People v. Templeton CA2/2

Filed 11/5/26 P. v. Templeton CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, B350404 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County v. Super. Ct. No. 24CJCF07655) MARVION TEMPLETON, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Francis B. Bennett, Karla D. Kerlin, and Yvette Verastegui, Judges. Affirmed. Jennifer Peabody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Blake R. Armstrong, Kenneth C. Byrne, and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _______________________  Marvion Templeton appeals his conviction on the ground the magistrate and trial court erred in denying his Penal Code section 1538.51 motions to suppress evidence. We affirm. FACTUAL BACKGROUND We construe the record in the light most favorable to the People. (People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 941.) At approximately 10:00 p.m. on March 5, 2024, Templeton was pulled over by Officer Cesar Esqueda for driving a car with an expired registration. Templeton did not have his driver’s license, but gave Esqueda his passport. Esqueda asked the owner of the car, who was in the passenger seat, to provide proof of insurance. While the owner looked for proof on her phone, Esqueda spoke with Templeton for about seven minutes. During this initial encounter, Esqueda noticed Templeton’s eyes were red and glossy. Based on his background, training, and experience, Esqueda recognized that as a symptom of being under the influence of narcotics. He also saw Templeton’s leg was in a cast, and there was a prescription pill bottle in the center console. Esqueda returned to his patrol car to verify Templeton’s driver’s license. He told a fellow officer in the narcotics unit, “ ‘I’m not seeing any objective symptoms. He just has a bike and a dog in the back. I’m going to keep talking to him for a little while to see if I can get anything else out.’ ” The narcotics officer asked Esqueda to turn off his body camera, and Esqueda did so. Esqueda requested assistance from the narcotics unit. Esqueda then turned his camera on and returned to Templeton’s car. He asked Templeton about the cast and the pill bottle. Templeton handed the bottle to Esqueda and told him it 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 was for his broken leg, but Templeton denied taking any of the medication. The bottle’s label said “ ‘oxycodone.’ ” Esqueda told Templeton his eyes looked glossy and red. He asked Templeton to exit the vehicle for a field sobriety test. Before Esqueda could conduct the test, the narcotics unit arrived and handled the rest of the investigation. Narcotics Officer Donovan Anderson responded to the scene. When Anderson arrived, Templeton was already out of the car, with his hands behind his back. Another officer conducted a patdown search of Templeton, which yielded a firearm. Narcotics Detective Todd Ramsey also responded to the scene. He examined the pill bottle and its contents. The label said the bottle contained 12 oxycodone pills inscribed “IP203.” Ramsey knew from his background, training, and experience those are larger white pills containing both oxycodone and acetaminophen. However, this bottle contained over 40 smaller, pink pills inscribed “K56.” Ramsey recognized that as a much stronger version of oxycodone, different from the bottle’s label. Ramsey asked Templeton why the pills did not match the bottle’s label and what had happened to the original pills. At first, Templeton said his doctor prescribed the medication with refills, but Ramsey pointed out the label did not indicate any refills. Templeton then explained he combined several separate prescriptions into that bottle. Ramsey noticed Templeton was nervous. Ramsey “decided [Templeton] was going to be arrested for possession for sales of oxycodone.” A police chemist later analyzed the pills and confirmed they were a type of oxycodone different than listed on the bottle label. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In December 2024, Templeton was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1) 3 and possession of a controlled substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 2). It was further alleged Templeton had suffered three prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and served a prior prison term (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)). In May 2025, Templeton moved to suppress all evidence recovered at the traffic stop. (See § 1538.5, subd. (a).) In June 2025, the motion was heard by a magistrate at the preliminary hearing and denied. The magistrate found that Esqueda noticed Templeton’s glossy and red eyes and the pill bottle during the initial conversation. That conversation occurred after “an initial stop which was completely proper” for “expired registration,” when Esqueda was “going through . . . to verify[] [Templeton’s] information.” Templeton was then “taken out of the car for a DUI investigation[,] there was a pat-down, and that’s how the gun was discovered.” Thus, the magistrate concluded the stop was not illegally prolonged, Esqueda saw the pill bottle in plain sight, and the discovery of the gun was proper. Templeton was held to answer on both counts, and a July 2025 information alleged the same counts and priors against Templeton. In July 2025, Templeton filed a renewed motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop. (See § 1538.5, subd. (i).) The trial court denied the motion after a hearing at which no new evidence was admitted. The court concluded it was bound by the magistrate’s findings, including that Esqueda observed Templeton’s glossy eyes and saw the pill bottle, which converted the detention to a DUI investigation. Templeton was “asked to step out of the car” and was quickly patted down for safety, at which point the gun was found. Thus, the investigation “convert[ed] from DUI to . . . narcotics and a weapon.” 