In re J.A. CA2/7
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketB349316
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/18/26 In re J.A. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re J.A., a Person Coming Under B349316
the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PS0226C)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Juvenile Court of
Los Angeles County, Steven E. Ipson, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Deepti Vaadyala,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
In 2024, when J.A. was 16 years old, he was arrested after
pointing a semiautomatic gun at Dylan F. After holding a
contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court found J.A.
committed assault with a semiautomatic firearm and that he
concealed a firearm. The court placed him on probation and
imposed several conditions, including a prohibition against using,
possessing, or being around sellers of “mind altering substances.”
J.A. contends substantial evidence does not support the
juvenile court’s true finding on the assault charge. He further
argues the probation conditions referring to “mind-altering
substances” are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. J.A.
also asserts the court erred by setting a maximum term of
confinement. The Attorney General concedes the maximum term
of confinement was unauthorized and should be stricken. We
agree, and also modify the challenged probation conditions
because they are vague and overbroad. We affirm the judgment
in all other respects.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Around midnight on November 18, 2024, Dylan arrived
home from work. He exited his car, and as he crossed the street
to his house, he sensed someone was behind him. He turned
around and saw an individual, whom he later identified as J.A.,
pointing a gun at him.
J.A. was dressed in all black, his face was fully covered,
and he was wearing a beanie and a backpack. He asked Dylan
where he was from, and Dylan said he was “from nowhere.” J.A.
again asked Dylan where he was from, and when Dylan again
responded “nowhere,” J.A. said “you’re good to go.” J.A. walked
away from Dylan, then returned, and told Dylan not to tell
anyone what happened. Dylan felt scared and reassured J.A. he
would not tell anyone. Dylan turned and walked toward his
house, and J.A. walked away in the direction of a nearby park.
Dylan called 911. He told the 911 operator that J.A. was
struggling to say his words and sounded intoxicated. Dylan
stated he knew the individual who pointed the gun at him was a
Latino male because of his voice and accent. Officer Vincent
Vizcaino responded to the call for a suspect described as a Latino
male wearing a black beanie, black sweater, black face mask,
black pants, and a black backpack.
Officer Vizcaino saw J.A. near Dylan’s house and observed
that he matched the suspect’s description. He noticed J.A. turn
his back away and increase the pace of his walking after realizing
police were near him. Officer Vizcaino told J.A. to stop walking
and show his hands, but J.A. ignored him, continued to walk, and
tossed a gun into a bush.
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Officer Vizcaino exited his car and detained J.A. at
gunpoint. J.A. told Officer Vizcaino, “[you] caught [me] slipping.”
J.A. appeared lethargic, had his eyes closed, and smelled strongly
of alcohol. He was wearing a black hoodie, black beanie, black
face mask, black backpack, and dark colored jeans.
Approximately 20 minutes after the assault and at the scene,
police officers showed J.A. to Dylan, and Dylan identified J.A. as
the person who pointed the gun at him. Dylan recognized J.A.
based on his clothing.
Officer Vizcaino placed J.A. under arrest then recovered
the gun from the bush. The gun had a magazine in it and a live
round in the chamber. Officer Vizcaino determined the gun was
an operable semiautomatic handgun. He noted that its serial
number had been scratched off and its trigger guard, which
prevented accidental firing, was missing.
The Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a Welfare
and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging J.A.
committed assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code,
§ 245, subd. (b); count one) and concealed a firearm (Pen. Code,
§ 25400, subd. (a)(2); count two) while being an active participant
in a criminal street gang (id., subd. (c)(3)).1 After holding a
contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained the
petition on both counts, but it found the gang allegation not true
and ordered it stricken.2 The court declared J.A. a ward of the
1 The gang allegation pertained only to count two.
2 Officer Vizcaino spoke with J.A. at juvenile hall the night of
his arrest, and J.A. admitted he was affiliated with a criminal
street gang. The juvenile court determined the officer elicited
J.A.’s statements in violation of his Miranda rights and excluded
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court, placed him on probation, and imposed two probation
conditions as detailed further below. The court also noted J.A.
had two other juvenile cases, and that his maximum term of
confinement across all three cases was six years 10 months. J.A.
timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding
J.A. Assaulted Dylan with a Firearm
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a),
states, “Except as provided in Section 707, any minor who is
between 12 years of age and 17 years of age, inclusive, when he
or she violates any law of this state or of the United States . . . is
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge
the minor to be a ward of the court.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602,
subd. (a).)
The juvenile court’s determination is reviewed for
substantial evidence. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809
[the same principles of review of a criminal case apply to review
of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a true finding in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding].) We review the record in the
light most favorable to the judgment below to determine if there
is substantial evidence from which any rational trier of fact could
find beyond a reasonable doubt that J.A. committed assault.
(Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319; People v.
Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.)
J.A.’s statements. The court found the gang allegation not true
and ordered it stricken on that basis.
