People v. Atencio

Filed 9/30/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Lassen) THE PEOPLE, C102744 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. v. 22CR0088891) ANGELO ATENCIO II, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Lassen County, Mark R. Nareau, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Robert Navarro, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Dina Petrushenko and Carly Orozco, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. A jury found Angelo Atencio II guilty of various crimes, including kidnapping for robbery and robbery. The crimes occurred when Atencio accosted the victim in her back yard with a gun and put a glove in her mouth, and then moved her into the house. Once inside, he tied her hands and feet and left her face down, head covered, on the bed in the master bedroom while rummaging through the bedrooms and a bathroom. He then moved her to the living room, where he left her on the floor while he continued to rummage through the house and the garage. When the robbery was foiled by the victim’s family, Atencio escaped with the victim’s car and property but abandoned everything at another property a few miles down the road. 1  On appeal, Atencio argues there is insufficient evidence to support the kidnapping for robbery conviction because his movement of the victim was incidental to the robbery. He further asserts there is insufficient evidence to support the robbery conviction because he abandoned the stolen property before he reached a place of temporary safety. We affirm the robbery conviction but reverse the kidnapping for robbery conviction. As we explain, there is insufficient evidence to support the kidnapping for robbery conviction on the element of asportation because the movements were incidental to the robbery. Atencio also argues, and the People concede, that the false imprisonment and grand theft of a firearm convictions must be vacated because they are lesser included offenses of the kidnapping for robbery and robbery convictions. In light of our reversal of the kidnapping for robbery conviction, we do not vacate the false imprisonment conviction but agree the grand theft of a firearm conviction must be vacated. Because we remand the matter for a full resentencing, we do not address the parties’ contentions of sentencing error. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 I The House and Location The crimes took place in May 2022 at a detached single-family house set back approximately 200 yards2 from the road by a long driveway. Ranch fencing with barbed 1 Because Atencio’s identity as the perpetrator is not at issue, we do not set forth the evidence pertaining to identification. 2 A distance of 200 yards equals 600 feet. We take judicial notice of this fact on our own motion. (Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (a) [reviewing court may take judicial notice of any matter specified in Evid. Code, § 452]; id., § 452, subd. (h) [judicial notice may be taken of “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy”].) 2 wire enclosed the property and a metal cattle gate provided access at the driveway. Inside the gate and fence of the property, there was no barrier between the front yard and the back yard—in other words, a person could freely walk unobstructed from the front yard to the back yard. There was a vacant lot to the left side of the property. Based on a police officer’s soundless bodycam video that was played for the jury, which captured the victim Connie discussing the crime as she was walking around her property and in the house, and photos entered into evidence by the prosecution, the property was large with no visible neighbors. The back yard consisted of grass with trees and shrubs seemingly forming a living fence for privacy around the perimeter of the property. II The Crimes Around 6:30 a.m., Connie, who lived alone, walked from the front yard to the back yard to pick up after her dogs. In the back yard, Connie observed an unknown backpack on the corner of the patio. When she turned, Atencio jumped up from behind some bushes by her back door. Connie screamed and started to run away, but Atencio grabbed her, put his gloved hand over her face, and put another glove in her mouth. Atencio pressed something that felt like cold metal against Connie’s head and told her he had a gun but, if she did as she was told, he would not hurt her.3 He then moved Connie approximately 15 feet from the edge of the patio by the grass toward the house, where he pushed her through a second back door that opened to the kitchen. Connie had a phone in her pocket and attempted to make a call, but Atencio took the phone and threw it across the kitchen. Atencio then moved Connie down the hall and into her bedroom, where he threw her face down on the bed and covered her head with a 3 Connie testified she later saw Atencio with a handgun in the kitchen. 3 dog blanket. In the soundless bodycam video that was played for the jury, it took Connie approximately 14 seconds to walk from the kitchen area to the master bedroom, while briefly slowing down to talk to the officer as she made her way down the hallway. In either the hallway or the bedroom, Atencio bound Connie’s hands with a phone cord and the belt of Connie’s bathrobe. Atencio also used her scarf and duct tape to tie Connie’s feet in the bedroom.4 Connie spent approximately an hour and a half on the bed, listening to Atencio going through things in the master bedroom and bathroom area, and going into other bedrooms down the hall. Connie asked him why he was doing this and Atencio replied because “he had to,” but he did not elaborate. Atencio wanted Connie to open the safe in the bedroom, but Connie did not know how, which made Atencio angry. Atencio then walked Connie down the hallway and threw her on the floor in the living room. Connie heard Atencio going “through everything” and going in and out of the garage through the door in the laundry room. She tried not to look at him because