Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 In re J.A. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN In re J.A., a Person Coming Under B349316 the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PS0226C) THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.A., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Juvenile Court of Los Angeles County, Steven E. Ipson, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ________________________ INTRODUCTION In 2024, when J.A. was 16 years old, he was arrested after pointing a semiautomatic gun at Dylan F. After holding a contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court found J.A. committed assault with a semiautomatic firearm and that he concealed a firearm. The court placed him on probation and imposed several conditions, including a prohibition against using, possessing, or being around sellers of “mind altering substances.” J.A. contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s true finding on the assault charge. He further argues the probation conditions referring to “mind-altering substances” are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. J.A. also asserts the court erred by setting a maximum term of confinement. The Attorney General concedes the maximum term of confinement was unauthorized and should be stricken. We agree, and also modify the challenged probation conditions because they are vague and overbroad. We affirm the judgment in all other respects. 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Around midnight on November 18, 2024, Dylan arrived home from work. He exited his car, and as he crossed the street to his house, he sensed someone was behind him. He turned around and saw an individual, whom he later identified as J.A., pointing a gun at him. J.A. was dressed in all black, his face was fully covered, and he was wearing a beanie and a backpack. He asked Dylan where he was from, and Dylan said he was “from nowhere.” J.A. again asked Dylan where he was from, and when Dylan again responded “nowhere,” J.A. said “you’re good to go.” J.A. walked away from Dylan, then returned, and told Dylan not to tell anyone what happened. Dylan felt scared and reassured J.A. he would not tell anyone. Dylan turned and walked toward his house, and J.A. walked away in the direction of a nearby park. Dylan called 911. He told the 911 operator that J.A. was struggling to say his words and sounded intoxicated. Dylan stated he knew the individual who pointed the gun at him was a Latino male because of his voice and accent. Officer Vincent Vizcaino responded to the call for a suspect described as a Latino male wearing a black beanie, black sweater, black face mask, black pants, and a black backpack. Officer Vizcaino saw J.A. near Dylan’s house and observed that he matched the suspect’s description. He noticed J.A. turn his back away and increase the pace of his walking after realizing police were near him. Officer Vizcaino told J.A. to stop walking and show his hands, but J.A. ignored him, continued to walk, and tossed a gun into a bush. 3 Officer Vizcaino exited his car and detained J.A. at gunpoint. J.A. told Officer Vizcaino, “[you] caught [me] slipping.” J.A. appeared lethargic, had his eyes closed, and smelled strongly of alcohol. He was wearing a black hoodie, black beanie, black face mask, black backpack, and dark colored jeans. Approximately 20 minutes after the assault and at the scene, police officers showed J.A. to Dylan, and Dylan identified J.A. as the person who pointed the gun at him. Dylan recognized J.A. based on his clothing. Officer Vizcaino placed J.A. under arrest then recovered the gun from the bush. The gun had a magazine in it and a live round in the chamber. Officer Vizcaino determined the gun was an operable semiautomatic handgun. He noted that its serial number had been scratched off and its trigger guard, which prevented accidental firing, was missing. The Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging J.A. committed assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b); count one) and concealed a firearm (Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (a)(2); count two) while being an active participant in a criminal street gang (id., subd. (c)(3)).1 After holding a contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition on both counts, but it found the gang allegation not true and ordered it stricken.2 The court declared J.A. a ward of the 1 The gang allegation pertained only to count two. 2 Officer Vizcaino spoke with J.A. at juvenile hall the night of his arrest, and J.A. admitted he was affiliated with a criminal street gang. The juvenile court determined the officer elicited J.A.’s statements in violation of his Miranda rights and excluded 4 court, placed him on probation, and imposed two probation conditions as detailed further below. The court also noted J.A. had two other juvenile cases, and that his maximum term of confinement across all three cases was six years 10 months. J.A. timely appealed. DISCUSSION A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding J.A. Assaulted Dylan with a Firearm Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), states, “Except as provided in Section 707, any minor who is between 12 years of age and 17 years of age, inclusive, when he or she violates any law of this state or of the United States . . . is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a).) The juvenile court’s determination is reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809 [the same principles of review of a criminal case apply to review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a true finding in a juvenile delinquency proceeding].) We review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine if there is substantial evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that J.A. committed assault. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) J.A.’s statements. The court found the gang allegation not true and ordered it stricken on that basis. 5 Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences based on that evidence. (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 339.) In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.) We do not substitute our own evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the finder of fact. