People v. Valencia CA4/1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketD086127
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Filed 11/16/26 P. v. Valencia CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086127
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCS328448)
v.
JESUS VALENCIA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Garry G. Haehnle, Judge. Affirmed.
Grace Legal Group, Zino Osehobo; Innocence Legal Team and William
P. Daley for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C.
Cavalier and Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Jesus Valencia of sexually abusing his former wife’s
younger sister when she was a teenager, and assaulting his more recent
girlfriend and molesting her young daughter. On appeal, Valencia asserts
that the trial court’s denial of his motion to sever the charges into three
separate trials was an abuse of the court’s discretion. In addition, Valencia
asserts (1) the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony on the
behavior of victims of sexual abuse, (2) insufficient evidence supported the
jury’s guilty verdicts concerning the victims of his sexual abuse, (3) the court
improperly admitted hearsay statements of the victims of his sexual abuse,
(4) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and (5) the court improperly
admitted victim impact testimony. In addition, after retaining new counsel,
Valencia raised a new challenge to his conviction in his reply brief, arguing
the trial court erred by denying his request after the start of trial to obtain
new counsel.1 As a result, we requested supplemental briefing from the
parties on this new issue.
We reject each of Valencia’s arguments and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Assault of Katie R. and Sexual Abuse of K.R.
Valencia and Katie R. met when Katie began working as a bookkeeper
for Valencia’s company. The couple began dating in December 2018. At that
time, Katie’s daughter, K.R., was almost three years old. Around November
2019, Katie, K.R., and Valencia’s five older children, who ranged in age from
approximately 8 years old to 21 years old, moved into a large, six-bedroom
1 In his reply brief, Valencia also withdraws an assertion in his opening
brief that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Accordingly,
we do not reach this withdrawn argument.
2
home together. In August 2020, Katie gave birth to a daughter, C.V., with
Valencia.
In October 2021, Katie briefly moved out of the house after a domestic
violence incident between her and Valencia. She was pregnant with another
child and returned to the home in December after Valencia promised to
change. The child was born in March 2022 and passed away a month later.
The death of the infant was extremely traumatizing for the family.
Valencia’s oldest daughter, Andrea, testified that after the tragedy, Katie and
Valencia fought frequently. On the evening of January 5, 2023, Katie was at
home with K.R. and C.V. At that time, two of Valencia’s older children lived
at the house—Andrea, who was an adult, and E.V., who was around 11 or 12
years old. E.V. was not home. Katie was not feeling well, and she and the
two younger children had COVID. Katie, K.R., and C.V. were all in the
upstairs primary bedroom that she and Valencia shared, and where the two
girls often slept.
Around 8:00 p.m., Katie and the two children were getting ready for
bed when Valencia arrived home intoxicated. Katie was expecting Valencia
to be home a few hours earlier with some medicine after he finished his
workday. She was angry when he arrived late and drunk. Katie testified
that she went downstairs to let Valencia through a gate, then went back
upstairs into their bedroom and locked the door. Valencia then came into the
room holding a large pocketknife. He took off his pants, exposing himself to
Katie and K.R.
Katie became angrier and yelled at Valencia to leave the room.
Valencia refused to leave and pushed Katie off the bed onto the floor, injuring
her. When Katie started to call 911, Valencia grabbed her by the throat,
squeezing his hand around her neck. When Valencia realized Katie had
3
called the police, he released her. The police arrived 15 minutes later and
arrested Valencia. After Valencia’s arrest, Katie moved out of the house with
K.R. and C.V.
Valencia and Katie did not see each other until April 2023, when
Valencia obtained visitation rights for C.V. Thereafter, they talked
periodically and resumed a physical relationship. In mid-June 2023, E.V.
and another child of Valencia’s, S.V., spent the night with K.R., who was six
years old at the time, at the apartment where Katie then lived. K.R., S.V.
and E.V. had a close relationship.2 S.V. was 12 years old at the time of the
sleepover.
S.V. testified at trial that K.R. told her at the sleepover that she was
mad at Valencia for hurting her mom and for touching her “private part,”
pointing to her vagina. S.V. explained that K.R. asked her and E.V. to go into
her room to talk after they had dinner with Katie and C.V. E.V. did not want
to join, so just K.R. and S.V. went into the room to talk. After K.R. disclosed
the abuse to S.V., S.V. told her that no one should touch her there. The girls
hugged, then returned to the living room. The morning after the sleepover,
S.V. was picked up by her mother, J.O. S.V. told J.O. that K.R. had confided
in her that Valencia had sexually abused her. J.O. contacted Katie and told
her about the abuse K.R. disclosed to S.V. J.O. also called the police.
