People v. Titman CA1/2

Filed 10/28/26 P. v. Titman CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A175260 v. SHANE PAUL DANIEL TITMAN, (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. 23CR01733) Defendant and Appellant. Shane Paul Daniel Titman appeals from a judgment of conviction for which he was sentenced to five years eight months in prison after a “global resolution” involving seven separate criminal dockets that included a plea of no contest to felony burglary in the second degree in this case (docket No. 23CR01733).1 Titman now challenges the denial of the motion to suppress that preceded his no contest plea, arguing his continued detention beyond 15 minutes for a traffic stop was “unconstitutionally prolonged” and 1 The plea in docket No. 24CR09310, which served as the baseline sentence, was the subject of our unpublished opinion in People v. Titman (Aug. 27, 2026, A175277) [nonpub. opn.] (Titman I), in which Titman sought our review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirmed the judgment finding no meritorious issues and expressly made no determinations concerning the other cases involved in the global disposition, including the case now before us. We limit our discussion of the other dockets as necessary to evaluate the claim of error here. 1 thus required the suppression of the stolen bicycles ultimately recovered from his vehicle as “ ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’ ” But because the extension of Titman’s detention was caused by his own conduct and justified by the detaining officer’s reasonable suspicion Titman was involved in criminal activity beyond the admitted traffic violations, we disagree and affirm. BACKGROUND2 At 8:00 a.m. on October 20, 2023, Santa Rosa Police Officer Travis Watson was on patrol when he observed a Toyota Highlander driven by Titman with a non-functioning right, rear brake light (a violation of Veh. Code, § 24252). After observing Titman turn right onto Santa Rosa Avenue without signaling (a violation of Veh. Code, § 22108), Watson “made the decision to conduct a traffic enforcement stop.” According to Watson’s body camera footage admitted in full at the motion to suppress and preliminary hearing that underlies this appeal, the car Titman was driving stopped in a parking lot at 8:02 a.m.3 As Watson approached the stopped SUV, he observed three bicycles in the trunk area “in plain view”: two were mountain bikes, and one was “a road bike style.” “[B]ased on previous calls for service regarding thefts and friends and family that are avid mountain bikers,” Watson believed the bicycles “appeared to be very high end . . . and very expensive.” Yet, rather than mounted on external 2 We limit our background discussion to the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, which includes the motion to suppress being challenged in this appeal. 3 Watson’s body camera footage begins at 8:02 a.m. as he stops his patrol car by Titman’s car. In this opinion, we refer to the time stamps denoted on the face of the recording introduced into evidence and included in the record on appeal, or, as Titman did before the court and in his appellate briefing, we note the video run time that can be tracked as the recording plays and is referenced in the audio transcript. 2 racks, the bicycles “were stacked on top of each other which would . . . increase the risk of them being damaged or scratched.” The bicycles appeared relatively new; because Watson had “friends and family that are avid mountain bike riders and theft reports [he had] been a part of,” he believed the bicycles were worth “over several thousand dollars.” Watson engaged Titman, who acknowledged the traffic violations, said he was on his way to work cleaning houses, and provided his driver’s license and the vehicle registration (the SUV belonged to his grandmother). At 8:04 a.m., Watson radioed the Santa Rosa Police Department dispatch unit for a records check. At the same time, Titman began recording Watson “for mine and your safety.” While waiting for a response from dispatch, Watson asked Titman, “What’s up with all the bikes in the back?” Titman responded, “I like to ride bikes.” During the exchange, Titman “seemed very . . . unsteady. He was moving around in his seat, he was unable to sit still, fidgety.” Despite it being “a relatively cold morning” and Titman wearing a beanie cap, he displayed “a glisten of sweat across his forehead” and appeared “extremely nervous”; Titman “was not . . . able to look [Watson] in the eyes for a long period of time.” Prior to the stop, Watson had been aware of a “multi thousand dollar bicycle” theft from a local bicycle shop “a couple weeks prior.” The suspect had been described as “a white male adult who was approximately 40 years old with a larger build,” which also “fit[] the general description” of Titman. At 8:05 a.m., Watson returned to his police car to access his department e- mail and social media page to attempt to locate the flyer detailing the bicycle theft; when unsuccessful, Watson called his sergeant and another officer who agreed to try to find the information. Meanwhile, dispatch had reported 3 