People v. Vera CA1/1

Filed 10/22/26 P. v. Vera CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A173746 v. JUAN VERA, (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 22-CR-003308A) Defendant and Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION1 Defendant Juan Vera appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of attempted voluntary manslaughter and a firearm offense. His sole claim on appeal is that the record compels the conclusion he acted in perfect self-defense, meaning insufficient evidence supports the conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. We affirm. Factual and Procedural Background In March 2022, Vera and Vera’s friend, who were attending a party together, went next door to a Hayward liquor store to buy more beer. Inside the store, the victim, Gustavo Tavera, got into an argument with Vera’s friend and threatened to beat up the friend. Vera then followed Tavera out of 1 We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1(3). the store and, after Tavera pushed him, fired three shots at the other man. Surveillance cameras capture much, but not all, of these interactions, and the recordings were played for the jury. Tavera was hit in the abdomen, back, and left arm, and he immediately walked back into the liquor store and fell to the ground. Less than two minutes after Vera shot Tavera, another friend of Vera’s who was at the party, Bryan Hernandez, entered the store and shot Tavera several times in the head. The forensic pathologist who performed Tavera’s autopsy indicated that with prompt medical care Tavera “probably would have survived” the first set of gunshot wounds. Vera was charged with felony counts of murder, attempted murder, and carrying a concealed firearm.2 After being jointly tried with Hernandez, Vera, who did not testify, was acquitted of murder and attempted murder and convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter and the firearm offense.3 The jury also found true the allegations that (1) Vera personally used a firearm, as to the attempted homicide; and (2) the firearm was loaded and he was not the registered owner, as to the firearm offense.4 2 The charges were brought under Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a) (murder), and 664 (attempted murder), and 25400, subdivision (a)(2) (carrying concealed firearm). Vera was also charged with a felony count of unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm under Penal Code section 25850, subdivision (a), which was dismissed during trial. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 Hernandez was convicted of first degree murder and the same firearm offense and sentenced to 35 years to life in prison. Hernandez’s appeal of his judgment is currently pending in this division. (People v. Hernandez, A176126.) 4 These allegations were found true under sections 12022.5, subdivision (a), and 12022.53, subdivision (b) (personal use), and 25400, subdivision (c)(6) (loaded weapon and not registered owner). 2  In June 2025, the trial court sentenced Vera to a total of seven years and eight months in prison in this case, as well as an additional year in an unrelated case. The sentence was composed of the midterm of three years for attempted voluntary manslaughter and consecutive terms of four years for the personal-use enhancement under section 12022.5 and eight months for carrying a concealed firearm.5 Analysis The jury was instructed on attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of attempted murder on two theories, heat of passion or sudden quarrel and imperfect self-defense. It was also instructed on perfect self-defense as a complete defense to the charge. We conclude that regardless of the theory the jury relied on to convict Vera of attempted voluntary manslaughter, his claim fails because there was substantial evidence that his use of force was objectively unreasonable. “ ‘For killing to be in self-defense, the defendant must actually and reasonably believe in the need to defend. [Citation.] If the belief subjectively exists but is objectively unreasonable, there is “imperfect self-defense,” i.e., “the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and cannot be convicted of murder,” but can be convicted of manslaughter. [Citation.] To constitute “perfect self-defense,” i.e., to exonerate the person completely, the belief must also be objectively reasonable.’ ” (People v. Horn (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 672, 682, quoting People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 5 The trial court found true two aggravating factors alleged as to the attempted homicide under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1) and (a)(2), and two mitigating factors under rule 4.423(a)(2) and (b)(1). It then found that neither set of factors outweighed the other, making the midterm appropriate. The court did not find any aggravating factors as to the firearm offense and concluded that the midterm was likewise appropriate for that conviction. 3 1082, fn. omitted.) In other words, “the difference between self-defense and imperfect self-defense is the reasonableness of the belief in the need to defend.” (People v. Temple (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1296 (Temple).) “These principles also apply to self-defense in the context of attempted murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter.” (Horn, at p. 682, italics omitted.) “ ‘ “[W]here the evidence is uncontroverted and establishes all of the elements for a finding of self-defense it may be held as a matter of law that the killing was justified; however, where some of the evidence tends to show a situation in which a killing may not be justified then the issue is a question of fact for the jury to determine.” ’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1044.) To resolve Vera’s claim, we ask whether sufficient evidence supports a finding that even if he actually believed in the need for deadly force, that belief was unreasonable. (See Temple, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1296.) “ ‘ “[W]e review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” ’ ” presuming “ ‘ “the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Barrera (2026) 19 Cal.5th 919, 943.) There is substantial evidence that Vera’s use of force was objectively unreasonable. “A defendant who had an actual and reasonable belief in being in imminent danger of death, but used more force than was reasonably necessary to repel the attack, or continued to use force after the danger no longer existed or reasonably appeared to exist, may not invoke [perfect] self- defense.” (Temple, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1297.) Tavera was unarmed, and the evidence hardly compelled the conclusion that he threatened Vera’s 4 friend, much less Vera, with deadly force. Yet Vera followed Tavera out of the store and responded to being pushed and briefly followed by shooting Tavera three times. A reasonable jury could find that this was more force than reasonably necessary to respond to Tavera’s aggression. (See, e.g., People v. Clark (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 376, 380–381 [perfect self-defense not established as matter of law where defendant shot unarmed man who threatened to “beat him up”].) In resisting this conclusion, Vera emphasizes the evidence that the wounds he inflicted were unlikely to be fatal and thus not intended as such. He also relies on admitted evidence of Tavera’s prior violent conduct, which he claims establishes that Tavera “acted fully in conformity with his character for unprovoked violence” by attacking and chasing him. These arguments fail to grapple with our standard of review, which asks not whether the jury could have reached a different conclusion but whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion it did reach. The jury could have legitimately determined that shooting Tavera multiple times in the torso did constitute deadly force and was an unreasonable response to behavior that, while confrontational, did not clearly pose a threat of imminent great bodily injury or death. The judgment is affirmed. 5  _________________________ Humes, P. J. WE CONCUR: _________________________ Banke, J. _________________________ Langhorne Wilson, J. People v. Vera A173746 6