Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Jackson CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, D088451 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. INF1701372) v. ALTONIA VONTAE JACKSON, Jr., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Matthew C. Perantoni, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions. Charles Thomas Anderson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Ksenia Gracheva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. I INTRODUCTION Altonia Vontae Jackson, Jr., appeals a judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of the premeditated attempted murder of Domenic T. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 1); carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a); count 2); robbery (§ 211; count 3); discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246; count 4); burglary (§ 459; count 5); possessing a firearm in violation of a probation condition (§ 29815; count 6); and evading a pursuing peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 7). The jury returned true findings on allegations that Jackson personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8); counts 1–4); personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5; count 5); and was a principal armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1); count 7). The trial court sentenced Jackson to prison for an indeterminate term of 32 years to life, plus a consecutive determinate term of 8 months. Jackson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the attempted murder was premeditated and deliberate. He also claims the trial court erred when it imposed the determinate sentence. Further, he contends the court abused its discretion by denying his request to reduce the firearm enhancement for count 1 to a lesser included enhancement. We reject Jackson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding of premeditation and deliberation. However, we agree with Jackson that the trial court imposed an unauthorized determinate sentence. Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter for 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 resentencing purposes only. This disposition renders it unnecessary for us to address Jackson’s argument concerning the count 1 firearm enhancement. II BACKGROUND A. The Shooting In the summer of 2017, Domenic T. and Dori L. were dating and living together in a single-family home in Desert Hot Springs. Domenic was an automotive mechanic, motorcycle enthusiast, and professional motorcyclist. He stored five or six motorcycles and dirt bikes in the garage attached to his home, including a Honda CR500 dirt bike that belonged to a friend. One morning, Dori was drinking coffee in her backyard when she heard her dog barking at a side gate leading from the front yard to the backyard. Dori approached the side gate and saw a stranger—later identified as Jackson—open the gate. Jackson was wearing motorcycle riding gear and an open-faced motorcycle helmet. Dori froze and screamed for Domenic, who was still asleep inside the home, to get his gun and call the police. Dori hoped she would scare Jackson away by mentioning Domenic’s gun, but her plan did not work. Jackson entered the side yard, jumped over a stacked cord of wood, leaned his back against a parked trailer for leverage, and kicked in the door leading from the side yard into the garage. He then entered the garage and tried, but failed, to open the vehicle garage door by pulling on a rope chain hanging from the garage door motor. Meanwhile, Dori grabbed a nearby toilet plunger and struck Jackson with it, breaking the rubber head off the plunger’s wooden handle. Jackson did not respond to Dori or say anything to her. 3 After Jackson’s unsuccessful attempt to open the vehicle garage door, he walked over to the door and removed a screwdriver that Domenic had placed through a mechanism on the door to prevent it from being opened. As he did so, Dori opened the interior door leading from the garage into the home and again called for Domenic to get his gun. Shortly after, Domenic entered the garage from the home and Dori told him to “take care” of Jackson. Dori then ran through the home and into the backyard hoping to find her cell phone so that she could call 911. She searched the backyard but could not locate her phone. Dori returned to the garage through the house’s interior door and heard gunshots. When she reached the garage, she saw Jackson standing in the driveway with the Honda CR500 dirt bike and firing a handgun into the garage. Domenic fell to the ground near the threshold of garage and said he was hit. Dori heard five or six gunshots, some of which came after Domenic said he had been hit. Dori immediately went back inside the house and called 911. By the time she returned to the garage, Jackson had left and taken the Honda CR500 dirt bike with him. Domenic survived the shooting but suffered gunshot wounds that left him permanently and severely disabled. A uniformed Desert Hot Springs police officer located Jackson on the stolen dirt bike about a mile from the crime scene and followed him. Jackson drove the dirt bike into desert terrain, briefly stopped, and tried kick-starting the bike back up again. Two uniformed officers pulled up to him and commanded him to get off the bike and lie down on the ground. Jackson ignored the commands, restarted