from the preliminary hearing. After further argument, the court trailed the matter to August 15, 2025. On August 15, 2025, the court ruled that the case must be dismissed if the People were unable to litigate the suppression motion within the time limit imposed by section 859b. Defendant confirmed he would not waive time. The People stated they were unable to proceed on the motion to suppress evidence, which the court then granted. Without the suppressed evidence, the People could not proceed on the preliminary hearing, and the court dismissed the case pursuant to section 859b. The court noted that the People could elect to refile the case. On August 26, 2025, the People filed a motion to reinstate the complaint under section 871.5, arguing the court had erroneously dismissed the complaint because the suppression motion could be bifurcated from the preliminary hearing and 4 heard subsequently. Defendant’s response reiterated his argument that the suppression motion and the preliminary hearing must be heard concurrently. The court heard and denied the 871.5 motion on September 30, 2025. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION I. Standard of review and statutory framework The issue presented is one of statutory interpretation based on undisputed facts—a question of law that we review de novo. (Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 125.) The applicable legal principles are well settled: “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context, because the language employed in the Legislature’s enactment generally is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ [Citations.] The plain meaning controls if there is no ambiguity in the statutory language. [Citation.] If, however, ‘the statutory language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, “ ‘ “courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265.) Section 859b and the 60-day time limit Section 859b governs timing of the preliminary hearing. As relevant here, the statute mandates dismissal of the complaint “if the preliminary examination is set or continued more than 60 days from the date of the arraignment . . . unless the defendant 5 personally waives his or her right to a preliminary examination within the 60 days.” (§ 859b, subd. (b).) Section 859b does not provide for continuances after the 60-day time limit, even for good cause, without the defendant’s personal waiver. (Ramos v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 719, 722 (Ramos).) A defendant can extend the 60-day time limit by giving a limited waiver. For example, if a defendant agrees to waive the 60-day limit on condition that the hearing begin by a certain date, the court may not continue the hearing beyond that date without a further waiver by the defendant. (People v. Superior Court (Arnold) 59 Cal.App.5th 923, 927.) Section 859b does not address motions to suppress evidence made at the preliminary hearing. (§ 859b.) Section 1538.5 Section 1538.5 is the statutory procedure for suppressing evidence pursuant to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule. (Barajas v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 944, 954.) It is the exclusive means for testing the legality of a search or seizure before trial in California. (§ 1538.5, subd. (m).) Section 1538.5 states that a motion to suppress in a felony case “shall be made only upon filing of an information.” (§ 1538.5, subd. (f)(1).) The statute provides an exception to that limitation, however, allowing a defendant in a felony case to make a motion to suppress evidence at the preliminary hearing: “(f)(1) If the property or evidence relates to a felony offense initiated by a complaint, the motion shall be made only upon filing of an information, except that the defendant may make the motion at the preliminary hearing, but the motion shall be 6 restricted to evidence sought to be introduced by the people at the preliminary hearing. “(2) The motion may be made at the preliminary examination only if, at least five court days before the date set for the preliminary examination, the defendant has filed and personally served on the people a written motion accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities as required by paragraph (2) of subdivision (a). At the preliminary examination, the magistrate may grant the defendant a continuance for the purpose of filing the motion and serving the motion upon the people, at least five court days before resumption of the examination, upon a showing that the defendant or his or her attorney of record was not aware of the evidence or was not aware of the grounds for suppression before the preliminary examination.” (§ 1538.5, subd. (f)(1), (2).) Section 1538.5, subdivision (i) also gives a defendant in a felony case the right to make or renew a motion to suppress at a special hearing before trial: “If the property or evidence obtained relates to a felony offense initiated by complaint and the defendant was held to answer at the preliminary hearing, or if the property or evidence relates to a felony offense initiated by indictment, the defendant shall have the right to renew or make the motion at a special hearing relating to the validity of the search or seizure which shall be heard prior to trial and at least 10 court days after notice to the people, unless the people are willing to waive a portion of this time.” (§ 1538.5, subd. (i).) The substance of the special hearing depends on whether the