People v. Holman CA2/2

Filed 11/5/26 P. v. Holman CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, B342613 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County v. Super. Ct. No. XCNBA504771) JASMAN DAWONE HOLMAN, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Karla D. Kerlin, Judge. Affirmed. Jennifer A. Mannix, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _______________________________  Defendant Jasman Dawone Holman appeals his conviction of rape and assault against three women. He contends the trial court (1) erroneously refused to declare a third doubt regarding his competency to stand trial; and (2) committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 361. We disagree and affirm. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In September 2021, Mariah L.1 met Holman near Pershing Square and exchanged numbers with him.2 On September 27, Holman invited Mariah L. to come downtown to eat and smoke marijuana. After they met up, they went to his apartment in the Alexandria Hotel to retrieve blunt wrappers. There, two male security guards came to talk with Holman. Nervous that she was in a room alone with three men, Mariah attempted to leave. Holman became angry and told her to go to the bathroom. When she refused, Holman said something to the security guards and they left the apartment. Holman then violently raped Mariah and forced her to sleep over that night. The next day, he made her go with him to buy blunt wrappers. When they returned to his apartment, Mariah escaped. Prior to 2021, Dolores E. lived “off and on” in Los Angeles and worked as a hairstylist. In 2017, she became part of a group of friends that included Holman. After several years away from 1 We refer to the victims by their first names and last initials to protect their privacy interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).) 2 In reciting this summary, “we ‘view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.’ ” (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302.) 2 Los Angeles, she returned in August 2021 and reconnected with Holman. On October 1, 2021, Dolores saw Holman at Pershing Square. Later that evening, Holman agreed to have her stay the night at his apartment as a friend. The next day, Holman allowed Dolores to remain in his apartment while he went out. When Holman returned in the evening, he was agitated and accused Dolores of inviting men over to his apartment. He then violently raped her and forced her to stay the night. On the morning of October 3, Holman went out to do laundry. While he was gone, Dolores left the Alexandria Hotel. Holman saw her leaving and followed her outside. When they reached Pershing Square, Holman gave up his pursuit. In or around February 2022, Maranda A. met Holman on a train and began staying with him at his apartment. One day, Holman became angry and accused her of “messing” with his neighbors. From that day on, over the course of approximately two and a half weeks, he held her in his apartment against her will, repeatedly beat and raped her, and threatened to kill her. On March 8, after Holman left the apartment, Maranda went to the leasing office to ask for help. The police came and stayed with her until her mother arrived to pick her up. PROCEDURAL HISTORY I. The Charges Against Holman An information charged Holman with multiple offenses as to the three women. As to Mariah L., the information charged Holman in count 1 with forcible rape (Pen. Code,3 § 261, subd. (a)(2)); in count 2 with sexual penetration by force (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)); and in count 3 with forcible oral copulation 3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A)). As to Dolores E., the information charged Holman in count 4 with sodomy by use of force (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(A)); and in count 5 with forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)). And as to Maranda A., the information charged Holman in counts 6 and 7 with forcible rape (ibid.)4; in counts 8 and 9 with assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)); and in count 10 with false imprisonment (§ 236). The information also alleged a multiple victim enhancement for counts 1 through 7 (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e)). II. Holman’s Competency Proceedings In June 2022, Holman’s attorney declared a doubt as to Holman’s mental competence on the basis he was not rationally assisting counsel with the preparation of the defense. The trial court suspended the criminal proceedings and referred him to the mental health division (mental health court) for competency proceedings. Nothing in the record shows whether competency proceedings were held pursuant to this referral.5 By September 2022, criminal proceedings had resumed. In December 2023, a new attorney representing Holman declared a doubt as to Holman’s mental competence on the basis he was not rationally assisting counsel. The trial court again 4 Evidence of Maranda A.’s sexual assault came in at trial. The People, however, dismissed counts 6 and 7 before closing arguments because they were unable to locate Maranda and have her testify at trial. 5 We assume for the purposes of this opinion that competency proceedings were not held between June 2022 and September 2022. (See State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WallDesign Inc. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1528, fn. 1.) 