People v. Lopez CA2/7
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketB348343
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Lopez CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS*
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B348343
Plaintiff and (Los Angeles County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No.
24CJCF04179)
v.
SEENDEE MALDONADO
LOPEZ,
Defendant and
Appellant.
* This case discusses material in documents that were filed
under seal in the trial court and in the record on appeal.
However, the record on appeal does not include a motion to seal
filed in the trial court or a trial court order sealing the record as
required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.46(b)(2).
Accordingly, we do not deem the report “a record sealed by order
of the trial court” and determine we need not file a public version
of this opinion that redacts references to the contents of Leifer's
report. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.46(b)(2), (g).)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Karla D. Kerlin, Judge. Affirmed.
Sarah S. Sanger, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Stephen D. Svetich, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________
Seendee Maldonado Lopez appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered after she pleaded no contest to attempted
second degree murder and admitted special allegations that she
personally inflicted great bodily injury and personally used a
deadly or dangerous weapon (a knife) during the offense. Lopez
contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her
motion for mental health diversion under Penal Code
section 1001.36.1 Lopez argues substantial evidence did not
support the court’s finding that she was unsuitable for diversion
because she posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Offense and Information
On the morning of May 27, 2024 Olga Rubio Lopez (Rubio)
was in her car in front of her house waiting for her husband,
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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Angel Molina Hernandez (Hernandez), to move his car from a
parking space so Rubio could take the space. After Hernandez
pulled out of the parking space, but before Rubio could move in,
another car quickly pulled into the space. Rubio got out of her
car and approached the car that had taken the parking space.
She told the driver, later identified as Naziz Harris, that her
husband had moved so that she could take the space. Rubio
suggested Harris move to another parking space, but he did not
move his car.
There were two female passengers in the car with Harris—
Lopez and an unidentified woman. After Harris parked, Lopez
got out of the car. Lopez began yelling at Rubio, and Rubio
thought Lopez was going to hit her. At that point Hernandez
returned from parking his car, and Lopez began screaming at
him. Hernandez tried to explain the parking situation to Harris,
but Lopez continued to scream at him. Rubio testified at the
preliminary hearing that Lopez told Hernandez, “Things are
going to be done the way I want them to be done right here.”
Lopez then walked toward Hernandez and punched him in the
eye. Hernandez grabbed her by the shoulders and said, “You’re
not going to hit me.” Lopez then bent forward, and it appeared
she was “looking into her purse.”
Harris and the unidentified woman then started running
toward Hernandez, and Harris kicked and punched Hernandez,
who fell to the ground. Lopez, Harris, and the unidentified
woman continued to hit and kick Hernandez while he was on the
ground. Lopez and the women then stabbed Hernandez
repeatedly in the torso with a knife; Lopez stabbed him “the
most.” When they stopped attacking Hernandez, Lopez, Harris,
and the woman ran to their car and drove away.
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Hernandez was stabbed approximately eight times. He
was hospitalized in critical condition for three weeks and was
unconscious for 10 weeks. As a result of the attack, Hernandez
lost a kidney and part of his intestines and now needs a
colostomy bag.
Lopez was charged with attempted first degree murder
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), with special allegations that she
personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and
personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)).
B. Lopez’s Motion for Mental Health Diversion
On June 27, 2025 Lopez moved for mental health diversion
pursuant to section 1001.36. Lopez argued she was eligible for
diversion because she had been diagnosed with major depressive
disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and multiple substance
use disorders. Further, her mental and substance use disorders
were significant factors in the commission of the attempted
murder. Lopez asserted she met the suitability factors under
section 1001.36, subdivision (c), because she consented to
diversion, waived her right to a speedy trial, was an appropriate
candidate for diversion through a residential treatment program,
and she did not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety as defined in the statute.
Lopez submitted a May 4, 2025 forensic evaluation
performed by clinical psychologist Dr. Michelle Adams, who
interviewed Lopez a month earlier. Adams diagnosed Lopez with
“persistent depressive disorder, early onset, with persistent
major depressive episode, moderate; posttraumatic stress
disorder; alcohol use disorder, severe, in a controlled
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environment; cannabis use disorder, severe, in a controlled
environment; and other hallucinogen use disorder, severe, in a
controlled environment.”
Adams reported that Lopez had a “history of chronic
traumatic stressors” during her childhood that impacted her
mental health, including witnessing domestic violence between
her parents and being physically abused by them. At one point
Lopez and her siblings were removed from their parents’ custody,
but they were reunited after six months. Lopez also experienced
“multiple life-threatening traumatic experiences” within the past
two years. During that time, Lopez had been forced to leave her
family’s home and lost her job due to her abuse of alcohol,
marijuana, and ecstasy. As a result, Lopez was unhoused. She
was forced to participate in sex work to earn money for motel
rooms and to support her substance use. Lopez stated she
abused substances to help her “survive having to do sex work.”
