People v. Sigala CA5

Filed 11/5/26 P. v. Sigala CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, F089466 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. RF009495A, v. RF009504A) RAY BRITE SIGALA, Defendant and Appellant. OPINION APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Kenneth Green, Judge. Kyle Gee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Amanda D. Cary and Viktoriya Chebotarev, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- Defendant Ray Brite Sigala accepted a plea agreement to resolve two underlying domestic violence criminal cases. After being placed on probation, defendant violated a criminal protective order and probation provision that he was to have no contact with the victims in the underlying cases. On appeal, he contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and committing him to prison to serve 23 years, without having enough evidence about the probation violation or having considered an alternative disposition. The People contend defendant forfeited his claim by failing to raise it at the probation violation hearing in the trial court, substantial evidence supports he willfully violated the no contact order, and the court properly exercised its discretion in revoking his probation. We affirm. PROCEDURAL SUMMARY A. Allegations 1. Case No. RF009495A (Case 1) On July 12, 2024, the Kern County District Attorney filed a complaint charging defendant with making felony criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422; count 1) 1, and misdemeanor battery involving domestic violence (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); count 2). As to count 1, it was further alleged that defendant had suffered two prior strike convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and two prior convictions for serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)). Additionally, as to count 1, it was alleged defendant was on bail in two separate cases at the time of the offense, resulting in two on-bail enhancements (§ 12022.1). The complaint also alleged numerous circumstances in aggravation. (§ 1170, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421.) 2. Case No. RF009504A (Case 2) On July 26, 2024, the Kern County District Attorney filed a complaint charging defendant with felony kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); count 1), injuring a spouse, cohabitant, fiancé, boyfriend, girlfriend, or child’s parent (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2), false imprisonment by violence (§ 236; count 3), and fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 4). As to count 1, it 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, except as otherwise noted. 2. was further alleged that defendant had two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)). As to counts 1 through 4, it was further alleged that defendant had suffered two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and that he was on bail at the time of the offense in three separate cases, resulting in three on-bail enhancements (§ 12022.1). The complaint also alleged numerous circumstances in aggravation. (§ 1170, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421.) B. Plea Agreement On September 13, 2024, defendant entered a negotiated plea agreement to resolve both underlying cases for a total term of 31 years, stayed in favor of a three-year term of probation. As to case 2, defendant agreed to plead no contest to all counts, and to admit two prior strike conviction allegations, two serious felony conviction allegations, three on-bail allegations, and as to count 1, one circumstance in aggravation. In exchange, all other circumstances in aggravation would be dismissed and the trial court indicated it would strike the prior strike convictions. It was further agreed that the court would impose and stay—in favor of a three-year grant of probation—an aggregate term of 26 years four months as follows: on count 1, eight years (the upper term), plus two five-year serious felony conviction enhancements, plus three two-year on-bail enhancements; on count 2, one year (one-third the middle term), consecutive; on counts 3 and 4, eight months (one- third the middle term), consecutive. As to case 1, defendant agreed to plead no contest to count 1, and to admit two prior strike conviction allegations and two on-bail allegations. In exchange, count 2 and all circumstances in aggravation would be dismissed and the trial court indicated it would strike the prior strike convictions. It was further agreed that the court would impose and stay a term of four years eight months as follows: on count 1, eight months (one-third the middle term), plus two two-year on-bail enhancements consecutive to the term imposed in case 2. 3.  C. Sentencing On October 10, 2024, pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, as modified by the parties that day, 2 the trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 23 years in prison. The trial court struck all prior strike conviction allegations pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, as set out in the plea agreement, then imposed the originally negotiated term except that the trial court imposed and stayed pursuant to section 12022.1, subdivision (d), two on-bail enhancements in case 2 and two on-bail enhancements in case 1 pending disposition of the two other cases (both of which were dismissed at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing). The resulting sentence was an aggregate term of 23 years, execution of sentence suspended and probation granted for a period of three years. The terms and conditions of probation included he was “to obey all laws, orders of the Court” and “to have no contact with the victim[s].” The court also issued a 10-year criminal protective order as to the victims, C.H. and J.S., which provided defendant was to have no contact with them. D. Probation Revocation On November 21, 2024, and January 24, 2025, the probation department filed violation of probation letters, recommending revocation of defendant’s probation in both cases. The “Probation Discovery Report,” (boldface omitted) dated January 24, 2025, contained allegations that defendant had been arrested for making criminal threats (§ 422) and violating a restraining order (§ 273.6), in addition to twice failing to report to the probation department and failing to provide a current address. On February 18, 2025, the court held a probation revocation hearing and found that defendant violated the 2 The parties agreed that the term of imprisonment set out in the original plea agreement included two on-bail enhancements in case 2 and two on-bail enhancements in case 1 that were based on pending matters that were to be dismissed in light of the plea agreement. Where a defendant is acquitted of the offense(s) underlying a section 12022.1 enhancement, the enhancements are permanently stayed by operation of law. (§ 12022.1, subd. (d).) The parties agreed that the total term would be 23 years. 4. conditions of his probation. The same day, the court revoked probation and imposed the suspended 23-year prison sentence. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 11, 2025. FACTUAL SUMMARY 3 On the morning of November 16, 2024, Ridgecrest Police Department Officer Jeremiah Lloyd was conducting a probation search for defendant, and his ankle monitor tracker placed him at a local motel. Upon arriving at the motel location, Lloyd, who had numerous prior contacts with defendant, saw him exiting a motel room. Once defendant noticed Lloyd, he ran from the motel, causing Lloyd to radio to a detective and another officer to report that defendant was running from the motel. Lloyd stayed at the motel, went to the room from which defendant exited, knocked on the door, and spoke to the female who answered. Lloyd recognized the woman as J.S., a protected party in the criminal protective order who defendant was not permitted to contact. Shortly thereafter, defendant was apprehended, detained, and brought back to the motel to be questioned by Lloyd. Defendant told Lloyd that he went to the motel to bring J.S. her dogs and stayed all night with her to say goodbye because he knew they could not keep seeing each other. Defendant confirmed to Lloyd that he knew about the no- contact order with J.S. and stated he “did not want to go to jail for 23 years because of the violation.” Lloyd believed defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance and defendant confirmed he “used coke” two days prior and smoked marijuana. Defendant was arrested for violating the criminal protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)). 