Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Lopez CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS* California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN THE PEOPLE, B348343 Plaintiff and (Los Angeles County Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 24CJCF04179) v. SEENDEE MALDONADO LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellant. * This case discusses material in documents that were filed under seal in the trial court and in the record on appeal. However, the record on appeal does not include a motion to seal filed in the trial court or a trial court order sealing the record as required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.46(b)(2). Accordingly, we do not deem the report “a record sealed by order of the trial court” and determine we need not file a public version of this opinion that redacts references to the contents of Leifer's report. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.46(b)(2), (g).) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Karla D. Kerlin, Judge. Affirmed. Sarah S. Sanger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Stephen D. Svetich, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ___________________ Seendee Maldonado Lopez appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after she pleaded no contest to attempted second degree murder and admitted special allegations that she personally inflicted great bodily injury and personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon (a knife) during the offense. Lopez contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36.1 Lopez argues substantial evidence did not support the court’s finding that she was unsuitable for diversion because she posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. The Offense and Information On the morning of May 27, 2024 Olga Rubio Lopez (Rubio) was in her car in front of her house waiting for her husband, 1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Angel Molina Hernandez (Hernandez), to move his car from a parking space so Rubio could take the space. After Hernandez pulled out of the parking space, but before Rubio could move in, another car quickly pulled into the space. Rubio got out of her car and approached the car that had taken the parking space. She told the driver, later identified as Naziz Harris, that her husband had moved so that she could take the space. Rubio suggested Harris move to another parking space, but he did not move his car. There were two female passengers in the car with Harris— Lopez and an unidentified woman. After Harris parked, Lopez got out of the car. Lopez began yelling at Rubio, and Rubio thought Lopez was going to hit her. At that point Hernandez returned from parking his car, and Lopez began screaming at him. Hernandez tried to explain the parking situation to Harris, but Lopez continued to scream at him. Rubio testified at the preliminary hearing that Lopez told Hernandez, “Things are going to be done the way I want them to be done right here.” Lopez then walked toward Hernandez and punched him in the eye. Hernandez grabbed her by the shoulders and said, “You’re not going to hit me.” Lopez then bent forward, and it appeared she was “looking into her purse.” Harris and the unidentified woman then started running toward Hernandez, and Harris kicked and punched Hernandez, who fell to the ground. Lopez, Harris, and the unidentified woman continued to hit and kick Hernandez while he was on the ground. Lopez and the women then stabbed Hernandez repeatedly in the torso with a knife; Lopez stabbed him “the most.” When they stopped attacking Hernandez, Lopez, Harris, and the woman ran to their car and drove away. 3 Hernandez was stabbed approximately eight times. He was hospitalized in critical condition for three weeks and was unconscious for 10 weeks. As a result of the attack, Hernandez lost a kidney and part of his intestines and now needs a colostomy bag. Lopez was charged with attempted first degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), with special allegations that she personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). B. Lopez’s Motion for Mental Health Diversion On June 27, 2025 Lopez moved for mental health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36. Lopez argued she was eligible for diversion because she had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and multiple substance use disorders. Further, her mental and substance use disorders were significant factors in the commission of the attempted murder. Lopez asserted she met the suitability factors under section 1001.36, subdivision (c), because she consented to diversion, waived her right to a speedy trial, was an appropriate candidate for diversion through a residential treatment program, and she did not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in the statute. Lopez submitted a May 4, 2025 forensic evaluation performed by clinical psychologist Dr. Michelle Adams, who interviewed Lopez a month earlier. Adams diagnosed Lopez with “persistent depressive disorder, early onset, with persistent major depressive episode, moderate; posttraumatic stress disorder; alcohol use disorder, severe, in a controlled 4 environment; cannabis use disorder, severe, in a controlled environment; and other hallucinogen use disorder, severe, in a controlled environment.” Adams reported that Lopez had a “history of chronic traumatic stressors” during her childhood that impacted her mental health, including witnessing domestic violence between her parents and being physically abused by them. At one point Lopez and her siblings were removed from their parents’ custody, but they were reunited after six months. Lopez also experienced “multiple life-threatening traumatic experiences” within the past two years. During that time, Lopez had been forced to leave her family’s home and lost her job due to her abuse of alcohol, marijuana, and ecstasy. As a result, Lopez was unhoused. She was forced to participate in sex work to earn money for motel rooms and to support her substance use. Lopez stated she abused substances to help her “survive having to do sex work.” Since becoming unhoused, Lopez was robbed at gunpoint multiple times, was the victim of an attempted rape, and had been physically assaulted on multiple occasions. Adams