People v. Henn

Filed 9/22/26; Certified for Publication 10/19/26 (order attached) IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE THE PEOPLE, B348158 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24ARCF01826) v. PAUL WILLIAM HENN, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Christopher W. Dybwad, Judge. Affirmed. Margaret Manning, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _________________________  Paul Henn was charged with, among other offenses, inflicting corporal injury on his girlfriend. He moved for mental health diversion under Penal Code 1 section 1001.36. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Henn was eligible for diversion but unsuitable for it because he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Henn then pleaded guilty to willful infliction of corporal injury on his girlfriend. He now appeals, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment. BACKGROUND I. The underlying crime Henn was charged with injuring his girlfriend (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), possessing a smoking device (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364), and possessing a controlled substance (id., § 11377, subd. (a)). The felony complaint also alleged that Henn used a deadly and dangerous weapon as to count 1 (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). During the trial court proceedings, Henn was allowed to remain out of custody on bond. The charges against Henn arose from the following evidence, admitted at the preliminary hearing. Isabel Herrera testified that on November 12, 2024, she was nine months pregnant, and Henn was the child’s father. Late that evening, Henn called Herrera and said he did not know where he was. When Herrera picked him up, Henn seemed to be under the influence of a substance, he was not wearing shoes, 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 and he had a blanket around his shoulders. Henn got into the car, and he and Herrera argued about him going to rehab. Henn started throwing things in the car. While Herrera was driving on the freeway, Henn choked her with a guitar “amp cord.” Henn had the cord around her neck for a few seconds, and, during this time, Herrera had trouble breathing, although she denied feeling pain. 2 Henn stopped when Herrera put her hand between the cord and her neck area. When Herrera parked near where Henn lived, his roommate saw Henn in the car’s backseat with his hand on Herrera’s neck. The roommate called the police. When the police arrived and arrested Henn, he was cooperative and complied with all orders. A law enforcement officer found a prescription pill bottle, a cylindrical bulbous pipe containing burn marks, and methamphetamine in Henn’s pocket. II. Henn’s motion for mental health diversion Henn moved for mental health diversion. To support the motion, Henn submitted documents from Cri Help, a residential treatment program, and a forensic evaluation and consultation performed by Dr. Michelle Adams. A. Documents from Cri-Help Henn was admitted to Cri-Help’s detox-in-patient program on November 16, 2024 and into the residential drug and alcohol treatment program a week later. Henn attended weekly individual sessions with a counselor and weekly groups about 12- step education, relapse prevention, cognitive-behavioral therapy, 2 A photograph of Herrera’s bruised neck was admitted at the preliminary hearing. 3 dialectical behavior therapy, conflict resolution, step study, life skills spiritual exploration, and relationships. He had a 12-step sponsor, remained drug and alcohol free, and complied with his program. As of February 2025, Henn continued to make progress, with the goal of transitioning to an outpatient program in March 2025. B. The forensic report Dr. Adams interviewed Henn in March 2025 at Cri-Help. Henn reported that he was diagnosed with attention- deficit/hyperactivity disorder when he was nine years old and prescribed Adderall for it. Henn began experimenting with substances when he was 17 years old. 3 But after his mother committed suicide in 2013, when he was 25 years old, he fell into a deep depression, and he reported not feeling happy since she died. He started using substances to self-medicate, to try and not feel “ ‘that flood of feelings.’ ” He began drinking 12 beers a day, smoking marijuana daily, and taking 30 Xanax pills a day. He increased his Adderall use to up to 30 pills a day and used as much as two grams of methamphetamine a day. From 2014 to 2024, he had not had a substantial period of sobriety, although he tried to quit on his own in 2013 and went to rehab for two months in 2014. His Adderall and methamphetamine use caused him to go into “ ‘full psychosis’ ” and paranoia, and he would not sleep for days. 3 Henn was 36 years old when the trial court considered his motion for mental health diversion. 4  Henn reported that his substance abuse worsened his trauma response symptoms of depression, isolation, and inability to sleep, and created problems in all aspects of his life. Dr. Adams diagnosed Henn with attention- deficit/hyperactivity disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, severe alcohol use disorder in early remission, severe amphetamine (Adderall) use disorder in early remission, severe cannabis use disorder in early remission, severe methamphetamine use disorder in early remission, and severe alprazolam (Xanax) use disorder in early remission. In the doctor’s opinion, Henn’s mental disorders significantly contributed to his involvement in the offenses based on his self- reported history, including that on the day of the incident he had been fired from his job, argued with his girlfriend, and was stressed about the impending birth of his first child. He had sold his shoes and phone to buy methamphetamine, and he was paranoid when Herrera picked him up, describing what happened as a blur and saying, “ ‘I barely remember it.’ ” Dr. Adams further opined that the symptoms motivating Henn’s criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment. She based her opinion on Henn’s willingness to discuss his issues, his desire for treatment, and his “notable progress” in treatment, as he had abstained from all substance use and had no instances of aggression in his first four months of rehab. She did note, however, that his treatment thus far had focused on his substance use recovery and had not specifically addressed his “trauma response symptoms—the very symptoms which been intolerable and initially led him to use substances problematically.” 5  The doctor also opined that Henn would not present an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated outside a secure setting. He had no documented violent or threatening behavior when the police intervened or during his residential treatment. She recommended 12 months’ minimum treatment at a residential center that could provide comprehensive treatment for his mental disorders. In reaching her opinions, the doctor noted that she did not have records of Henn’s criminal history. C. Hearing on motion At the hearing on the motion, the prosecutor, who did not submit written opposition, argued that Henn’s conduct was consistent with a willingness to commit a super strike and referenced a prior domestic violence battery conviction under section 243, subdivision (e)(1) and an uncharged incident from 2022 involving Herrera that also involved strangulation. Henn’s counsel explained that the prior misdemeanor conviction was 15 years old and the prior uncharged incident “had to do with his alcohol substance abuse” and unresolved mental health issues. Counsel further represented that Henn had successfully completed 152 days of inpatient treatment and was now an outpatient. Also, Henn had no significant criminal record, and his misdemeanor conviction had been expunged. The trial court said it was inclined to deny mental health diversion “because of the risk to commit a super strike based on the present offense and the uncharged incident and I suppose, to the extent it’s a pattern, the misdemeanor conviction from many, many years ago.” The trial court added that its primary focus was on the risk to “everyone with strangulation of a driver on the 6 freeway and coupled with that driver being the defendant’s girlfriend, who is nine months pregnant. I do think that rises to the level of risk of committing a super strike.” The trial court declined to hold a further evidentiary hearing at which Dr. Adams could testify and denied the motion. Otherwise, the trial court made it clear that it was finding “a presence of a mental health issue.” III. Plea and sentence On July 16, 2025, Henn, pursuant to a negotiated plea, pleaded no contest to willfully inflicting corporal injury. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Henn on three years formal probation on various terms and conditions, including that he complete a one-year dual diagnosis treatment program through I-ADARP. The trial court dismissed the remaining counts and allegations. DISCUSSION I. Overview of mental health diversion and standard of review Pretrial mental health diversion allows criminal proceedings to be suspended and charges to be potentially dismissed upon successful mental health treatment. (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890.) Section 1001.36 authorizes pretrial mental health diversion for defendants with qualifying mental disorders. (See generally People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624, 626–627.) “ ‘Pretrial diversion’ means the postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, at any point in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is charged until adjudication, 7 to allow the defendant to undergo mental health treatment.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1).) Section 1001.36’s purpose is to keep people with mental disorders from entering and reentering the criminal justice system while protecting public safety, to give counties discretion in developing and implementing diversion across a continuum of care settings, and to provide mental health rehabilitative services. (§ 1001.35; see generally People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 886.) The mental health diversion program shall be applied as broadly as possible. (Frahs, at p. 632.) A defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion if two eligibility requirements are met. First, the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and defense counsel has provided evidence of that disorder, including a diagnosis within the last five years by a qualified mental health expert. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) Second, the defendant’s disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) If the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, then a court shall find that the disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence it was not a motivating, causal or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense. (Ibid.) If a defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements, then the court must consider the defendant’s suitability for pretrial diversion, which requires meeting four criteria. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) First, a mental health expert has found that the defendant’s disorder would respond to mental health treatment. 8 (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1).) Second, the defendant consents to treatment. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(2).) Third, the defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion, unless the defendant is incompetent to consent. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(3).) Fourth, the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in section 1170.18, if treated in the community. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Section 1170.18, subdivision (c), defines an “ ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ ” as “an unreasonable risk” the defendant will commit a new violent felony known as a super strike. The super strikes are a sexually violent offense, oral copulation with a child under 14 years old, a lewd or lascivious act involving a child under 14 years old, homicide, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machinegun on a peace officer or firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, and any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life without parole. (§§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4), 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).) In determining whether a defendant poses an unreasonable risk to public safety, the “court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) The trial court has discretion to order the defendant to diversion if it finds the defendant both eligible and suitable. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a); People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080 [“Ultimately, however, diversion under section 1001.36 is discretionary, not mandatory, even if all the requirements are met”].) Moreover, even if a defendant makes 9 the requisite showing of eligibility and suitability for diversion, a court retains “residual” discretion to deny diversion. (People v. Qualkinbush, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.) We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mental health diversion for an abuse of discretion, but we review its factual findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147 (Whitmill).) “ ‘ “A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Doron (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1, 9.) “ ‘On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends.’ ” (People v. Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1079.) 10 II. Analysis The trial court found Henn eligible for mental health diversion but unsuitable, finding that Henn would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community. 4 (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Henn contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him mental health diversion because there is not substantial evidence to support that finding. As we now explain, we disagree. In reaching its conclusion that Henn was likely to commit a super strike, the trial court relied, first and primarily, on the circumstances of Henn’s current offense, and second, on Henn’s prior criminal history to the extent it showed a pattern of domestic violence. First, the circumstances surrounding Henn’s choking of Herrera was sufficient evidence he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (See generally People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 862 [nothing in mental diversion statute “precludes a trial court from relying primarily, or even entirely, on the circumstances of the charged offense or offenses in denying a motion for diversion”]; see People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 799 [nature and manner of charged crimes, particularly two super strikes, rendered defendant likely to commit another super strike].) Henn used a guitar chord to choke Herrera while she was driving on the freeway. And after they parked, a witness saw Henn with his hands on Herrera’s neck area. Although the witness did not testify that Henn was 4 The trial court did not make express eligibility findings, focusing instead on Henn’s suitability for diversion. 11 choking Herrera and Herrera did not testify about any second choking, whatever the witness saw was enough to prompt a 911 call. Henn minimizes his conduct by arguing that the first choking lasted but seconds. However, a catastrophic accident involving others on the freeway could have occurred in that time. Additionally, Henn’s choking of Herrera stopped only after Herrera was able to take some defensive action while driving, not because Henn voluntarily stopped choking her with the guitar chord. Henn’s actions thus implicated not only a direct danger to Herrera and their unborn child but also to others on the freeway. (Compare with Sarmiento v. Superior Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 897 [diversion improperly denied for defendant whose charged offense did not involve weapons or threat of violence].) Moreover, Henn applied a weapon directly against Herrera. This use of a weapon distinguishes cases he cites for the proposition that using a weapon is not sufficient evidence a defendant poses an unreasonable risk to public safety. In Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, the defendant had PTSD and had been treated for military sexual trauma. One evening, the defendant, who had indicated he was feeling unwell, warned a friend not to “ ‘walk up’ ” on him, fired a gunshot into the air, and then told his girlfriend he would kill her. He was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, discharging a firearm with gross negligence, and criminal threats. (Id. at pp. 1142–1144.) The trial court denied the defendant’s diversion motion on the ground that his threat to kill and firing a gun into the air demonstrated he was likely to commit a super strike. (Id. at p. 1147.) Whitmill found that the facts of the incident, 12 including that the defendant ran from further confrontation, threw away his firearm, and complied peacefully with law enforcement, did not indicate he was likely to commit a super- strike offense in the future. (Id. at pp. 1151–1156.) The gunshot was akin to a warning shot to his friend not to get close to him and resulted from his hypervigilance disorder. (Id. at p. 1153.) Thus, the Whitmill defendant did not fire a gun at a victim or otherwise use the gun directly against a victim. This contrasts with Henn, who used a weapon to choke Herrera and inflicted visible injury on her. Second, Henn’s criminal history was also evidence that he posed an unreasonable risk to public safety. Henn had a 2010 misdemeanor conviction for domestic battery and a 2022 uncharged domestic violence incident involving Herrera, although the details surrounding the conviction and uncharged incident were not developed. As the trial court found, the prior conviction and uncharged incident showed a pattern or history of domestic violence. This fact also separates Henn from the Whitmill defendant, whose prior record consisted of possession and sales of drugs and theft, and did not include violent convictions. (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1151; accord, People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 450–451 [diversion improperly denied to defendant whose criminal