Full Opinion

Filed 11/10/26 P. v. Beck CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A173734 v. (Sonoma County ELIJAH JUSTIN BECK, Super. Ct. No. SCR-762811-1) Defendant and Appellant. Defendant Elijah Justin Beck appeals a judgment following a jury trial in which he was convicted of attempted carjacking, assault with a deadly weapon, and elder abuse likely to produce great bodily harm or death against two different victims. The trial court sentenced him to 10 years in state prison. On appeal, Beck contends that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the elder abuse counts and elder victim enhancement; (2) the elder abuse enhancement cannot attach to a conviction for attempted carjacking; (3) his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing to move to strike the enhancements; and (4) the court erred in applying his presentence custody credits towards specific counts rather than his aggregate sentence. Contrary to Beck’s contention, we find sufficient evidence to support the elder abuse counts and elder victim enhancement. However, the People concede and we agree that the elder abuse enhancement should be stricken because it cannot attach to Beck’s attempted carjacking conviction. 1 Accordingly, the matter is remanded for a full resentencing, rendering the remaining issues moot. I. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History An information charged Beck with the following felonies against three victims: (1) attempted carjacking (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, 215, subd. (a); counts 1 and 3); (2) elder abuse (§ 368, subd. (b)(1); counts 2 and 6); (3) criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 4); and (4) assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 5 and 7). With respect to all counts except for the assault counts, the information alleged that Beck personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), (2).) It further alleged, with respect to one of the attempted carjacking counts, that the victim was elderly. (§ 667.9, subd. (a).) Finally, the information alleged various aggravating factors. During pre-trial proceedings, Beck was found incompetent to stand trial twice. After Beck received treatment, the trial court eventually found him competent and reinstated the criminal proceedings against him. Following trial, a jury found Beck guilty on all counts and found true the enhancements. A jury trial was waived as to the aggravating factors and the trial court found three of the four alleged factors. The court sentenced Beck to an aggregate term of 10 years in state prison and awarded him 1,444 days of presentence credit, comprised of 722 days of actual credit and 722 days of conduct credit. Beck timely appealed. 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2 B. Facts On May 16, 2023, Beck was walking around a Safeway parking lot with a 10-inch kitchen knife in his hand. Jane Doe, then 68 years old, was sitting in her parked car with her window down when she noticed Beck looking at her intently. After he walked around her car a few times, she felt uncomfortable and rolled her window up halfway. Her doors, however, were unlocked. She lost sight of Beck briefly before he “popped up at [her] driver’s side window.” He held up his knife and yelled, “ ‘I’m going to kill you. I have to kill you.’ ” Beck stabbed the window with his knife and then reached over the window to try to stab Doe. Doe dodged the attacks. Beck then tried to open the door but Doe grabbed the interior door handle and “slammed it shut.” After struggling to open the door, Beck grew frustrated, stepped back, and slashed Doe’s tire. He turned away and started walking toward the Safeway while still holding the knife. Doe immediately called the police. At this time, K.S. was using an ATM at the Safeway when he noticed Beck wandering back and forth behind him with the knife. Beck then came up next to K.S. with the knife raised and told him not to move. K.S. responded that Beck needed to put the knife down, and Beck repeated, “ ‘[d]on’t move, this won’t hurt.’ ” Beck lunged at K.S. with the knife and stabbed him in the shoulder. K.S. ran and jumped over some bushes to escape but Beck followed him. Two bystanders, one of whom had a golf club, came over to help K.S. At this point, J.G., then a 72-year-old security guard assigned to patrol the parking lot, drove by and got out of his car. He left his car running with the keys inside and the driver’s side door open. Beck turned towards J.G. and pointed the knife at him. Frightened, J.G. moved to the other side of the car. Beck then jumped into the driver’s seat. K.S. took a shopping cart and 3 tried to wedge it in the door to prevent Beck from driving off while the bystander with the golf club tried to stop Beck from the passenger side. As the car started to reverse, K.S. jumped into the back seat, saw a backpack next to him, and used its strap to pin Beck’s head against the headrest. He restrained Beck for about a minute before Beck slipped out from underneath the strap and got out of the car. Several police officers arrived at this time and detained Beck. II. DISCUSSION A. Elder Abuse Counts and Elder Victim Enhancement Beck contends that his elder abuse convictions and elder victim enhancement should be reversed because there is insufficient evidence that he knew or reasonably should have known that Doe and J.G. were at least 65 years old.2 We are unpersuaded. 1. Law and Standard of Review Elder abuse and the elder victim enhancement both require that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was at least 65 years of age or older. (§§ 368, subds. (b)(1) & (g), 667.9, subd. (a).) We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by examining “the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable [jury] could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60 (Albillar).) We presume every fact that the jury could reasonably have found in support of the judgment. “If the circumstances reasonably justify the [jury’s] findings, reversal of the 2 The People do not contend that Beck knew either Doe’s or J.G.’s age at the time of the offenses. 