she was scared and did not want her children to find her dead on the floor. It is unclear whether Atencio closed only the kitchen curtains, as testified to by Connie, or whether he closed all the curtains, as testified to by Connie’s brother-in-law, Victor. Similarly, Connie testified that the house was dark because of the drawn curtains, whereas Victor testified the house “wasn’t dark, but it wasn’t lit up, either, it was kind of in between.” While the foregoing was occurring, Connie’s sister Patricia called Connie several times on both her home and cell phones. When the home phone rang again, Atencio brought the phone to Connie, held it to her ear, and told her to answer it. Connie answered the phone and briefly spoke to Patricia. Atencio told Connie to tell her sister that a “neighbor came to help [her] feed the chickens,” which Connie did. Connie did 4 When Connie received her belongings back from the sheriff’s office, she noticed a roll of duct tape in the box that did not belong to her. 4 not, however, have any chickens and Patricia was aware of that fact. When Patricia said she was “coming out” to Connie’s house and the phone call ended, Atencio asked Connie where her sister lived. Connie replied, “in town.” Atencio started acting nervous and was rushing about. Connie was scared. He went to the garage but ran back into the house a bit later and told Connie that “some guy” was walking up her driveway. When they heard a knock on the door, Atencio stood Connie up and cut her hands loose. Atencio pulled down his mask and made Connie answer the door. Victor, who was at the door, arrived around 9:00 a.m., and asked what was going on. Atencio responded that Connie gave him a dresser and he was helping her move it. After Atencio rebuffed Victor’s offer to help move the dresser, Victor took the opportunity to step inside the house and told Atencio, “we’re going to take this outside.” Atencio then ran past Victor and out the front door. Victor checked on Connie and then followed Atencio out the front door. When Victor initially arrived, Connie’s car was backed into the garage with the hatch up and the garage door was sitting on top of the car. However, by the time Victor got outside after checking on Connie, Atencio had driven the car halfway down the driveway. The car’s hatch was still open, and some of Connie’s belongings had fallen out. Atencio was out of the car, and it appeared to Victor that he was drawing a firearm. Victor fired his firearm at Atencio; Atencio dove back into the car, rammed the closed gate until it bent and opened, and left. The car was later found abandoned at another property approximately four miles from Connie’s house. III Verdicts and Sentencing The jury found Atencio guilty of seven crimes, to wit: (1) kidnapping for robbery; (2) first degree robbery; (3) first degree burglary; (4) grand theft of a firearm; (5) false imprisonment; (6) unlawful possession of a firearm; and (7) unlawful taking of a vehicle. The jury further found true special allegations that Atencio personally used a firearm and 5 tied, bound, or confined the victim, and that Atencio had been convicted of three prior felonies. The prosecution later conceded that one of the prior felony convictions did not qualify as a strike. The trial court sentenced Atencio to 25 years to life for the kidnapping for robbery conviction based on his two prior strike convictions plus one year for the firearm use enhancement, and concurrent 25 years to life for the first degree robbery, first degree burglary, and grand theft of a firearm convictions. The trial court also imposed and stayed, under Penal Code5 section 654, six years for the false imprisonment conviction and six years for the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction. Finally, the trial court imposed a consecutive term of six years for the unlawful taking of a vehicle conviction. Atencio thus received an aggregate sentence of 32 years to life in prison. Atencio timely appealed in December 2024. His opening brief was filed in September 2025, and this case was fully briefed on April 28, 2026. DISCUSSION I The Kidnapping for Robbery Conviction Is Reversed Atencio argues the kidnapping for robbery conviction must be reversed because there is insufficient evidence of asportation given “[t]he movements were brief and occurred in a single, typical suburban house for insubstantial distances, and were all incidental to the robbery.” The People disagree, arguing the asportation element was met when Atencio moved Connie from the back yard into the house, thereby increasing her risk of harm, and the movements were unnecessary to effectuate the robbery. We conclude there was insufficient evidence of asportation. 5 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 6  In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court’s task is to “review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) “ ‘The court does not, however, limit its review to the evidence favorable to the respondent.’ ” (People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1153 (Dominguez).) Section 209, subdivision (b)(1) provides: “A person who kidnaps or carries away an individual to commit robbery … shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole.” Kidnapping for robbery is an aggravated kidnapping. (People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 11.) A conviction for aggravated kidnapping requires a showing that the moving of the victim (1) was not merely incidental to the commission of the underlying robbery, and (2) the movement increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that inherent in the act of robbery itself. (§ 209, subd. (b)(2); People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 232.) “The classic kidnapping to commit robbery involves a robber taking a victim from one place to another to help get a distant and valuable thing the robber wants: money from a cash machine, treasure from a home, and so forth.” (People v. Taylor (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1110.) The asportation requirement is a codification of the rule set forth in People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119 (Daniels). (People v. James (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 446, 453.) The Daniels test is considered a two-part test. First, in determining whether the movement is merely incidental to the underlying crime, the jury considers the totality of the circumstances, including “ ‘the “scope and nature” of the movement,’ as well as ‘the context of the environment in which the movement occurred.’ [Citations.] This standard suggests a multifaceted, qualitative evaluation rather than a simple quantitative assessment.” (Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1151-1152.) The jury considers the 7 actual distance a victim is moved but “ ‘there is no minimum number of feet a defendant must move a victim in order to satisfy the first prong.’ ” (People v. Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 233.) There is also “no rigid ‘indoor-outdoor’ rule by which moving a victim inside the premises in which he is found is never sufficient asportation for kidnapping for robbery while moving a victim from inside to outside (or the reverse) is always sufficient.” (People v. James, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 456.) “The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm above and beyond that inherent in [the underlying crime]. [Citations.] This includes consideration of such factors as the decreased likelihood of detection, the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape, and the attacker’s enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes. [Citations.] The fact that these dangers do not in fact materialize does not, of course, mean that the risk of harm was not increased.” (People v. Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 13-14.) The increased risk of harm includes the risk of physical, mental, emotional, or psychological harm. (People v. Leavel (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 823, 834; People v. Nguyen (2000) 22 Cal.4th 872, 885-886.) The two elements of the Daniels test are related: “[W]hether the victim’s forced movement was merely incidental to the [underlying offense] is necessarily connected to whether it substantially increased the risk to the victim.” (Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1152.) “[E]ach case must be considered in the context of the totality of its circumstances.” (Ibid.) In Daniels, our Supreme Court observed that “when in the course of a robbery a defendant does no more than move his victim around inside the premises in which he finds him -- whether it be a residence … or a place of business or other enclosure -- his conduct generally will not be deemed to constitute the offense proscribed by section 209. Movement across a room or from one room to another, in short, cannot reasonably be 8 found to be asportation ‘into another part of the same county.’ ” (Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1140.) In this case, the record establishes the following pertinent facts: Atencio committed the crimes alone; the property was enclosed by a barbed wire fence with a metal gate at the driveway; the house was set back approximately 200 yards from the road; there was an empty lot to the left of the house and no evidence as to the distance or location of any neighbor—no neighbor was visible in any of the evidence submitted to the jury; the back yard was large with rows of trees and shrubs that seemingly formed a living fence for privacy around the perimeter of the property; Atencio had gloves and a gun when he accosted Connie; he wore a glove on one hand and put the other glove in Connie’s mouth before the movement started; he told Connie that he would not hurt her if she did as she was told; Atencio moved Connie approximately 15 feet from the end of the patio into the back door, and then down the hallway into the master bedroom; Atencio tied Connie’s hands either in the hallway or in the bedroom and tied her feet in the bedroom; he left Connie unmoved in the bedroom for an hour and a half while rummaging through the bedrooms and a bathroom in the same vicinity; Atencio then moved Connie to the living room and left her on the floor there for approximately an hour while rummaging around the house and in the garage, where he put belongings into Connie’s car; and finally Atencio stood Connie up and cut her hands free when he had her answer the front door. Focusing on the scope and nature of the movements and the context of the environment within which the movements occurred, we note that this is not a case in which the perpetrator robbed the victim before moving the victim to another location or a case in which there is evidence that the perpetrator moved the victim for reasons unrelated to the robbery. (Cf. People v. Leavel, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 834 [sufficient evidence of asportation when the defendant took victim’s cell phone and purse 9 and then forced her into several rooms in her home and outside for reasons unrelated to robbery].) This is also not a case in which there is evidence that the robber moved the victim from an area visible to the public to a private, remote, or dark place, or that the victim’s calls for help could have been heard by someone had she not been moved. (See People v. Ellis (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 66, 73 [robbers forced women from street into their apartments]; Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1153 [movement changed victim’s environment “from a relatively open area alongside the road to a place significantly more secluded, substantially decreasing the possibility of detection, escape or rescue”]; People v. Shadden (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 164, 170 [moving victim to back room took her out of public view and made it “less likely for others to discover the crime and decreased the odds of