People v. Sanchez CA5
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketF089944
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/17/26 P. v. Sanchez CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F089944
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. VCF347040)
v.
ANTONIO SANCHEZ,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Melinda
Myrle Reed, Judge.
Erin J. Radekin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, David A. Lowe and
Clifford E. Zall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Antonio Sanchez appeals from a conviction pursuant to a plea
agreement, without first seeking a certificate of probable cause. Defendant entered a
negotiated plea of no contest for one count of forcible lewd and lascivious acts on a child
under 14 in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (b)(1), 1 and six counts of
lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14 in violation of section 288, subdivision (a),
as well as admitting aggravating factors and substantial sexual conduct allegations.
Defendant was sentenced to a stipulated aggregate term of 22 years in prison. Defendant
argues the trial court erred when it failed to award him presentence custody credit for the
time he spent on supervised own recognizance release (SORR), amounting to
approximately 2,161 days.
We find defendant’s claim is barred due to defendant waiving his right to appeal
any part of the case, including the sentence, as part of the plea agreement. Likewise,
even if defendant had not waived his right to appeal the sentence, we find the trial court
properly denied him presentence custody credit for his time spent on SORR and affirm
the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 16, 2019, the Tulare County District Attorney filed a first amended felony
complaint charging defendant with 22 counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of
14, naming three victims, A.J., L.Z., and E.Y. (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 1–5, 9–25), and
three counts of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation or sexual penetration of a
child 10 years of age or younger, against E.Y. (§ 288.7, subds. (a), (b); counts 6–8). The
same day defendant was arraigned on the complaint, the trial court issued a criminal
protective order restraining defendant from contacting the minor victims, and bail was set
at $500,000.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
On May 30, 2019, a bail bond company posted bond in the amount of $500,000
for the release of defendant from custody. The conditions imposed by the bond company
included 24-hour GPS monitoring, a requirement to “check in” twice a week, to be home
no later than 8:00 p.m. and to leave home no earlier than 6:00 a.m.
On June 28, 2019, the trial court granted defendant a SORR agreement. The
agreement directed defendant to report to the Probation Officer of Tulare County, to
reside in Fresno County and not leave the State of California without prior approval, to
immediately report any change in address or phone number to the probation officer, and
to have no contact with the victims. The trial court imposed additional conditions
requiring defendant to not travel outside of Fresno County, to travel to Tulare County
only for court or probation reasons, and to comply with bail bond company conditions.
Defendant was also prohibited from changing his residence without permission. Notably,
defendant was not required to submit to warrantless searches of his person, residence,
automobile, or objects under his control, at any time of day or night. Although this
condition was listed in the SORR agreement as a possible condition of release, it was not
marked by the trial court as a condition of defendant’s release.
On July 10, 2020, the Tulare County District Attorney filed an information
charging defendant with 23 total counts naming three victims, A.J., L.Z., and E.Y.,
including three counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy of E.Y., a child 10 years of age or
younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a); counts 1–3), two counts of oral copulation or sexual
penetration of E.Y., a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 4–5),
one count of forcible lewd acts upon E.Y., a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd.
(b)(1); count 6), and 17 counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd.
(a); counts 7–23).
3.
On March 3, 2025, defendant changed his plea pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement. The trial court stated as follows:
“The matter is before the Court for jury trial conference and hearing
on motions in limine. It is my understanding defendant is going to plead
guilty or no contest in this matter to Counts 6, 9, 10, 12, 15, 19, and 23.
“Defendant will also admit allegations of substantial sexual conduct
pursuant to Section 1203.066[, subdivision ](a)(8), to all of those counts
except Count 23.
“Defendant will also admit an [sic] aggravating factors pursuant to
Rule of Court 4.421(a)(3), vulnerable victim, and 4.421(a)(11), position of
trust as to all the counts.
“Furthermore, defendant agrees to give up all of his appellate rights,
and does agree that at the end of the sentence that defendant serves, he will
be subject to screening by the Department of State Hospitals to determine
whether or not he qualifies as a sexually violent predator.
“In exchange for defendant’s guilty or no-contest plea, plus
admissions, the People have agreed that defendant will receive 22 years in
state prison, and have agreed to dismiss the remaining counts at the time of
sentencing.”
Addressing defendant, the court stated, “Also, by waiving your right to appeal,
you are giving up the right to appeal any part of the case, including sentence if you are
sentenced in conformity with this plea agreement. [¶] Do you understand that?”
Defendant stated he understood, and fully and freely gave up his right to appeal “any part
of this case.” Defendant then entered no contest pleas to the aforementioned counts and
admitted the allegations of substantial sexual conduct and the aggravating factors.
In his sentencing memorandum, defendant requested the trial court award him
presentence custody credit for the time he spent under GPS monitoring pursuant to the
SORR agreement. Defendant argued the SORR release conditions were comparable to
home detention pursuant to section 1203.018. On May 28, 2025, the trial court sentenced
defendant to 22 years in conformance with the plea agreement and denied presentence
4.
custody credit for the time defendant spent on SORR and GPS monitoring. 2 Defendant
filed a timely appeal. He did not first seek a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
A. Defendant waived his right to appeal the award of presentence conduct credits
when he entered into the negotiated plea agreement.