the dirt bike, and fled. Jackson then led officers on a 26-minute chase covering about 17 miles. He drove at speeds of 60 or 70 miles per hour in a 50-mile-per-hour zone, 4 climbed to speeds of 85 miles per hour, drove through multiple stop signs, and drove both on the freeway and through the open desert as uniformed officers followed him in marked patrol vehicles with activated lights and sirens. The dirt bike eventually stalled, and Jackson was taken into custody. Jackson had a .45 caliber Desert Eagle handgun that belonged to Domenic in his front left pocket. The magazine was loaded and a round was in the chamber. No other firearm was recovered. At trial, the parties stipulated that Jackson was on probation, was prohibited from possessing a firearm, and knew about the prohibition against possession of a firearm. Back at the crime scene, officers recovered five expended 7.65 caliber shell casings from the front of Domenic and Dori’s home. Two of the casings were found near the front driver-side wheel of a truck that was parked in the driveway. Two additional casings were found near the truck’s rear passenger wheel. The fifth casing was found in the street in front of the house. No .45 caliber casings (the caliber of Domenic’s gun) were found at the scene. B. Domenic’s Trial Testimony Domenic suffered a gunshot wound to the forehead from the attack, which required him to undergo a craniotomy during which a portion of his brain was removed. He is permanently disabled because of his injuries. He struggles to focus and remember past events, can no longer read or watch television, and has lost his peripheral vision and sense of balance. Domenic did not recall testifying at the preliminary hearing, which occurred three years after the shooting and four years before trial. At the time of trial, seven years after the shooting, he still received rehabilitation treatment. Despite these deficits, Domenic testified at trial and told the following narrative about the shooting. On the morning in question, Domenic was awakened by the sound of Dori yelling for him and screaming “bloody 5 murder.” Domenic was worried that Dori was hurt, so he retrieved a loaded .45 caliber Desert Eagle handgun from the bedroom and went to the garage from the interior of the house. Jackson and Dori were inside the garage. Jackson was wearing motorcycle boots, motorcycle gloves, and an open-faced motorcycle helmet. He was also taking a Honda CR500 dirt bike that belonged to one of Domenic’s friends. Domenic asked Jackson what he was stealing, and Jackson did not respond. When Domenic entered the garage, he held his handgun in one of his hands, though he could not recall which hand. He did not point the gun at Jackson or shoot the gun. Instead, he placed the gun on his toolbox. When asked at trial why he did not shoot the gun, Domenic replied, “I just could not shoot somebody.” According to Domenic, he saw Jackson holding a handgun sideways with his palm facing the ground. The gun was pointed at Domenic. Domenic then heard a gunshot, felt a bullet strike his head, and said, “I am hit. I am hit. Stop, I am hit.” In total, Domenic was struck five times, resulting in injuries to his head, kidney, finger, and jaw. His next memory after being shot was when he was being loaded into the ambulance. C. Domenic’s Preliminary Hearing Testimony Because Domenic’s memory degraded after the shooting in 2017, the parties stipulated to read into the trial record his sworn testimony from the preliminary hearing, which occurred in 2020. At the preliminary hearing, Domenic testified that he was awakened on the morning of the shooting by Dori’s screams coming from the garage. Her screaming was the loudest he had ever heard, so he believed she was in danger. He owned three firearms and kept them loaded with magazines, but he did not keep them loaded with rounds in the chamber. Hearing Dori, 6 Domenic grabbed his .45 caliber semiautomatic firearm with his left hand and ran into the garage. When Domenic arrived at the garage, he saw Dori and Jackson, who was wearing motorcycle equipment and positioned on top of the Honda CR500. Domenic asked Jackson what he was doing, and Jackson did not respond. Instead, Jackson “just pulled the gun out … and started shooting [Domenic].” The shooting happened with “no warning, no answer, nothing.” Domenic testified that he did not see the actual gun in Jackson’s hand. However, he demonstrated the way in which Jackson held the gun sideways with his right arm extended and his palm facing down. Jackson was about 10 or 11 feet away from Domenic when he shot him. Domenic’s next memory after being shot was being loaded into the ambulance. Domenic gave inconsistent testimony at the preliminary hearing concerning whether and when he pointed his own gun at Jackson. On cross- examination, Domenic testified that he had “dropped [his] gun to disarm [him]self” by the time he was shot because he did not have the “balls to shoot anything or anyone.” However, Domenic then testified that he disarmed himself after “about four shots to the head.” He also reiterated that he disarmed himself and put the gun “on the floor” after he was shot. On redirect, the prosector asked Domenic whether he had ever raised the hand in which he held his gun towards Jackson. Domenic replied, “I raised my hand to the defendant, and I couldn’t do it. I couldn’t shoot the gun. I pulled – I cocked the gun