opined that Lopez’s mental health disorders significantly contributed to her commission of the attempted murder, explaining the “factors which Ms. Lopez was experiencing at the time of the alleged offense . . . compelled her behavior during and around the time of the alleged offense.” Adams further opined that the symptoms motivating Lopez’s criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment. Lopez did not have any history of treatment prior to her incarceration for the current offense. However, Lopez demonstrated a willingness to adhere to and participate in her current treatment and appeared to be responding well to 5 medication. Since beginning treatment during her current incarceration, Lopez had remained sober and experienced a reduction in her symptoms, including less frequent depressed moods and a decreased desire to use controlled substances. Lopez experienced auditory hallucinations when she was first detained and was unable to use controlled substances, but the hallucinations had decreased by the time of Adams’s assessment. Finally, Adams opined that Lopez would not present an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated outside a secure setting. Adams noted Lopez had no previous criminal record and had denied any history of interpersonal violence. Further, the current offense “represents the singular incident in which [Lopez] was violent toward another person.” Adams recommended Lopez be treated in a long-term residential facility. Lopez also submitted a letter from a residential treatment facility conditionally accepting her for admission for a three- to 12-month treatment program. C. The Hearing on Mental Health Diversion The trial court held a hearing on Lopez’s motion on July 11, 2025. At the outset of the hearing the court stated it had reviewed the case file, the information, the probation report, and Adams’s report. During the hearing the court viewed three surveillance videos of the incident. Rubio and her son made statements to the court regarding the hardship the family had suffered since the attack. As a result of his injuries, Hernandez was unable to work, and Rubio’s health had suffered from having to care for him full time. Hernandez did not make a statement but requested permission to show the court his scars. He lifted his shirt, and the court described an incision from 6 Hernandez’s neck to below his naval, as well as the colostomy bag on his side. After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court denied Lopez’s motion for mental health diversion. The court found Lopez was eligible for mental health diversion, but she was not “suitable” because she posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The court explained that an “unreasonable risk” “means at risk of committing a super strike, but the facts in this case, even though it is her only case, are so serious, I cannot say that she would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger.” The court continued, “This was a very, very serious assault that could have resulted in the death of the victim. . . . He was in a coma for some time . . . . He has lost organs. He is permanently marked and infirm, and this has had a tremendous impact on his physical being.” D. Lopez’s No Contest Plea and Sentencing On August 15, 2025, pursuant to a negotiated plea, the trial court struck the allegation in the information that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and Lopez pleaded no contest to attempted second degree murder. Lopez admitted the special allegations that she had personally inflicted great bodily injury and personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon. The court sentenced Lopez to the middle term of seven years for attempted second degree murder, and it imposed and stayed a three-year term for the great bodily injury enhancement and a one-year term for the use of a weapon enhancement. Lopez timely appealed, and the trial court granted her request for a certificate of probable cause. 7 DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “Section 1001.36 gives trial courts the discretion to grant pretrial diversion for individuals suffering from certain mental health disorders.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626; People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147-1148.) Under pretrial diversion, the trial court may postpone prosecution at any time in the judicial process, either temporarily or permanently, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health treatment. (Frahs, at p. 626; Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133 (Vaughn); Whitmill, at p. 1148.) “The Legislature intended the mental health diversion program to apply as broadly as possible.” (Whitmill, at p. 1149; see Frahs, at p. 632.) Under section 1001.36, a defendant must be both eligible and suitable for mental health diversion. “Section 1001.36, subdivision (e), places the burden on the defendant ‘to make a prima facie showing that the defendant will meet the minimum requirements of eligibility for diversion and that the defendant and the offense are suitable for diversion.’” (See Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.) A defendant is eligible under section 1001.36, subdivision (b), if (1) the defendant has been diagnosed by a qualified mental health expert with a mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the DSM, “excluding antisocial personality disorder and pedophilia”; and (2) the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. (See People v. Tourville (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 439, 451-452 (Tourville); Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 133.) 8 With respect to the second eligibility requirement that the defendant’s mental disorder must have been “a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense,” section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2), provides: “If the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.” The statute specifies four factors that must be met for a defendant to be suitable for diversion: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant consents to diversion and agrees to waive his or her speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4) if treated in the community, the defendant will not pose an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in section 1170.18.”2 (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4); Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.) “An unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in section 1170.18, subdivision (c), means “‘an unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will commit a new violent felony’” within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), which felonies are ‘colloquially referred to as “super strikes.”’ [Citation.] ‘Those 2 The Legislature recently amended section 1001.36, effective January 1, 2027, replacing “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18,” with “a substantial and undue risk to the physical safety of another person.” (Stats. 2026, ch. 18, § 1.) The amended language does not apply to Lopez’s motion. 9 super strikes are murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, or any sexually violent offenses or sexual offense committed against minors under the age of 14.’” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 679; accord, Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.) In determining whether a defendant will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community, “[t]he court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Even if a defendant meets all the statutory eligibility and suitability criteria, the trial court retains discretion to deny diversion. (People v. Cabalar (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 41, 53; Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.) “This residual discretion is not unfettered and must be exercised ‘“consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law.”’” (Vaughn, at p. 135; see Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 453.) We review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for mental health diversion for an abuse of discretion. (Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 135; People v. Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1147.) A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary decision by applying the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. (Vaughn, at p. 135; Whitmill, at p. 1147.) A court also abuses its 10 discretion “when its decision exceeds the bounds of reason or is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 588.) B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding Lopez Was Not Suitable for Diversion Lopez contends the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Lopez’s treatment in the community would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Lopez argues the court’s reliance on the circumstances of the current offense did not provide substantial evidence for the dangerousness finding given that Lopez had no prior criminal history, stated she had never acted violently toward another person, and was responding well to treatment and sobriety while in custody. As discussed, the trial court considered the statutory factors and noted that Lopez had no prior criminal history. However, as the court explained, the circumstances of the current offense were particularly egregious. Not only did Lopez initiate the confrontation with Rubio and Hernandez by screaming at them, but without any provocation, she escalated it to a physical confrontation by punching Hernandez. She then escalated the incident further by taking a knife from her purse and stabbing Hernandez repeatedly while he was on the ground being beaten by two other people. Hernandez was seriously wounded, spent months in the hospital, and has permanent physical injuries as a result of the attack. In light of these facts, the circumstances of the current offense (itself a super strike) provided substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that Lopez posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (See People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 862 [“there is nothing in 11 section 1001.36, with respect to either eligibility or suitability, that precludes a trial court from relying primarily, or even entirely, on the circumstances of the charged offense or offenses in denying a motion for diversion”]; see also People v. Henn (2026) 124 Cal.App.5th 173, 182 [“the circumstances surrounding Henn’s choking of Herrera was sufficient evidence he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety”]; People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 801 [“It was reasonable for the trial court to infer from these facts that, because defendant was recently capable of engaging in such violent, calculated criminal behavior, she posed a risk of doing so again.”]; People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 124 [jury’s finding that the “victim was vulnerable and the offense involved great violence and a high degree of cruelty, viciousness or callousness” supported trial court’s finding that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety].) On appeal, Lopez is essentially arguing the trial court should have given less weight to the circumstances of the offense and greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Adams. However, the fact there was evidence that could have supported a finding Lopez did not pose an unreasonable risk of danger “is not a sufficient basis for this court to supplant the findings of the trial court.” (People v. Brown, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 124; accord, People v. Henn, supra, 124 Cal.App.5th at p. 184.) Nor is Adams’s opinion regarding Lopez’s dangerousness if treated in the community dispositive. Section 1001.36 does not “preclude[] a trial court from rendering a dangerousness finding contrary to one expressed by a mental health professional.” (Siam v. Superior Court (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 67, 83; see In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 823 [“Although experts may testify about 12 their opinions, the fact finder decides what weight to give those opinions.”].) We recognize that Lopez has made positive changes during her time in custody and has benefitted from treatment. However, nothing in the record shows the court misunderstood its discretion or exercised that discretion in an irrational or arbitrary manner. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. FEUER, J. We concur: MARTINEZ, P. J. SEGAL, J. 13