Full Opinion

Filed 10/26/26 P. v. Ballard CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, D086361 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD305269) v. DAQUAN CHARLES BALLARD, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Daniel B. Goldstein, Judge. Reversed in part; affirmed in part. Stephanie L. Gunther, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Caelle Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Daquan Charles Ballard was convicted of felony vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1) and receipt of a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d; count 2). As the Attorney General concedes, Ballard may not be convicted of both stealing and receiving the same property, and thus we reverse his conviction on count 2. We reject Ballard’s arguments that we should reduce his conviction on count 1 to a misdemeanor because there was insufficient evidence the value of the vehicle was greater than $950, or alternatively because the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense of petty theft. We thus affirm the judgment of conviction on count 1 for vehicle theft. BACKGROUND In October 2024, a 2003 Cadillac Escalade belonging to Nikki and Marc M. was stolen from the parking structure of the Viejas Casino. Video surveillance from the casino’s security cameras showed Ballard and another person leaving in the Escalade. Two days later, police officers found Ballard driving the Escalade after receiving an alert from an automated license plate reader for the stolen vehicle. In June 2025, a jury convicted Ballard of felony theft of a vehicle valued more than $950 (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1) and receipt of a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d; count 2).1 At sentencing, the court granted him two years of formal probation with 120 days in county jail. 1 When he was arrested, Ballard had a small plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance in his pocket which the officers believed was a useable amount of methamphetamine. He was charged and acquitted of possession of methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 3). 2 DISCUSSION I. Ballard’s Conviction for Receiving the Stolen Vehicle Must Be Reversed When a defendant is convicted of the taking of a vehicle under Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), “it is a theft conviction that bars a conviction of the same person . . . for receiving the same vehicle as stolen property.” (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 881 (Garza) [applying rule to receipt of stolen vehicle under Pen. Code § 496, subd. (a)]; see id. at pp. 871, 876 [same].) When a defendant is convicted of both offenses, the theft conviction should be upheld and the receiving conviction reversed. (People v. Ceja (2010) 49 Cal.4th 1, 10 (Ceja).) Dual convictions for violating Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), and Penal Code section 496d are permissible where “ ‘there is evidence of complete divorcement between the theft and the subsequent receiving, such as when the thief has disposed of the property and subsequently receives it back in a transaction separate from the original theft.’ ” (Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 875, italics omitted, quoting People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 759, fn. 8.) A complete divorcement requires “more than the mere passage of time”; there must be “a significant break in the defendant’s possession and control over the stolen property.” (Id. at p. 879.) Here, as the People concede, there was no complete divorcement. Ballard remained in possession and control of the vehicle from the moment he drove it away from the casino to when he was apprehended by police. Accordingly, we reverse Ballard’s conviction on count 2 for receiving stolen property. (See Ceja, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 10.) 3 II. Substantial Evidence Supported the Jury’s Finding the Vehicle’s Value Was More than $950 for Count 1 Ballard argues there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding the value of the vehicle was greater than $950 and we must reduce his conviction of vehicle theft from a felony to a misdemeanor. We disagree. “When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence.” (People v. Grant (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 323, 329 (Grant) [cleaned up].) When analyzing if substantial evidence exists, we look only to the evidence supporting the fact finder’s conclusion, and if it exists “ ‘it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.’ ” (People v. Ortiz (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1363, italics omitted (Ortiz).) “[A]n offender who obtains a [vehicle] valued at [$950 or less] by theft must be charged with petty theft and may not be charged as a felon under any other criminal provision.” (People v. Jackson (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 371, 377 [cleaned up].) “ ‘In determining the value of the property obtained [by theft], the reasonable and fair market value shall be the test.’ ” (Grant, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 329; Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a).) “The fair market value of an item is ‘the highest price obtainable in the market place’ as between ‘a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither of whom is forced to 4 act.’ ” (Grant, at p. 329.) It is “ ‘not the value of the property to any particular individual,’ ” but it “may be established by opinion or circumstantial evidence.” (Ibid.) Jurors may “ ‘rely on their common knowledge’ in determining the value of an item.” (Ibid.) Here, Marc, the Escalade’s registered owner, testified he purchased the vehicle for $3,000 in 2021. The vehicle’s condition when it was stolen was “[f]air,” “drivable,” and without any kind of damage to the interior. Both he and Nikki testified there was no exterior damage. Marc did not identify any mechanical problems and confirmed “[i]t ran.” Nikki also confirmed the vehicle “[ran] fine mechanically” and said the “[o]nly problem was it had a power steering leak.” If he were to sell the Escalade at the time Ballard stole it, Marc would have listed it for $3,000 because that is how much he believed it was worth. This testimony is sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude the Escalade’s value was at least $950. It is well established that an owner’s valuation of personal property may constitute sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude the property’s fair market value. (See People v. Portillo (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 577, 593, fn. 16 [“an owner’s testimony is admissible as evidence of the value of an item”], citing Schroeder v. Auto Driveway Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 908, 921 [“The opinion of an owner of personal property is in itself competent evidence of the value of that property, and sufficient to support a judgment based on that value.”]; People v. Coleman (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 358, 361 [“ ‘[t]he owner of personal property who is familiar with its original cost and use is qualified to testify regarding its value’ ”]; People v. More (1935) 10 Cal.App.2d 144, 145 [“[t]he owner of property is a competent witness to testify as to its value”].) 