and pointed it at him, I couldn’t shoot. So I decided, I can’t shoot this, and I put the gun on the ground.” Domenic also stated that he believed he put his gun on the ground after he had been shot. Moments later, however, Domenic claimed he “was shot first, and then [he] grabbed the gun.” The prosecutor asked Domenic if he was confused, and 7 Domenic said he was confused and he would like to take a break in the proceeding. After a break, Domenic explained that the accident had left him unable to focus for extended periods of time. He also testified that he was holding the gun at his side and pointing it at the ground when he was shot. However, on recross, Domenic again stated that he was shot before he grabbed his gun. D. The Defense Narrative Jackson was 22 years old when he decided to steal a motorcycle from Domenic and Dori’s home. He had scoped out their home from a nearby vantage point a week earlier, saw motorcycles there, and wanted to steal one to go riding with his friends. On the morning in question, Jackson hitched a ride from his home in Palm Springs to Desert Hot Springs by paying $10 to a man named Doug. Jackson brought a backpack containing motorcycle gear, as well as a handgun he had illegally bought from a man on the street a year before. Jackson loaded the gun with a magazine and a round in the chamber. He also concealed the gun in a holster on the inside of his front waistband. Jackson was on probation and knew he was prohibited from possessing guns. Even so, he “always” carried a gun “for protection.” Doug dropped Jackson off near Domenic and Dori’s home sometime before 7:00 a.m. Jackson put on his motorcycle gear, walked over to the home, saw a truck parked in the driveway, and understood that people were likely home. Nevertheless, he proceeded with his plan and approached the side gate to the house. Jackson entered the side yard, saw Dori, and heard her say, “Hurry, get your gun.” From this statement, Jackson knew a gun might be in the home, someone might use it in defense, and the burglary might turn violent; however, Jackson did not abandon his plan to steal a 8 motorcycle. Instead, he entered the gate, turned away from Dori, kicked in the side door to the garage, and entered the garage. Once Jackson was in the garage, he pressed a button to try to open the vehicle garage door, which did not work. Jackson therefore walked to the vehicle garage door itself to try opening it. As he did, Dori struck him five or six times with a wooden plunger, but he ignored her and continued with his plan. He tried pulling a manual release rope to open the vehicle garage door, but that also did not work. At that point, he noticed the screwdriver wedged in a mechanism on the vehicle garage door, so he removed the screwdriver and pushed the door open with his hands. By this point, Dori had entered the home through the interior garage door and yelled, “Hurry, someone is trying to steal your motorcycle. Get your gun.” Jackson saw five or six motorcycles and dirt bikes in the garage, grabbed the nearest one, and pushed it out of the garage. He pushed the bike, mounted it, and tried using the downward slope of the driveway to “bump start” the bike, but it did not work. When he reached the street at the bottom of the driveway, he partially dismounted the bike and tried turning the gasoline valve on the side of the bike. At this point in the encounter, he was sitting on top of the bike and facing away from the home. As Jackson tried starting the dirt bike, he turned back to the garage and saw Domenic pointing a gun at him. Domenic had both of his hands on the gun and his left index finger on the trigger. According to Jackson, Domenic pulled the trigger, but the gun did not fire. Domenic then examined his gun, racked the slide to load a round into the chamber, and again pointed the gun at Jackson. Fearing for his life, Jackson removed his semiautomatic firearm from its holster and fired at Domenic. Jackson fired five shots in 9 total and walked from the base of the driveway towards Domenic as he fired. Domenic fell to the ground after the fifth shot. Jackson then approached Domenic, who was lying unconscious on the ground. He took Domenic’s Desert Eagle handgun and placed it in his pocket to prevent Domenic from firing at him as he fled. Jackson then returned to the dirt bike, started up the bike, and drove away. Several blocks from the scene, Jackson fell off the dirt bike while transitioning from a paved street onto unpaved desert terrain. He saw police officers near him and knew they were trying to arrest him. However, he did not surrender; instead, he managed to restart the dirt bike and drive away. He fled for another 20 to 30 minutes and committed several traffic infractions before stalling out and being taken into custody. Jackson believed his semiautomatic firearm was lost during his flight from the crime scene. After Jackson’s arrest, two detectives interviewed him at a police station. Jackson was evasive and repeatedly lied during the interview. He falsely told the detectives he found the dirt bike, gloves, helmet, and Domenic’s gun while walking in the desert. However, after the detectives led Jackson to believe Domenic had died from the shooting, Jackson told the detectives a version of events that was somewhat closer to the truth. He told the detectives that he went to Domenic and Dori’s house intending to steal a motorcycle. He said someone pointed a gun at him and “tried to kill” him, and he reacted by shooting his gun. He did not tell the detectives that Domenic pulled the trigger of his gun or racked the gun after it failed to fire. He also did not tell the detectives that he took Domenic’s gun after shooting him. When the detectives asked Jackson how he ended up in possession of Domenic’s gun, he initially lied and said it “flew towards” him during the shooting. However, he later confessed he took the gun from Domenic. 