People v. Lang CA1/5
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA173004
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Lang CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A173004
v.
CHRISTOPHER RYDER LANG, (Contra Costa County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 022201109)
This is an appeal from judgment after a jury convicted defendant
Christopher Ryder Lang of two counts of second degree commercial burglary
(Pen. Code, § 459) and found true that the manner in which he carried out
the burglaries indicated planning, sophistication or professionalism (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(8)).1
Imposing an upper term sentence, the trial court relied on four
aggravating facts: (1) defendant’s prior convictions were of increasing
seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)); (2) his prior performance on probation was
unsatisfactory (rule 4.421(b)(5)); (3) the manner in which he carried out the
crimes indicated planning and sophistication (rule 4.421(a)(8)); and (4) he
was convicted of crimes for which consecutive sentences could have been
1 Unless otherwise stated in this opinion, all statutory citations are to
the Penal Code and all rules citations are to the California Rules of Court.
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imposed but for which concurrent sentences were being imposed (rule
4.421(a)(7)). Only one of these factors was found true by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The parties agree the trial court committed error by relying on
aggravating facts that were not found true by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt or stipulated to by defendant. They disagree, however, on whether the
court’s error was prejudicial. Finding no prejudice, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 8, 2025, an information was filed charging defendant with
two counts of second degree commercial burglary (§ 459) and alleging four
aggravating facts: (1) the manner in which the crimes were committed
indicated professionalism, planning, or sophistication (rule 4.421(a)(8));
(2) defendant was convicted of crimes for which consecutive sentences could
have been imposed but for which concurrent sentences were being imposed
(rule 4.421(a)(7)); (3) the crime involved an attempted or actual taking or
damage of great monetary value (rule 4.421(a)(9)); and (4) defendant’s prior
convictions as an adult or sustained juvenile petitions were numerous or of
increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)).
Trial started on October 16, 2023, and revealed the following facts.
About 5:30 a.m. on March 27, 2022, defendant and his companion drove to a
small market in Richmond in a white, stolen dump truck. Defendant
reversed the truck into the front of the market several times until the entry
door was finally forced open. Defendant’s companion then exited the truck
and ran inside. At this point, the store owner’s brother, who lived across the
street and was awakened by the commotion, confronted the men and yelled at
them to stop. Defendant and his companion fled in the stolen truck as the
owner’s brother called the police.
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About 20 minutes later, defendant and his companion arrived at
another small local business in El Sobrante, where they attempted to execute
the same plan—reversing the stolen truck into the storefront until the front
wall caved in. Once that occurred, the men entered the store where they
looped a chain around two ATM’s. Defendant then reentered the truck, first
accelerating the truck forward and then reversing it in an attempt to push
the ATM’s from their moorings.
Shortly thereafter, two sheriff deputies responded to the scene based on
a report of a commercial burglary in progress. Defendant fled eastbound on
foot. The deputies, unable to locate defendant, conducted a search of the area
that produced a brown jacket. Defendant was subsequently identified as the
culprit of the burglary based on DNA evidence collected from this jacket.
On January 14, 2025, the jury found defendant guilty as to both
burglary counts. In a bifurcated trial held the next day, the jury was asked
to decide two aggravating facts—to wit, whether the manner in which
defendant committed the crimes indicated planning, professionalism and
sophistication and whether he caused damage of great monetary value to the
victim’s property during the commission of the crime. The jury found the
former aggravating fact true and deadlocked on the latter. Thus, the trial
court declared a mistrial as to the allegation relating to great monetary value
and the prosecution subsequently moved for its dismissal.
On February 11, 2025, the trial court sentenced defendant to the upper
term of three years on count 1 and the middle term of two years on count 2, to
be served as a split sentence with one year in county jail and two years under
mandatory supervision. The court also ordered defendant to pay a total of
$31,300 in victim restitution. Defendant timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
As stated, the trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term based
on four aggravating facts: the increasing seriousness of his prior convictions;
his unsatisfactory performance on previous grants of probation; his conviction
of crimes for which consecutive sentences could have been imposed but for
which concurrent sentences were being imposed; and the manner in which he
carried out the burglaries, which indicated planning and sophistication. Only
the last of these facts was found true by the jury.
The parties agree that under People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069
(Wiley), binding precedent issued after defendant was sentenced, the trial
court erred by relying on the other three aggravating facts since they were
not found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury or stipulated to by
defendant. As Wiley makes clear, a “defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all
aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its
elements, that expose [him or her] to imposition of a sentence more serious
than the statutorily provided midterm.” (Id. at p. 1086, fn. omitted.) The
sole issue on appeal is thus whether the court’s error was prejudicial.2 We
conclude it was not.