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) For these reasons, a party challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal bears an “ ‘enormous burden.’ ” (People v. Vasco (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 137, 161 (Vasco).) Identification of a defendant by a single eyewitness may be sufficient to prove the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of a crime. (People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 1006 (Reed).) J.A. contends the record contains insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that he assaulted Dylan. The contention lacks merit. J.A. matched the description of the person who pointed a gun at Dylan. As stated, Dylan identified J.A. as his assailant soon after the assault. And when he was arrested, J.A.’s clothing and face mask matched Dylan’s description of his assailant. Additionally, J.A., like Dylan’s assailant, was intoxicated. J.A. was arrested near Dylan’s house when police found him, and he had a gun. This is substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s true finding on the assault with a firearm count. (Reed, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1006 [identification of a defendant by a single eyewitness may be sufficient to prove identity]; People v. Lindsay (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 482, 494 [even if no witness saw the perpetrator’s face, identity may be established by proof of peculiarities of size, appearance, similarity of voice, features, or clothing]; People v. 6 James (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 166, 170 [despite assailant having worn a face covering when committing robbery, identity evidence was sufficient because the witnesses could identify the robber after seeing him at close range, observing his walk, and hearing his voice].) J.A. highlights what he contends are differences between himself and Dylan’s description of his assailant. For example, J.A. notes that Dylan described his assailant as having a black gun, but J.A.’s gun was black and tan. During closing argument, J.A.’s attorney similarly pointed out minor discrepancies in the identification evidence to argue J.A. was not Dylan’s assailant. But the juvenile court heard and considered these differences and nonetheless sustained the assault count. J.A. essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do on substantial evidence review. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) J.A. also argues that Dylan’s identification of him was insufficient in light of certain factors stated in People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252 (Cuevas). Cuevas enumerates a non- exhaustive list of factors that may impact the probative value of out-of-court witness identification, including “the identifying witness’s prior familiarity with the defendant,” “the witness’s opportunity to observe the perpetrator during the commission of the crime,” “whether the witness has a motive to falsely implicate the defendant,” and “the level of detail given by the witness in the out-of-court identification and any accompanying description of the crime.” (Id. at p. 267.) As Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at page 267 explains, although these factors are relevant in assessing the probative value of an out-of-court identification (ibid.), the overarching question before us is whether the record contains substantial 7 identification evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that J.A. committed the assault. (See id. at p. 272 [“the substantial evidence test . . . should be used to determine whether an out-of- court identification is sufficient to support a criminal conviction”].) It was the juvenile court’s role to weigh the evidence before it and decide whether J.A. was the person who pointed a gun at Dylan. (In re B.J. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 646, 651 [“ ‘ “it is the exclusive province of the [court] to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends” ’ ”].) We decline to second-guess the court by weighing the Cuevas factors to reach a finding contrary to the court’s factual finding that J.A. was Dylan’s assailant. (See ibid.)3 3 Even if we were to analyze the Cuevas factors, they support the juvenile court’s finding that J.A. committed assault. Dylan was able to observe the perpetrator’s appearance, clothing, and the sound of his voice during the commission of the crime, as well as the facts that he had a gun and seemed intoxicated. (See Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 267 [relevant factors include witness’s opportunity to observe the perpetrator during the commission of the crime and the level of detail given by the witness in the out-of-court identification].) Moreover, the facts suggest the perpetrator chose to assault Dylan at random, and the record contains no evidence that Dylan knew J.A. or had any motive to falsely implicate him. (See ibid. [another Cuevas factor is whether the witness had a motive to falsely implicate the defendant].) In short, viewing the record through the lens of the Cuevas factors, J.A. cannot overcome the “ ‘enormous burden’ ” of demonstrating the juvenile court’s finding that he assaulted Dylan is unsupported by substantial evidence. (See Vasco, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 161.) 8 B. We Modify Probation Conditions 17 and 18 To Avoid Vagueness and Overbreadth Concerns J.A. argues probation conditions 17 and 18 are facially unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Arguments that probation conditions are facially unconstitutionally vague or overbroad are legal questions appellate courts may remedy by modifying any unlawful condition. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887-888 (Sheena K.).) Such arguments are not forfeited by a lack of objection in the juvenile court. (Id. at p. 887.) “To withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition must be sufficiently definite to inform the probationer what conduct is required or prohibited, and to enable the court to determine whether the probationer has violated the condition.” (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500 (Hall).) A probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad when it imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights without closely tailoring those limitations to the purpose of the condition. (Sheena K., at p. 890.) “A probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.’ ” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382 (Olguin).) Probation condition 17 states: “You must not knowingly drink or possess any alcoholic beverages nor knowingly use or possess illegal drugs or mind altering substances except as prescribed by a physician.” Probation condition 18 states: “You must not be around persons you know to be users or sellers of illegal drugs or mind altering substances.” J.A. contends these conditions are unconstitutionally vague because the meaning of “ ‘mind altering substances’ ” is “neither 9 defined nor self-evident,” and as a result, “the phrase fails to give [J.A.] or law enforcement officers notice of what substances are encompassed by the probation terms.” (See Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 500.) He also argues the conditions are overbroad because they prohibit more constitutionally protected conduct than necessary. He further asserts that because the conditions use the term “ ‘mind altering substances’ ” rather than specifying “illegal . . . mind altering substances,” they are unconstitutional to the extent they may be read as applying to legal innocuous substances such as coffee and chocolate.4 (Italics added.) The Attorney General contends both conditions are constitutional because a reasonable, objective reading of the conditions would not prohibit him from consuming substances like coffee, sugar, and chocolate. (See Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 382 [reasonable objective reading of a probation condition governs].) Although we agree with the Attorney General that it would be unreasonable for law enforcement or J.A.’s probation officer to construe lawful innocuous behavior like consuming sugar, coffee 4 J.A. also argues condition 18 “potentially prohibits [him] from associating with anyone who sells legal mind altering substances – substances such as coffee, chocolate, energy drinks, and legally prescribed psychotropic drugs . . . . [¶] Further, because it also potentially prohibits [J.A.] from associating with persons he knows to consume such substances, the term is overbroad because it could include friends and family members whose conduct is completely legal – they consume coffee or take prescribed psychotropic medicines. Indeed, numerous people in [J.A.’s] life, including even his probation officer, could be taking ‘mind[-]altering substances’ as prescribed by a physician for their mental health. Limiting [J.A.’s] access to these people serves no purpose.” 10 or chocolate as a probation violation, J.A. is correct that both conditions are vague and overbroad because the meaning of “mind altering substances” is not defined or self-evident and could prohibit more conduct than necessary. (See, e.g., United States v. Kappes (7th Cir. 2015) 782 F.3d 828, 853 [condition banning the purchase, possession or use of any “ ‘mood altering substance’ ” was unlawful in part because the phrase “[was] not defined nor its meaning self-evident”]; United States v. Aquino (9th Cir. 2015) 794 F.3d 1033, 1037 [probation condition prohibiting substance use was impermissibly vague because it “could cover innocuous substances such as chocolate and coffee”].) We can resolve these vagueness and overbreadth concerns on appeal by modifying the conditions. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 888 [modification by appellate court of a facially unconstitutional probation condition is an appropriate and efficient remedy].) The Attorney General suggests proposed modifications to conditions 17 and 18 in the event we conclude modification is warranted. J.A. agrees with these proposed modifications. Accordingly, in the Disposition we modify conditions 17 and 18 to remedy the constitutional vagueness and overbreadth concerns J.A. raises on appeal. C. We Strike the Maximum Term of Confinement The juvenile court is required to set a maximum term of confinement when a minor is removed from the custody of his or her parents (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (d)) or when the minor is committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice (id., § 731, subd. (b)). This requirement does not apply when a minor is released to his parents’ custody on probation. (In re Ali A. (2006) 11 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 573 (Ali A.).) J.A. was placed on probation in his father’s custody. At J.A.’s disposition hearing, the court stated his maximum term of confinement across all of his cases was six years 10 months.5 J.A. argues, the People concede, and we agree that because J.A. was released to his father’s custody on probation, the maximum term of confinement has no legal effect and should be stricken. (Ali A., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 574 [juvenile court declares the maximum term of confinement only in the event the minor violates probation; while the minor is on probation, the maximum term of confinement has no legal effect]; In re A.C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 590, 592 [“where a juvenile court’s order includes a maximum confinement term for a minor who is not removed from parental custody, the remedy is to strike the term”].) The maximum term of confinement is stricken. Because the minute order from the disposition hearing is silent regarding maximum term of confinement, it does not require correction. (See People v. Cervantes (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 213, 227 [“the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment as reflected in the reporter’s transcript that controls, not the minute order . . . .”].) 5 The record before us has minimal information regarding J.A.’s two other juvenile delinquency cases other than that they also involved unlawful firearm possession. 12 DISPOSITION We modify Condition 17 to read as follows: “You must not knowingly drink or possess any alcoholic beverages or knowingly use or possess illegal drugs or any prescribed substances for which you do not have a valid and current prescription.” We modify Condition 18 to read as follows: “You must not be around persons you know to be drug users or sellers of illegal drugs or illegal mind-altering substances.” We also strike the maximum term of confinement. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. MARTINEZ, P. J. We concur: SEGAL, J. FEUER, J. 13