Full Opinion

Filed 10/27/26 P. v. Riel CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Shasta) THE PEOPLE, C105505 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. v. CRF86788102) CHARLES DELL RIEL, Defendant and Appellant. Charles Dell Riel was sentenced to death in 1988. He appeals from an order on his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code 1 section 1172.75 that struck a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)) but refused to revisit his death sentence. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the superior court can modify a death judgment under section 1172.75, and, (2) alternatively, the superior court should address his request for recall and resentencing under section 1172.1. We affirm the court’s order. I. BACKGROUND “Before 2020, the Penal Code instructed criminal sentencing courts to ‘impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term or county jail term’ the defendant had previously served for a felony. ([]§ 667.5, former subd. (b), added by Stats. 1976, ch. 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 1 1139, § 268, pp. 5137, 5138 and amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 442.) Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature eliminated these one-year prior-prison-term enhancements except in cases involving prior terms for sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) Two years later, the Legislature made the change retroactive. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3.) In … section 1172.75, the Legislature declared that, aside from enhancements imposed for sexually violent offenses, ‘[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to’ … section 667.5, subdivision (b) ‘is legally invalid.’ ([]§ 1172.75, subd. (a), added by Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.)” (People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1053-1054.) “A defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a now-invalid enhancement is entitled to resentencing. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a), (c).) To facilitate the process, the statute directs California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to ‘identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a).’ (Id., subd. (b).) Upon receiving that information, the sentencing court must ‘review the judgment and verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a).’ (Id., subd. (c).) ‘If the court determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.’ (Ibid.)” (People v. Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1055.) In 1988, a jury convicted Riel of first degree murder, robbery, and kidnapping. As relevant to this proceeding, the jury found true robbery murder and kidnapping murder special circumstance allegations (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) and two prior prison term allegations (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). After the penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death, and the court imposed that sentence. On direct appeal, our Supreme Court struck a redundant prior prison term finding and otherwise affirmed the judgment. (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1172.) 2 In 2023, Riel filed a motion to strike his special circumstance findings or, in the alternative, modify the judgment. He argued that he was entitled to recall and resentencing under section 1172.75, and that the trial court therefore could and should strike the special circumstance findings under section 1385 2 or modify the judgment under section 190.4, subdivision (e) to impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole instead of death. The court denied Riel’s motion as premature because CDCR had not referred the matter to it pursuant to section 1172.75. On appeal, the People conceded that CDCR had referred the matter to the trial court. (People v. Riel (Apr. 15, 2025, C099455) [nonpub. opn.].) A different panel of this court remanded the case to the trial court to consider Riel’s motion. (Ibid.) On remand, Riel filed a supplemental brief arguing the trial court should not follow People v. Dixon (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 236, review granted Oct. 22, 2025, S292223 (Dixon). The court in Dixon concluded section 1172.75 does not authorize resentencing on death sentences because “[t]he ‘exclusive procedure for collateral attack on a judgment of death’ is a petition for writ of habeas corpus under section 1509. (§ 1509, subd. (a).)” (Dixon, supra, at p. 249.) Riel also argued, alternatively, that he could be resentenced under section 1172.1. 2 Defendant was convicted prior to the approval of section 1385.1 by the electorate through Proposition 115 (Prop. 115, as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990)). It provides: “Notwithstanding Section 1385 or any other provision of law, a judge shall not strike or dismiss any special circumstance which is admitted by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or is found by a jury or court as provided in Sections 190.1 to 190.5, inclusive.” (§ 1385.1.) Whether it bars sentencing courts from striking special circumstance findings for murder convictions that occurred prior to its June 6, 1990 effective date is a question currently pending before our Supreme Court. (People v. Henderson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 828, review granted July 9, 2025, S291105.) 3 The trial court ruled on Riel’s petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 as follows: “The Court finds the inability to address the circumstances as the finding was a death verdict by jury trial, however, the Court will strike the Prison Prior.” II. DISCUSSION A. Section 1172.75 The People argue section 1172.75 does not authorize resentencing in death penalty cases. This issue is currently on appeal in our Supreme Court. (Dixon, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at pp. 247-249, rev. granted.) In the meantime, we are aware of no court of appeal that has concluded a death sentence may be revisited under section 1172.75. (See, e.g., People v. Cain (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 917, 930, review granted Feb. 18, 2026, S294810 [concluding death sentence cannot be recalled under section 1172.75]; People v. Millsap (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 368, 383 [“Dixon held, and we agree, that section 1172.75 may not be used to collaterally attack a judgment of death”].) Thus far, the published opinions addressing this issue have all agreed that section 1509 prevents using section 1172.75 to reduce a death sentence. (Cain, supra, at pp. 930-933; Millsap, supra, at pp. 379, 383; Dixon, supra, pp. 247-249.) Section 1509 provides, in relevant part: “This section applies to any petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of death. A writ of habeas corpus pursuant to this section is the exclusive procedure for collateral attack on a judgment of death.” (§ 1509, subd. (a).) “A ‘collateral attack’ is ‘[a]n attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than a direct appeal.’ ” (Wall v. Kholi (2011) 562 U.S. 545, 552.) A proceeding under section 1172.75 is a proceeding other than a direct appeal. In this appeal, the People argue section 1509 does not affect section 1172.75. Instead, they argue section 1172.75 itself does not authorize resentencing in death penalty cases. We need not address this issue because the parties have not persuaded us to depart from the published authorities that have concluded section 1509 prohibits the attacks to the propriety of his death sentence that Riel sought to make here. (See Cain, supra, at p. 931 [“Regardless of who initiated the 4 section 1172.75 proceeding in the present case, it is an attack on the judgment of death”].) We recognize this is a close question and one our Supreme Court may soon decide differently. Until then, we will follow Dixon and its progeny. B. Section 1172.1 Riel argues briefly in the alternative that the trial court should address his request for recall and resentencing under section 1172.1. The court is not required to respond to a defendant’s request for resentencing under this provision. (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).) As such, there is no basis for us to order a response. III. DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. /S/ RENNER, Acting P. J. We concur: /S/ KRAUSE, J. /S/ MESIWALA, J. 5