motion was already heard at the preliminary hearing. If heard at the preliminary hearing, a renewed motion at the 7 special hearing is limited to the preliminary hearing transcript or evidence that could not reasonably have been presented. (Ibid.) If the defendant brings the motion for the first time at the special hearing, it is a full hearing. (See People v. Glenn (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 886, 889–890.) Section 1538.5 does not mention section 859b. It is also silent on continuances. Section 1050 Section 1050 establishes procedures for continuances in criminal cases. To continue any hearing in a criminal case, the statute requires two days’ written notice (unless excused for good cause) and good cause: “(b) To continue any hearing in a criminal proceeding, including the trial, (1) a written notice shall be filed and served on all parties to the proceeding at least two court days before the hearing sought to be continued, together with affidavits or declarations detailing specific facts showing that a continuance is necessary and (2) within two court days of learning that he or she has a conflict in the scheduling of any court hearing, including a trial, an attorney shall notify the calendar clerk of each court involved, in writing, indicating which hearing was set first. A party shall not be deemed to have been served within the meaning of this section until that party actually has received a copy of the documents to be served, unless the party, after receiving actual notice of the request for continuance, waives the right to have the documents served in a timely manner. Regardless of the proponent of the motion, the prosecuting attorney shall notify the people’s witnesses and the defense attorney shall notify the defense’s witnesses of the notice of 8 motion, the date of the hearing, and the witnesses’ right to be heard by the court. “(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (b), a party may make a motion for a continuance without complying with the requirements of that subdivision. However, unless the moving party shows good cause for the failure to comply with those requirements, the court may impose sanctions as provided in Section 1050.5.” (§ 1050, subds. (b), (c).) Dismissal of the action is not a permissible sanction for failure to show good cause. Section 1050.5, which specifies the sanctions that may be imposed pursuant to section 1050, subdivision (c) states in part: “The authority to impose sanctions provided for by this section shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to the court, except that the court or magistrate shall not dismiss the case.” (§ 1050.5, subd. (b).) II. Motion to suppress and preliminary hearing Section 1538.5, subdivision (f) permits defendants to make a motion to suppress at the preliminary hearing: “[T]he defendant may make the motion [to suppress] at the preliminary hearing.” (§ 1538.5, subd. (f)(1).) “The phrase ‘at the preliminary hearing’ means during the preliminary hearing.” (People v. Ciraco (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1142, 1145.) The statutory language of section 1538.5, subdivision (f) is permissive, in contrast to subdivision (i), which accords a defendant the statutory right to make or renew a suppression motion at a special hearing: “[T]he defendant shall have the right to renew or make the motion at a special hearing relating to the validity of the search or seizure which shall be heard prior to trial.” (Id., subd. (i).) Notwithstanding this difference in statutory language, courts have held that section 1538.5, 9 subdivision (f) grants defendants a statutory right to make a motion to suppress at the preliminary hearing; and denial of that right results in an illegal commitment: “Petitioners seek the opportunity provided by the statute to move at the preliminary hearing for suppression of evidence obtained under an allegedly invalid search warrant; this is their right, and, because they were prevented from exercising their statutory prerogative, petitioners were illegally committed.” (Cuevas v. Superior Court (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 406, 411 (Cuevas).) The petitioners in Cuevas claimed they were precluded from challenging a search warrant at the preliminary hearing pursuant to section 1538.5. At the preliminary hearing, their counsel stated his intention to move to suppress evidence obtained through execution of the search warrant. The court refused to hear the motion because section 1538.5, subdivision (b) provided “the motion should first be heard by the magistrate who issued the search warrant,” and the court conducting the preliminary hearing had not issued the warrant. (Cuevas, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at p. 408.) The evidence subject to the suppression motion was introduced, the petitioners were held to answer, and their subsequent motion to set aside the information denied. (Id. at p. 409.) The petitioners sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the superior court from further proceedings. The appellate court issued the writ, concluding the petitioners were erroneously denied the right to present the suppression motion at the preliminary hearing. (Id. at pp. 409–412.) The court in Cuevas cited Jennings v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1967) 66 Cal.2d 867 (Jennings), which held that restricting a defendant’s right of cross-examination at the preliminary hearing was a denial of the defendant’s “substantial 10 rights” resulting in an “illegal commitment” remediable by a writ of prohibition. (Cuevas, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at p. 410, citing Jennings, at pp. 879–880.) The Supreme Court in Jennings explained why this is the case: “ ‘The preliminary examination is not merely a pretrial hearing. “The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to weed out groundless or unsupported charges of grave offenses, and to relieve the accused of the degradation and expense of a criminal trial. Many an unjustifiable prosecution is stopped at that point, where the lack of probable cause is clearly disclosed.” [Citations.]’ To effectuate this constitutional and statutory purpose the defendant must be permitted, if he chooses, to elicit testimony or introduce evidence tending to overcome the prosecution’s case or establish an affirmative defense.” (Jennings, at p. 880.) A defendant’s ability to elicit testimony and cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary hearing about the legality of a search and seizure is dependent on the filing of a motion to suppress under section 1538.5. “[T]he only way in which a defendant can litigate the unreasonableness of a search and seizure at the preliminary hearing is to move to suppress under section 1538.5.” (People v. Williams (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1186, 1195–1196.) Bringing a motion under section 1538.5 triggers a defendant’s statutory and “substantial” right to have the motion heard at the preliminary hearing. (Jennings, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 879–880; Cuevas, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at p. 410.) Other appellate courts have reaffirmed this principle. (See, e.g., Bruner v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1193, 1197 [“Failure to accord a defendant the statutory right to a suppression motion at the preliminary hearing requires the granting of a Penal Code section 995 motion”]; Cox v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 11 1046, 1053 (Cox) [same].) We are unpersuaded by the People’s argument that Jennings, Cox, Cuevas, and Bruner are distinguishable and therefore inapposite because the courts in those cases denied a motion to suppress premised on improper grounds but did not consider whether to continue a suppression motion for good cause. The People argue that a suppression motion can be severed from the preliminary hearing for good cause and that no statute or case authority requires a suppression motion to be heard within the time frame for the preliminary hearing under section 859b. The first argument contradicts the principles articulated in Jennings, Cuevas, Bruner, and Cox—a defendant who brings a motion to suppress at the preliminary hearing pursuant to section 1538.5, subdivision (f) has a statutory and substantial right to have the motion heard at the preliminary hearing. The second argument is an unsuccessful attempt to reframe the issue. Defendant had the statutory right to have his motion to suppress heard at the preliminary hearing. (Jennings, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 880; Cox, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1053; Bruner, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1197; Cuevas, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at p. 410.) The preliminary hearing in this case could not be continued because defendant would not waive time, which was also his right. (§ 859b, subd. (b); Ramos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 722.) The People could not subvert those rights by continuing the suppression motion, thereby precluding defendant from eliciting testimony and cross-examining witnesses at the preliminary hearing about the legality of the search and seizure. (Jennings, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 879–880.) That defendant could instead have exercised a statutory right under section 1538.5, subdivision (i) to make or renew a 12 motion to suppress at a subsequent special proceeding does not alter our analysis. The election whether to move to suppress under subdivision (f) or subdivision (i) of section 1538.5 belongs to the defendant, not the prosecution. (§ 1538.5, subds. (f), (j).) Defendant chose to exercise his statutory right to make a motion to suppress at the preliminary hearing. Denying him the opportunity to do so would have violated both a statutory and a substantial right. (Jennings, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 880; Cox, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1053; Bruner, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1197; Cuevas, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at p. 410.) The court here did not err by denying the People’s motion to continue the suppression motion, by granting the suppression motion, by dismissing the complaint, or by denying the motion to reinstate the complaint. III. Continuance pursuant to section 1050 The People cite no authority to support their argument that a good faith showing for a continuance under section 1050 vitiates a defendant’s right to have a suppression motion heard at the preliminary hearing within the time limits prescribed by section 859b. Courts that have addressed continuances of suppression motions pursuant to section 1050 have recognized that a continuance must not violate the statutory time limits for a speedy preliminary hearing or trial. In