Titman “had numerous priors for property related crimes as far as like burglaries, stolen property, and miscellaneous property crime related offenses.” At 8:09 a.m., Watson returned to Titman’s vehicle and asked again about the bikes in the back of the SUV. Titman explained that “he likes to ride bikes” and “ha[d] to go to work” and started “to rush [Watson] through [the] ticket,” repeating, “I’m asking if you can give me a ticket, right? [¶] . . . [¶] I’m asking for my ticket.” Titman told Watson the officer had five to 15 minutes to complete the citation; Titman was on his way to work and needed to get going; if Watson was going to write a ticket, “just do it already.” Watson returned to his patrol vehicle at 8:10 a.m. and called the “on call PCI” (property crimes investigator) to see if a suspect from the prior bicycle theft had ever been identified. At 8:14 a.m., Officer Edmonds arrived on scene and was briefed by Watson. At 8:15 a.m., Watson returned to Titman and asked him to roll down the rear window of the SUV; Titman declined and demanded his ticket. Watson took photographs of the bicycles and returned to his patrol car at 8:18 a.m., whereupon he began writing a “citation for the vehicle code violations.” From his patrol car, Watson could hear Titman “yelling and screaming profanities at me.” “He was saying hurry the fuck up, I need to fucking go, this is bullshit, things of that nature, that he was screaming outside the window trying to rush me through my citation. I could see the -- from his level of agitation of him moving around the driver’s side area, I could see the vehicle rocking, and then when I was not meeting his needs by going up to give him his citation already, I saw him making furtive movements in the driver’s side area of his vehicle. I could not see where his hands were and I could tell his agitation was rising, and that’s when I made the decision to halt 4 my citation and separate him from his vehicle because him and his vehicle had not been searched for readily accessible weapons.”4 Watson returned to the driver’s side of the SUV at 8:28 a.m. and told Titman he was going to remove him from the vehicle. Titman began arguing with Watson, saying he didn’t “want to get out of the car.” Watson repeatedly ordered Timan to “step out of the vehicle” and explained Titman “could be arrested for obstruction” if he did not comply. Titman instead “said he was calling his lawyer, he was gonna call the sheriff of Sonoma County, and then also he said he was gonna call our sergeant’s office, and he was not gonna make a decision until he talked to all of them.” At 8:29 a.m., Watson returned to his patrol car and called additional officers, requesting assistance. When Watson returned to the SUV at 8:32 a.m., again directing Titman to exit the vehicle, Titman ignored Watson’s direction, continued to talk on the phone and record Watson, and rolled up the driver’s side window. “After some negotiations,” at 8:36 a.m., Titman stepped out of the SUV and was handcuffed and placed in the back of Watson’s patrol vehicle. Titman stated, “I am not authorizing you to go in my vehicle.” At 8:38 a.m., additional officers arrived; Watson narrated what had happened thus far and explained that he believed he had probable cause to search the SUV, and, as another officer suggested, “at least to run the bikes and see if they’re stolen.” At 8:40 a.m., Watson and Edmonds removed the bicycles from the SUV to photograph their serial numbers; at 8:44 a.m., Watson returned to the patrol vehicle and informed Titman they were checking the bicycles to see if they matched the bikes recently stolen from a 4 At the time of the stop, Titman had represented he “might” have “a razor knife from work.” 5 nearby store because Titman matched “the general . . . description of the suspect.” Titman responded, “those didn’t come from there, I promise you that” and told Watson to “go ahead” three times. At 8:46 a.m., Watson was interrupted by an associate of Titman’s, who asked about the investigation and said he was “just trying to figure out getting to work.”5 At 8:49 a.m., the bicycles “returned clear, so they were not reported stolen”; Watson asked the other officers on scene to “check RMS” for any additional theft reports. At 8:50 a.m., Watson adjusted Titman’s handcuffs at his request, partially removing him from the patrol car, and then advised him of his Miranda6 rights. Titman initially waived his rights and agreed to speak with Watson but when asked, “How’d you get [the bikes],” Titman said, “I don’t wanna talk to you anymore.” Seconds later, Titman asked Watson, “is there anything wrong with ‘em?” Watson answered, “I believe they’re stolen,” and Titman followed, “But they’re not though, so I got nothing to worry about.” Titman and Watson continued discussing the status of the bikes until 8:54 a.m., when Titman said, “I’m not saying nothing to you no more. [¶] . . . [¶] I ride bikes.” Watson locked Titman back in the patrol car, took photographs of the bicycles, which he transmitted to other officers, and telephoned another officer to summarize the status of the investigation. At 8:58 a.m., dispatch informed Edmonds it had received a call from a person in Santa Rosa who reported “that their garage had just been broken into and burglarized” and they were “missing several bikes.” At 8:59 a.m., Watson called the reporting 5 The individual had slowly driven by earlier at 8:15 a.m., and Titman had then represented to officers that the individual was Titman’s coworker and asked officers to tell the individual that Titman would “be a minute.” 