10 III DISCUSSION A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Jackson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the attempted murder was premeditated and deliberate. He claims the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence is that the shooting was a spontaneous use of force. We reject this contention. “ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court ‘ “ ‘presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88 (Morales).) “[A]s a general matter, a person guilty of attempted murder must be punished by imprisonment for five, seven or nine years.” (People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 665.) Unlike the crime of murder, “the crime of attempted murder is not divided into degrees.” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 740.) However, “[t]he prosecution may seek a jury finding that an attempted murder was ‘willful, deliberate, and premeditated’ for purposes of sentence enhancement,” which subjects the defendant to a prison sentence of life with the possibility of parole. (Ibid., quoting § 664, subd. (a).) 11 “ ‘ “In this context, ‘premeditated’ means ‘considered beforehand,’ and ‘deliberate’ means ‘formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.’ ” (People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1027.) In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, the Supreme Court “surveyed a number of prior cases involving the sufficiency of the evidence to support findings of premeditation and deliberation.” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125 (Perez).) After doing so, the Anderson court “identified ‘three basic categories’ of evidence [the] [Supreme] [C]ourt has generally found sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation: (1) planning activity, or ‘facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing’; (2) motive, or ‘facts about the defendant’s prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a “motive” to kill the victim’; and (3) manner of killing, or ‘facts about the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a “preconceived design” to take his victim’s life in a particular way for a “reason” ....’ ” (Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 88–89.) These are descriptive guidelines, which are “neither normative nor exhaustive, and … reviewing courts need not accord them any particular weight’ ” when they assess the sufficiency of 12 the evidence supporting findings of premeditation and deliberation. (Id. at p. 89.) Here, there was ample evidence of planning. Jackson admitted he went to Dori and Domenic’s home with an illegal loaded handgun, which he concealed in an easily accessible holster on the inside of his front waistband. The act of bringing a loaded and concealed handgun to the crime scene “indicat[ed] [Jackson] had considered the possibility of a violent encounter.” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 636 [evidence supported premeditation and deliberation finding where defendant brought loaded handgun and ammunition to crime scene]; see also, e.g., People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 245 [“defendant brought a loaded gun with him to the [crime scene], demonstrating preparation”]; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1183 [“Defendant[] … executed his planned entry into the house with a loaded gun in his hand. Hence, the jury could infer that defendant ‘considered the possibility of murder in advance’ ”].) Jackson also planned the break-in for 6:50 a.m., when the home’s occupants were likely present and potentially asleep. Further, Jackson admitted that the pickup truck parked in the driveway tipped him off that the home was occupied before he broke into it. Jackson’s perpetration of an armed break-in of an occupied home—while its inhabitants were potentially asleep and particularly vulnerable—gives rise to a reasonable inference that Jackson contemplated the possibility of murder. There was also credible evidence of motive. Jackson and Domenic both testified that Jackson shot Domenic after he went to the garage and saw Jackson stealing a dirt bike. Jackson wore an open-faced motorcycle helmet, which meant Domenic potentially could have identified Jackson for law enforcement. Further, there were multiple other dirt bikes and motorcycles in the garage. From this evidence, a jury could reasonably find that Jackson 13 considered his murderous plan beforehand and ultimately proceeded with the plan to prevent Domenic from intervening in the armed carjacking, pursuing Jackson on another dirt bike or motorcycle, or later identifying Jackson as the culprit—i.e., to remove an impediment to his successful completion of the carjacking. (See People v. Elliott (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 471 [“The jury could have construed the evidence as establishing a motive, such as that defendant deliberately