K.R. was interviewed by a forensic interviewer on July 6, 2023. At that
time, she was seven years old. K.R. told the interviewer that Valencia pulled
down his pants in front of her and exposed his genitals, which she referred to
2 E.V. is the youngest son of Valencia and his ex-wife, Dina Valencia.
Dina is the mother of Valencia’s five oldest children. J.O. is Dina’s younger
half-sister. S.V. is the daughter of Valencia and J.O.
4
as his “private spot.” She described Valencia coming in drunk, hitting her
mom “a bunch,” and pushing her mom off the bed. K.R. told the interviewer
that Valencia touched her “private spot” with his hand and said he “got onto
the bed” and “did some stuff to me.” She also said Valencia kissed and
touched her, and massaged her back before touching her “private spot.” K.R.
stated that Valencia touched her private spot over her clothes and sometimes
under her clothes, and that he touched her genitals with his mouth and
tongue on more than one occasion. Valencia also grabbed K.R.’s hand and
tried to make her touch his genitals on more than one occasion.
At the time of trial, K.R. was eight years old. She testified that
Valencia touched her front private parts. K.R. also told the jury Valencia did
this more than once, under her clothes, and over and under her underwear
with his hands. He touched her private parts beneath her underwear with
his mouth more than once.3 K.R. said Valencia hurt her when he touched
her private parts, and she told him to stop but he did not. K.R. sometimes
used her hands and feet to push and kick Valencia away. Sometimes
Valencia tried to make K.R. touch his private parts with her hand; he would
grab her wrists and move them towards his private part.
K.R. also testified that on one occasion Valencia took his clothes off in
front of K.R., and K.R.’s mother became upset and got mad at Valencia. K.R.
saw Valencia push her mom off the bed, which caused bruises on her mom’s
arm. The police came to the house when that happened. Following that
incident, K.R. and her mom moved out of the house they shared with
Valencia.
3 The parties stipulated that at the preliminary hearing K.R. denied that
Valencia placed his mouth on her private part.
5
B. Abuse of J.O.
J.O. is the younger half-sister of Dina, who was married to Valencia
from the time J.O. was a child until shortly before trial. At the time of trial,
J.O. was 37 years old. Growing up, she bounced between foster homes,
emergency shelters, homes of various family members, and Dina and
Valencia’s home. At some point when J.O. was a young teenager, Dina and
Valencia showed her a backpack of sex toys and a magazine about sex toys,
and Valencia “educated” her about them. More than once, the couple had sex
in front of J.O. Dina also talked to J.O. about sex with Valencia, which made
J.O. uncomfortable.
When J.O. was about 15 years old, Valencia gave J.O. alcohol and it
made her sick. J.O. went into the guest room to lie down and Valencia
followed her. He put his hands down her pants and inserted his fingers into
her vagina. J.O. told Valencia “no” and tried to move his hand away, but
Valencia got on top of her, removed her pants, and inserted his penis into her
vagina. J.O. was scared. At the time, Valencia was 27 or 28 years old. The
next day Valencia said to J.O., “I liked it, and I wanna continue doing this
with you.”
J.O. was scared because Valencia was bigger and stronger than her,
and she had seen him hit her sister before. J.O. testified that Valencia
continued raping her for years. Once, when J.O. told Valencia she wanted to
leave, he punched her repeatedly in the face, choked her, and threatened to
kill her. J.O. testified that Valencia raped her three times that night. J.O.
told him to stop, but the “the more [she told] him to stop, the more he g[ot]
mad.”
J.O. told Dina what Valencia had done that night, and her sister
instructed her to leave in the morning. J.O. went to a friend’s house but
6
Valencia came looking for her. She eventually returned because she was only
16 or 17 years old and did not have any money. J.O. testified that she
eventually stopped “fighting back” because she had no way out and did not
think anyone would believe her because no one had protected her since she
was a little girl. Valencia told J.O. on multiple occasions that if she reported
his abuse to anyone he would kill her, even telling her once that “he knows
places in Mexico where [he] can bury [a] body and nobody would ever find it.”
