Full Opinion

Filed 9/16/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B343669 (Super. Ct. No. 22F-02065) Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County) v. CHARLES NELSON AMMONS, Defendant and Appellant. Charles Nelson Ammons appeals his conviction, by jury, of the attempted murder of City of Pismo Beach police officer Christopher Siglin (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187),1 assault with a semi-automatic firearm on a police officer (§ 245, subd. (d)(2)), resisting an executive officer (§ 69), carrying a loaded and unregistered firearm (§ 25850), two counts of driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)), and public intoxication. (§ 647, subd. (f).) The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term in state prison of 15 years to life plus 12 years. All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 1 otherwise stated. Appellant limits this appeal to the attempted murder conviction. He contends the trial court erred when it instructed the jury, in terms of CALCRIM No. 3426, that it could “consider [evidence of appellant’s voluntary intoxication] only in deciding whether [appellant] acted with the intent to kill Siglin and the knowledge that Siglin was a peace officer.” He argues that the trial court erred by precluding the jury from also considering his intoxication in deciding whether he premeditated and deliberated. Finally he contends his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because counsel did not object to the instruction as worded. We affirm. Facts Officer Siglin was in uniform, patrolling on his police motorcycle when he saw appellant, driving a white van, make an illegal left turn. Appellant ignored Siglin’s initial efforts to pull him over but eventually stopped after Siglin drove his motorcycle ahead of the van and stopped in front of it. Siglin radioed for backup before approaching the van. The interaction between Siglin and appellant was recorded on Siglin’s body camera. Video from the camera confirms that when Siglin reached the van, he ordered appellant to turn off the ignition. Appellant was confrontational and refused to turn off the engine. Siglin opened the driver’s side door and reached into the van to get appellant to step out of the vehicle. Appellant swung his right hand toward Siglin while holding a handgun. Siglin diverted the blow with his left hand and tried to disarm appellant. The two men grappled with each other for a considerable amount of time, at extremely close quarters inside the van. Siglin constantly tried to pry appellant’s fingers from 2 the firearm and press its muzzle away from his head and face. For his part, appellant struggled to maintain control of the firearm and to pry Siglin’s fingers off it. During the struggle, the firearm was about 12 inches away and pointed at Siglin’s face. The pistol “clicked” but did not fire. Eventually Siglin was able to retrieve the firearm. Backup officers arrived. Together, the officers removed appellant from the van and took him into custody. Siglin’s body camera documented a “clicking” sound that occurred when appellant pulled the trigger. An examination of the firearm, a .40 caliber Beretta semi-automatic 96 pistol explained the “clicking” but not the firing: the bullets in the magazine clip were loaded backwards. Had the firearm been properly loaded, it would have fired.2 After his arrest, appellant was taken to the hospital. A screening test determined his blood alcohol content was .21. Procedural History Appellant’s first jury trial resulted in his conviction of assault with a semi-automatic firearm, carrying a loaded and unregistered firearm, driving under the influence and public intoxication. That jury was unable to reach a verdict on the attempted murder and resisting arrest charges. Appellant’s second jury trial was limited to attempted murder and resisting arrest charges and resulted in his conviction. 2 We parenthetically comment on appellant’s lack of even a rudimentary knowledge of firearms. The fact that he loaded the magazine with bullets facing backwards is the only reason Siglin was not murdered. 3 Voluntary Intoxication Instruction The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3426: “You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence only in deciding whether the defendant acted with the intent to kill [Christopher] Siglin and the knowledge that [Christopher] Siglin was a peace officer. [¶] A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated by willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the risk of that effect. [¶] In connection with the charge of attempted murder, the People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with intent to kill. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of attempted murder.” Appellant contends the trial court erred because this instruction did not expressly address premeditation and deliberation. We are not persuaded. The instructions, read as a whole, allowed the jury to consider voluntary intoxication in connection with premeditation and deliberation. Because appellant did not request that the trial court clarify or modify its proposed instruction on the issue, he has forfeited this contention. Evidence of a defendant’s voluntary intoxication is admissible “solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought.” (§ 29.4, subd. (b).) An instruction on voluntary intoxication, “is a form of pinpoint instruction that the trial court is not required to give in the 4 absence of a request.” (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 559; see also, People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119-1120 (Saille).) Here, the trial court’s instruction on voluntary intoxication correctly informed the jury that voluntary intoxication could be considered in deciding whether appellant acted with the intent to kill Siglin. The jury was further instructed, “If you find the defendant guilty of attempted murder under Count One, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the attempted murder was done willfully, and with deliberation and premeditation. [¶] The defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill when he acted. The defendant deliberated if he carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the act of attempted murder.” (CALCRIM No. 601.) As the court noted, in People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, these instructions connect the concepts of willfulness, premeditation and deliberation with the related concept of the intent to kill that is required for attempted murder. (Id. at pp. 1016-1017.) “No reasonable juror would understand the instructions to permit the jury to consider intoxication in determining whether defendant specifically intended to kill but to prohibit it from considering that same intoxication in determining whether he premeditated and deliberated. Premeditation and deliberation are clearly mental states; no reasonable juror would assume otherwise.” (Id. at p. 1017.) 5 Moreover, because the instruction on voluntary intoxication is a pinpoint instruction, it was appellant’s responsibility to request any modifications or clarifications he required. (Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1120.) His election not to do so forfeits the contention that the instruction did not sufficiently connect voluntary intoxication to the concepts of premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 650.) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Finally, we reject the contention that appellant’s counsel was ineffective because he did not request that the instruction expressly mention premeditation and deliberation. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, appellant must show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. (People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 679.) “ ‘This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) Here, the jury’s verdict establishes that it found appellant formed the specific intent to kill Siglin and that his voluntary intoxication did not prevent him from doing so. There is no reasonable probability the jury would have reached a different result had the voluntary intoxication instruction specifically mentioned premeditation and deliberation. To reach a more favorable result on that issue, the jury would have to find that appellant was sober enough to form the intent to kill Siglin but simultaneously too intoxicated to premeditate and deliberate that killing. No rational jury could reach that conclusion, especially after reviewing the body camera video of the incident. 6 (See, e.g., People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 45 [jury could not rationally find defendant intended to kill but was too intoxicated to intend to rape].) Conclusion The judgment is affirmed. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. YEGAN, J. We concur: CODY, P. J. BALTODANO, J. 7 Crystal T. Seiler, Judge Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo ______________________________ Law Offices of James Koester and James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Christopher G. Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.