“Section 1237.5[ 3] and [former] rule 8.304(b)[ 4] of the California Rules of Court
require a defendant, who has pleaded guilty or no contest to a charge, to obtain a
certificate of probable cause in order to challenge the validity of the plea.” (People v.
Becerra (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 178, 185 (Becerra).) “Appellate waivers contained
within plea agreements are generally enforceable. ‘Just as a defendant may affirmatively
waive constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to the
privilege against self-incrimination, and to counsel as a consequence of a negotiated plea
2 The remaining counts and special allegations were dismissed at sentencing.
3 Section 1237.5 states:
“No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of
conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a revocation of
probation following an admission of violation, except where both of the
following are met: [¶] (a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a
written statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing
reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the
legality of the proceedings. [¶] (b) The trial court has executed and filed a
certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court.”
4 Former rule 8.304(b) of the California Rules of Court states in part:
“(b) Appeal after plea of guilty or nolo contendere or after admission
of probation violation
“(1) Except as provided in (4), to appeal from a superior court
judgment after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or after an admission of
probation violation, the defendant must file in that superior court—with the
notice of appeal required by (a)—the statement required by Penal Code
section 1237.5 for issuance of a certificate of probable cause.”
5.
agreement, so also may a defendant waive the right to appeal as part of the agreement.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 186.)
“ ‘[A] waiver that is nonspecific, e.g., “I waive my appeal rights” or “I waive my
right to appeal any ruling in this case,” ’ is considered a general waiver. [Citation.] ‘A
broad or general waiver of appeal rights ordinarily includes error occurring before but not
after the waiver because the defendant could not knowingly and intelligently waive the
right to appeal any unforeseen or unknown future error. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 186, italics omitted.)
However, “when a defendant waives the right to appeal as part of a plea
agreement, and the waiver’s terms encompass the issue the defendant wishes to raise, the
defendant must obtain a certificate of probable cause to avoid dismissal of the appeal.
With a certificate of probable cause in hand, the defendant may argue that the waiver is
not enforceable as to the issue raised, whether because the waiver was not knowing and
intelligent or for some other reason.” (People v. Espinoza (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 794,
803.)
“ ‘In a criminal case, judgment is rendered when the trial court orally pronounces
sentence.’ ” (Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 189; see §§ 1191, 1202.) “Further,
‘ “[t]he court imposing a sentence” has responsibility to calculate the exact number of
days the defendant has been in custody “prior to sentencing.” ’ ” (Becerra, at p. 189.)
In Becerra, the defendant’s appellate waiver expressly encompassed “an appeal
from the ‘judgment’ or any collateral attack on the ‘sentence.’ Specifically, the waiver
state[d] that [the] defendant waives ‘all rights regarding state and federal writs and
appeals. This include[d], but [was] not limited to, the right to appeal [his] conviction,
the judgment, and any other orders previously issued by this court.’ (Italics added.) [The
d]efendant also agreed ‘not to file any collateral attacks on [his] conviction or sentence at
any time in the future.’ (Italics added.)” (Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.)
6.
The Becerra court concluded, “[the] defendant’s appellate claim concerning the
trial court’s purported error in calculating custody credits falls within the scope of his
appellate waiver. A trial court must calculate custody credits as part of the court’s
imposition of sentence and oral pronouncement of judgment [citations], and [the]
defendant’s appellate waiver in this case expressly encompasses an appeal from the
‘judgment’ or any collateral attack on the ‘sentence.’ Thus, based on [the] defendant’s
express waiver of ‘all rights’ regarding ‘writs and appeals,’ and the specific references in
the waiver to the right to appeal from the ‘judgment’ and to collateral attack on the
‘sentence,’ [the] defendant’s waiver encompasses the instant appeal from the judgment
regarding the sentencing court’s purported error in calculating custody credits.”
(Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 189–190.)
In this case, defendant agreed to “give up all of his appellate rights.” The trial
court further clarified, “by waiving your right to appeal, you are giving up the right to
appeal any part of the case, including sentence if you are sentenced in conformity with
this plea agreement.” Defendant stated he understood and freely and fully gave up his
right to appeal “any part of this case.”
Much like in Becerra, by giving up his right to appeal “any part of this case”
including the “sentence,” defendant has waived his right to challenge the trial court’s
calculation of his presentence custody credits. This waiver includes the trial court’s
determination that his time spent on SORR did not qualify for presentence custody
credits. Defendant’s claim concerning custody credits is therefore barred.
B. Defendant was not entitled to presentence custody credits for the time he spent on
SORR.
Even if defendant’s claim was not barred, we find defendant’s confinement
pursuant to the SORR agreement did not entitle him to presentence custody credits.