6 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). 6 party directly, who explained how the garage had been forced open and that three bicycles were stolen, valued “upwards of close to $20,000.” After speaking with an additional victim and confirming the descriptions of the stolen bicycles matched the bikes removed from Titman’s car, Watson arrested Titman for possession of stolen property at 9:25 a.m. Prior to being transported to the police station, Titman called out to Watson, asking to throw something away. Titman said he had “a piece of glass,” meaning “a pipe,” in his pant leg. Watson partially removed Titman from the patrol vehicle; when Titman shook his pant leg, out fell a suspected methamphetamine pipe and a piece of metal, later determined to be part of the garage locking component that appeared to have been forced open to access the bicycles that were stolen and found in Titman’s vehicle. On November 3, 2023, Titman was charged with two felony counts in connection with the October 20 arrest: (1) second degree burglary in violation of Penal Code,7 section 459, and (2) the unlawful possession of stolen property in excess of $950 in violation of section 496. Both were alleged to have been committed while Titman was out on bail or his own recognizance under section 12022.1. In March 2024, Titman filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5 in which he sought suppression of “the recovery of the bikes as well as the observations related to the bikes” because the traffic stop became “unduly prolonged” well before police developed probable cause to arrest him. The motion was heard in conjunction with the preliminary hearing held on June 17 and 20, 2024, at which Watson testified and his body camera recording of Titman’s detention and arrest was admitted into evidence with an accompanying transcript. 7 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 7  After reviewing the supplemental authorities filed by counsel and hearing argument, the court denied the motion to suppress, finding that by the 34th minute after the stop, at 8:36 a.m., “the obstructing and delaying has occurred and that there’s probable cause for the arrest. So if there had not been already probable cause for arrest based on the traffic stop itself, there was undoubtedly probable cause for arrest at that point in which case then any further Fourth Amendment analysis is not relevant.” The court further commented, “I would note that that investigative detention went on only as long as necessary to determine whether or not the facts as suspected did in fact rise to the level of probable cause which in the end they did.” Thereafter, the court held Titman to answer for the charged felony offenses and the bail enhancement. After the district attorney filed an information charging Titman with the same two felony counts and an additional misdemeanor count of possession of a smoking device in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11364, subdivision (a), Titman filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Penal Code section 995, challenging the magistrate’s ruling on the motion to suppress. The court denied the motion on September 17, 2024.8 On October 31, 2025, Titman entered into a “global resolution” of all pending matters, in which he pled no contest to the second degree burglary charged in count 1 of the information9 and was sentenced to the low term of 8 We do not recite the hearing court’s determinations because, “In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a section 995 motion, we disregard the ruling of the trial court and directly review the magistrate’s ruling.” (People v. Superior Court (Mendez) (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 268, 277; see also People v. Demolle (2026) 19 Cal.5th 1117, 1140 (Demolle).) 9 Counts 2 (§ 496) and 3 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)) were dismissed with a waiver pursuant to People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754. 8 16 months in state prison to be served concurrent with the total five-year eight-month prison commitment ordered for the seven dockets being resolved.10 Titman timely appealed but did not obtain a certificate of probable cause. Thus, our review is limited to the challenged motion to suppress. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2)(A) [no certificate of probable cause is required to challenge “[t]he denial of a motion to suppress evidence under . . . section 1538.5”]; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 74 [denial of § 1538.5 motion “may be raised in a guilty or nolo contendere plea appeal without issuance of a certificate” of probable cause].) 