People v. Diaz CA6

Filed 10/23/26 P. v. Diaz CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, H050849 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1915685) v. RICARDO DIAZ et al., Defendants and Appellants. Defendants Alexander Toledo, Ricardo Diaz, and Keonte Smith met with Brian Castro and Robert Hernandez, ostensibly to purchase several pounds of marijuana. At the meeting, Diaz fatally shot Castro and wounded Hernandez. The prosecution pursued a theory of felony murder as to Toledo and Diaz based on evidence that the defendants planned to rob the victims and that Castro’s killing occurred during the robbery. A jury convicted Toledo and Diaz of murder and convicted all three defendants of multiple counts of robbery and assault with a firearm. On appeal, defendants argue that the prosecutor violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 3.5; Pen. Code, § 745)1 (RJA). Among the practices barred by the RJA in criminal proceedings is an attorney’s use at trial of “racially discriminatory language”—including “language that, to an objective observer, … compares the defendant to an animal.” (§ 745, subds. (a)(2) & (h)(4).) Here, the 1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. prosecutor (1) in jury selection analogized the role of jurors evaluating evidence of defendants’ conduct to his personal experience dog-sitting a pit bull and (2) in opening statement and closing argument compared the defendants to ocean predators preying on defendants in “the food chain on the street.” Because defendants have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an objective observer would understand the prosecutor’s language as appealing to racial bias by comparing defendants to animals, we will reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with section 745, subdivision (a). I. BACKGROUND A. The Operative Information The Santa Clara County District Attorney charged Toledo and Diaz with the August 2019 murder of Brian Castro (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and alleged a robbery-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The information charged all three defendants with second degree robberies (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); counts 2 [Castro] and 3 [Hernandez]) and assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 4). The information charged only Diaz with two firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (d)) as to each of counts 1, 2, and 3; two great bodily injury enhancements (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) as to count 2 and another as to count 3; one firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and one great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) as to count 4; and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29900, subd. (a)(1); count 5). The information also alleged that Smith and Diaz each had a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12, subd. (b)(1)) and that Smith had one prior serious felony conviction and Diaz had two prior serious felony convictions. (§ 667, subd. (a)). B. The Trial The prosecution’s theory of the case was that Toledo, Smith, and Diaz drove from Stockton to San Jose ostensibly to purchase marijuana from Castro but in fact intending 2 to rob him. When Castro and Hernandez arrived at the arranged meeting spot, Toledo and Diaz entered Castro’s car. Diaz then pulled out a gun and shot both Castro and Hernandez, wounding Hernandez and killing Castro. The three defendants advanced similar defense theories: that the defendants arrived at the prearranged meeting with Castro and Hernandez with no intent to commit a robbery; the men had simply intended to complete a marijuana purchase and that Diaz fired his gun either accidentally or in self-defense, after Hernandez suddenly stepped on the gas pedal with Toledo and Diaz still inside the car. 1. Hernandez’s Testimony Hernandez was granted use immunity in exchange for his testimony at defendants’ trial. At the time of Castro’s death, Hernandez and Castro were good friends who both sold marijuana, but only occasionally and in small amounts to close friends.2 Before meeting the defendants, Castro and Hernandez had never had altercations or fights with their buyers. According to Hernandez, neither he nor Castro owned a firearm, though they had once considered purchasing one. On August 14, 2019, Castro told Hernandez that he had an opportunity to sell a larger quantity of marijuana—about four pounds. Castro showed Hernandez Toledo’s Instagram page, identifying Toledo as “some guy from Stockton.” Castro told Hernandez that he was going to message Toledo by Instagram to see if he wanted to purchase marijuana. Asked if he was sure “it’s good people,” Castro told Hernandez not to worry about it. Castro said that they could sell Toledo the marijuana for over a thousand dollars per pound, and Hernandez estimated they would profit about $200 to $300 each per bag 2 Despite Hernandez’s initial characterization of his marijuana sales as minor, he testified on cross-examination that he and Castro had exchanged text messages in 2018 about exporting marijuana to the east coast. Hernandez also acknowledged that Castro may have sold drugs other than marijuana and had sent him messages about selling cocaine. Hernandez had also “sometimes” sold a pound of marijuana at a time and “thousands of dollars” worth of marijuana. 