Presentence custody credits are governed by section 2900.5, subdivision (a), which
provides in relevant part that “[i]n all felony and misdemeanor convictions, either by plea
7.
or by verdict, … all days of custody of the defendant, including … days served in home
detention pursuant to Section 1203.016 or 1203.018, shall be credited upon his or her
term of imprisonment.”
Section 1203.018 governs presentencing home detention and applies to “inmates
being held in lieu of bail and on no other basis.” (§ 1203.18, subd. (a).) To qualify for
home detention, “(1) [t]he participant shall remain within the interior premises of the
participant’s residence during the hours designated by the correctional administrator. [¶]
(2) [t]he participant shall admit any probation officer or other peace officer designated by
the correctional administrator into the participant’s residence at any time for purposes of
verifying the participant’s compliance with the conditions of the detention. [¶] (3) [t]he
electronic monitoring may include global positioning system devices or other supervising
devices for the purpose of helping to verify the participant’s compliance with the rules
and regulations of the electronic monitoring program….” (§ 1203.018, subd. (d)(1)–(3).)
“Both the state and federal Constitutions extend to persons the equal protection of
law.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 287.) This concept “ ‘ “compels
recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate
purpose of the law receive like treatment.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “An equal protection analysis has
two steps. ‘ “ ‘The first prerequisite … is a showing that the state has adopted a
classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’
[Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all
purposes, but ‘whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law
challenged.’ ” ’ ” (Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1102, italics
omitted.)
To show that he is “similarly situated to persons participating in an electronic
monitoring program pursuant to section 1203.018, [the defendant] must establish that the
terms of his release were as ‘custodial, or restraining’ as a statutory home detention
program pursuant to section 1203.018.” (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067,
8.
1089 (Gerson); see People v. Raygoza (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 593, 601 (Raygoza).) “If
persons are not similarly situated for purposes of the law, an equal protection claim fails
at the threshold.” (People v. Buffington (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1155.) We review
an equal protection claim de novo. (California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 177, 208.)
In Gerson, the trial court set the defendant’s bail on the condition that he wear a
GPS monitoring device and be admitted to a locked hospital unit for treatment and
evaluation. (Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1087.) The conditions were modified
over the course of the defendant’s custody, but he remained subject to a curfew, wore a
GPS device and was subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver. (Gerson, at p. 1087, fn. 17.)
The appellate court found the defendant was similarly situated to persons participating in
an electronic monitoring program pursuant to section 1203.018, because “the record
shows that [the defendant] was required to remain in his home during the hours
designated by the court, wear a GPS device, and was subject to a Fourth Amendment
waiver.” (Gerson, at p. 1090.)
In Raygoza, the defendant was $105,000 short in posting the $455,000 bail. The
trial court agreed to reduce bail if the defendant agreed to be confined to his home under
an electronic monitoring program. (Raygoza, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 596.) The
appellate court found the defendant was held “ ‘in lieu of’ ” the $455,000 bail, in that the
defendant was either required to post sufficient bond or, in lieu of such additional bond,
submit to home confinement. (Id. at p. 600.) The defendant’s home detention,
administered by Los Angeles County Probation Department, was otherwise substantially
identical to the standards of section 1203.018. (Raygoza, at p. 602.)
In People v. Brown (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 17, the defendant was released
on SORR, which included a “ ‘SCRAM with GPS monitoring to be installed and
monitored by probation,’ ” a criminal protective order, and a Fourth Amendment waiver.
(Brown, at p. Supp. 22.) The trial court did not designate hours where the defendant was
9.
to remain inside his home and there was no limit on his movement other than the
protective order prohibiting contact with the protected parties. (Ibid.) The appellate
division found the defendant was not similarly situated to participants in home detention
pursuant to section 1203.018, because a single prong was missing – there were no
restrictions requiring the defendant to remain inside his home during any timeframe.
(Brown, at p. Supp. 22.)
In this case, the SORR agreement required defendant to comply with all
conditions set by the bail bond company, which included a curfew from 8:00 p.m. to
6:00 a.m., and 24-hour GPS surveillance monitoring. These conditions are comparable to
the requirements of section 1203.018, subdivision (d)(1) and (3). However, despite
defendant’s assertion, a review of the record and the SORR agreement does not indicate
defendant was required to submit to warrantless searches. The box on the SORR
agreement, under “special conditions” (underscoring & some capitalization omitted),
which provides for warrantless searches is not checked. And the bail bond company
required defendant only to “check in twice a week.” No provision comparable to section
1203.018, subdivision (d)(2) requiring defendant to submit himself or his property to
search to verify compliance with the conditions of his release, was imposed.
As a result, we cannot say that defendant was similarly situated to persons
participating in home detention pursuant to section 1203.018. Defendant was not subject
to a Fourth Amendment waiver. Defendant’s equal protection claim therefore “fails at
the threshold.” (People v. Buffington, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1155.) The trial court
did not err in denying defendant presentence custody credit for the time defendant spent
on SORR.
10.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DETJEN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MEEHAN, J.
SNAUFFER, J.
11.