People v. Mattox CA1/1

Filed 11/10/26 P. v. Mattox CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A173322 v. (Humboldt County Super. GREGORY NELSON MATTOX, Ct. No. CR2302612) Defendant and Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION1 After a jury found Gregory Nelson Mattox guilty of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code,2 § 192, subd. (a)) and three other offenses, in addition to finding true three special firearms allegations (§ 12022.53, subds. (a)–(c)) in connection with the voluntary manslaughter charge, the superior court struck the section 12022.53 allegations and imposed a lesser included sentencing enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), ultimately sentencing Mattox to 21 years, eight months’ imprisonment. That sentence comprised an upper term of 11 years for voluntary manslaughter, a 1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.) 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 1 consecutive upper term of 10 years for the firearms enhancement, and 8 months for another offense, with various other punishments either to run concurrently or to be stayed under section 654. In this appeal, Mattox argues first that the superior court erred in imposing an upper term on the basis of factors in aggravation that were not admitted by Mattox or found by the jury, and second, that the superior court imposed constitutionally excessive fines. We agree with Mattox as to his first claim, so we will reverse the judgment and remand the matter for a full resentencing hearing—a disposition which renders the second claim moot. “The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) Here, as the Attorney General concedes, the superior court erred in relying on two circumstances in aggravation to which Mattox did not stipulate, and which were not found by a jury: the purportedly increasing seriousness of Mattox’s crimes, and the fact that Mattox was on probation when he committed the offenses in the present case. (See People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082–1083.) The Attorney General contends the error was harmless, but we disagree. Under such circumstances, “ ‘a sentence imposed under . . . section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute.’ ” (People v. Wiley, supra, 2 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087.) Here, although it appears likely that a jury would have found Mattox to have been on probation, drawing that conclusion (even beyond a reasonable doubt) would not be dispositive of Mattox’s appellate claim. This is because a sentencing court may select the upper term on the basis of a single aggravating circumstance “ ‘only’ if it determines ‘in its sound discretion,’ that a single aggravating circumstance ‘justif[ies]’ the upper term.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 764.) And since Mattox’s upper-term sentence was based on at least two aggravating circumstances, we cannot know whether a single aggravating circumstance would have, in the sound discretion of the superior court, sufficed to justify the upper term. Consequently, if we cannot conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true” the increasing-seriousness circumstance, we must reverse and remand. (People v. Wiley, at p. 1087.) We cannot so conclude. In the superior court’s opinion, Mattox’s felonious conduct was “without a doubt increasing in seriousness from his first felony, which was [unlawfully carrying] a concealed firearm.” (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1).) “[A]nd since then, he’s picked up manslaughter as well as a new” second-degree burglary conviction. (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b).) To be sure, these statements were entirely rational on the part of the superior court. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of increasing seriousness. Instead, it asks, “ ‘whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion.’ ” (People v. Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1090.) Here, based on the totality of Mattox’s conduct, a rational juror might well have disagreed. “Accordingly, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would have found” Mattox’s “criminal convictions were of increasing seriousness.” (Ibid.) 3  A “determination that a defendant’s prior convictions are of increasing seriousness may be made by ‘reference to the range of punishment provided by statute for each offense[,]’ ” or “by a ‘comparison of the offenses’ respective elements’ ”—inquiries requiring “a comparison and evaluation of the relationship among a defendant’s prior convictions, and a determination as to their relative seriousness.” (People v. Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1082.) The jury in Mattox’s case convicted him of voluntary manslaughter, but found him not guilty of second-degree murder. They reached this verdict after Mattox testified he acted in self-defense, defense counsel argued Mattox acted in self-defense, and the jury was specifically instructed on the imperfect-self- defense theory of voluntary manslaughter.3 Looking to the qualitative assessment required of the jury, it is not beyond the bounds of reason to ascribe greater seriousness to actively breaking into a building with the intent to commit a crime than to acting in self-defense on the basis of an unreasonable, but good-faith, belief. Further, it would not be unreasonable to regard carrying a weapon—an offense from which it might be reasonably inferred that the perpetrator is preparing for violence against a person—as more serious than the burglary. Thus, because a rational juror might not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mattox’s convictions were of increasing seriousness, we cannot conclude the error was harmless.4 3 A “ ‘ “defendant who intentionally and unlawfully kills . . . lacks malice . . . when [he] . . . kills in ‘unreasonable self-defense’—the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense [citations].” ’ ” (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 460.) 4 Additionally, we note that the error might well have contributed to the trial court’s conclusion that, notwithstanding the mitigating factor of Mattox’s youth, “the aggravating factors outweigh [the] mitigating factors.” (See § 1170, subd. (b)(6).) For that matter, the error also seems to have 4  DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the superior court for a new sentencing hearing. influenced the trial court’s election not to strike the final firearm enhancement in furtherance of justice under section 1385. 5  _________________________ SMILEY, J. WE CONCUR: _________________________ HUMES, P. J. _________________________ BANKE, J. People v. Mattox / A173322 6