3 of marijuana. That evening, Castro told Hernandez that he had negotiated the marijuana deal and that they would meet the buyer later that night. Castro and Hernandez then spent several thousand dollars to acquire the four pounds of marijuana. Castro told Hernandez that the sale to Toledo would take place at around midnight. Castro and Toledo had been exchanging messages on Instagram. At around 1:00 a.m., Castro told Hernandez that the buyers had arrived at the meeting spot, an address down the street from Castro’s house, and Hernandez said he could drive. Hernandez drove Castro’s car to the meeting spot with Castro in the passenger seat. On arrival, Castro and Hernandez saw a Jeep at the intended meeting spot, but the Jeep left before Castro and Hernandez could meet the occupants. Castro communicated with Toledo over Instagram and then told Hernandez that they would instead meet at a gas station near Capitol Expressway and Senter Road. Hernandez was unsure why the Jeep had moved from the earlier meeting spot. Hernandez and Castro arrived at the gas station and parked at a gas pump, and the Jeep stopped at the other side of the pump. Toledo came out of the Jeep and got into the rear seat of Castro’s car, behind Hernandez. Toledo inspected one of the bags of marijuana and said, “ ‘Oh, yeah, I’m taking these.’ ” The rear door remained open for the two minutes Toledo was inside Castro’s car. Toledo then stepped out of the car to count money telling Castro and Hernandez that he wanted his partner to check the product. Leaving the Jeep, Diaz came and sat in Castro’s car, behind Castro. The sleeve of the sweater Diaz was wearing concealed his hand. Toledo also returned to the rear passenger seat behind Hernandez. Toledo had money in his hands but never gave the money to either Castro or Hernandez.3 3 In prior statements to the police, Hernandez said that Toledo had handed over the money but had later taken the money back. 4  Diaz told Castro and Hernandez, “ ‘[I]t’s a robbery,’ ” and Toledo added, “ ‘Give me everything.’ ” Castro, surprised, said something like “huh,” but handed Toledo and Diaz one of the bags of marijuana. Two things happened next: Diaz shot Castro, and Hernandez “punched the gas,” causing the car to move forward. Because everything “happened fast,” Hernandez testified variously that he heard the gunshot before he stepped on the gas pedal and that he was unsure whether the gunshot was before or after Hernandez stepped on the gas pedal. As soon as Castro was shot, he began bleeding so copiously that Hernandez could hear it “throwing out, just hella blood coming out” from the center of his chest. Castro seemed to be trying to catch his breath. Neither Diaz nor Toledo said anything that would suggest either had been surprised by the gunshot. Nor did Toledo or Diaz attempt to assist Castro. Hernandez continued to drive, trying with his free right hand to keep Castro from slumping forward in his seat. About a “couple seconds” after Hernandez left the gas station parking lot, Diaz put a gun behind Hernandez’s ear and instructed him to “ ‘pull over before I blow your head off.’ ” Hernandez pulled over; he had been driving for a “minute or two” by that point. The Jeep, which had followed behind him, pulled over as well. Diaz demanded the keys, but Hernandez responded that he did not have them (Castro did). At this point, Castro was still alive but vomiting “a lot of blood.” Toledo grabbed the remaining bags of marijuana from Castro’s lap. Although Diaz threatened to shoot Hernandez if he moved, Hernandez drove away with Castro once Toledo and Diaz left the car. Hernandez went to the closest hospital he could think of, got out, and yelled for help. Hernandez then realized that he had been shot himself. At the hospital, Hernandez initially lied to police and said that he and Castro had been fired upon by a car that had pulled up to them at a stoplight. Thinking Castro was alive, Hernandez was worried that he and Castro would get in trouble for selling 5 marijuana. After learning that Castro had died, Hernandez