4 suspended the criminal proceedings and referred Holman to the mental health court. The mental health court appointed Dr. Pourat to prepare a short report, but the initial examination was inconclusive. At a hearing in January 2024, the court appointed Dr. Karine Shakib- Beltran to prepare a long report. At that hearing, Holman represented he was “not incompetent.” The court responded that although it agreed with Holman because he was “clearly very thoughtful and articulate” and “on top of [his] case,” it was duty- bound to have his competency tested. Dr. Shakib-Beltran found Holman competent. She opined Holman was “likely exaggerating or feigning symptoms of a mental illness in order to achieve his desired goal of being deemed incompetent to stand trial to avoid trial due to the severity of his charges.” To support this conclusion, Dr. Shakib- Beltran pointed to inconsistent answers Holman gave. For example, he claimed to not know the meaning of “a plea” or “guilty,” but when asked if he would accept a plea bargain, he stated, “No, I didn’t do nothin’.” She also noted his ability to participate in a lengthy interview and weigh information demonstrated abilities necessary for adjudicative competency. She further opined, “[Holman] has the ability to assist counsel if he so chooses, as the record indicates that he is able to engage with others in a productive manner but does not do so when he does not get what he wants, which is personality based. He has a rational understanding of the legal proceedings, such that he knows that he has this case and the potential outcome, which is distressing to him as indicated by numerous records. Any inability to testify in court is volitional, as he does know how to 5 behave properly, which usually occurs when he gets what he wants.” In February 2024, the mental health court reviewed Dr. Shakib-Beltran’s report, declared Holman competent to stand trial, reinstated criminal proceedings, and transferred the case back to criminal court. At a pretrial proceeding in March 2024, Holman told the trial court he had been upset that he could not leave his cell and go to court unless the court issued an order. He then explained that in an effort to see the court, he resorted to actions like intentionally flooding his cell or cutting himself. When the court tried to tell Holman he should not hurt himself just to appear in court, Holman began identifying what he perceived to be weaknesses with the People’s case and started naming things he would like done by the court or his attorney. The court advised Holman to consult with his attorney and continued the matter after scheduling future dates with the attorneys. In April 2024, Holman’s counsel again asserted he was not rationally assisting counsel and declared a doubt as to his competency. The trial court observed Holman’s behavior in court and expressed concern that he was malingering because his behavior was “very exaggerated.” During a pause in the proceedings, Holman was removed from the courtroom because he was grabbing at items and yelling loudly. When Holman was brought to the courthouse lockup, he attempted to strangle himself with a telephone cord. The court reinstated competency proceedings, but it also stated it had a “very strong suspicion” that Holman was exaggerating and was trying to delay trial. The court specifically noted Holman appeared to escalate his erratic behavior after the court said he might have been malingering. 6  In the mental health court, Dr. Eric Wagreich prepared a short report stating it was “quite apparent” Holman was feigning his mental and cognitive disorders, but Dr. Wagreich recommended a long report given the serious charges. The court accordingly appointed Dr. Pietro D’Ingillo for a long report. Dr. D’Ingillo found Holman competent. Like the previous doctors, Dr. D’Ingillo opined that Holman’s “supposed psychiatric impairment [was] volitional and intentional” and that he was exaggerating his behavior to “minimize criminal prosecution and accountability.” Dr. D’Ingillo noted Holman (1) asked for crystal meth the moment Dr. D’Ingillo arrived; (2) claimed he was 15 years old; (3) stated he did not know the reason he was in jail; and (4) asserted he did not know the role of the judge in legal proceedings. Dr. D’Ingillo further noted sheriff’s deputies reported Holman was faking his symptoms and had been counseling other inmates on how to manipulate their social workers. In August 2024, the mental health court accepted Dr. D’Ingillo’s findings, declared Holman competent to stand trial, reinstated criminal proceedings, and transferred the case back to criminal court. At a pretrial conference in September 2024, Holman became emotional when the trial court cut him off from making inculpatory statements. The court then had Holman removed from the courthouse when he began yelling that he never can talk in court and there was no evidence he committed the charged crimes. When Holman was brought into lockup, he attempted to flush his ankle chains down a toilet. Holman’s counsel again represented he was not rationally assisting counsel and declared a doubt as to his competency. The court declined to reinstate 7 competency proceedings. It noted that although Holman clearly had difficulty regulating his emotions, Holman’s comments about his case indicated he understood the legal proceedings and was competent to stand trial. III. Holman’s Disruptions at Trial The matter was tried before a jury in October 2024. In light of Holman’s past outbursts, the trial court ordered the use of a concealed restraint. On October 23, 2024, when Mariah L. took the stand to testify, Holman exclaimed: “The devil is real. I know the devil is real.” After the trial court admonished Holman, he remained silent during Mariah’s testimony. At the end of the day, Holman told the court that he was ready to testify (even though it was not yet his turn) and asked some questions that the court had difficulty understanding. Holman’s attorney interjected and said he would talk to Holman and answer the questions. On October 24, 2024, sheriff’s deputies informed the trial court that when Holman was brought to lockup after the previous