Full Opinion

Filed 11/17/26 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B344499 (Super. Ct. No. GA071678) Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County) v. ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING DANIEL RODRIGUEZ, et al. REHEARING [NO CHANGE IN Defendants and Appellants. JUDGMENT] THE COURT: It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on October 22, 2026, be modified as follows: 1. On page 1, first paragraph, first sentence commencing with “Daniel Rodriguez was convicted, by guilty plea” is modified to read: “Daniel Rodriguez was convicted, with a plea of no contest, to the attempted murder of Miguel Alvarez during a drive-by shooting in which he was the driver.” 2. On page 5, first full paragraph, first sentence commencing with “Appellant pled no contest to the attempted” is modified to read: “Appellant pled no contest to the attempted murder of Alvarez.” 3. On page 5, first full paragraph, second sentence commencing with “He also admitted enhancement allegations” is modified to read: “He also admitted enhancement allegations that a principal involved in the offense personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (e)(1)), and that the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied. There is no change in judgment. CODY, P. J. YEGAN, J. BALTODANO, J. 2 Filed 10/22/26 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/6 (unmodified opinion) NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B344499 (Super. Ct. No. GA071678) Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County) v. DANIEL RODRIGUEZ, et al. Defendants and Appellants. Daniel Rodriguez was convicted, by guilty plea, of the attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder of Miguel Alvarez during a drive-by shooting in which he was the driver. (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a).)1 He was sentenced in 2011 to 29 years in state prison. In 2022, appellant filed a petition for resentencing. (§ 1172.6.) After appointing counsel and holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. Appellant contends the trial court erred because there is no All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 1 otherwise stated. substantial evidence he acted with the intent to kill Alvarez. We affirm with respect to appellant Rodriguez. Rodriguez’s co-defendant, Iban Manuel Ma Gurrola, was a passenger in the SUV driven by Rodriguez. He personally fired a handgun at the victim. Gurrola pleaded no contest to the attempted murder of Alvarez, and admitted the firearm use and gang allegations. (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)-(e); § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(c).) The trial court sentenced Gurrola to a total term in state prison of 35 years. In 2023, Gurrola filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. After appointment of counsel, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which it considered the record of Gurrola’s conviction, including the transcript of his preliminary hearing. The trial court found Gurrola was a direct perpetrator who acted with an intent to kill or, at a minimum, aided and abetted the third co-defendant, Steven Aguilar, with the intent to kill. It denied Gurrola’s petition. We appointed counsel to represent Gurrola on appeal. After an examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues and requested that we follow the procedures set forth in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. On November 12, 2025, we directed Gurrola’s counsel to send the record of the appeal and a copy of appellant’s brief to Gurrola immediately and to notify him of his right to submit a supplemental brief or letter stating any grounds for an appeal, or contentions or arguments he wished us to consider. Appellant Gurrola has not filed a supplemental brief or letter. Accordingly, we dismiss appellant Gurrola’s appeal as abandoned. 2 Facts Erick Rodriguez (no relation to appellant) was standing on a sidewalk in Glendale, talking with some friends when a burgundy SUV drove slowly toward them. There was a driveway, leading to an apartment building, directly to the right where Erick was standing. Appellant stopped his SUV in the middle of the street, about five feet away from Erick. Erick saw that, in addition to the driver, there was a man in the front passenger seat and a man in the rear passenger seat. Both passenger side windows were open. The front seat passenger, appellant Gurrola, asked Erick if he was “Tuna Fish,” referring to the Toonerville gang. Erick answered, “No.” Gurrola asked Erick to lift his shirt and he complied, revealing that he had no tattoos. Appellant drove the SUV past Erick and his friends as Gurrola and Aguilar yelled derogatory things about the Toonerville gang. Within moments, appellant stopped the SUV and drove it in reverse until it was in front of the driveway. Both Gurrola and Aguilar began shooting down that driveway. Erick did not see who they were shooting at; he didn’t look. Aguilar, the rear seat passenger, got out of the SUV, yelled, “motherfucker,” and fired some more shots in the same direction. After Gurrola yelled, “come on, let’s go,” Aguilar got back into the SUV. Appellant drove away. Erick heard appellant say to Gurrola, “ ‘Get the witnesses.’ ” No additional shots were fired. Erick estimated seven or eight shots were fired. Another witness, Maria Trejo, said there were three or four shots. The entire incident lasted only seconds. Miguel Alvarez was visiting with some friends in an apartment at the end of the driveway. When he saw the SUV 3 stop at the driveway, he began walking toward it. He heard occupants of the SUV saying something, but he could not hear what they were saying. When Alvarez was between 100 and 200 meters from the street, one of the SUV passengers pointed a handgun at him. Then, Aguilar started shooting. Alvarez was hit almost immediately, in the foot and the back. He heard six or seven shots. Alvarez’s wounds required medical treatment but not surgery. Within a few minutes, the SUV was stopped on the freeway by a Glendale police officer. Appellant and Gurrola remained in the SUV. The rear seat passenger, Aguilar, jumped out and ran away down a freeway embankment. He was later found in a backyard and returned to the location where the SUV was stopped. About 40 minutes later, police brought Erick Rodriguez to the location for a field show-up. Erick identified the SUV and the men being detained as those who were involved in the shooting. Alvarez was also brought to the site. He identified Gurrola as the front seat passenger but could not identify the other men. Los Angeles Police Officer John Cuenca testified at the preliminary hearing as a gang expert. He identified the defendants as members of the Rascals gang and opined that the Rascals and Toonerville gangs are “bitter rivals.” This shooting occurred in “Toonerville territory.” Officer Cuenca explained that, in the early morning hours of February 15, 2008, a member of the Rascals was shot and killed. Toonerville members were arrested in connection with that crime. He also opined that, when gang members drive into rival gang territory and shoot at someone, “it’s almost always an intent to injure . . . or probably kill them.” A shooting like the one that occurred here would likely be 4 considered by gang members to be “pay back for what happened in the prior evening . . . .” Procedural History Appellant pled no contest to the attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of Alvarez. He also admitted enhancement allegations that a principal involved in the offense personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d), (e)(1)), and that the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) The trial court sentenced appellant to the upper term of 9 years for the attempted murder and a 20-year enhancement term for the firearm use. After appellant filed his form petition for resentencing, respondent conceded that he stated a prima facie case for relief. The trial court appointed counsel to represent him. No new evidence was presented at the evidentiary hearing. Instead, the parties relied on the record of conviction including the information, minute orders reflecting appellant’s change of plea, the transcript of the preliminary hearing and the transcript of the sentencing hearing. Following the arguments of counsel, the trial court denied the petition because it found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was a direct aider and abettor who acted with express malice. Standard of Review The trial court sits as an independent fact finder when considering a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.) We review findings made after the evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988; People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 591.) Under this 5 familiar standard, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution, presuming in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence and drawing all factual inferences in favor of the trial court’s ruling. (Reyes, supra, at p. 988; Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951.) Discussion Appellant contends the trial court erred when it denied his petition for resentencing because there is no substantial evidence that he acted with the specific intent to kill the named victim, Miguel Alvarez, rather than some other person. We are not persuaded. Section 1172.6 established a process by which a person convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine” may petition to have the conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts. (Id., subd. (a); People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.) Once a petitioner establishes a prima facie case for resentencing, the trial court appoints counsel, issues an order to show cause and schedules an evidentiary hearing. At that hearing, the prosecution bears the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner could be convicted of attempted murder under “California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) A petitioner is not entitled to resentencing under section 1172.6 if he or she was convicted of attempted murder “either as a perpetrator or a direct aider and abettor, and not under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or indeed any theory under which malice is imputed to a person based 6 solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 204.) Attempted murder “ ‘requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ ” (People v. Falaniko (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1242 (Falaniko).) As our Supreme Court has explained, “Attempted murder requires express malice, i.e., intent to kill. Implied malice – a conscious disregard for life – suffices for murder but not attempted murder.” (People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 139-140 (Stone).) The doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder because “an intent to kill cannot be ‘transferred’ from one attempted murder victim to another . . . .” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602.) “Someone who in truth does not intend to kill a person is not guilty of that person's attempted murder even if the crime would have been murder—due to transferred intent—if the person were killed. To be guilty of attempted murder, the defendant must intend to kill the alleged victim, not someone else.” (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 328.) Appellant contends there is no substantial evidence he directly aided and abetted the attempted murder of the named victim, Alvarez, rather than the attempted murder of one of the other people standing on the street at the time of the shooting. The record, however, contains substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s findings to the contrary. Appellant, Gurrola and Aguilar were all members of the same gang. On February 15, one of their follow gang members was shot and killed. Members of their rival gang, Toonerville, were arrested in connection with that shooting. The next day, appellant drove Gurrola and Aguilar, who were armed 7 with handguns, into rival gang territory. He must have heard them question Erick Rodriguez and shout slurs about the rival gang. Appellant then drove a short distance away but suddenly stopped and reversed back to the first location. He stopped his SUV in front of the driveway, giving his passengers the clearest possible shot at Alvarez. Appellant remained parked in front of the driveway while Aguilar jumped out of the back seat and fired several shots down the driveway toward Alvarez. This conduct shows that appellant shared his passengers’ intent to kill Alvarez and that he acted to assist them in committing that crime. (People v. Delgado (2013) 56 Cal.4th 480, 486 [elements of aiding and abetting].) There is also substantial evidence that appellant shared his passengers’ intent to kill Alvarez rather than Erick Rodriguez or one of the other bystanders. Alvarez testified that the rear seat passenger, Aguilar, pointed a handgun directly at him and that he was shot almost immediately. Erick Rodriguez testified he was standing near the street with the driveway to his right. When the shooting started, the SUV passengers were shooting “off to the right.” Erick knew they were shooting in the direction of “a paisa guy,” who was in the driveway, walking toward them.2 He did not look to his right to see their target. Erick testified that, at first, the SUV passengers were pointing their guns at him, but when they started firing, they were pointing their guns down the driveway in the direction of Alvarez. There is no evidence that anyone other than Alvarez was in the driveway during the shooting. Nor is there evidence Erick later explained that a “paisa guy” is a non-gang 2 member from Mexico. 8 that either of the shooters took aim at Erick Rodriguez or anyone else. The record of conviction thus contains substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of the attempted murder of Miguel Alvarez and not some other person. Appellant maneuvered his SUV to provide Gurrola and Aguilar with the clearest possible shot at Alvarez. Aguilar aimed directly at Alvarez rather than toward other bystanders. Appellant did not drive away from the scene until Aguilar had fired several shots at Alvarez. This is substantial evidence that appellant acted with the specific intent to kill Alvarez. (Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th 131 at pp. 139-140; Falaniko, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 1242.) Because there is substantial evidence appellant acted with specific intent to kill the named victim, it is not necessary for us to consider the alternate “kill zone” theory. (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 745-746.) The trial court properly denied the petition for resentencing. Conclusion Appellant Gurrola’s appeal is dismissed as abandoned. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220, subd. (a).) The order denying appellant Rodriguez’s petition for resentencing is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. YEGAN, J. We concur: CODY, P. J. BALTODANO, J. 9 Darrell S. Mavis, Judge Superior Court County of Los Angeles ______________________________ Danalynn Pritz, under appointment by the Court of appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Daniel Rodriguez. Miriam K. Billington, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Iban Manuel Ma Gurrola. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller, John Yang, Patricia Rosman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.