told the police everything that he knew. 2. Surveillance Videos Surveillance videos from the gas station were consistent with Hernandez’s account of the event. But the videos show little of what took place inside Castro’s car and do not show whether the gunshot preceded or followed the car’s forward movement. The timestamp on the surveillance video shows Toledo entering Castro’s car at about 1:36 a.m. and leaving to retrieve something from a parked Jeep and returning to Castro’s car at about 1:41 a.m. Seconds after Toledo’s return to Castro’s car at around 1:41 a.m., Diaz enters Castro’s car. Within that same minute, the Jeep pulls forward a few inches. At around 1:41:28, the rear doors of Castro’s car slam shut, and the car accelerates forward. At 1:41:49, Castro’s car leaves the gas station, with the Jeep following. 3. Forensic Evidence Castro was pronounced dead at the hospital at around 2:06 a.m. He had gunshot wounds to his chest and his arm. Hernandez had a gunshot wound on his right thigh. At the time of his death, Castro had around $29 in his pocket, and Hernandez had around $59. Officers arrived that evening to the hospital and examined the car that Hernandez had arrived in. There was blood in the interior of the vehicle, including “a lot of blood” on the center console, blood on the passenger seat, and blood on the handle and part of the compartment of the driver’s side door. Officers retrieved a spent cartridge case on the rear passenger seat floorboard and a spent projectile near the right side railing of the driver’s seat. No physical evidence suggested a second gunshot. An expert in firearms forensics analysis opined that the projectile found in the car had been fired from a Glock .40-caliber or 10-millimeter pistol. Based on toolmark evidence, the expert associated the recovered cartridge case with a firearm recovered in 6 Stockton after the shooting. The serial number on this gun matched a gun depicted on Smith’s Instagram account in August 2019. That firearm recovered in Stockton was a Glock pistol; the lower portion below its back plate had been cut out, potentially to accommodate an “auto sear,” which would have enabled the gun to fire automatically until the trigger was released. With or without an attached auto sear, the gun would require 6.75 pounds of force to pull the trigger. A Glock pistol is equipped with several safety features to prevent accidental firings or discharges. An expert in trace evidence collection, hair and fiber analysis, and gunshot residue analysis processed the interior of the suspects’ Jeep. There were no bloodstains on the Jeep’s exterior. But there were some red-brown stains in the rear of the Jeep’s interior that tested presumptively positive for blood. A total of $909 in cash was found in a black purse on the front driver’s side floor and in the glove box. Castro had two through-and-through gunshot wounds. The first gunshot entered his upper body from the back of his ribcage, fatally traversed his right lung, bronchus, pulmonary artery, and aorta before exiting the front of his chest. The other wound— possibly from the same gunshot as the first—was through his arm. No projectiles were recovered from Castro’s body. A single bullet may have caused the wounds to both Castro and Hernandez. Data from Castro’s phone showed that Castro had exchanged text messages with a number associated with Toledo. In the text exchange, they agreed to a location on Durant Avenue and an estimated meeting time of about 11:45 p.m. for “ ‘4 Ps.’ ” At around 11:35 p.m., Toledo texted that he was in Pleasanton. At 12:53 a.m., Toledo responded that he was “ ‘here dropping my bitch off in the south and I’ll be RT.’ ” At around 1:22 a.m., Toledo wrote that he had “ ‘parked right here like behind your car,’ ” and Castro responded, “ ‘Where at, hop in.’ ” Then at 1:27 a.m., Castro wrote, “ ‘Where you going.’ ” Shortly thereafter, Castro received a call from Toledo’s number that lasted 7 around two minutes and 27 seconds. Castro made another call to Toledo’s number at 1:32 a.m., when the two cars were already at the gas station. 4. Social Media Evidence Stockton Police Department Sergeant Kevin Knall testified as an expert in slang associated with theft crime and narcotics cases, and he interpreted several social media messages exchanged between Toledo and several others, including Alejandro Rangel-Torres, the brother of Toledo’s girlfriend. Knall examined messages exchanged between Toledo and Rangel-Torres. In one message, Toledo wrote on August 5, 2019, “ ‘I hit hella kicks’ ” and then “ ‘[l]icks.’ ” Knall opined based on his prior investigative experience that “licks” was commonly used to denote robberies. Toledo also wrote to Alejandro that he had just “ ‘hit for two keys of black,’ ” which Knall interpreted to mean that Toledo had stolen two kilograms of “black” tar heroin. Toledo wrote that he had “ ‘slammed two paisa for 80 zips,’ ” which Knall interpreted to mean that Toledo had robbed Mexican nationals of 80 ounces of some unidentified substance, most likely marijuana. On August 14, the day before Castro was killed, Toledo sent Alejandro Rangel-Torres a message that said “ ‘I got a lick in SJ tho,’ ” which Knall interpreted to mean that Toledo had a robbery opportunity in San Jose. The message exchange between Toledo and Rangel-Torres included a screenshot of a text message exchange between Toledo and Castro about the marijuana sale. Rangel-Torres responded that he knew Toledo’s target. Toledo asked if the intended target was usually with many people or had a “ ‘pole,’ ” which Knall took to mean a gun. Rangel-Torres replied, “ ‘nah,’ ” “ ‘[h]e’s a bitch,’ ” and“ ‘[i]t’s ah easy play.’ ” Toledo then asked Rangel-Torres, “ ‘[t]hey keep shit on em or no.’ ” Rangel- Torres, who had offered to join Toledo in the robbery, replied, “ ‘Nah,’ ” “ ‘[t]hey dry,’ ” and “ ‘[i]f they do, they won’t pop shit on me.’ ” Knall interpreted Rangel-Torres’s response to confirm that the intended target was unlikely to have a firearm and that even 8 if armed, he would not shoot at Rangel-Torres. When Rangel-Torres added, “ ‘I could get [a] chop if you want,’ ” Toledo answered, “I got one with 60 on it.” According to Knall, a “chop” commonly refers to an assault weapon or a fully automatic firearm, and Toledo’s response conveyed that Toledo already had one of his own equipped with a 60-round magazine. Toledo later sent a message saying that he had made contact with the intended target. Toledo’s Instagram account included images and videos of him handling firearms, including a photo of him with a Glock with an auto sear. Smith’s social media presence included his comment that he does not “ ‘play wit off brand guns Glocks only,’ ” an image of Smith holding a firearm with a “red dot sight,” and a video that showed him fanning out $100 bills with the text, “ ‘I love hittin licks,’ ” followed by an emoji. Smith’s Instagram page also featured a video—estimated to have been taken when defendants were en route to the meeting with Castro—depicting a Jeep steering wheel, Smith’s forearm (identified by his tattoos) and a red dot illuminating the steering column. 5. Evidence of Uncharged Acts In 2014, 17-year-old Donnie McKinney was accosted by a group of people while walking home. A man in the group asked first if McKinney had change for a $100 bill and then if he wanted to purchase marijuana; when he declined and walked on, two men from the group ran after him. One grabbed him while another (later identified as Diaz)4 pointed a gun at him and told him to stop running. When McKinney said he had no money, the two men made him strip down to his underwear and took his phone, watch, and shoes. Diaz and the People stipulated that in April 2015, Diaz was convicted of robbery with an enhancement for personal use of a firearm. 4 At trial, McKinney identified Toledo as the gunman. The jury was instructed to limit its consideration of McKinney’s testimony only as to Diaz’s guilt, not the other defendants. 9  Social media messages between Smith and several unknown users suggested Smith’s involvement in robberies. On August 14, Smith and someone identified as “Yonsi” exchanged messages about a marijuana sale. Smith agreed to sell Yonsi a pound of marijuana for $1,950. Later, someone else sent Smith a message accusing him of robbing Yonsi, the person’s cousin.5 Smith responded “ ‘Damn I didn’t know that was your kousin,’ ” followed by some emojis, then followed by: “ ‘I ain’t gone lie … I just finessed tho not even stripped em.’ ” Knall explained that “finessed” generally means cheating, swindling, or stealing, whereas “stripped em” commonly means a violent robbery. Smith then contacted Yonsi, who attempted to negotiate the return of his money. Later, someone with the username “sp_tha_roadrunna” sent Smith a message saying, “ ‘You stripped somebody again,’ ” to which Smith responded with “ ‘[o]f course.’ ” Knall interpreted this to mean that the “sp_tha_roadrunna” had found out that a robbery had been committed and that Smith’s response was to confirm that a more violent attack had happened, contradicting his earlier statement that he had only “finessed” someone. 6. Defense Evidence Toledo’s father testified that Toledo and Diaz were half-brothers and that after Toledo turned 18, he developed a close relationship with Diaz, who was five years younger. Toledo’s father was unaware that Diaz had been convicted of robbery in 2014. Smith presented an expert on cultural dynamics and language, who testified that “licks” has alternative innocuous meanings (music lyrics or song titles) and that people often falsely boast about having money or guns on social media. 