Full Opinion

Filed 10/23/26 P. v. Willis CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, D085768 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCE427942) v. CHARLES E. WILLIS, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michelle Ialeggio, Judge. Reversed in part and affirmed in part. Rex Adam Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Tami Falkenstein Hennick, and Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION In this appeal, we accept the People’s proper concession that we must reverse for insufficient evidence of Charles Willis’s conviction in count 1 for violation of Penal Code1 section 290.010. Willis is a convicted sex offender subject to lifetime registration. Registrants must report every address they frequent, regardless of how much time they spend there. From 2016 to May 2023, Willis registered an address in Lakeside as his residence. In May 2023, however, he registered as a transient, and in August and September 2024, he continued to identify himself as transient. Yet during this period, Willis was seen at the Lakeside address. A police search of the Lakeside address revealed a package addressed to Willis in the kitchen, medications bearing his name, and mail addressed to him at that location. In count 1, the People alleged that, between January 1 and October 1, 2024, Willis had “more than one residence address” and “failed to register all addresses and locations at which he regularly resides,” in violation of section 290.010 and section 290.018, subdivision (b). A jury convicted Willis of that offense and of failing to provide required information or providing false information on registration forms. (§ 290.018, subd. (k), count 2.) The court sentenced him to prison for the middle term of four years on count 1 and three days in jail, with credit for time served, on count 2. Willis contends insufficient evidence established that he violated section 290.010 by failing to register multiple residences. He also contends the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury that conviction required a finding he had more than one residence address at 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 which he regularly resided when he was registering and failed to report those residences to the registering authority. The People concede both claims. We agree insufficient evidence supported his conviction on count 1 and reverse that count. We therefore need not address Willis’s instructional error claim. Section 290.010 requires a person who regularly resides at more than one residence to register in each jurisdiction where those residences are located, regardless of the number of days or nights spent at each address. The evidence established that Willis registered as a transient in San Diego County throughout the charged period but also regularly resided at the Lakeside address. The parties agree this evidence does not support the finding that Willis had more than one residence within the meaning of section 290.010. We concur. The Sex Offender Registration Act (the Act, § 290 et seq.) defines a “transient” as a person who has no residence. (§ 290.011, subd. (g).) A “residence,” in turn, means “one or more addresses at which a person regularly resides, regardless of the number of days or nights spent there.” (Ibid.) These definitions are dispositive. Willis’s transient registration did not constitute one residence in addition to the Lakeside address. Rather, once he regularly resided at the Lakeside address, he no longer qualified as a transient because he had a residence. Thus, his failure to register that address as a residence did not establish he had multiple residences or failed to register multiple residences as alleged in count 1. The evidence instead suggests Willis violated section 290.011, which requires a transient who moves to a residence register that address within five working days. (§ 290.011, subd. (b).) The People concede, and we agree, that charging the offense under section 290.010 was not harmless error. Willis lacked notice that he was charged with violating section 290.011 and 3 therefore had no opportunity to prepare or present a defense to that offense. (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 317.) Accordingly, the conviction on count 1 must be reversed. DISPOSITION The judgment on count 1 is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. DO, J. WE CONCUR: DATO, Acting P. J. AMIN, J. 4