Since becoming unhoused, Lopez was robbed at gunpoint
multiple times, was the victim of an attempted rape, and had
been physically assaulted on multiple occasions. Adams opined
that Lopez’s mental health disorders significantly contributed to
her commission of the attempted murder, explaining the “factors
which Ms. Lopez was experiencing at the time of the alleged
offense . . . compelled her behavior during and around the time of
the alleged offense.”
Adams further opined that the symptoms motivating
Lopez’s criminal behavior would respond to mental health
treatment. Lopez did not have any history of treatment prior to
her incarceration for the current offense. However, Lopez
demonstrated a willingness to adhere to and participate in her
current treatment and appeared to be responding well to
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medication. Since beginning treatment during her current
incarceration, Lopez had remained sober and experienced a
reduction in her symptoms, including less frequent depressed
moods and a decreased desire to use controlled substances.
Lopez experienced auditory hallucinations when she was first
detained and was unable to use controlled substances, but the
hallucinations had decreased by the time of Adams’s assessment.
Finally, Adams opined that Lopez would not present an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated outside a
secure setting. Adams noted Lopez had no previous criminal
record and had denied any history of interpersonal violence.
Further, the current offense “represents the singular incident in
which [Lopez] was violent toward another person.” Adams
recommended Lopez be treated in a long-term residential facility.
Lopez also submitted a letter from a residential treatment
facility conditionally accepting her for admission for a three- to
12-month treatment program.
C. The Hearing on Mental Health Diversion
The trial court held a hearing on Lopez’s motion on July 11,
2025. At the outset of the hearing the court stated it had
reviewed the case file, the information, the probation report, and
Adams’s report. During the hearing the court viewed
three surveillance videos of the incident. Rubio and her son
made statements to the court regarding the hardship the family
had suffered since the attack. As a result of his injuries,
Hernandez was unable to work, and Rubio’s health had suffered
from having to care for him full time. Hernandez did not make a
statement but requested permission to show the court his scars.
He lifted his shirt, and the court described an incision from
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Hernandez’s neck to below his naval, as well as the colostomy bag
on his side.
After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court denied
Lopez’s motion for mental health diversion. The court found
Lopez was eligible for mental health diversion, but she was not
“suitable” because she posed an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety. The court explained that an “unreasonable risk”
“means at risk of committing a super strike, but the facts in this
case, even though it is her only case, are so serious, I cannot say
that she would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger.” The
court continued, “This was a very, very serious assault that could
have resulted in the death of the victim. . . . He was in a coma for
some time . . . . He has lost organs. He is permanently marked
and infirm, and this has had a tremendous impact on his physical
being.”
D. Lopez’s No Contest Plea and Sentencing
On August 15, 2025, pursuant to a negotiated plea, the
trial court struck the allegation in the information that the
attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and
Lopez pleaded no contest to attempted second degree murder.
Lopez admitted the special allegations that she had personally
inflicted great bodily injury and personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon. The court sentenced Lopez to the middle
term of seven years for attempted second degree murder, and it
imposed and stayed a three-year term for the great bodily injury
enhancement and a one-year term for the use of a weapon
enhancement.
Lopez timely appealed, and the trial court granted her
request for a certificate of probable cause.
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DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“Section 1001.36 gives trial courts the discretion to grant
pretrial diversion for individuals suffering from certain mental
health disorders.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626;
People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147-1148.)
Under pretrial diversion, the trial court may postpone
prosecution at any time in the judicial process, either temporarily
or permanently, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health
treatment. (Frahs, at p. 626; Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133 (Vaughn); Whitmill, at p. 1148.) “The
Legislature intended the mental health diversion program to
apply as broadly as possible.” (Whitmill, at p. 1149; see Frahs, at
p. 632.)
Under section 1001.36, a defendant must be both eligible
and suitable for mental health diversion. “Section 1001.36,
subdivision (e), places the burden on the defendant ‘to make a
prima facie showing that the defendant will meet the minimum
requirements of eligibility for diversion and that the defendant
and the offense are suitable for diversion.’” (See Vaughn, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.)
A defendant is eligible under section 1001.36,
subdivision (b), if (1) the defendant has been diagnosed by a
qualified mental health expert with a mental disorder as
identified in the most recent edition of the DSM, “excluding
antisocial personality disorder and pedophilia”; and (2) the
defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense. (See People v. Tourville
(2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 439, 451-452 (Tourville); Vaughn, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 133.)
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With respect to the second eligibility requirement that the
defendant’s mental disorder must have been “a significant factor
in the commission of the charged offense,” section 1001.36,
subdivision (b)(2), provides: “If the defendant has been diagnosed
with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s
mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was
not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the
defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.”