J.O. also testified that during the years-long ordeal of abuse, Valencia
impregnated her four times, twice while she was under the age of 18.
Valencia was angry about the pregnancies, and each time drove her to get an
abortion. The abuse continued until J.O. was 24 years old and became
pregnant with S.V. At this point, J.O. had a stable job and moved out of her
sister’s home. She refused to have an abortion.
After S.V. was born, Valencia attempted to control J.O. by threatening
to take S.V. away from her. Eventually, over J.O.’s objections, Valencia
obtained a court order requiring J.O. to allow him to visit S.V. During that
time, J.O. and S.V. got to know Katie and K.R. During the investigation into
Valencia’s abuse of K.R., J.O. told detectives about the abuse she had
suffered.
C. Expert Testimony
The prosecution presented the testimony of Christina Shultz, a licensed
clinical social worker and a forensic interviewer. Shultz testified generally
about common misconceptions regarding the behavior of victims of child
abuse. She did not interview K.R., S.V., or J.O.
D. Defense Evidence
Valencia’s daughter, Andrea, took the stand in his defense. She
testified that Valencia and J.O. had a good relationship during the time J.O.
7
lived with them. Andrea told the jury she no longer considered J.O. her aunt
because “[a]ll men cheat. … But a blood, you know, family member is
supposed to be forever, and she didn’t respect that.”
The defense also called San Diego District Attorney Investigator
Ricardo Cruz to the stand. Cruz testified that J.O. told him she had been
contacted by the San Diego Police Department when she was “out on the
street after hours,” and the police told her she had been “reported as a
runaway.” However, Cruz said that he was unable to find a police report
documenting the police contact. He also explained this was “not all that
surprising due to the fact that she told me that the incident happened
between 1990 and 1993,” some 30 years ago. Cruz also testified that he had
looked for medical documentation concerning J.O.’s abortions, but was unable
to find any documentation to confirm her testimony.
E. Conviction and Sentencing
On November 18, 2024, just before the start of trial, the San Diego
County District Attorney filed an amended information charging Valencia
with two counts of oral copulation/sexual penetration with a child 10 years
old or younger (Pen. Code,4 § 288.7, subd. (b), counts 1 and 2 (K.R.)); four
counts of forcible lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1), counts 3, 4, 5, 6
(K.R.)), corporal injury to a spouse or roommate (§ 273.5, subd. (a), count 7
(Katie)); and two counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2), counts 8 and 9
(J.O.)). With regard to counts 3 and 4, the information alleged the victim was
under the age of 14 (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)); as to counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and
9, the information alleged a multiple victim enhancement (§ 667.61,
4 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
8
subds. (b), (c), (e)); and as to counts 8 and 9, the information alleged the
victim was under the age of 18 when the crime occurred and the criminal
action commenced prior to the victim’s 40th birthday (§ 801.1, subd. (a)).
After the conclusion of the trial, a jury convicted Valencia of all charges and
enhancements.
At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a total prison term of
three years plus 45 years to life, comprised of 15 years to life for counts 1, 3,
and 8, and the midterm of three years for count 7. The court imposed
separate indeterminate terms of 15 years to life on each of counts 2, 4, 5, 6,
and 9, to run concurrently with the sentences for counts 1, 3, and 8.
Valencia filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Motion to Sever
A
Additional Background
Prior to trial, Valencia moved to sever the charges against him and face
a separate trial for each victim. The District Attorney opposed the motion,
asserting the charges were of the same class of crimes, the evidence would be
cross-admissible in separate trials, and there were overlapping witnesses.
The trial court denied Valencia’s motion, finding that all the crimes were
committed in households over which Valencia had control and access to the
9
victims, the crimes were all assaultive crimes, the evidence would be cross-
admissible in separate trials, and judicial economy favored a joint trial.
B
Legal Standards
“ ‘The law prefers consolidation of charges.’ ” (People v. Manriquez
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 574.) “[J]oint trial has long been prescribed—and
broadly allowed—by the Legislature’s enactment of section 954. The purpose
underlying this statute is clear: joint trial ‘ordinarily avoids the increased
expenditure of funds and judicial resources which may result if the charges
were to be tried in two or more separate trials.’ [Citation.] ‘A unitary trial
requires a single courtroom, judge, and court attach[és]. Only one group of
jurors need serve, and the expenditure of time for jury voir dire and trial is
greatly reduced over that required were the cases separately tried. In
addition, the public is served by the reduced delay on disposition of criminal
charges both in trial and through the appellate process.’ ” (People v. Soper
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 771–772 (Soper).)