4  Templeton later pled no contest to count 1 and admitted the prison prior. Count 2 and the strike allegations were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. The trial court sentenced Templeton to the high term of three years. Templeton timely appealed. (§§ 1237, subd. (a), 1538.5, subd. (m); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a).) DISCUSSION I. The Magistrate Correctly Concluded the Traffic Stop Was Not Unduly Prolonged Templeton argues the magistrate’s factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence, and the record “shows that the stop was unduly prolonged because [Templeton’s] license was verified and there was no reasonable suspicion to warrant further investigation.” We disagree. A. Standard of Review “Where, as here, a motion to suppress is submitted to the superior court on the preliminary examination transcript, ‘the appellate court disregards the findings of the superior court and reviews the determination of the magistrate . . . , drawing all presumptions in favor of the factual determinations of the magistrate, upholding the magistrate’s express or implied findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, and measuring the facts as found by the trier against the constitutional standard of reasonableness.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 620, 626 (Johnson).) We do “ ‘ “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts,” ’ ” and we uphold the findings “ ‘ “if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the [trier] might have 5 reached a different result had it believed other evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622, 646 (Helzer).) Based upon the facts found by the magistrate, “we exercise our independent judgment in determining the legality of a search.” (Johnson, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 626–627.) “[W]e do not consider each fact in isolation,” but “ ‘ “the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture” ’ ” (People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043 (Flores))—against an objective standard (id. at p. 1049). B. The Initial Stop Was Lawful “ ‘A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation,’ ” as well as “ ‘ “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop,” ’ ” such as “ ‘checking the driver’s license . . . and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.’ ” (People v. Suggs (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1360, 1365, original brackets (Suggs).) Templeton concedes Esqueda lawfully stopped him for the expired registration. He also concedes that Esqueda’s inquiries during the initial conversation, regarding Templeton’s license, the car’s registration, and insurance, were within the scope of the stop’s mission. C. Esqueda’s Continued Inquiries Were Justified by Reasonable Suspicion Templeton Was Driving Under the Influence Templeton, however, argues the mission of the stop ended once Esqueda “verified [Templeton] had a valid license” while at his patrol car, before he returned to Templeton’s vehicle for the second conversation. According to Templeton, Esqueda’s inquiries during the second conversation were thus unlawful because the mission of the stop had ended. (See Suggs, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1365 [where the reason for the traffic stop “was completely 6 dispelled” as the officer approached the car, he could not “prolong the stop by conducting inquiries aimed at finding evidence of [unrelated] criminal wrongdoing”].) We disagree. Esqueda’s continued inquiries were justified by a reasonable suspicion Templeton was driving under the influence of narcotics. During a lawful stop, circumstances may develop that “provide reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention.” (People v. Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 102 (Russell).) “[T]o be reasonable, the officer’s suspicion must be supported by some specific, articulable facts that are ‘reasonably “consistent with criminal activity.” ’ ” (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083 (Wells); see also ibid. [“[r]easonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause”].) “[W]here a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists,” it is entirely appropriate for an officer “ ‘to inquire into such circumstances “in the proper exercise of [his] duties.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Further, “an officer . . . ‘may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop’ ” in order “to detect ‘ “evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” ’ ” but he may not prolong the stop to do so unless he has developed reasonable suspicion. (Suggs, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1365.) Here, Esqueda testified that he noticed Templeton’s cast, glossy and red eyes, and the pill bottle during his initial conversation with Templeton. That testimony is substantial evidence supporting the magistrate’s factual findings regarding the first conversation. (See In re Marriage of Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 403 (Fregoso) [“The testimony of one witness . . . may constitute substantial evidence.”].) Templeton does not squarely dispute that. Instead, he argues Esqueda’s testimony that he saw Templeton’s glossy and 7 red eyes during the initial conversation was not credible because: (1) Esqueda told the narcotics officer at the time he did not “see[] any objective symptoms”; (2) Esqueda did not testify Templeton was driving erratically; (3) a still image from Esqueda’s body camera does not appear to show Templeton with glossy or red eyes; and (4) Esqueda did not say anything to Templeton about his eyes during the initial conversation. We cannot reweigh the evidence. (Helzer, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 646.) The magistrate was entitled to credit Esqueda’s testimony regarding Templeton’s eyes; the presence of certain evidence to the contrary does not undermine the magistrate’s factual findings. (See ibid.; see also Fregoso, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 703 [“ ‘[t]he issue is not whether there is evidence in the record to support a different finding, but whether there is some evidence that, if believed, would support the findings of the trier of fact’ ”].) Likewise, Templeton’s assertion that “the pill bottle in and of itself is . . . insufficient to furnish reasonable suspicion” is beside the point. “[W]e do not consider each fact in isolation.” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1043.) Instead, we consider the totality of the circumstances, and here, those furnished reasonable suspicion Templeton was driving under the influence of narcotics. (See Russell, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 102 [officer was not required to accept driver’s explanation that he had a cold, which purportedly caused his eyes to be red and watery].) Templeton’s reliance upon Suggs is misplaced. In that case, no reasonable suspicion of any other criminal activity had developed before the original justification for the stop “was completely dispelled.” (Suggs, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1365.) By contrast, Esqueda’s second conversation with Templeton was justified by specific, articulable facts amounting to a reasonable 8 suspicion Templeton was driving under the influence—not by the original justification for the stop. (See Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1083.) D. The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply Because the stop was not unlawfully prolonged, the exclusionary rule does not apply. (See People v. Robinson (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1123–1124.) II. Templeton Forfeited His Challenge to the Search of the Pill Bottle Templeton argues Ramsey’s opening of the pill bottle to examine its contents was “a separate search for which he needed probable cause,” and probable cause was lacking because the bottle appeared to be an ordinary oxycodone prescription. We decline to address this argument on the merits because it was raised for the first time on appeal. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880–881.) A defendant moving to suppress evidence “must inform the prosecution and the court of the specific basis for [his] motion,” and he bears the burden to “(1) assert[] the search or seizure was without a warrant, and (2) explain[] why it was unreasonable under the circumstances.” (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 129.) Review on appeal is thus “ ‘limited to those [issues] raised during argument [in the trial court] . . . . This is an elemental matter of fairness in giving each of the parties an opportunity adequately to litigate the facts and inferences relating to the adverse party’s contentions.’ ” (Id. at p. 136.) In the trial court, Templeton argued: (1) the stop was unlawfully prolonged; and (2) the evidence recovered was thus inadmissible as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Templeton never suggested that even if the stop was lawful, the search of the pill bottle amounted to an independent Fourth Amendment violation. 9  Templeton argues he twice challenged the reasonableness of the search of the pill bottle, but that is contradicted by the record. First, while the pill bottle’s presence in “plain view” or “plain sight” was discussed at the preliminary hearing, that discussion was about Esqueda seeing the bottle during the initial conversation, and therefore its contributing, “in combination with the glossy eyes,” to a reasonable suspicion of Templeton driving under the influence. Second, Templeton did not argue during the hearing on the renewed motion to suppress “that the [pill] bottle was not subject to search under the plain view doctrine.” Rather, his counsel argued Esqueda “lie[d]” about Templeton’s eyes, and “it [was] not readily apparent” the pill bottle was illegal, so Esqueda had no justification to prolong the stop. Counsel never argued the search of the pill bottle itself was unlawful, let alone unlawful on the ground the bottle did not appear to be illegal. Because Templeton challenged the legality of the search of the pill bottle for the first time on appeal, the argument is forfeited. (See People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 980 [claims were forfeited because “whether the duration of the stop was excessive and whether [police] questions were proper—involve analyses the trial court was not asked to conduct and potentially required factual bases additional to those adduced at the hearing”].) III. We Presume the Trial Court Followed the Law Finally, Templeton argues we should reverse because the trial court purportedly misunderstood the standard of review. According to Templeton, the court erroneously believed it was bound by the magistrate’s factual findings, regardless of their evidentiary support in the record, and by the magistrate’s legal conclusions. 10  Assuming the trial court’s decision is properly before us (cf. Johnson, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 626 [we “ ‘disregard[] the findings of the superior court and review[] the determination of the magistrate’ ”]), Templeton has not demonstrated it used an incorrect standard. The court stated multiple times it was bound by the magistrate’s findings, but never expressly stated it was bound by legal conclusions. Likewise, while the court did not specifically use the term “substantial evidence” standard of review, Templeton’s counsel did so and explained its application to this case. “[T]he issue was squarely presented to the trial court,” and we presume the court was “ ‘ “aware of and followed the applicable law.” ’ ” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 398.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. RICHARDSON, J. WE CONCUR: CHAVEZ, Acting P. J. GOORVITCH, J. 11