Full Opinion

Filed 10/20/26 P. v. Spivey CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, D087162 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SWF2300511) v. RICKY SPIVEY, JR., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Helios Hernandez, Judge. Affirmed. Rex Adam Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Christine Y. Friedman and Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. A jury convicted Ricky Spivey, Jr. of count 1, battery on a custodial officer (Penal Code § 243.1)1, and count 2, deterring and resisting an executive officer on duty by threats, force, and violence (§ 69). On appeal, Spivey contends that section 654 required that sentencing on one of the two charges be stayed. We are not persuaded by the argument and affirm the judgment. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2023, Spivey was an inmate at the Cois M. Byrd Detention Center. Spivey learned that he was to be moved to a different location, and he objected to the move. Sergeant John Mylles met with Spivey in his cell and discussed with him the need for the move. After discussion, Mylles explained that he would need to be moved, and instructed Spivey to stand up. Spivey refused. When Mylles placed his hand on Spivey’s arm to begin the escort, Spivey abruptly stood up and punched Mylles in the jawline. Mylles moved his face away to avoid a more direct hit. Three other officers then entered the cell and worked together to bring Spivey to the ground so that he could be handcuffed. Spivey actively resisted their efforts. Spivey testified at trial. He denied hitting Mylles, instead testifying that Mylles had punched him in the face repeatedly. He conceded that he had no injuries to his face after the altercation. He denied resisting the officers as they brought him to the ground. The jury returned guilty verdicts as to both counts. At sentencing, the probation report discussed the two offenses and then concluded, “As count 1 and 2 involve the same set of circumstances, it appears sentencing limitations pursuant to 654 PC may apply to Count 2.” 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. 2 In its summary, the probation report stated, “it is respectfully recommended the punishment be stayed pursuant to Penal Code Section 654.” The court sentenced Spivey to one-third the mid-term (8 months) on count 1, to run consecutively to the ten-year term he was serving on a pending case, and on count 2, the court sentenced Spivey to the low term of 16 months, to run concurrently. “So your whole sentence, that 10-year 8 months, is increased by 8 months.” Defense counsel did not raise the issue of section 654, and the court did not discuss its applicability. II. DISCUSSION For the first time on appeal,2 Spivey contends that the trial court should have stayed one of the sentences because, even though he was convicted of two different offenses, his behavior that resulted in the convictions comprised just one single indivisible course of conduct. This multiple punishment argument is rooted in subdivision (a) of section 654, which says: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” As our Supreme Court has explained: “Section 654 does not preclude multiple convictions but only multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct. [Citation.] ‘The proscription against double punishment . . . is applicable where there is a course of conduct which violates more than one statute and comprises an indivisible transaction punishable under more than one statute. . . .’ ” 2 Because a sentence imposed in contravention of section 654 is an unauthorized sentence, the error may be raised on appeal even in the absence of an objection. (People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618). The People do not contend that Spivey forfeited this issue by failing to raise it below. 3 (People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 885). “ ‘[I]f all the offenses are incident to one objective, [then] the defendant may be punished for any one of them but not for more than one.’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, the Court has stated that “section 654 is applicable to ‘limit punishment for multiple convictions arising out of . . . a course of conduct deemed to be indivisible in time in those instances wherein the accused entertained a principal objective to which other objectives, if any, were merely incidental’ ” (italics omitted). (Ibid., quoting People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639.) But, “[i]f he entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.” (Beamon, at p. 639.) How the rule just discussed is applied in practice has been explained as follows: “Section 654, as construed by our Supreme Court, permits the imposition of sentences on separate crimes incident to one objective, but precludes the execution of the multiple sentences in a fashion which permits the defendant to be punished in a manner greater than the punishment provided for the greater of the crimes. [Citations.] That result is accomplished in the trial court by staying execution of the sentence on the lesser crime with the stay to become permanent when the judgment on the greater offense is satisfied.” (People v. Lowe (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 792, 795, italics added; see also People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 591, 594 [“if a defendant commits two crimes, punishment for one of which is precluded by section 654, that section requires the sentence for one conviction to be imposed, and the other imposed and then stayed”].) A stay is required because “[s]ection 654 does not allow any 4 multiple punishment, including either concurrent or consecutive sentences.” (Deloza, at p. 592.) “On appeal, ‘[a] trial court’s express or implied determination that two crimes were separate, involving separate objectives, must be upheld . . . if supported by substantial evidence’ [citation], that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (People v. Kelly (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 886, 903, quoting People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 450). Here, Spivey argues that “no substantial evidence suggests appellant harbored multiple intents with different objectives in resisting” the officers. The People counter that substantial evidence supports a finding of separate objectives, namely that he struck Mylles because he was angry that Mylles touched him, but he resisted the other officers because he did not want to be moved to a new housing section.. However, we need not resolve this argument, because we agree with the People that the multiple victim exception applies to the application of section 654. (See People v. Martin (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 776, 781 (Martin) [section 654 does not stay the execution of the second count of conviction if the multiple-victim exception applies].) “[E]ven though a defendant entertains but a single principal objective during an indivisible course of conduct, he may be convicted and punished for each crime of violence committed against a different victim.” (Martin, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 781.) On facts substantially similar to the situation presented in this appeal, the Martin court concluded that “section 243, subdivision (c)(2), battery on a peace officer, and section 69, resisting arrest are such crimes,” and accordingly, section 654 did not require that the punishment for one of the offenses should have been stayed. (Martin, at p. 782.) Here, the testimony of Mylles and the other officers constituted substantial evidence that Spivey committed battery upon Mylles and resisted 5 the executive officers with force. Thus, there were multiple victims of violence, such that the multiple-victim exception to section 654 applies. Appellant does not contend otherwise. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to stay the second count. III. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. KELETY, J. WE CONCUR: MCCONNELL, P. J. BUCHANAN, J. 6