5 The police could not identify either Yonsi or the “iaint_choose_this_life_baby” user. Both accounts had been deleted. 10 C. The Verdict and Sentencing In September 2022, the jury found the defendants guilty as to all counts as charged, further finding true all the enhancements and allegations as alleged. In February 2023, the trial court sentenced Diaz to a total term of life without the possibility of parole, consecutive to a determinate term of 21 years 4 months, Toledo to a term of life without the possibility of parole, consecutive to a determinate term of 4 years, and Smith to a determinate term of 13 years. Defendants timely appealed. II. DISCUSSION A. The Racial Justice Act On appeal, all three defendants argue that the prosecutor violated the RJA by comparing them to animals—first, by analogizing the defendants to a pit bull during jury selection, and later, by describing the defendants as predators during opening and closing argument. None of these RJA claims were raised in the trial court in the first instance. Although we agree with the Attorney General that RJA claims are subject to the traditional rules of forfeiture, under the specific circumstances of this case we excuse counsel’s failure to object below. And reviewing the record, we find that defendants have met their burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence a violation of the RJA. 1. Additional Background a. The Pit Bull Analogy During voir dire, the prosecutor sought to rehabilitate a potential juror, No. 116, who had expressed reservations about her ability to keep an open mind if defendants engaged in illegal sales and brought a firearm to the sale for protection. Explaining that he wanted to discuss “bias,” the prosecutor told this anecdote: “So when I was in law school, I was asked to dog[-]sit for a couple friends …. [¶] .… And I knew a few things about this dog. I knew it was about 60 pounds. I knew her name was Medusa and she was a pit[]bull. [¶] So I’m thinking about what I’ve read in the news, I’m thinking about, you know, horror stories that I’ve heard about. And obviously not every—dogs 11 are kind of reflections of their owners. But obviously I have these experiences, I read these things, right.” The prosecutor closed by explaining how his first encounter with Medusa dispelled his fears: “I open up the door and I’m like[,] get in[,] and without a beat she jumps into the car, right. Close the door. I have a best friend for a week, okay.” Prospective juror No. 116 responded that she remained unsure if she could sit through a trial without “mak[ing] … biases or judgments based on whether or not there was a drug deal involved, whether or not there was drugs involved.” In response, the prosecutor again referred to his pit bull analogy and his fear of being mauled by the pit bull: “So again, we’re going back to Medusa is going to tear my arm off, right?” The prosecutor then said: “I’ve seen pit[]bulls do it before. Medusa is going to tear my arm [off]. I can’t take Medusa, okay. And then we’re going to—I’m going to wait to go see Medusa and then make my decision based on that. At this point you haven’t even met Medusa, right.” The prosecutor then continued to discuss bias with other prospective jurors, building again on his story about the pit bull. The prosecutor stated: “Let’s say for example, I have all these experiences, you know, reading the news about pit[]bulls attack[,] that sort of stuff. And I go to Medusa and I knock on the door. I—the second I knock on the door I’m hearing barking. Just barking, barking, bark. Okay.” As the prosecutor was elaborating on the pit bull:dog sitter analogy, a different prospective juror, No. 50, objected: “I can’t sit here while [the prosecutor] compares the defendants to an animal. His analogy is not appropriate. …[¶] The only analogy he comes up [with] - - he’s a smart guy.” The trial court replied that it “didn’t perceive [the analogy] that way” but would discuss the issue with the juror later. The prosecutor responded by asking all the assembled jurors, “Does anybody feel that I’m comparing the defendants to a dog?” Receiving no response, the prosecutor put the question to six individual prospective jurors. The first demurred: “I’m sorry. I’m still thinking about what’s your story telling us. I can’t go to the point.” Attributing this 12 uncertainty to the prospective juror’s “language issue,” the prosecutor asked the next, “[D]o you feel I’m comparing a specific person in courtroom to a dog?” This prospective juror and another four each