Charges may be consolidated under two circumstances: (1) when they
are connected in their commission; or (2) when they are of the same class of
crimes. (§ 954.) Offenses are of the same class of crimes or offenses if they
“possess common characteristics or attributes.” (People v. Moore (1986) 185
Cal.App.3d 1005, 1012.) Offenses are connected in their commission if there
is a common element of substantial importance in their commission,
including the intent or motivation with which different acts are committed.
(Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1219.) Whether the charges
are properly consolidated under section 954 is a question of law subject to
independent review on appeal. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 188.)
10
If the charges are properly joined, “[t]o demonstrate that a denial of
severance was reversible error, defendant must ‘ “clearly establish that there
[was] a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be
separately tried.” ’ [Citations.] [¶] Refusal to sever charges on a defendant’s
motion may be an abuse of discretion where: ‘ “(1) evidence on the crimes to
be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of
the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant;
(3) a ‘weak’ case has been joined with a ‘strong’ case, or with another ‘weak’
case, so that the ‘spillover’ effect of aggregate evidence on several charges
might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of
the charges carries the death penalty.” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th
483, 510–511.)
“Unlike what occurs in situations involving the admissibility of
uncharged misconduct—in which the People bear the burden of establishing
that the evidence has substantial probative value that clearly outweighs its
inherent prejudicial effect—… in the context of properly joined offenses, ‘[t]he
burden is reversed.’ [Citations.] In the latter setting, ‘[t]he … burden is on
the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there is a substantial
danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried.
[Citations.] When the offenses are [properly] joined for trial the defendant’s
guilt of all the offenses is at issue and the problem of confusing the jury with
collateral matters does not arise. … That the evidence would otherwise be
inadmissible [under Evidence Code section 352] may be considered as a factor
suggesting possible prejudice, but countervailing considerations [of efficiency
and judicial economy] that are not present when evidence of uncharged
offenses is offered must be weighed in ruling on a ... motion [to sever properly
joined charges]. The burden is on the defendant therefore to persuade the
11
court that these countervailing considerations are outweighed by a
substantial danger of undue prejudice.’ ” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 773,
italics omitted.)
Additionally, section 954.1 “provides that when, as here, properly
joined charges are of the same class, the circumstance that evidence
underlying those charges would not be cross-admissible at hypothetical
separate trials is, standing alone, insufficient to establish that a trial court
abused its discretion in failing to sever those charges. Accordingly, the
assumed absence of cross-admissibility … is simply one factor to be weighed
against the benefits of joinder.” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 779–780.)
“A trial court’s denial of a motion to sever properly joined charged
offenses amounts to a prejudicial abuse of discretion only if that ruling
‘ “ ‘ “ ‘falls outside the bounds of reason.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
p. 774.)
C
Analysis
Valencia contends the court abused its discretion in denying his
severance motion because the evidence of the crimes against J.O. was weak
and “riddled with inconsistencies and memory problems,” and “[K.R.]’s
testimony as a young child was more emotionally compelling, even though it
too contained contradictions.” He also asserts the offenses “were not of the
same class, were not cross-admissible, and produced overwhelming
prejudice,” in violation of his right to a fair trial under the state and federal
constitutions.
In his reply, Valencia adds that the crimes against K.R. and J.O. were
too dissimilar to be properly tried together because J.O. was a teenager when
the sexual abuse against her began, whereas K.R. was a young child. He also
12
argues the crimes should not have been tried together because the crimes
against J.O. occurred over many years, while the crimes against K.R.
occurred over a more limited time period. Finally, Valencia argues the
assault against Katie “ha[d] nothing to do with the other counts” and should
have been severed because denial of his motion affected his “ability to defend
against the charge.”
The Attorney General responds that the court’s denial of the motion to
sever was not error because all of the charged crimes were assaultive crimes
and thus of the same class of crimes. Further, the Attorney General asserts
that no other factor required severance of the charges. Specifically, there was
cross-admissible evidence for all charges, none of the crimes were unusually
likely to inflame the jury against Valencia, and no case was particularly
weaker or stronger than the others. We agree with the Attorney General
that Valencia has not shown denial of his motion to sever was error.