The statute specifies four factors that must be met for a
defendant to be suitable for diversion: (1) in the opinion of a
qualified mental health expert the defendant’s mental disorder
would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant consents to
diversion and agrees to waive his or her speedy trial rights;
(3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements;
and (4) if treated in the community, the defendant will not pose
an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
section 1170.18.”2 (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4); Tourville, supra,
120 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.)
“An unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined
in section 1170.18, subdivision (c), means “‘an unreasonable risk
that the [defendant] will commit a new violent felony’” within the
meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), which felonies
are ‘colloquially referred to as “super strikes.”’ [Citation.] ‘Those
2 The Legislature recently amended section 1001.36, effective
January 1, 2027, replacing “an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18,” with “a substantial
and undue risk to the physical safety of another person.”
(Stats. 2026, ch. 18, § 1.) The amended language does not apply
to Lopez’s motion.
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super strikes are murder, attempted murder, solicitation to
commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer,
possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent
felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, or any sexually
violent offenses or sexual offense committed against minors
under the age of 14.’” (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 671, 679; accord, Tourville, supra,
120 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.) In determining whether a defendant
will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if
treated in the community, “[t]he court may consider the opinions
of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health
expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the
defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged
offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
Even if a defendant meets all the statutory eligibility and
suitability criteria, the trial court retains discretion to deny
diversion. (People v. Cabalar (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 41, 53;
Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.) “This residual
discretion is not unfettered and must be exercised ‘“consistent
with the principles and purpose of the governing law.”’” (Vaughn,
at p. 135; see Tourville, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 453.)
We review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion for mental health diversion for an abuse of discretion.
(Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 135; People v. Whitmill,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1147.) A court abuses its discretion
when it makes an arbitrary decision by applying the wrong legal
standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual
findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.
(Vaughn, at p. 135; Whitmill, at p. 1147.) A court also abuses its
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discretion “when its decision exceeds the bounds of reason or is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it.” (People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 588.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding
Lopez Was Not Suitable for Diversion
Lopez contends the trial court abused its discretion in
finding that Lopez’s treatment in the community would pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Lopez argues the
court’s reliance on the circumstances of the current offense did
not provide substantial evidence for the dangerousness finding
given that Lopez had no prior criminal history, stated she had
never acted violently toward another person, and was responding
well to treatment and sobriety while in custody.
As discussed, the trial court considered the statutory
factors and noted that Lopez had no prior criminal history.
However, as the court explained, the circumstances of the current
offense were particularly egregious. Not only did Lopez initiate
the confrontation with Rubio and Hernandez by screaming at
them, but without any provocation, she escalated it to a physical
confrontation by punching Hernandez. She then escalated the
incident further by taking a knife from her purse and stabbing
Hernandez repeatedly while he was on the ground being beaten
by two other people. Hernandez was seriously wounded, spent
months in the hospital, and has permanent physical injuries as a
result of the attack. In light of these facts, the circumstances of
the current offense (itself a super strike) provided substantial
evidence to support the court’s finding that Lopez posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (See People v.
Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 862 [“there is nothing in
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section 1001.36, with respect to either eligibility or suitability,
that precludes a trial court from relying primarily, or even
entirely, on the circumstances of the charged offense or offenses
in denying a motion for diversion”]; see also People v. Henn (2026)
124 Cal.App.5th 173, 182 [“the circumstances surrounding
Henn’s choking of Herrera was sufficient evidence he posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety”]; People v. Graham
(2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 801 [“It was reasonable for the trial
court to infer from these facts that, because defendant was
recently capable of engaging in such violent, calculated criminal
behavior, she posed a risk of doing so again.”]; People v. Brown
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 124 [jury’s finding that the “victim
was vulnerable and the offense involved great violence and a high
degree of cruelty, viciousness or callousness” supported trial
court’s finding that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety].)
On appeal, Lopez is essentially arguing the trial court
should have given less weight to the circumstances of the offense
and greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Adams. However, the
fact there was evidence that could have supported a finding
Lopez did not pose an unreasonable risk of danger “is not a
sufficient basis for this court to supplant the findings of the trial
court.” (People v. Brown, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 124;
accord, People v. Henn, supra, 124 Cal.App.5th at p. 184.) Nor is
Adams’s opinion regarding Lopez’s dangerousness if treated in
the community dispositive. Section 1001.36 does not “preclude[]
a trial court from rendering a dangerousness finding contrary to
one expressed by a mental health professional.” (Siam v.
Superior Court (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 67, 83; see In re Scott
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 823 [“Although experts may testify about
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their opinions, the fact finder decides what weight to give those
opinions.”].) We recognize that Lopez has made positive changes
during her time in custody and has benefitted from treatment.
However, nothing in the record shows the court misunderstood
its discretion or exercised that discretion in an irrational or
arbitrary manner.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
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