intended to kill [the victim] to eliminate her as a witness”]; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 34, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 [“The evidence supports a strong inference that Joey entered his parents’ house to rob them. When his father resisted the robbery, Joey was motivated to murder him in order to gain access to both money and tangible goods”]; Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 1126–1127 [evidence supported premeditation and deliberation finding because it gave rise to an inference that “defendant determined it was necessary to kill [the victim] to prevent her from identifying him”].) Finally, the manner of the shooting supported the premeditation and deliberation finding. At trial, Jackson testified that he set down the dirt bike he was stealing to withdraw the handgun from its holster, aim it, and shoot Domenic at a close range of 10 or 11 feet. Jackson did not stop after a single shot. Rather, he fired multiple shots while continually moving closer to his victim. Five of these shots struck Domenic, including a shot to the forehead. According to Dori, some of these shots were fired even after Domenic said (loudly enough for her to hear from inside the house) that he had been hit. And, when Domenic fell to the ground, Jackson did not aid him or seek medical assistance; instead, he went up to Domenic’s bullet-ridden body, stole his firearm, completed the carjacking, and fled the scene on the stolen dirt bike. Jackson’s firing of multiple shots at close range, his efforts to close the 14 gap between himself and the victim as he fired his gun, and his decision to continue shooting the victim even after he was shot suggest that Jackson made a cold, calculated, and deliberate decision to kill. (See People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 892 [“ ‘The act of shooting a firearm toward a victim at close range in a manner that could have inflicted a mortal wound had the shot been on target is sufficient to support an inference of an intent to kill.’ ”]; People v. Lunafelix (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 97, 102 [affirming premeditation and deliberation finding where “[t]he victim was disabled by the first one or two shots,” and “[a]fter a pause, appellant fired the third and fourth shots, which indicated [his] intent to make sure the victim died”].) In his appellate briefs, Jackson claims the attempted murder resulted from an unconsidered and rash impulse that he made under life-threatening circumstances. He emphasizes that he did not physically harm Dori during the break-in, as one might reasonably expect if he had made a cold and calculated decision to kill. He also points to his own testimony that he carried a gun only for “protection,” and that he did not shoot Domenic until after Domenic already had pointed a handgun at him and pulled the trigger. However, the jury was entitled to disbelieve Jackson’s self-serving description of the shooting and his motivations. Further, although Domenic suffered memory problems from his injuries, he unequivocally denied pointing or shooting his gun at Jackson during his trial testimony. In any event, Jackson’s argument asks us to substitute our judgment for the judgment of the jury simply because the jury rationally could have found that he acted without premeditation and deliberation. That is not our role. “ ‘ “ ‘ “If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be 15 reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Serrano (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1324, 1333.) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment, we conclude sufficient evidence supports the premeditation and deliberation finding. B. Sentencing Error Next, Jackson argues that the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence. He claims the court erred because it failed to calculate the determinate term and the indeterminate term of his sentence separately before deciding whether to run the determinate term concurrently or consecutively to the indeterminate term. We agree. 1. Additional Background Prior to sentencing, the probation department filed a report recommending that the trial court sentence Jackson to a determinate term of three years followed by an indeterminate term of 32 years to life. With respect to the determinate term, the probation report designated count 7 (evading a pursuing peace officer) as the principal count and recommended that the court impose the low term of 16 months for count 7, plus a consecutive term of one year for the related firearm enhancement. The probation report designated count 6 (possessing a firearm in violation of a probation condition) as the subordinate term and recommended that the court impose a consecutive term of one-third the middle term, or eight months, for count 6. Further, the report recommended that the court impose and stay punishments for counts 2 through 5 pursuant to section 654. As for the indeterminate term, the probation report recommended that the court sentence Jackson to seven years to life for count 1 (premeditated attempted 16 murder), plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the related firearm enhancement. At sentencing, the prosecution urged the court to adopt the probation department’s recommended sentence.2 Meanwhile, the defense urged the court to dismiss the premeditation and deliberation