As an initial matter, all the crimes against the three victims were
assaultive crimes against a person and, thus, were properly joined under
section 954 as the same class of crimes. (See People v. Landry (2016) 2
Cal.5th 52, 76 [“ ‘Offenses of the same class are offenses which possess
common characteristics or attributes.’ ”].)
Valencia has not shown that there was a substantial danger of
prejudice which required severance. Critically, much of the evidence would
have been cross-admissible in separate trials. For instance, in separate trials
the parties would have presented testimony concerning the initial disclosures
of the abuse of K.R. and J.O.; evidence concerning K.R. witnessing the
13
assault of Katie, which was disclosed at trial and in K.R.’s forensic interview;
and the same detective investigated the crimes against all three victims.
There was also not an unusual risk that evidence concerning one victim
would unduly inflame the jury against Valencia in connection with the crimes
that he perpetrated against the other victims. As the Attorney General
points out, the crimes against K.R. and J.O. shared similar characteristics.
In each situation, as the trial court found, Valencia was the “man of the
family,” controlled the victim, and had “easy access to all three victims.”
Further, the crimes against K.R. and J.O. were each extraordinarily serious
and likely to inflame the jury. J.O.’s testimony that Valencia repeatedly
raped her as a young teenager, impregnated her five times (including twice
before her eighteenth birthday), threatened her life, and physically abused
her was just as inflaming as K.R.’s testimony that Valencia sexually abused
K.R. at the age of five or six.
In addition, the evidence against Valencia was strong for all three
victims. This was not a matter in which a weak case was joined with a
stronger case, thereby “ ‘ “causing a spillover effect that might have unfairly
altered” ’ ” the outcome. (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 127 (Simon);
see ibid. [“even where evidence from one incident could be considered
‘inflammatory’ …, we will find no abuse of discretion if the evidence of guilt
for each of the joined incidents is sufficiently compelling”].) In addition, the
defense effectively pointed out inconsistencies in both K.R. and J.O.’s
testimony, questions about J.O.’s credibility given the long passage of time
after the abuse occurred and her custody battle with Valencia, and questions
about Katie’s credibility in light of her prior altercations with Valencia. Put
simply, neither case was so overwhelmingly strong relative to the other that
it could influence the jury’s perception of the other.
14
On the other side of the balancing test, the benefits of joining the cases
were significant. Instead of three separate trials, Valencia’s case required a
single courtroom, judge, jury panel, and appeal. These benefits outweigh any
potential prejudice that resulted from trying the cases together. (See Soper,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 771–772.) Accordingly, we reject Valencia’s assertion
that the court abused its discretion by allowing a joint trial of the charges
against him.
Valencia has also not shown “ ‘that joinder actually resulted in ‘gross
unfairness’ amounting to a denial of [his] constitutional right to fair trial or
due process of law.’ ” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 129.) “In determining
whether joinder resulted in gross unfairness, … a judgment will be reversed
on this ground only if it is reasonably probable that the jury was influenced
by the joinder in its verdict of guilt.” (Id. at pp. 129–130.) Valencia does not
specifically argue that joinder of these cases resulted in gross unfairness to
him. Rather, he asserts that the evidence of the crimes as to each victim was
weak, but heard together the jury was improperly persuaded of his guilt. He
also asserts that injuries he sustained in the altercation with Katie that the
trial court excluded, would have been admitted in a separate trial.
These arguments do not show that the joint trial of the offenses was
grossly unfair to Valencia. As stated, the evidence against Valencia was
strong as to all the offenses charged against him. We agree with the
Attorney General that the court’s decision to deny Valencia’s motion to sever
was not an abuse of discretion and that gross unfairness to Valencia did not
result from this decision.
15
II
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
Before trial, Valencia moved to exclude the testimony of Shultz, a
licensed clinical social worker and a forensic interviewer, who was expected
to testify about common misconceptions about the delayed disclosure of
sexual abuse by J.O., often referred to as Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome (CSAAS). The trial court denied the request, noting that
California courts consistently allow such expert testimony.
At trial, Shultz testified she had been a forensic interviewer for
20 years. Shultz stated she did not interview any of the victims in this case.