history was for misdemeanor drug offenses and a hit and run and did not include violent felonies].) And although there was other evidence that could support a grant of mental health diversion, it does not render the evidence we have cited insufficient or otherwise compel reversal of the order denying diversion. Instead, although Dr. Adams 13 opined that Henn “would likely not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated outside of a secure treatment setting,” her opinion was expressly qualified. That is, in a section labeled, “Data that May not be Consistent with Opinion,” Dr. Adams noted that Henn’s criminal history was not in the police and investigation records. “As such, it was not possible to consider the documented presence or absence of any charges or violations related to dangerousness.” Thus, the doctor did not review Henn’s criminal history on which the trial court relied to reach its decision. And her report did not indicate that Henn told her about that history, which could suggest he was not completely forthcoming. Therefore, Dr. Adams was missing information relevant to her dangerousness finding. Nor are we persuaded that the trial court’s grant of a pretrial bond undermined its finding Henn was at risk of committing a super strike. In People v. Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at page 451, the trial court released the defendant into the community on bond, which required a finding he was not likely to cause great bodily injury to others if released. Later, the trial court denied diversion on the ground he was too dangerous to be treated in the community. The appellate court found it “logically inconsistent to deny mental health diversion on the ground that a [defendant] was likely to commit a super-strike offense, while simultaneously finding he was not likely to inflict great bodily injury on persons in the community.” (Ibid.; accord, Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 690.) Here, we recognize that Henn was allowed to be out on bond during the trial proceedings and was in a residential treatment facility. Moreover, while we agree that a decision to grant a bond may be 14 relevant to a later decision regarding diversion, it should not necessarily be dispositive of a decision about diversion. (See People v. Tourville (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 439, 468–469 (dis. opn. of Stone, J.) [“Nor do we want to discourage prosecutors from recommending probation for particular defendants as opposed to prison, even if they opposed diversion”].) Also, only six months elapsed from when Henn committed his offense (November 12, 2024) to the date of the diversion hearing (May 19, 2025). The defendants in Moine and Gomez lived in the community without incident longer, over two and one years, respectively. (People v. Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 451; Gomez v. Superior Court, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 690.) Nor is this insignificant, given that relapse is a common occurrence during treatment. Indeed, there was evidence that Henn had a history of not completing or failing in treatment. He told Dr. Adams that he tried to quit drugs in 2013 on his own and that he went to rehab for two months in 2014 but remained sober for only two months. Thus, prior efforts at rehabilitation failed, which supports the trial court’s order. (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Taylor) (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1153, 1168 [diversion denied for defendant with history of not completing treatment].) Similarly, the grant of probation pursuant to the negotiated plea was not inconsistent with denying diversion. Rather, probation can afford additional protections and supervision than perhaps available in diversion programs. (See generally People v. Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at pp. 468–469 (dis. opn. of Stone, J.); People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207, 214 [while mental health diversion may provide some motivation for 15 remaining drug free, felony probation with state prison hanging over one’s head may provide more].) 5 To the extent Henn relies on People v. Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th 439, that case is distinguishable. Although the trial court found that Tourville was eligible for diversion and did not pose an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike, it expressed doubt whether two years of mental health diversion would be sufficient time to treat Tourville absent supervision by the probation department. In an apparent exercise of its residual discretion, the court then found him not suitable for diversion and, after accepting a plea, placed him on probation and imposed the same treatment program. The reviewing court found this to be an abuse of discretion. Here, the court found Henn posed an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike based on his criminal history and the facts of the underlying offense. We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings, and, accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 5 We do not address Henn’s alternative contention regarding residual discretion because the trial court did not exercise its residual discretion in this case. 16  DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. ASHWORTH, J. * We concur: ADAMS, P. J. HANASONO, J. * Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 17 Filed 10/19/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE THE PEOPLE, B348158 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24ARCF01826) v. ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION PAUL WILLIAM HENN, FOR PUBLICATION [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] Defendant and Appellant. THE COURT: The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed September 22, 2026, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause, it now appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered. [There is no change in judgment.] ____________________________________________________________ ASHWORTH, J. * ADAMS, P. J. HANASONO, J. * Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.