detection”; when perpetrator closed the door, “he enhanced his opportunity to rape and injure her”]; People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 616, 629-630 [critical factor that substantially increased risk of harm to victim was when perpetrator forced her to move 40 feet in a parking lot and pushed her into her car while the car alarm was sounding; “once he pushed her into the car, she was no longer in public view as when she was in plain sight with [perpetrator] holding his hand over her mouth—a situation which would have aroused concern immediately in any onlookers”]; People v. Salazar (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 341, 348 [movement of victim from exterior walkway to motel room meant “the likelihood of anyone detecting [the defendant] decreased dramatically” and “he had an enhanced opportunity to perpetrate any additional crimes he desired”]; People v. Aguilar (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1049 [moving victim from an illuminated area to a dark area where they could not be seen increased the risk of harm by decreasing the likelihood of detection]; In re Lokey (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 767, 769-770, 772 [asportation increased risk of harm because victim was moved from a place where her screams could be overheard].) There was no evidence before the jury that Connie was visible to or within earshot 10 of neighbors or the public when Atencio first grabbed her in the back yard.6 Further, Atencio put a glove in Connie’s mouth when he grabbed her and thus reduced her ability to call for help before the movement started from the outside to the inside of the house. There was no further evidence that the movement to the inside of the house or the other movements inside the house substantially increased the risk of harm to Connie beyond that incidental to the robbery. Other than the back yard not being enclosed by walls and a roof (although it was enclosed by a barbed wire fence), there is no evidence that there was a significant difference in the victim’s environment in the back yard and inside the home. (See Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1140 [movement may be considered incidental when there is no significant change in environment].) The People argue that, when Atencio threw Connie on the bed, tied her up, and put a blanket over her head, he increased the risk of psychological harm because she “had no ability to defend herself, and given the context, could have believed [Atencio] intended to rape her.” They further argue that he did cause actual psychological harm because Connie testified she was scared and did not want her children to find her dead. We appreciate the increased stress and psychological harm associated with being tied up, put face down on a bed, and having a blanket placed over her head. “However, any movement of a robbery victim increases the risk of harm to the victim over and above that present in a standstill robbery. Where the movement of a robbery victim is substantially similar to that found insufficient to support a conviction of aggravated kidnapping in Daniels and its progeny, analysis of whether the movement of the victim increased the risk of harm need not be undertaken.” (People v. Washington (2005) 127 6 The People summarily assert the movements decreased the likelihood of detection because “it was more likely a neighbor or passerby would notice [Atencio’s] actions and/or hear [Connie’s] cries for help.” The People provide no record citations for this proposition and their argument is not supported by the evidence in the record. 11 Cal.App.4th 290, 301.) That is because a kidnapping for robbery conviction cannot be upheld solely based on an increased risk of harm. (Ibid.) It is apparent from the record that Atencio’s primary goal was to rob Connie of valuables in the house. The nature of the movement, i.e., Atencio pushing Connie to walk, throwing her on the bed and the living room floor, and tying her hands and feet, are unfortunately risks inherent in the crime of robbery. (See People v. Hoard (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 599, 607 [moving employees to back room and tying them up was incidental to robbery and served no other apparent purpose because it gave assailant free access to store and allowed him to conceal the robbery from anyone who entered store]; People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 398 [“Pistol-whipping, unfortunately, is a risk inherent in the crime of armed robbery” and may be used in an effort to obtain information].) Indeed, victims are often bound and detained in a secure location where the robbery occurs to allow the robbers to supervise them while stealing the valuables without interruption. (See Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1135 [“ ‘It is a common occurrence in robbery, for example, that the victim be confined briefly at gunpoint or bound and detained, or moved into and left in another room or place’ ”].) The evidence shows that Atencio intended to take as many valuables as possible from Connie’s house and needed time to do so. The People further argue the movements increased the inherent danger in Connie’s foreseeable attempts to escape because “she may have had an increased opportunity to escape [outside] because there was room for her to escape in any direction.” The People do not provide any citation to the record for this argument. (McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 947 [“Statements of fact that are not supported by references to the record are disregarded by the reviewing court”].) They further do not explain how Connie would have foreseeably escaped from the back yard given the location of the property, the lack of evidence regarding the surrounding areas, and that the back yard was enclosed by a barbed wire fence. Even if Connie had a greater chance of escape when she was in the back yard, that fact alone is insufficient to meet the 12 Daniels test. (In re