She explained to the jury that the vast majority of victims of child sexual
abuse do not disclose the abuse right away. She stated it can often take
months or even years before a child discloses abuse, and that some victims of
abuse do not disclose sexual abuse until adulthood. Shultz noted that one
reason victims sometimes delay disclosure is out of fear they will not be
believed.
She stated it is common for victims to continue to have a relationship
with their abuser because that person is commonly a family member or
trusted adult, and the victim may be dependent on them. She also stated it is
unrealistic to expect victims of abuse to describe every detail of the abuse,
especially if the abuse happened multiple times. She also explained the
concept of grooming as a way for abusers to gain access to and cooperation of
a child with the ultimate goal of engaging in sexual acts.
Prosecutors often elicit testimony concerning CSAAS in cases involving
child sexual abuse. Such “expert testimony on the common reactions of child
molestation victims is not admissible to prove that the complaining witness
has in fact been sexually abused; it is[, however,] admissible to rehabilitate
16
such witness’s credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s
conduct after the incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his
or her testimony claiming molestation. [Citations.] ‘Such expert testimony is
needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child
sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s
seemingly self-impeaching behavior.’ ” (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d
1289, 1300–1301 (McAlpin).)
The trial court has discretion to determine whether such evidence is
more prejudicial than probative, and the court’s ruling will not be disturbed
on appeal unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown. (McAlpin, supra,
53 Cal.3d at p. 1299.)
Valencia contends that Shultz’s testimony “suggested that the very
problems with [K.R.]’s and [J.O.]’s testimony, delays, inconsistencies, and
contradictions, were actually indicia of truth” and “effectively vouched for
their credibility.” Not so. Shultz’s testimony, as Valencia concedes, was
general only. Shultz did not interview or have any information concerning
the conduct or victims in the case. Rather, under established precedent, she
testified only in generalities about the behavior of sexual abuse survivors.
This testimony was admissible to disabuse the jury of any misconceptions it
may have harbored about delayed disclosure of abuse. (See People v. Patino
(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744–1745.)
Moreover, the trial court specifically warned the jury against using the
testimony for an improper purpose, instructing with CALCRIM No. 1193 that
“You have heard testimony from Christina Shultz regarding child abuse.
Christina Shultz’s testimony about child abuse is not evidence that
Defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him. You may
consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not the victims’ conduct
17
was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested,
and in evaluating the believability of her testimony.”
“The jury is presumed to have followed the trial court’s instructions in
the absence of any indication it was unwilling or unable to do so.” (People v.
Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 196.) There is no evidence the jury
used this evidence for an improper purpose, and Valencia has not
demonstrated the admission of this evidence constituted an abuse of
discretion.
III
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Valencia next makes various claims concerning the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the jury’s guilty verdicts. He argues that K.R.’s and
J.O.’s testimony was so inherently improbable that it could not establish his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, Valencia claims that investigator
Cruz’s testimony that he was unable to corroborate J.O.’s assertions that
Valencia took her to obtain four abortions and had once been picked up by
police as a runaway teenager demonstrate the insufficiency of the evidence
supporting the convictions related to J.O. These contentions are all without
merit.
In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court’s role
is a limited one. “ ‘ “The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of
evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v.
Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738–739.) This court “evaluate[s] the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant
18
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Ramos (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th
99, 104.) We do not “reweigh the evidence; the credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within the
province of the trier of fact.” (People v. Stewart (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785,
790.)
Further, we presume in support of the judgment every fact that could
reasonably be deduced from the evidence (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th
978, 1035) and disregard any evidence that does not support the judgment as
having been rejected by the trier of fact for lack of sufficient veracity (People
v. Ryan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1316). If the circumstances reasonably
justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not
warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be
reconciled with a contrary finding. (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th
838, 890.)
In addition, the testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to
“uphold a judgment ‘even if it is contradicted by other evidence, inconsistent
or false as to other portions.’ ” (People v. White (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 305,
319, fn. 14 (White).) “Consequently, ‘[c]onflicts and even testimony which is
subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it
is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility
of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends.’ ” (People v. Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 729 (Ennis).)
A reviewing court may reject a witness’s testimony only if it is
inherently improbable or incredible—i.e., it is unbelievable per se, physically
impossible, or wholly unacceptable to reasonable minds. (Ennis, supra, 190
Cal.App.4th at p. 729.) A witness’s statements are inherently improbable
only if there exists “ ‘ “ ‘either a physical impossibility that they are true, or
19
their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or
deductions.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 124 (Thompson).)