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Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences based on that evidence. (People v. Navarro
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 339.) In reviewing a sufficiency of the
evidence claim, we “presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably
deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th
913, 919.) We do not substitute our own evaluation of a witness’s
credibility for that of the finder of fact. (People v. Ochoa (1993)
6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) For these reasons, a party challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence on appeal bears an “ ‘enormous
burden.’ ” (People v. Vasco (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 137, 161
(Vasco).) Identification of a defendant by a single eyewitness may
be sufficient to prove the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator
of a crime. (People v. Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 1006 (Reed).)
J.A. contends the record contains insufficient evidence to
support the juvenile court’s finding that he assaulted Dylan. The
contention lacks merit. J.A. matched the description of the
person who pointed a gun at Dylan. As stated, Dylan identified
J.A. as his assailant soon after the assault. And when he was
arrested, J.A.’s clothing and face mask matched Dylan’s
description of his assailant. Additionally, J.A., like Dylan’s
assailant, was intoxicated. J.A. was arrested near Dylan’s house
when police found him, and he had a gun. This is substantial
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s true finding on the
assault with a firearm count. (Reed, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1006
[identification of a defendant by a single eyewitness may be
sufficient to prove identity]; People v. Lindsay (1964)
227 Cal.App.2d 482, 494 [even if no witness saw the perpetrator’s
face, identity may be established by proof of peculiarities of size,
appearance, similarity of voice, features, or clothing]; People v.
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James (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 166, 170 [despite assailant having
worn a face covering when committing robbery, identity evidence
was sufficient because the witnesses could identify the robber
after seeing him at close range, observing his walk, and hearing
his voice].)
J.A. highlights what he contends are differences between
himself and Dylan’s description of his assailant. For example,
J.A. notes that Dylan described his assailant as having a black
gun, but J.A.’s gun was black and tan. During closing argument,
J.A.’s attorney similarly pointed out minor discrepancies in the
identification evidence to argue J.A. was not Dylan’s assailant.
But the juvenile court heard and considered these differences and
nonetheless sustained the assault count. J.A. essentially asks us
to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do on substantial
evidence review. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
J.A. also argues that Dylan’s identification of him was
insufficient in light of certain factors stated in People v. Cuevas
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 252 (Cuevas). Cuevas enumerates a non-
exhaustive list of factors that may impact the probative value of
out-of-court witness identification, including “the identifying
witness’s prior familiarity with the defendant,” “the witness’s
opportunity to observe the perpetrator during the commission of
the crime,” “whether the witness has a motive to falsely implicate
the defendant,” and “the level of detail given by the witness in
the out-of-court identification and any accompanying description
of the crime.” (Id. at p. 267.)
As Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at page 267 explains,
although these factors are relevant in assessing the probative
value of an out-of-court identification (ibid.), the overarching
question before us is whether the record contains substantial
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identification evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that
J.A. committed the assault. (See id. at p. 272 [“the substantial
evidence test . . . should be used to determine whether an out-of-
court identification is sufficient to support a criminal
conviction”].) It was the juvenile court’s role to weigh the
evidence before it and decide whether J.A. was the person who
pointed a gun at Dylan. (In re B.J. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 646,
651 [“ ‘ “it is the exclusive province of the [court] to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon
which a determination depends” ’ ”].) We decline to second-guess
the court by weighing the Cuevas factors to reach a finding
contrary to the court’s factual finding that J.A. was Dylan’s
assailant. (See ibid.)3
3 Even if we were to analyze the Cuevas factors, they support
the juvenile court’s finding that J.A. committed assault. Dylan
was able to observe the perpetrator’s appearance, clothing, and
the sound of his voice during the commission of the crime, as well
as the facts that he had a gun and seemed intoxicated. (See
Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 267 [relevant factors include
witness’s opportunity to observe the perpetrator during the
commission of the crime and the level of detail given by the
witness in the out-of-court identification].) Moreover, the facts
suggest the perpetrator chose to assault Dylan at random, and
the record contains no evidence that Dylan knew J.A. or had any
motive to falsely implicate him. (See ibid. [another Cuevas factor
is whether the witness had a motive to falsely implicate the
defendant].) In short, viewing the record through the lens of the
Cuevas factors, J.A. cannot overcome the “ ‘enormous burden’ ” of
demonstrating the juvenile court’s finding that he assaulted
Dylan is unsupported by substantial evidence. (See Vasco, supra,
131 Cal.App.4th at p. 161.)
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B. We Modify Probation Conditions 17 and 18 To Avoid
Vagueness and Overbreadth Concerns
J.A. argues probation conditions 17 and 18 are facially
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Arguments that
probation conditions are facially unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad are legal questions appellate courts may remedy by
modifying any unlawful condition. (In re Sheena K. (2007)
40 Cal.4th 875, 887-888 (Sheena K.).) Such arguments are not
forfeited by a lack of objection in the juvenile court. (Id. at
p. 887.) “To withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground
of vagueness, a probation condition must be sufficiently definite
to inform the probationer what conduct is required or prohibited,
and to enable the court to determine whether the probationer has
violated the condition.” (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500
(Hall).) A probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad
when it imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights
without closely tailoring those limitations to the purpose of the
condition. (Sheena K., at p. 890.) “A probation condition should
be given ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable,
objective reader.’ ” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382
(Olguin).)