People v. Ferrer (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 873 (Ferrer) the court held that although it is an abuse of discretion to deny a prosecutor’s request to continue a suppression hearing when the denial will foreseeably result in a dismissal of the case, a court’s discretion to grant a continuance is nevertheless circumscribed by the statutory time limits imposed under section 859b. (Id. at pp. 877, 884.) The defendant in Ferrer made the motion to 13 suppress after the preliminary hearing at which he was held to answer. (Id. at p. 878.) At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor requested a continuance, stating she had not subpoenaed the witnesses due to a “mix up.” The trial court denied the request for a continuance under section 1050, and granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. On appeal, the prosecution conceded failure to show good cause but argued that denying the continuance was error because sufficient time remained to hear the suppression motion before trial. (Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 878–879.) The appellate court agreed and reversed. In doing so, the court in Ferrer reviewed the legislative history to section 1050 and concluded the Legislature intended to prohibit dismissal for failure to show good cause but only so long as the defendant’s rights to a speedy preliminary hearing or trial were not violated. (Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 880.) The court explained that there is no right to a speedy suppression hearing, and that a requested continuance should be granted unless it would result in violation of a statutory time limits applicable to a preliminary hearing or trial: “While the Legislature has provided statutory protection for the rights to a speedy preliminary hearing and trial, it has not provided any independent right to a speedy suppression hearing. And no such right exists in either the state or federal Constitutions. Instead, the statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial ensure that a criminal defendant is able to insist on a prompt resolution of any suppression motion. In interpreting section 1050, there is no reasonable basis to conclude the Legislature intended to provide greater protection to a defendant’s interest in a prompt section 1538.5 hearing than it 14 provided to a defendant’s interest in a prompt preliminary hearing and trial. Instead, we conclude the Legislature did not intend for a dismissal to result unless the requested continuance results in violation of a statutory time limit (such as § 859b or § 1382) or defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.” (Id. at p. 884.) In People v. Brown (2023) 14 Cal.5th 530 (Brown), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Ferrer court’s holding that denying a request to continue a suppression hearing is and abuse of discretion if it results in dismissal of the case: “The Ferrer court was correct in concluding that the trial court abuses its discretion when it declines . . . a request to continue a suppression hearing if a dismissal of the underlying case is reasonably foreseeable.” (Id. at p. 548.) The Supreme Court also reaffirmed the Ferrer court’s determination that discretion to continue a suppression hearing is circumscribed by statutory time limits: “When time remains to bring the matter to trial, and thus to hear the defendant’s motion to suppress, it typically does not further justice for the court to force a dismissal and forestall a legitimate prosecution conducted in compliance with the speedy trial statutes.” (Id. at p. 549, italics added.) Neither Brown nor Ferrer involved circumstances where requested continuance of a suppression hearing conflicted with the statutory time limit under section 859b. The courts in both cases, however, made clear that a continuance must not result in a violation of statutory time limits, including those prescribed under section 859b. (Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 549; Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 884.) In this case, granting a continuance of the suppression hearing would have resulted in violation of the time limits applicable to a preliminary hearing 15 under section 859b. The superior court accordingly did not abuse its discretion by denying the People’s request for a continuance. IV. Statutory purpose and public policy We are unpersuaded by the People’s arguments that their motion to continue should have been granted because sections 859b and 1538.5 serve different purposes; public policy favors determination of the suppression motion on the merits; defendant would suffer “minimal” prejudice; and refiling the complaint is not a substitute for a proper continuance. These arguments fail to address established legal principles that a defendant is entitled to make a motion to suppress at the preliminary hearing; once such a motion is made, the defendant has the right to litigate at the preliminary hearing the propriety of a search and seizure; and failure to adjudicate the motion within the time limit prescribed for the preliminary hearing denies the defendant a statutory and substantial right resulting in an improper commitment. 16  DISPOSITION The September 30, 2025 order denying the People’s motion to reinstate the complaint pursuant to Penal Code section 871.5 is affirmed. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. LUI, P. J. We concur: CHAVEZ, J. RICHARDSON, J. 17