I. The Wiley Opinion.
Wiley explains that, “[u]nder the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, ‘any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater
potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established
beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence.’
(Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127
S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham); accord, Erlinger [v. United States (2024)] 602 U.S.
2 Defendant, in his reply brief, conceded that his performance on prior
grants of probation was unsatisfactory.
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[821,] 830–832 [219 L.Ed.2d 451, 144 S.Ct. 1840].) ‘Inhering in that
guarantee is an assurance that a guilty verdict will issue only from a
unanimous jury.’ (Erlinger, at p. 830; [citation].)” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 1078.)
“Section 1170(b)(2) similarly provides that the trial court may impose a
sentence exceeding the middle term only when circumstances in aggravation
of the crime justify imposition of an upper term sentence, and ‘the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt’ at a jury or court trial.
Construing this statutory scheme in light of the high court’s holding in
Cunningham, People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 [323 Cal.Rptr.3d 675,
552 P.3d 877] (Lynch) held that this jury trial right is not merely a state law
entitlement, but is constitutionally required for all aggravating facts, other
than a prior conviction, relied upon to justify an upper term sentence. (Id. at
pp. 755–767.)” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1078.)
While an exception to this jury trial right exists for “ ‘the fact of a prior
conviction,’ ” the exception is narrowly construed to encompass only a
determination of “ ‘ “what crime, with what elements, the defendant was
convicted of.” ’ ” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 1079, 1081.) Otherwise, “the
Sixth Amendment requires a jury determination of the . . . ‘increasing
seriousness of a defendant’s prior convictions’ ” before this fact can be used to
justify an upper term sentence. (Id. at p. 1082.) The same is true with
respect to the fact of a defendant’s “ ‘unsatisfactory’ ” prior performance on
probation. (Ibid.)
II. Failure to Afford Defendant a Jury Trial on Aggravating Facts
Was Not Prejudicial on This Record.
“When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used
to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must
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apply the Chapman standard of review. [Citations.] Under that standard, ‘a
sentence imposed under . . . section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded
unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury,
applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating
facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or
that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current
statute.’ [Citations.] Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under Chapman if
‘the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding’
with respect to the aggravating fact at issue.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p.
1087.) Thus, we do not ask whether the evidence was sufficient to support
the court’s finding of increasing seriousness. Rather, we ask “ ‘whether any
rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion.’ ” (Wiley,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1082.)
A. Increasing Seriousness of Prior Convictions.
“[T]he determination that a defendant’s prior convictions are of
increasing seriousness [(rule 4.421(b)(2))] may be made by ‘reference to the
range of punishment provided by statute for each offense.’ [Citation.] Or it
may be determined by ‘a comparison of the offenses’ respective elements.’
[Citation.] By either measure, the inquiry requires a comparison and
evaluation of the relationship among a defendant’s prior convictions, and a
determination as to their relative seriousness.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 1082, fn. omitted.)
Having reviewed the record at hand, we conclude no rational juror
could have disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that defendant’s prior
convictions were increasing in seriousness based on the totality of his
criminal conduct and the punishments he received for his crimes.
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Evidence considered by the trial court during sentencing included the
probation report3 and defendant’s certified rap sheet. This evidence showed
four prior felony convictions: In 2019, defendant was convicted of one count
of being an accessory after the fact to the commission of a felony (§ 32), and
received three years of probation. In 2021, defendant was convicted of one
count of willful failure to appear for felony charge (§ 1320.5), and received 24
months of probation. Finally, in 2024, defendant was convicted of two
felonies committed in 2022: one count of being a felon in possession of a
firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and one count of buying or receiving a stolen
vehicle or equipment (§ 469d, subd. (a)). He received probation, which
included as one of its terms a one-year jail sentence.
As the prosecutor argued below, the current offenses, two counts of
second degree commercial burglary, were significantly more serious than
defendant’s prior felony convictions in that they involved “immense property
damage and incredible brazen acts of smashing a truck into two storefronts.”
Thus, the current offenses involved destructive criminal acts taken by
defendant against victims’ properties. To the contrary, the previous felonies
involved much less aggressive criminal acts such as acting as an accessory to
another person’s commission of a crime, failing to appear on a felony charge,
or possessing a firearm or stolen vehicle or equipment.