Probation condition 17 states: “You must not knowingly
drink or possess any alcoholic beverages nor knowingly use or
possess illegal drugs or mind altering substances except as
prescribed by a physician.”
Probation condition 18 states: “You must not be around
persons you know to be users or sellers of illegal drugs or mind
altering substances.”
J.A. contends these conditions are unconstitutionally vague
because the meaning of “ ‘mind altering substances’ ” is “neither
9
defined nor self-evident,” and as a result, “the phrase fails to give
[J.A.] or law enforcement officers notice of what substances are
encompassed by the probation terms.” (See Hall, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 500.) He also argues the conditions are overbroad
because they prohibit more constitutionally protected conduct
than necessary. He further asserts that because the conditions
use the term “ ‘mind altering substances’ ” rather than specifying
“illegal . . . mind altering substances,” they are unconstitutional
to the extent they may be read as applying to legal innocuous
substances such as coffee and chocolate.4 (Italics added.) The
Attorney General contends both conditions are constitutional
because a reasonable, objective reading of the conditions would
not prohibit him from consuming substances like coffee, sugar,
and chocolate. (See Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 382
[reasonable objective reading of a probation condition governs].)
Although we agree with the Attorney General that it would
be unreasonable for law enforcement or J.A.’s probation officer to
construe lawful innocuous behavior like consuming sugar, coffee
4 J.A. also argues condition 18 “potentially prohibits [him]
from associating with anyone who sells legal mind altering
substances – substances such as coffee, chocolate, energy drinks,
and legally prescribed psychotropic drugs . . . . [¶] Further,
because it also potentially prohibits [J.A.] from associating with
persons he knows to consume such substances, the term is
overbroad because it could include friends and family members
whose conduct is completely legal – they consume coffee or take
prescribed psychotropic medicines. Indeed, numerous people in
[J.A.’s] life, including even his probation officer, could be taking
‘mind[-]altering substances’ as prescribed by a physician for their
mental health. Limiting [J.A.’s] access to these people serves no
purpose.”
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or chocolate as a probation violation, J.A. is correct that both
conditions are vague and overbroad because the meaning of
“mind altering substances” is not defined or self-evident and
could prohibit more conduct than necessary. (See, e.g., United
States v. Kappes (7th Cir. 2015) 782 F.3d 828, 853 [condition
banning the purchase, possession or use of any “ ‘mood altering
substance’ ” was unlawful in part because the phrase “[was] not
defined nor its meaning self-evident”]; United States v. Aquino
(9th Cir. 2015) 794 F.3d 1033, 1037 [probation condition
prohibiting substance use was impermissibly vague because it
“could cover innocuous substances such as chocolate and coffee”].)
We can resolve these vagueness and overbreadth concerns on
appeal by modifying the conditions. (Sheena K., supra,
40 Cal.4th at p. 888 [modification by appellate court of a facially
unconstitutional probation condition is an appropriate and
efficient remedy].)
The Attorney General suggests proposed modifications to
conditions 17 and 18 in the event we conclude modification is
warranted. J.A. agrees with these proposed modifications.
Accordingly, in the Disposition we modify conditions 17 and 18 to
remedy the constitutional vagueness and overbreadth concerns
J.A. raises on appeal.
C. We Strike the Maximum Term of Confinement
The juvenile court is required to set a maximum term of
confinement when a minor is removed from the custody of his or
her parents (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (d)) or when the
minor is committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice (id., § 731,
subd. (b)). This requirement does not apply when a minor is
released to his parents’ custody on probation. (In re Ali A. (2006)
11
139 Cal.App.4th 569, 573 (Ali A.).) J.A. was placed on probation
in his father’s custody.
At J.A.’s disposition hearing, the court stated his maximum
term of confinement across all of his cases was six years
10 months.5 J.A. argues, the People concede, and we agree that
because J.A. was released to his father’s custody on probation,
the maximum term of confinement has no legal effect and should
be stricken. (Ali A., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 574 [juvenile
court declares the maximum term of confinement only in the
event the minor violates probation; while the minor is on
probation, the maximum term of confinement has no legal effect];
In re A.C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 590, 592 [“where a juvenile
court’s order includes a maximum confinement term for a minor
who is not removed from parental custody, the remedy is to strike
the term”].)
The maximum term of confinement is stricken. Because
the minute order from the disposition hearing is silent regarding
maximum term of confinement, it does not require correction.
(See People v. Cervantes (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 213, 227 [“the
court’s oral pronouncement of judgment as reflected in the
reporter’s transcript that controls, not the minute order . . . .”].)
5 The record before us has minimal information regarding
J.A.’s two other juvenile delinquency cases other than that they
also involved unlawful firearm possession.
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DISPOSITION
We modify Condition 17 to read as follows: “You must not
knowingly drink or possess any alcoholic beverages or knowingly
use or possess illegal drugs or any prescribed substances for
which you do not have a valid and current prescription.” We
modify Condition 18 to read as follows: “You must not be around
persons you know to be drug users or sellers of illegal drugs or
illegal mind-altering substances.” We also strike the maximum
term of confinement. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J.
FEUER, J.
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