Although a court may reverse a judgment if it concludes the evidence
supporting it “was ‘inherently improbable,’ such a finding is so rare as to be
almost nonexistent.” (Ennis, at p. 728.)
Valencia has not shown such circumstances in this case. K.R.’s
disclosure of the abuse to her mother and her description of the abuse during
her forensic interview were largely the same as her testimony at trial. While
K.R. denied Valencia orally copulated her at the preliminary hearing, the fact
that an eight-year-old child, under the stress of the courtroom, did not testify
exactly the same in each proceeding does not establish inherent
improbability. Likewise, Valencia’s contention that J.O.’s testimony is
“contradictory and unsupported” is also without merit. Indeed, Valencia’s
challenge amounts to no more than a request for this court to reevaluate
J.O.’s credibility and find her untruthful. That is not our role. (See Ennis,
supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 729.)
Similarly, Valencia argues that Cruz’s inability to locate documentation
for events that occurred decades earlier shows J.O.’s testimony was false.
Valencia’s counsel asked Cruz whether, aside from the remoteness of when
the events occurred, one possible reason he could not locate any records was
“that it never happened, correct?” and Cruz answered, “It could be.”
Valencia’s assertion on appeal that this “concession” “undermined the
prosecution’s case” is without merit. Even if Valencia could establish a
contradiction in Cruz’s testimony, it does not render J.O.’s testimony
inherently improbable nor does it render the verdict unsupported by
substantial evidence. Rather, the jury was free to find that J.O. was credible
and that the lack of documentation of the events she recalled was the result
20
of the passage of time and not evidence that those events did not occur. (See
Thompson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 124–125 [rejecting contention that a
witness’s testimony was inherently incredible on the basis it contradicted
physical evidence].)
Put simply, “[w]e reject defendant’s attempt to reargue the evidence on
appeal and reiterate that ‘it is not a proper appellate function to reassess the
credibility of the witnesses.’ ” (Thompson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 125.)
IV
Hearsay Statements
Valencia next asserts the court improperly admitted K.R.’s statement
to Katie under the fresh complaint exception to the hearsay rule, which
Valencia contends deprived him of a fair trial. He contends that because the
abuse occurred sometime before K.R. disclosed it to her mother, the fresh
complaint exception does not apply. The Attorney General responds that the
statement was properly admitted under Evidence Code section 1360. In his
reply brief, Valencia makes a new argument, asserting that K.R.’s statement
to S.V. was improperly admitted under Evidence Code section 1360 because
the court did not make explicit findings of fact required by the statute.
Prior to trial, the prosecution moved in limine to admit K.R.’s
statement to her mother disclosing that Valencia abused her under the fresh
complaint exception to hearsay. K.R. told her mother about the abuse after
her mother learned from J.O. that K.R. had disclosed the abuse to S.V. At a
hearing on the motion, Valencia’s counsel argued that “we have to wait to see
what they testify to and what I ask them, and I certainly might open the door
to something that—that I don’t anticipate—anticipate doing, but that’s the
risk I’ll take. But until such time, I think they should be rendered as
21
inadmissible statements.” The trial court then stated it would take the
matter under submission.
The trial court then considered the prosecution’s motion in limine to
allow K.R.’s statements to S.V. and the forensic interviewer under Evidence
Code section 1360. Defense counsel agreed it had an adequate opportunity to
prepare for the admission of the testimony and submitted on the issue
without objection. The court then granted the motion, finding the
requirements of the statute were satisfied.
During her testimony, Katie relayed K.R.’s statements to her that
Valencia had touched her private parts with his tongue and that Valencia
had also tried to make K.R. touch his private parts, but “that she would act
like a cat and hiss at him and try and scratch him, and he would stop.”
Valencia’s counsel made no objections to the testimony. During her
testimony, S.V. relayed the disclosures K.R. made to her the night of the
sleepover.
Evidence Code section 1360 “creates a limited exception to the hearsay
rule in criminal prosecutions for a child’s statements describing acts of child
abuse or neglect, including statements describing sexual abuse.” (People v.
Roberto V. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1367.) “Section 1360 safeguards the
reliability of a child’s hearsay statements by requiring that: (1) the court find,
in a hearing conducted outside the presence