day’s proceedings, Holman had a heated argument with his attorney, engaged in an altercation with the deputies, spat on one of them, and used his restraints as a whip to damage his cell. Holman admitted he was upset at his attorney and the deputies but claimed the spitting was accidental. When the court ordered Holman to wear a spit mask at trial, he became upset, excused himself from the day’s proceedings, and broke windows in frustration. He then absented himself from the ensuing days of trial. Because of these disruptions, the court also authorized the deputies to transport Holman to court using a safety chair. On October 30, 2024, the sheriff’s deputies attempted to bring Holman to court pursuant to an extraction order. But when 8 they asked him to wear a spit mask, he threatened them and refused to attend trial. That same day, the People rested their case. On October 31, 2024, the day Holman was scheduled to testify, Holman appeared in court and agreed to wear a spit mask, handcuffs, and a concealed restraint. Holman took the stand and testified he and the three women had consensual sex. On the next day of trial, he also appeared in court to testify during the People’s rebuttal case and address inconsistencies between his trial testimony and a statement he gave police. During these days of testimony and the remainder of trial, Holman did not cause any disruptions. The jury found Holman guilty on all counts and found the multiple victim allegations true as to counts 1, 2, 4, and 5. The trial court sentenced Holman to an aggregate term of 60 years to life plus 10 years eight months. Holman timely appealed. DISCUSSION I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Declining to Hold a Third Competency Hearing Holman argues the trial court should have initiated a third competency hearing because the disruptions he caused leading up to and during trial in September and October 2024 were new circumstances that called into question the prior competence findings. We reject the contention. “A criminal trial of an incompetent person violates his or her federal due process rights. [Citation.] The state Constitution and section 1367 similarly preclude a mentally incompetent defendant’s criminal trial or sentencing. [Citations.] A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if the defendant lacks ‘sufficient 9 present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . [or] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 194–195.) When a trial court is presented with substantial evidence of a defendant’s incompetence to stand trial, the court must initiate competency proceedings. (Id. at p. 195.) To raise a doubt of competency, more is required than bizarre or disruptive actions by the defendant. (See id. at p. 202; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 735.) “When a competency hearing has already been held and the defendant has been found competent to stand trial, however, a trial court need not suspend proceedings to conduct [another] competency hearing unless it ‘is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence’ casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding.” (People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153; see also In re Sims (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 762, 783 [“[T]he duty to suspend is not triggered by information that substantially duplicates evidence already considered at an earlier, formal inquiry into the defendant’s competence, and that when faced with evidence of relatively minor changes in the defendant's mental state, the court may rely on a prior competency finding rather than convening a new hearing to cover largely the same ground”].) “We review for substantial evidence the trial court’s finding of no substantial change of circumstances and no new evidence casting serious doubt on the initial competency determination, and we review its decision not to reinstate competency proceedings for an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Bertsch and Hronis (2026) 19 Cal.5th 183, 233 (Bertsch).) 10  Applying these standards here, we conclude there is substantial evidence Holman had not shown a substantial change in his circumstances as to his competence such that the trial court acted within its discretion to not revisit the prior competency determinations. The prior findings of competence, and the psychiatric reports supporting them, serve as our benchmark. (See Bertsch, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 234.) In the prior competency proceedings, three psychiatrists found Holman’s symptoms of a mental illness were volitional and he was feigning them to avoid trial. Dr. Shakib-Beltran in particular noted Holman showed he could assist counsel and behave properly, which usually occurred when he got what he wanted. When he did not get what he wanted, he behaved unproductively. Consistent with the findings, Holman engaged in troubling behavior like cutting himself or attempting to strangle himself when things were not going his way in court. Conversely, he was able to cogently address the court about his views on the case and what he believed needed to be done to help his defense. The record thus supported a finding that Holman was merely an uncooperative defendant rather than one incompetent to stand trial. (See id. at p. 228.) The trial court could have reasonably found there were no substantially changed circumstances. The record supports a finding that Holman’s trial disruptions were voluntary decisions to lash out when he did not get what he wanted. For instance, he spat on a sheriff’s deputy and used his restraints to damage his cell after the court refused to let him testify out of order and did not answer his questions. He excused himself from the courtroom and broke windows in frustration when