replied, “No.” The prosecutor resumed his analogy, asking prospective juror No. 210 whether, if the prosecutor had heard loud barking and had opened the door to have Medusa lunge at him with an open mouth to bite him, he would have been “justified in concluding, okay, Medusa might hurt me.” Later, outside the panel’s presence, the court further questioned prospective juror No. 50, then discussed privately with counsel whether he should be excused for cause. The prosecutor took issue with other aspects of the objecting prospective juror’s answers on voir dire and with his demeanor but argued that the prospective juror’s characterization of the analogy as racist was “extreme” and “unfair” and that “the accusation … should [alone] be a bar.” Ultimately, the court excused prospective juror No. 50 for cause, finding that he “intend[ed] to be disruptive” and notably avoided answering whether he could follow the court’s instructions. b. Predators and Prey During his opening statement, the prosecutor made another analogy, this time to ocean predators and prey. Describing Castro and Hernandez, the prosecutor stated that the two, by starting to sell marijuana, “entered into deep water, like an ocean metaphorically, and in this water it’s its own food chain. And when you swim in those waters for any amount of time you become potential prey for predators. And in this case Mr. Hernandez and Mr. Castro became pr[e]y for Mr. Toledo, Mr. Diaz, and Mr. Smith.” Later, during closing argument, the prosecutor returned to his predator/prey analogy, urging the jury to “conclude what I had told you at the beginning of this case rings just as true, which is this is a case about the food chain on the street where you have three subjects: Mr. Toledo, Mr. Diaz, and Mr. Smith, preying on the drug dealers that were Mr. Castro and Mr. Hernandez.” 13  2. Overview of the RJA Effective January 1, 2021, “[t]he state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (a); Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 3.) An RJA violation may be established if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that “[d]uring the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings, … an attorney in the case … used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.” (§ 745, subd. (a), (a)(2).) “ ‘Racially discriminatory language’ ” includes language “that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, … language that compares the defendant to an animal.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).) Thus, the RJA prohibits the use of racially discriminatory language that directly appeals to bias and “facially neutral language that implicitly appeals to racial bias.” (People v. Bankston (2026) 19 Cal.5th 786, 856 (Bankston).) “To identify language that falls in the latter category, in particular, requires a nuanced inquiry that is sensitive to context.” (Id. at pp. 856–857.) Section 745, subdivision (b) provides that “[f]or claims based on the trial record, a defendant may raise a claim alleging a violation of subdivision (a) on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence.” Yet subdivision (c) of section 745 provides that motions alleging a violation of the RJA may be made in the trial court and that “[a] motion made at trial shall be made as soon as practicable upon the defendant learning of the alleged violation. A motion that is not timely may be deemed waived, in the discretion of the court.” More recently, effective January 1, 2026, the Legislature amended the RJA. (Stats. 2025, ch. 721, § 2 [Assem. Bill No. 1071 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 1071)].) In passing Assembly Bill No. 1071, the Legislature expressed its “concern 14 about [the] silent evisceration” of the RJA, observing that some courts have “misconstrue[d] the statute to apply procedural barriers or otherwise impose impediments to relief, discordant with the legislative intent of the RJA, and improperly insulate convictions and sentences tainted by racial bias.” (Stats. 2025, § 721, § 1(a).) The Legislature also observed that “[c]ourts have failed to find a prima facie showing or a violation in cases where individuals involved in the prosecution or investigation have,” among other examples of biased tactics, “used dehumanizing and othering language such as ‘predator,’ ‘monster,’ ‘sociopath,’ ‘terrorist,’ ‘brute,’ ‘thug,’ ‘gangster,’ ‘uncivilized,’ ‘welfare queen,’ ‘superpredator,’ or ‘superhuman’ ….” (Stats. 