Earley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 122, 129 [“violation of section 209 requires not only that the asportation be not merely incidental to the associated crime of robbery (i.e., that there be a kidnapping) but also that it ‘substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself’ ”].) We find People v. John (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 798 (John) instructive. In that case, the victim “lived in a pool house situated amidst a cluster of buildings on an eight- acre plot owned by his parents.” (Id. at p. 801.) The cluster of buildings included “the ‘main house’ where his parents lived and some rental units.” (Ibid.) There were several buildings “spread over different levels [that] were connected by a system of driveways, stairs and open air causeways.” (Id. at pp. 801-802.) Although the victim “lived in the ‘separate,’ ‘detached’ pool house, he appears to have been allowed to enter the ‘main house’ at any time and could utilize any of its facilities.” (Id. at p. 801.) The victim was “in charge” of the entire premises when the crimes occurred. (Id. at p. 802.) The victim encountered the defendant on one of the driveways on his parents’ property; the defendant told the victim he had car trouble. (John, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 802.) The victim allowed the defendant to accompany him to the pool house to use a phone, where the defendant pulled a gun. The defendant instructed the victim to walk out of the pool house, up the stairs, along a driveway and halfway up another driveway, then back to the pool house. (Ibid.) After an accomplice joined the defendant in the pool house, the victim’s hands were bound behind his back, and he was taken “through the ‘open air causeway’ and through two sets of sliding doors into the ‘master bedroom’ of the main house.” (Id. at p. 803.) Inside the bedroom, the victim was blindfolded and his feet tied together. He was told to lie on the couch and could hear the robbers rifling through drawers. The robbers left when a car arrived. (Ibid.) The First District Court of Appeal concluded there was insufficient evidence of asportation when the victim, although moved approximately 465 feet, “was never forced to move outside of the interconnected living quarters shared by him and his parents.” 13 (John, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 805.) The court found three post-Daniels cases factually analogous, in which the courts “found the evidence insufficient to support a violation of section 209.” (Ibid., citing and discussing People v. Smith (1971) 4 Cal.3d 426, 427 [insufficient evidence of asportation where one victim was moved about an office and up to a second-floor room and another victim was moved across that room]; People v. Morrison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 442, 443 [insufficient evidence of asportation where victim was moved up and down stairs and into various rooms in her private residence]; In re Crumpton (1973) 9 Cal.3d 463, 466 [insufficient evidence of asportation where service station attendant was held at gunpoint and forced to lie down behind a truck parked on the station premises about 20 to 30 feet away before robber searched his pockets and took a set of keys, while another robber got cash from the service island].) The facts here are like those in John and other California Supreme Court cases in which the movements were deemed incidental to the robbery. (People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894, 899-900 [movements incidental to robbery where victim moved from public area of service station premises to the inside of a locked bathroom]; People v. Killean (1971) 4 Cal.3d 423, 424 [movements incidental to robbery where perpetrators accosted the robbery victims outside their apartment and forced them inside and through various rooms in search of valuables]; People v. Adams (1971) 4 Cal.3d 429, 430-431 [directing appellate court to vacate kidnapping for robbery conviction where victims of a liquor store robbery were forced to a rear storage area, and victim of a service station robbery was required to lie on the floor of the lube room]; In re Crumpton, supra, 9 Cal.3d 463 at p. 466.) People v. Simmons (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1458, relied upon by the People, is distinguishable. There, the assailants moved the victims “a significant distance up the front stairs and into [a] home,” where they had access to additional victims and whereby they decreased the likelihood of detection and “increased the possibility of something going awry and somebody getting hurt.” (Id. at p. 1472.) “The movement not only 14 increased the risk of harm to the victims, but it also caused additional harm in fact.” (Ibid.) During another robbery, the defendant also moved the victim “from his driveway, up his front stairs, and into his home.” (Ibid.) In doing so, the victim “was forced to leave his young daughter asleep and alone in his car at night and, once inside, faced new threats to his family.” (Ibid.) These facts are simply not analogous to the evidence presented to the jury in this case. (Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1152 [each case considered in context of the totality of its circumstances].) In sum, we conclude the evidence was insufficient to support the asportation element of the kidnapping for robbery conviction. We accordingly reverse that conviction. In light of the reversal, we reject Atencio’s argument and the People’s concession that the false imprisonment conviction must be vacated because it is a lesser included offense of kidnapping for robbery. The false imprisonment conviction stands. (People v. Williams (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 644, 672 [unlike kidnapping for robbery, false imprisonment has no asportation requirement; it “can occur with any movement or no movement at all”].) We remand the matter for a full resentencing to allow the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances. (People v. Ellis (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 590, 601, citing People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) II The First Degree Robbery Conviction Is Affirmed Atencio argues there is insufficient evidence to support the first degree robbery conviction because the robbery was never completed given he “never reached a place of temporary safety while in possession of any stolen goods.” He asserts that the most he could be convicted of is attempted robbery. The People disagree, arguing robbery does not require that the stolen items be taken to a “ ‘safe location’ ” to satisfy the “taking” element of the crime, citing People v. Green (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 991. Atencio does not respond to the People’s argument in his reply brief. 