3 A factual summary for the underlying offenses in case Nos. RF009504A and RF009495A is omitted as defendant does not dispute these facts and they are not at issue on appeal. This factual summary pertains only to the disputed violation of probation and is supported by the testimony from the February 18, 2025 probation violation hearing. 5.  DISCUSSION Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and committed him to prison to serve a 23-year sentence without knowing more about his violation of the no contact order. He seeks reversal of the judgment and remand to the trial court with instructions to explore further the nature of the violation. The People contend substantial evidence supports the finding that defendant willfully violated his probation, he forfeited any abuse of discretion claim by failing to raise it in the trial court, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it terminated his probation. We affirm. A. Additional Background At defendant’s February 18, 2025 formal revocation hearing, defense counsel was asked by the trial court if he wished to present a defense and he responded, “No, Your Honor. I’ll submit.” Defendant did not call any witnesses nor proffer any evidence. After finding defendant violated his probation, the court asked if either side wished to be heard and there was no response. The court then pronounced the previously imposed and stayed sentence, stating “the two cases will be 23 years” and “I will allow either side to address that issue,” to which the prosecution replied that was “the correct amount” and defense counsel affirmed, “Yes, Your Honor.” After the court formally sentenced defendant, it asked if there was anything further on behalf of either side, and defendant asked about the criminal protective order being dropped and if he could “get [his] discovery” before he left the county jail. Defendant never raised any objection during the probation revocation and sentencing hearing. B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review “Section 1203.2, subdivision (a), authorizes a court to revoke probation if the interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe that the person has violated any of the conditions of his or her probation.” (People v. Urke (2011) 6. 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 772.) “The facts supporting a probation revocation must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” (People v. Gray (2023) 15 Cal.5th 152, 163.) “We review the trial court’s probation revocation order for an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.” (People v. Butcher (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318.) A trial court’s order should not be disturbed under the abuse of discretion standard unless it is arbitrary or capricious, applies the wrong legal standard, or is based on factual findings unsupported by substantial evidence. (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449.) Under the substantial evidence standard, we “review the whole record most favorably to the judgment to determine whether there is substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof.” (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298.) C. Analysis Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and committing him to the 23-year sentence because “there [was] no evidence that [an] alternative was considered” and there was a “limited” record, which the court should have “investigated further.” First, defendant seems to suggest the court has an affirmative duty to state its reasoning on the record for revoking his probation and imposing his original prison sentence. However, the court is not required to do so, and defendant fails to cite any authority to the contrary. (See People v. Latham (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 27, 29–30 [once defendant is found to have violated the conditions of his probation, the court declining to reinstate probation is not a “sentencing” choice requiring reasons within the meaning of § 1170, subd. (c)].) Next, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and imposing the previously stayed 23-year term because it “did not know enough” about his violation. By failing to object on those grounds at the probation 7. revocation hearing, defendant forfeited this claim. (People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 778 [failure to object at the trial court bars raising the ground on appeal].) The court gave defendant a meaningful opportunity to object at the revocation hearing, but he did not do so. Nonetheless, even if defendant had objected to the court’s exercise of sentencing discretion, he failed to show the court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and sentencing him to serve the previously suspended 23-year sentence. The trial court found defendant violated the terms of his probation. Viewing the record most favorably to the judgment, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s probation violation finding. The trial court accepted evidence that defendant was subject to a criminal protective order which provided he must not contact J.S., and testimony that defendant admitted he used a controlled substance, went to J.S.’s hotel room in violation of the protective order, stayed there all night, ran from police when Lloyd attempted to contact him, and once he was apprehended, stated he understood he was not permitted to contact J.S. This constituted a violation of the protective order and the terms of his probation which included an order that he obey all laws, orders of the court, and not have contact with J.S. After finding that a defendant has violated probation, a trial court may either reinstate probation on the same or modified terms or terminate probation and order the defendant committed to prison “if the interests of justice so require.” (§ 1203.2, subd. (b); People v. Medina (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 318, 321; People v. Harris (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 141, 147.) In considering whether to reinstate or revoke probation, the court’s inquiry is directed to the probationer’s performance on probation and whether the defendant can conform his or her conduct to the law in the future. (People v. Beaudrie (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 686, 691.) It is presumed here that the court understood the scope of its discretion and acted in conformity with the law. (People v. Mosley (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 489, 496.) From the testimony at the revocation hearing, which included defendant’s statement to Lloyd that he knew about the contact order with J.S. and “did 8. not want to go to jail for 23 years because of the violation,” the trial court could reasonably have concluded that based on his willful probation violations, defendant could not conform his conduct to the law in the future. Based on the record as a whole, the trial court’s decision to revoke probation and impose the original prison sentence was not an abuse of discretion. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. FRANSON, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: SNAUFFER, J. HARRELL, J. 9.