2025, ch. 721, § 1(c).) Assembly Bill No. 1071 did not alter the definition of what constitutes a violation of the RJA. 3. Forfeiture and Ineffective Assistance It is undisputed that the RJA took effect before jury selection, trial, and entry of judgment here. At no point in the trial proceedings, however, did any defendant object to the statements they now challenge from the prosecutor’s voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument, despite raising the RJA at other points during the trial. Many appellate courts, including a different panel of this court, have found that “a section 745 claim, like any other appellate claim, is subject to the general appellate rules of preservation and forfeiture of claims that could have been but were not made in the trial court.” (People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 812 (Lashon); People v. Quintero (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1074 (Quintero); People v. Corbi (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 25, 39; People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76, 114–115; People v. Wagstaff (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1207, 1219; People v. Gomez (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 384, 391–392 (Gomez).) Smith argues that the legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 1071 supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended to craft an exception to the forfeiture doctrine for RJA claims. To be sure, the Assembly floor analysis of the bill states that on direct 15 appeal a reviewing court “shall address any claims based on the trial record” unless a stay and remand is made (Assem. Floor Analysis Com., Off. of Assem. Floor Analyses, Conc. Sen. Amends. to maj. vote of Assem. Bill No. 1071 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 5, 2025, par. 3b., p. 2), but nothing in the chaptered amendments to section 745 requires a reviewing court to address record-based RJA claims on direct appeal. “The plain language of the statute establishes what was intended by the Legislature,” and when the statutory language is clear, there is no need to resort to statutory construction. (People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 690.) Even if we were to consider Assembly Bill No. 1071’s legislative history, that history reflects that the omission of any mandate against forfeiture was deliberate. Earlier iterations of the bill specified that “[r]ecord-based claims raised on direct appeal shall not be subject to waiver.” (Assem. Bill No. 1071 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 13, 2025; see also Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1071 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 13, 2025, p. 13 [“[t]his bill states that records-based claims cannot be ‘waived’ on direct appeal”].) But this proposed language was eliminated in the legislative process. We cannot overlook this deletion in determining the legislative intent. (See People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1, 19, fn. 4 [considering amendments to bill as aid in determining legislative intent].) We presume that the Legislature was aware of existing case law that applied the forfeiture doctrine to RJA cases when it enacted Assembly Bill No. 1071 in 2025— including Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th 804, which was decided in 2024.6 (See People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 105 [reviewing court must presume that in enacting a statute, Legislature was aware of existing case law].) So we understand the Legislature to have known that deleting an express provision that would have exempted RJA claims 6 This presumption is particularly apt as to Assembly Bill No. 1071, given the Legislature’s expressed dissatisfaction with what it considered the judicial evisceration of the RJA. 16 from forfeiture would leave Lashon’s application of the forfeiture doctrine as controlling authority. This supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended to leave courts free to apply the forfeiture doctrine to unpreserved RJA claims. That RJA claims are generally subject to forfeiture, however, does not end our analysis. “[N]either forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic.” (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593.) The purpose of a timely objection to preserve claims of error is to permit the trial court to address an alleged issue and to cure any curable defects. (See, e.g., People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434.) Absent certain exceptions, appellate courts do not consider claims of error that could have been raised below because it is typically both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim which could have been properly litigated and addressed in the trial court. (See People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 275–276, overruled on a different ground as stated in People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47, fn. 