10 As stated in Titman I and using only the last four digits of each docket, Titman was sentenced as follows: “[I]n the docket ending in 9310 that is the subject of [Titman I], the record, minute order, and abstract of judgment reflect the following sentences: count 3, felony violation of section 33215, upper term of three years; count 4, felony violation of section 29800, subdivision (a)(1), one-third the midterm for eight months consecutive; and count 18, felony violation of section 496, subdivision (a), one-third the midterm for eight months consecutive. In 3205, count 1, a felony violation of section 459 for one-third the midterm of eight months consecutive. In 9277, count 1, a felony violation of section 459 for one-third the midterm of eight months consecutive. In [this case, docket] 1733, count 1, a felony violation of section 459 for the low term of 16 months to run concurrent with the preceding five-year eight-month sentence. And in 1354-1, a felony violation of section 459 for the low term of 16 months also to run concurrent with the preceding sentence.” Although the concurrent nature of the sentence ordered for the docket on appeal here raises a question of mootness, we decide this appeal because “the conviction continues to exist” and Titman “continues to suffer disadvantageous and prejudicial collateral consequences.” (People v. DeLong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 492; see also People v. Moore (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 626, 630 [potential “collateral” consequences may include “the possibility of enhanced punishment in the event of a future conviction,” “the possibility of probation revocation in another case,” and “limitations on the ability to earn conduct and work credits while in prison”].) 9  DISCUSSION On appeal, Titman does not contest his initial detention for the two acknowledged traffic violations, rather he contends, “the detention in this case became unconstitutionally prolonged once officer Watson started writing the traffic citation at the fifteen-minute, thirty-second mark of the traffic stop, if not much sooner.” Titman continues, “Even if the detention was not unduly prolonged and police had probable cause to arrest appellant, they did not have probable cause to search the vehicle when they did.” Accordingly, he argues, the “bicycles constitute ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ and should have been suppressed,” and the case therefore dismissed after the permissible withdrawal of Titman’s no contest plea.11 But because we agree with the magistrate’s determination that “the investigative detention went on only as long as necessary to determine whether or not the facts as suspected did in fact rise to the level of probable cause which in the end they did,” we affirm the denial of Titman’s motion to suppress. A magistrate ruling on a motion to suppress under section 1538.5 raised at a preliminary hearing “ ‘sits as the finder of fact with the power to judge credibility, resolve conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw inferences.’ ” (Demolle, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 1140, quoting People v. Shafrir (2010) 11 In his motion to suppress, Titman “request[ed] that all evidence obtained” be suppressed “as the officers illegally searched his person and his vehicle,” but Titman did not include any argument about the discovery of the pipe after his arrest, and Titman’s appellate briefing focuses exclusively on the bicycles. Thus, we do not separately address the search of Titman’s person after his arrest but note that, because officers had probable cause to arrest Titman, there was no basis to suppress the discovery of his pipe. (United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 224 [“It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment”]; People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1213.) 10 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1244.) The superior court ruling on a subsequent motion under section 995 therefore sits as a reviewing court, so, on appeal, “we in effect disregard the ruling of the superior court and directly review the determination of the magistrate.” (Demolle, at p. 1140.) In doing so, “We draw all presumptions in favor of the magistrate’s express or implied factual determinations and must uphold them if they are supported by substantial evidence [citation], but we exercise our independent judgment in determining the ultimate constitutional question of whether a seizure occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 242 [“We independently assess whether the challenged search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, applying federal constitutional standards”].) Although a traffic stop “ ‘constitutes a “seizure” of “persons” within the meaning of’ the Fourth Amendment,’ ” it is constitutionally reasonable “ ‘where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.’ ” (People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669, quoting Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 809–810.) “Nevertheless, a traffic stop ‘that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution.’ [Citation.] ‘[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.’ ” (Gyorgy, at p. 669, quoting Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 350.) But, “ ‘There is no set time limit for a permissible investigative stop; the question is whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.’ ” (People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 937; see also People v. Gallardo (2005) 11 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 238 [“There is no hard-and-fast limit as to the amount of time that is reasonable; rather, it depends on the circumstances of each case”].) “When determining the lawful duration of a traffic stop, courts should ‘examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.’ ” (People v. Suggs (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1360, 1364, quoting United States v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 686 (Sharpe) [there is no rigid formula for determining how long a detention may last].) Indeed, “Circumstances which develop during a detention may provide reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention.” (People v. Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.) A detaining officer must be aware of “ ‘specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity.’ ” (People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 588, quoting In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893.) Here, as articulated by Watson, we have such circumstances. (See, e.g., People v. Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 536, 540 [defendant’s “Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by” detention for seatbelt violation that lasted “well over an hour” while officers investigated possible narcotics trafficking].) It is uncontested that Titman’s broken right taillight and his failure to signal before a turn were Vehicle Code violations that justified his initial stop and detention. (Rodriguez v. United States, supra, 575 U.S. at p. 354 [“A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation”].) And Titman concedes that the time between the lawful traffic stop at 8:02 a.m. and the time Watson’s body camera shows him writing the 12 citation at 8:16 a.m. does not demonstrate an unconstitutional delay. Instead, he challenges the continued detention, arguing that “Officer Watson prolonged the traffic stop until he finally received evidence that confirmed his hunch that the bicycles in the back of [Titman’s] SUV were stolen.” But this contention overlooks the “ ‘specific and articulable facts’ ” leading to Watson’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that he tried to explain to Titman as early as 15 minutes into the stop, explained to his sergeant on the telephone and the officers on scene, and testified to before the magistrate at the hearing on the motion to suppress. (People v. McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 588.) For example, Watson testified that, prior to contacting Titman, he was aware of the theft of bicycles from a nearby store a few weeks earlier. Near the start of the stop, Watson developed a suspicion Titman had been involved in criminal activity when he saw three “high-end,” “relatively new,” and “very expensive” bicycles stacked on top of each other in the back of Titman’s SUV, rather than mounted on an external rack. Titman, who matched the general description of the suspect in the bike theft, appeared “extremely nervous” and “was moving around in his seat, he was unable to sit still, fidgety.” Despite the “relatively cold morning,” Titman “displayed a glisten of sweat across his forehead” and was not able to look Watson in the eyes “for a long period of time.” The fact that Titman began recording the stop almost immediately further raised Watson’s suspicions, so Watson—who by now had probable cause to search the SUV—attempted to locate the bike theft flyer, first on his own, and then by contacting and briefing a series of other officers, as the body camera footage demonstrates. By 8:18 a.m., Watson was aware Titman had a criminal history of theft but had not yet received further information relating to the bike theft, so he 13 began writing Titman a citation for the Vehicle Code offenses, as Titman had requested. However, it was Titman who interrupted the process by “yelling and screaming profanities.” Watson could see Titman “making furtive movements” around the driver’s side area of the SUV and “the vehicle rocking”; because Titman’s “agitation was rising,” Watson “made the decision to hault [sic] my citation and separate him from his vehicle because him and his vehicle had not been searched for readily accessible weapons.” Thus, at 8:28 a.m., Watson told Titman he was going to remove him from the vehicle (see Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 410 [“a police officer may as a matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle”]), but Titman refused and rolled up his window while reportedly calling his lawyer and other members of the police department. After extended negotiations, Titman finally exited the vehicle over eight minutes later at 8:36 a.m. Because Titman’s conduct served as the basis for an additional criminal violation, “obstruction” as Watson termed it,12 the magistrate stopped its inquiry, finding “[Titman was] under arrest or arrestable for a [section] 148” violation; therefore, “there was undoubtedly probable cause for arrest at that point in which case then any further Fourth Amendment analysis is not relevant.” We agree that Titman’s obstreperous conduct delayed the completion of the citation and created a basis for further detention, as well as a potential search of the vehicle. (People v. Russell, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 102 12 Section 148, subdivision (a)(1) provides, “Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer, peace officer, or an emergency medical technician . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or employment, when no other punishment is prescribed, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. 14 [“Circumstances which develop during a detention may provide reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention”].) But, because Watson did not arrest Titman at that time, and because, as stated, Titman challenges the search of his vehicle on appeal, we continue our inquiry. (But see In re Lennies H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1239–1240 [“The fact that a defendant is not formally arrested until after the search does not invalidate the search if probable cause to arrest existed prior to the search and the search was substantially contemporaneous with the arrest”].) By the time Titman was placed in Watson’s patrol vehicle at 8:38 a.m., Watson still had not located the bike theft flyer so, believing—and confirming with his sergeant—he had probable cause to search the vehicle because of his ongoing suspicion that Titman was involved in criminal activity that had just been exacerbated by Titman’s refusal to exit his vehicle, Watson decided “to remove the bicycles from the vehicle to conduct records checks on the serial numbers.” (See United States v. Torres-Sanchez (9th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 1123, 1129 [permissible to question suspect “to clear up appropriate questions about ownership of the truck” being stopped].) Absent further information detailing the bike theft, running the bicycle serial numbers “was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly” and justified Titman’s further detention. (See Sharpe, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 686.) And although when being handcuffed Titman had stated, “I’m not authorizing you to go into my vehicle,” when Watson informed Titman of his intent to run the bike serial numbers, Titman offered, “those didn’t come from there, I promise you that” and said Watson could “go ahead” several times.13 13 Although we do not resolve this appeal on the matter of consent, we note that Titman’s apparent consent to the search of the vehicle to remove the bicycles could forfeit any challenge to the search he now makes on appeal and further justifies his continued detention. (United States v. Brown (9th 15  By 8:49 a.m., the bicycles “returned clear,” so Watson asked the other officers present to “check RMS” for additional theft reports, while he read Titman his Miranda rights to specifically ask about the bicycles, and then took photographs of the bicycles to transmit to other officers. (See United States v. Mayo (9th Cir. 2005) 394 F.3d 1271, 1275–1276 [40-minute detention was constitutionally permissible where “new grounds for suspicion of criminal activity continued to unfold” and “officers pursued their multiple inquiries promptly as they arose”].) Less than 10 minutes later, at 8:58 a.m., Watson learned of a newly reported garage burglary earlier that morning in which three bicycles were stolen, thus providing additional specific and articulable facts justifying Titman’s further detention. After speaking with the reporting parties directly and comparing the bicycles they reported stolen to those recovered from Titman’s SUV, Watson arrested Titman for possession of stolen property at 9:25 a.m. Because Watson was aware of objectively reasonable “ ‘specific and articulable facts’ ” causing him to suspect that Titman was involved in criminal activity beyond the initial, valid vehicle stop (People v. McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 588), because he “ ‘diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions’ ” (People v. Suggs, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1364), and because any further extension of the delay was caused by Titman’s own disruptive conduct (People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1050 [“ ‘nervous, evasive behavior’ ” is “ ‘a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion’ ”]), we find no error in the Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 410, 415 [“ ‘[A warrantless] search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible’ ”].) 16 magistrate’s determination and affirm the denial of Titman’s motion to suppress. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. 17  DESAUTELS, J. We concur: STEWART, P. J. RICHMAN, J. People v. Titman (A175260) 18