5 In addition to the owner’s valuation, jurors may also determine the fair market value of a vehicle based on common knowledge. (See Ortiz, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1366 [“jurors could rely on their common knowledge that late-model BMW’s have a substantial market value”].) Ballard’s jury received photographs and testimony about the Escalade’s condition and capabilities. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude an operable Escalade without major mechanical problems or major cosmetic damage would be worth at least $950. We reject Ballard’s arguments to the contrary. His contention that the valuation of the Escalade needed to come from a source other than the owner, such as Kelley Blue Book or a vehicle dealer, overlooks our standard of review. (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 210 [“ ‘[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding’ ”]; People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296 [“testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, unless testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable”].) His argument that the Escalade would depreciate since its purchase does not compel the conclusion, without any record support, that it was less than $950 when he stole it. Finally, his reliance on Grant is misplaced. The felony theft conviction in Grant was not affirmed because there was no evidence that the “comparable value” displayed on the tags of the stolen clothing items from an outlet store reflected the items’ fair market value, not in the face of the clothing’s actual discounted prices. (Grant, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 326–327.) 6 III. No Prejudicial Error from Failure to Instruct on Lesser Included Offense of Petty Theft As an alternative basis for reversal of count 1, Ballard argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense of petty theft under CALCRIM No. 1801. He concedes “there was substantial evidence of his guilt of the theft of the vehicle” but argues there was not substantial evidence the value of the vehicle was $950 or more, triggering the court’s sua sponte duty to instruct on the lesser offense of petty theft. We have already rejected this contention. But assuming without deciding there was instructional error, we conclude any error was harmless under the prejudice standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (See People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 178 [“in a noncapital case, error in failing sua sponte to instruct, or to instruct fully, on all lesser included offenses . . . must be reviewed for prejudice exclusively under Watson”], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7.) Under the Watson standard, an error is reversible “only if, ‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), it appears ‘reasonably probable’ the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred.” (Breverman, at p. 178.) The appellant bears the burden to make this showing. (Conservatorship of Maria B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 514, 532–533.) Ballard fails to meet this burden. He devotes only three paragraphs in his opening brief to prejudice and, reprising his insufficient evidence claim, argues “the only evidence of the value of the vehicle was from the owner” who testified he purchased the vehicle for $3,000 and that “[i]n the grand scheme 7 of things, just that number alone is very close to the $950 cut off.”2 The rest of his argument focuses on the evidence he believes is missing, such as “[i]t is unknown if [Marc] got a great deal” when he bought it for $3,000, or perhaps Marc took “sympathy on the previous owner and pa[id] more than what it was worth.” Such arguments do not establish prejudice from a claim of instructional error. Although Ballard fails to meet his burden of establishing prejudice by articulating a cogent argument, we perceive no prejudice from the lack of an instruction on petty theft. The trial court instructed the jury that to find Ballard guilty of felony vehicle theft under Vehicle Code section 10851, it had to find that the “vehicle was worth more than $950.” (CALCRIM No. 1820.) The court also instructed the jury based on CALCRIM No. 1750 that to find Ballard guilty of receiving stolen property under Penal Code section 496d, it had to find the “value of the property received was more than $950” and, importantly, that if the jury “ha[s] a reasonable doubt whether the property received has a value of more than $950, you must find this charge has not been proved.” Had the jury also been instructed on petty theft under CALCRIM No. 1801, they would have similarly been told that if the jury concludes the defendant committed theft, it “must decide whether the crime was grand theft or petty theft” and that the “defendant committed petty theft if [he] stole property worth $950 or less” and the “defendant committed grand theft if the value of the [property] is more than $950.” Ballard fails to explain how 2 This is a questionable statement because $3,000 is approximately 316 percent greater than $950, or stated another way, $3,000 is approximately 3.16 times the size of $950. 8 instructing the jury on grand and petty theft would meaningfully differ from CALCRIM No. 1820 which required the jury to make the same valuation determination that would have been required under CALCRIM No. 1801. Moreover, the jury convicted Ballard of receipt of stolen property which establishes they did not have a reasonable doubt the value of the stolen vehicle was greater than $950. We discern no prejudice even assuming a petty theft instruction was warranted on this record. DISPOSITION The judgment of conviction for count 2, receipt of stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496d), is reversed. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. The trial court shall correct the abstract of judgment to remove the conviction on count 2 and shall forward an amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. DO, J. WE CONCUR: DATO, Acting P. J. RUBIN, J. 9