the court ordered him to wear a spit mask. And he threatened the deputies and refused to 11 attend trial when they asked him to comply with the court’s spit mask order. The record also supports a finding that, consistent with the prior competence findings, Holman was composed and cooperative when he got what he wanted. When it was his turn to testify, he complied with the trial court’s orders and testified at length without incident. He also testified during the People’s rebuttal case and attended the remainder of trial. Holman argues we should discount the fact that he testified because his testimony likely did more harm than good, but that goes to the credibility of his testimony rather than his mental competence. Regardless of how the jury may have viewed Holman’s testimony, the court could have reasonably concluded he understood the accusations made against him, was able to rebut them, and could comply with legal procedures when he chose to. (See People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 798 [“his steadfast contention” that the victim was “responsible reflected an ability to formulate a defense to the charges against him”].) In arguing that the circumstances here were sufficiently different to compel the trial court to initiate a third competency proceeding, Holman relies on People v. Murdoch (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 230 and People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219. Those cases are distinguishable. In each, experts found the defendants had severe mental illnesses that rendered them incompetent to stand trial, but medication made them competent. (Murdoch, at p. 233; Rodas, at pp. 223–224, 235.) When they stopped taking medication, their conditions severely deteriorated and gave rise to serious doubts about their competence. (Murdoch, at pp. 234, 238; Rodas, at pp. 227, 235.) Similar facts are not present here. 12  In sum, the trial court did not err in declining to initiate a third competency hearing. II. Giving the Jury CALCRIM No. 361 Was Not Prejudicial Error Holman additionally argues reversal is warranted because CALCRIM No. 361 inappropriately lessened the People’s burden of proof or shifted the burden to the defense: “If the defendant failed in his testimony to explain or deny evidence against him, and if he could reasonably be expected to have done so based on what he knew, you may consider his failure to explain or deny in evaluating that evidence. Any such failure is not enough by itself to prove guilt. The People must still prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] If the defendant failed to explain or deny, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that failure.” (Ibid.) We agree with the People that even assuming the trial court erred in giving CALCRIM No. 361, the instruction was harmless. To obtain a reversal, Holman must show a reasonable probability that he would have obtained a more favorable result at trial if the instruction had not been given. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836–837; People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 683 (Saddler) [applying the Watson standard of prejudice to assess the harmlessness of an instruction under CALJIC No. 2.62, the predecessor to CALCRIM No. 361].) For several reasons, he failed to do so. First, CALCRIM No. 361’s very language mitigated any harmful impact it may have had. (See People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897, 993 (Barrett) [analyzing CALJIC No. 2.62 and applying the Watson standard].) CALCRIM No. 361 was expressly conditional, leaving it to the jury to determine, based 13 on its view of the evidence, whether the instruction applied. (See Barrett, at p. 993.) Even if the jury concluded the instruction applied, the instruction emphasized the People bore the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the failure to explain or deny was not sufficient to prove guilt. (Ibid.) Second, other properly given instructions regarding the applicability of the instructions, witness credibility, and the prosecution burden of proof mitigated any potential prejudice. (See, e.g., Barrett, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 993; Saddler, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 684; People v. Vega (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 484, 503.) The trial court instructed the jury that: (1) not all instructions applied; (2) the People bore the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the jury alone must judge the credibility or believability of the witnesses and must not automatically reject testimony due to inconsistencies. Finally, closing arguments to the jury are relevant in evaluating prejudice (People v. Chavez (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 379, 388), and the prosecutor’s closing argument militates against a finding of prejudice. The prosecutor neither mentioned CALCRIM No. 361 nor argued that Holman had failed to explain or deny adverse evidence. Instead, she emphasized that the People bore the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and argued they affirmatively met this burden based on the evidence they presented. Because it is not reasonably probable CALCRIM No. 361 affected the outcome of the trial, we conclude any error by the trial court in delivering this instruction was harmless. III. There Was No Cumulative Error Holman finally argues the cumulative impact of the two errors he alleged denied him due process and a fair trial. Because 14 we have concluded the trial court did not err in declining to initiate a third competency hearing and CALCRIM No. 361 did not cause any prejudice, we reject this contention as well. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. RICHARDSON, J. WE CONCUR: LUI, P. J. GOORVITCH, J. 15