15  Atencio cites no authority for the premise that a robbery is not completed until the robber reaches a place of temporary safety with the stolen goods, and we are aware of none. As explained by the First District Court of Appeal, “[n]o authority supports [the] contention that liability for the ‘completed’ offense of robbery (as opposed to a mere attempt) does not commence until the robber has escaped with the loot to a place of temporary safety. Rather, the law is well settled to the contrary. No extended asportation is required for the offense to pass from the attempt stage to the consummated offense.” (People v. Green, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at p. 1000.) Atencio relies on the following quote in People v. Ramirez (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1369 at page 1374, which, in turn, quotes People v. Carroll (1970) 1 Cal.3d 581, and cites several other cases: “ ‘The nature of the crime [of robbery] is such that a robber’s escape with his loot is just as important to the execution of the crime as obtaining possession of the loot in the first place. Thus, the crime of robbery is not complete until the robber has won his way to a place of temporary safety.’ ” The quote does not support Atencio’s position because neither Ramirez, Carroll, nor any of the other cases cited addressed whether the robber had to reach a place of temporary safety while in possession of the stolen goods. (Ramirez, at p. 1374 [robbery not completed because neither robber nor victim reached a place of temporary safety; scene of the robbery is not a place of temporary safety]; Carroll, at p. 585 [concluding robbery not completed because the defendant “had not won a place of temporary safety”]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1161, 1166 [concluding, “asportation, the final element of the offense of robbery, continues so long as the stolen property is being carried away to a place of temporary safety” (italics added)]; People v. Taylor (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [“for purposes of applying a firearm use enhancement, theft crimes such as robbery, burglary, and receiving stolen property continue beyond the time of the physical conduct constituting the offense until the perpetrator has reached a place of temporary safety”]; People v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 552, 559-560 [objective standard applies in 16 determining whether the defendant reached a place of temporary safety].) Cases are not authority for propositions not considered. (People v. Chavez (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 477, 480.) Atencio further references a slew of cases addressing whether the robber in each of those cases reached a place of temporary safety. The cases do not assist Atencio’s argument because he does not argue that he did not reach a place of temporary safety; he instead argues that he did not reach a place of temporary safety with the stolen goods.7 We conclude the record contains substantial evidence to support the first degree robbery conviction and accordingly affirm. III Other Contentions Atencio raises three arguments, the merits of which the People concede. Two of the errors agreed upon by the parties pertain to sentencing errors and the third pertains to vacating the grand theft of a firearm conviction. The People also raise an additional sentencing error—the trial court failed to impose sentence on the firearm use enhancements that were found true as to several of the convictions. We do not address the alleged sentencing errors because, as explained ante, we are remanding the matter for a full resentencing. (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 425 [“A court conducting a full resentencing also may, as appropriate, revisit sentencing choices such as a decision to stay a sentence”].) 7 To the extent that Atencio makes a lurking argument not addressed under a separate heading and with reasoned argument, we deem it forfeited. (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179 [“Failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a heading”]; In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [courts may deem forfeited arguments not supported by meaningful legal analysis with citations to authority].) 17  As to the grand theft of a firearm conviction, we agree that it must be vacated because it is a lesser included offense of first degree robbery. The conviction arises from the same conduct at the same time against the same victim as the first degree robbery conviction. (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50 [grand theft is a lesser included offense of robbery]; People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 355 [“multiple convictions may not be based on necessarily included offenses”], overruled on other grounds in People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632, 651.) DISPOSITION The kidnapping for robbery conviction is reversed, and the grand theft of a firearm conviction is vacated. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. The sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for a full resentencing. /s/ BOULWARE EURIE, J. We concur: /s/ EARL, P. J. /s/ MESIWALA, J. 18