4 judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (Ibid.) We do not reweigh or resolve any conflicts in the evidence. (Ibid.) 2. Analysis Beck contends that “no reasonable juror could have concluded from the evidence presented that [he] had constructive knowledge that Doe and [J.G.] were at least 65” years old. (Boldface & italics omitted.) The evidence, which includes body-worn camera videos of the incident as well as the victims’ live trial testimony, belies this argument. A victim’s physical appearance, in addition to his or her age, constitutes substantial evidence that a defendant reasonably should have known that the victim was at least 65 years old. (People v. Smith (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1190 (Smith).) In Smith, the victim was nearly 68 years old at the time of the robbery. The jury saw her when she testified at trial and found that the defendant reasonably should have known that she was 65 years or older.3 (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the jury “could reasonably deduce from its view of [the victim’s] physical appearance that [the] defendant reasonably should have known that she was at least 65 years old.” (Ibid.) Similarly, substantial evidence supports the jury’s findings as to Doe. Doe was 68 years old at the time of the offenses. The jury not only observed her physical appearance at trial, it also saw video of her from the day of the incident when the police interviewed her in the parking lot. Moreover, Beck had ample opportunity to observe Doe before he attacked her. Doe testified 3 The victim in Smith testified “that at the time of the robbery and kidnapping, she looked substantially the same as she did at trial.” (Smith, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1185.) 5 that Beck looked at her intently and walked around her car several times before approaching her driver’s side window. Beck argues that his observation of Doe is irrelevant because the People “identif[y] nothing about her appearance showing that she appeared to be at least 65.” But we must indulge all presumptions in favor of the judgment, and Beck has not identified anything about Doe’s appearance to support that she appeared less than 65 years old. (Smith, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1191 [“no evidence was presented which was clearly contrary to the finding made by the jury” that defendant reasonably should have known that the victim was at least 65 years old].) To the contrary, Doe’s hair was white or gray in the body-worn camera video, and she appeared elderly. Substantial evidence likewise supports the jury’s finding as to J.G. J.G. was 72 years old at the time of the offenses. In addition to observing J.G.’s appearance at trial, the jury also viewed body-worn camera footage of J.G. immediately after the incident as well as cell phone videos taken by bystanders in which he appeared. Other evidence also supported J.G.’s older appearance. During her 911 call, Doe twice described J.G. as an “old man.” And at trial, K.S. described him as an “older gentleman” with “gray hair” who did not appear “quick on his feet.” Viewed altogether, this constitutes substantial evidence that Beck should have reasonably known that J.G. was at least 65 years old. Beck counters that K.S. testified that J.G. appeared to be in his “late fifties, early sixties.” But the jury was not required to adopt K.S.’s estimate of how old J.G. looked and could independently assess J.G.’s physical appearance from his appearance at trial and from the videos of the incident. Moreover, the existence of evidence supporting a contrary inference does not 6 warrant reversal where, as here, the jury’s finding is otherwise reasonably supported. (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 60.) That J.G. was “an actively employed shopping-center security officer” at the time does not therefore warrant reversal. Lastly, Beck contends that the victims’ appearances at trial, nearly two years after the offenses, did not establish how they appeared at the time of the offenses. We agree that the relevant inquiry concerns the victims’ appearances at the time of offenses. Here, the jurors viewed videos of both Doe and J.G. from the day of the incident and could assess whether they looked substantially the same at trial. Based on the foregoing, we find that substantial evidence supports the jury’s findings that Beck reasonably should have known that Doe and J.G. were at least 65 years old at the time of the offenses. B. Elder Victim Enhancement Beck contends and the People agree that the elder victim enhancement should be stricken because it does not apply to attempted carjacking (count 1). We agree. Section 667.9 provides for a one-year enhancement where a defendant commits “one or more of the crimes specified in subdivision (c) against a person who is 65 years of age or older.” (§ 667.9, subd. (a).) Carjacking is one of the specified crimes but attempted carjacking is not. (§ 667.9, subd. (c)(4).) Accordingly, the enhancement must be stricken and the matter must be remanded for resentencing. C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Beck next contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to argue at sentencing that his enhancements should be dismissed because the offenses were connected to his mental illness. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D).) As the parties acknowledge, our 7 remand for resentencing renders this issue moot because Beck can raise his mental illness at that resentencing. D. Custody Credits Lastly, Beck contends that the trial court erred in awarding 1,444 days of presentence credit towards specific counts rather than his aggregate sentence. The court awarded Beck 1,444 days of presentence credit as to counts 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, and zero days as to counts 3 and 7 “because of the consecutive sentences.” Section 2900.5, subdivision (b) provides that “[c]redit shall be given only once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed.” The People argue that the court properly awarded custody credit on the principal term. Again, our remand for resentencing renders this issue moot, and the court can consider the parties’ arguments when it recalculates and awards custody credit on the new sentence. III. DISPOSITION The elder victim enhancement attached to count 1 is stricken and the matter is remanded for resentencing. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. CHOU, J. WE CONCUR. JACKSON, P. J. BURNS, J. 8