3; People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590; see generally People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353.) But this case presents a unique scenario not typically present when a litigant fails to preserve a claim: The trial court was alerted that the prosecutor’s comments may have implicated racial bias during voir dire but swiftly rejected that interpretation. As we have explained, prospective juror No. 50 objected that the prosecutor’s pit bull analogy compared the defendants to animals—one of the primary bases for defendants’ appellate RJA claims—but the trial court immediately replied that it did not “perceive” the prosecutor’s statements “that way.” The prosecutor himself responded by denying (just as the Attorney General does here) that his analogy compared defendants to animals. “ ‘[N]o useful purpose is served by declining to consider on appeal a claim that merely restates, under alternative legal principles,’ ” the same objection. (Partida, at p. 436.) Here, the potential futility of 17 objecting to the prosecutor’s voir dire statements is apparent from the trial court’s express rejection the very premise raised on appeal.7 Furthermore, in the first years after the RJA’s enactment, there was little case law to guide courts and counsel in its implementation and what constitutes an animal comparison. (See Bonds v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 821, 828 [“[a]ppellate decisions interpreting [the RJA] are, as yet, few” and the law “is also novel in concept and expansive in scope”].) And the prosecutor’s comparison of defendants to “ocean predators” in opening statement and closing argument was oblique in that he avoided specifying a particular animal. As recently as 2024, appellate courts had held that a prosecutor’s descriptions of defendants as “ ‘monsters’ and ‘predators’ were within the ‘ “ ‘wide range of descriptive comment’ ” ’ [citation] that is permissible during argument” and not violative of the RJA. (People v. Quintero (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1074.) “ ‘ “[R]eviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence.” ’ ” (People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 7–8.) The trial court’s dismissal of an animal analogy unambiguously objected to by a prospective 7 We recognize that no one asked the trial court to decide whether the prosecutor violated the RJA with his pit bull analogy. But prospective juror No. 50 identified what defendants on appeal now claim as the prosecutor’s racially discriminatory “language that compares the defendant to an animal” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4)), and the trial court plainly decided that the analogy was not an animal comparison. We have no reason to depart from our customary presumption that the trial court is aware of applicable laws. (See People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) That presumption is particularly apt here, when the RJA had taken effect before trial with unprecedented and explicit legislative findings of racism in the criminal legal system, and when defense counsel here had cited the RJA in support of unrelated requests. (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1; cf. People v. Simmons (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 323, 336–337 [imputing to trial counsel constructive knowledge of RJA at sentencing hearing three days after RJA’s effective date and finding deficient performance for failing to seek RJA remedy for prosecutor’s pre-RJA rebuttal closing argument].) 18 juror suggests that an objection by counsel to a less explicit animal comparison would have been futile under then-existing decisional law. Moreover, defendants have alternatively argued that any forfeiture of their RJA claims denied them the effective assistance of trial counsel, given our conclusion above that RJA claims generally remain subject to well-established forfeiture principles. On this unique record, where we see no likelihood that counsel’s reiteration of the objection by the prospective juror would have produced a different result or finding, or that objections to “predator”/“prey” references—connoting nonhuman predators without specifically identifying any—would have been any more fruitful than prospective juror No. 50’s objection to the prosecutor’s direct reference to jurors judging a pit bull, we will exercise our discretion to reach the merits of defendants’ RJA claims to “forestall [their] ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” (People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 400 [exercising discretion under People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161–162, fn. 6, to relieve defendant of forfeiture