Defendant does not seriously dispute these facts. Instead, he shifts
focus, arguing: “The fact that his county jail sentences tended to lengthen
from one case to the next seemingly reflects an effort by the courts to deter
his recidivism, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of substantially
worsening misconduct.” Defendant misses the point. The increasingly severe
punishments he received for his prior convictions undeniably stems from the
3 The probation report listed no mitigating facts.
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fact that his convictions were increasingly more serious in nature. As noted,
defendant was first convicted of knowingly concealing or aiding another
person who committed a felony with the intent of helping that person avoid or
escape justice (§ 32). Then, following defendant’s subsequent convictions for
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), failure to appear on a felony
charge (§ 1320.5), and receiving or buying stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a)),
he added to the severity of his criminal behavior by acting as the principal
felon in two brazen commercial burglaries (§ 459), committed on the same
night and resulting in thousands of dollars in property damage for his
victims.
These facts distinguish this case from Wiley. There, the high court
noted “none [of Wiley’s felonies] is strikingly more serious than the others,
either by reference to the nature of the offense or the punishment. The
majority of Wiley’s felony offenses were drug related and exposed Wiley to a
sentencing range of 16 months, two or three years. [Citations.] His 2015
conviction for unlawful possession of ammunition was punishable
alternatively as a felony or misdemeanor, and carried the standard default
felony range of 16 months, two or three years. [Citation.] The conviction
with the longest sentence exposure was his 2016 conviction for transporting a
controlled substance, carrying a potential two-, three- or four-year term.
[Citation.] Two crimes followed in 2018 and 2020. A misdemeanor
marijuana offense carried a six-month maximum jail term [citation], and a
felony criminal threats offense, an alternative felony/misdemeanor, involved
a 16 month, two- or three-year prison exposure.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 1089.) Thus, the Wiley court concluded: “A jury considering this criminal
history could have disagreed as to whether it demonstrated criminal conduct
of increasing seriousness.” (Ibid.)
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We reach the opposite conclusion. A jury considering defendant’s
criminal history could not have disagreed that it demonstrated criminal
conduct of increasing seriousness in terms of both the nature of his crimes
and the punishments he received.
B. Unsatisfactory Performance on Probation.
We thus turn to the trial court’s second aggravating fact, defendant’s
unsatisfactory performance on probation (rule 4.421(b)(5)), which “may be
proved ‘by evidence demonstrating that, while previously on probation or
parole, [the defendant] committed and was convicted of new offenses.’ ”
(Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1083.)
After initially disputing this fact, defendant concedes in his reply brief
that his unsatisfactory performance on probation was established below
beyond a reasonable doubt. As he should. The prosecutor provided the
following summary for the trial court during the sentencing hearing based on
information in defendant’s certified rap sheet and the probation report:
“So for each one, for the [section] 1320.5 offense [willful failure to appear for
felony charge], he was on probation for the [section] 32 [accessory after the
fact] as well. [¶] For the [offenses under sections] 29800 and the
469(d)(a) [sic] [felon in possession and buying or receiving stolen property,
respectively], I believe he was on two grants of probation, it looks like, from
the rap sheet for both of those offenses. [¶] For the instant offense, he was on
probation for at least the 1320.5. [¶] That’s simply just based off of the dates
in the rap. And there is a probation violation listed for the [section] 1320.5
failure to appear conviction. It looks like on December 5th, 2022, there was
action taken on his probation in that case.”
Defendant did not dispute the prosecutor’s statements as an accurate
description of his performance on probation during the sentencing hearing;
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nor does he do so here. As such, we conclude on this record that no rational
fact finder could have disagreed with the court’s finding that his performance
was unsatisfactory. (People v. Keene (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 305, 315
[no rational fact finder could have concluded the defendant’s prior
performance on supervised release was satisfactory where “the presentence
report identifies nine different cases where [he] committed probation
violations, parole violations, or PRCS [postrelease community supervision]
violations”]; cf., Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1091 [harmless error standard
not met where the probation officer characterized “Wiley’s mixed performance
on probation as both an aggravating factor and a mitigating factor”].)
C. Imposition of Concurrent Sentence on Count 2.
Finally, defendant does not challenge the trial court’s consideration of
the aggravating fact that he received a concurrent sentence on count 2 when
he could have received a consecutive sentence (rule 4.421(a)(7)). In fact, he
fails to mention the issue, even after it was raised in the respondent’s brief.
As such, we decline to address whether the trial court’s consideration of this
fact constituted prejudicial error. (McDoniel v. Kavry Management, LLC
(2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 949, 971, fn. 16 [review on appeal is limited to issues
adequately raised and briefed].) The judgment stands.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Burns, J.
Chou, J.
A173004/People v. Christopher Ryder Lang
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