finding for count 1 or, alternatively, reduce the firearm enhancement for count 1 (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) to a lesser included enhancement (§ id., subd. (a)). Additionally, defense counsel asked the court to run the determinate term concurrently with the indeterminate term. After hearing these arguments, the court declined to reduce the firearm enhancement for count 1 and imposed an indeterminate term of seven years to life for count 1, plus 25 years to life for the related firearm enhancement.3 With respect to the determinate term, the court imposed “the middle term, one third consecutive,” or “eight months,” for count 6. Then, the court imposed “one third the middle term” for count 7, plus one year for the related firearm enhancement. Immediately after selecting this sentence, however, the court corrected itself and “impose[d] the middle term of two years” for count 7 (instead of one-third the middle term), plus one year for the related firearm enhancement, and ran the count 7 sentence “concurrent with the other charges.” The court imposed and stayed punishments for the remaining determinate counts (counts 2 through 5) and all related 2 In doing so, the prosecutor disagreed with the probation report’s determination that counts 2 through 5 all fell within the scope of section 654. She also inaccurately stated that the probation report recommended an aggregate sentence of 37 years to life, plus three years. However, she ultimately “submit[ted] on Probation’s recommendation.” 3 The court did not explicitly address defense counsel’s request to dismiss the finding of premeditation and deliberation. 17 enhancements.4 In closing, the court described the aggregate sentence as “life in prison with a parole date of seven years, plus 25 years to life for the [count 1 firearm enhancement], and an additional eight months consecutive under Count 6, for a total of … 32 years eight months to life.” 2. Analysis “Indeterminate term crimes and determinate term crimes are subject to two different sentencing schemes.” (People v. Neely (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 787, 797 (Neely).) “Sentencing under these two sentencing schemes must be performed separately and independently of each other. [Citation.] Only after each is determined are they added together to form the aggregate term of imprisonment.” (Id. at p. 797; see also People v. Lyons (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1228 [courts “treat and compute determinate and indeterminate terms separately”]; People v. Reyes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 852, 856 [“When a defendant is sentenced to both a determinate and an indeterminate sentence, … [t]hey are to be considered and calculated independently of one another.”].) Generally, “[s]ection 1170.1 establishes the ‘sentencing protocol’ for offenses with determinate terms …. Sentencing pursuant to section 1170.1 involves a three-step procedure. [Citation.] ‘First, the trial court is required to select a base term—either the statutory low, middle or upper term—for each of the crimes. [Citations.] Second, if the court determines that a consecutive sentence is merited, it must designate the crime with the “greatest” selected base term as the principal term and the other crimes as subordinate terms. [Citation.] Third, the court sentences the defendant to 4 We “must look to the sentence of the base term and not an enhancement to decide whether the term is determinate or indeterminate.” (People v. Sanders (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 543, 559.) Therefore, counts 2 through 5 had determinate terms, notwithstanding the 25-year-to-life firearm enhancements associated with certain of those counts (counts 2 through 4). 18 the full base term it selected for the principal term crime and one-third of the middle term for any crimes for which the sentence is ordered to run consecutively. [Citations.] A subordinate term is one-third of the middle term even if the trial court had initially selected the lower or upper term as the base term.’ ” (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 204, 211–212, citations omitted.) “Offenses for which an indeterminate sentence of life imprisonment or death can be imposed are not subject to section 1170.1. Consequently there are no principal and subordinate terms to be selected. (§ 1168, subd. (b).) The court simply imposes the statutory term of imprisonment for the indeterminate sentence crime,” which in this case is an indeterminate term of seven years to life for the premeditated attempted murder conviction. (Neely, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 798; §§ 664, subd. (a), 3046, subd. (a).) “Once the court determines what sentence is to be imposed for the indeterminate term offenses and the determinate term offenses, it combines the two to reach an aggregate total sentence. Nothing in the sentencing for the determinate term crimes is affected by the sentence for the indeterminate term crime. [¶] Such sentencing has been conceptualized as sentencing in separate boxes. [Citation.] Applying this ‘box’ analogy to the instant case, the indeterminate term crime of [premeditated attempted] murder is placed in one box. The court imposes the required [seven] years to life sentence and, in the same box, adds any enhancements to that sentence. The total sentence in the indeterminate term box is [seven] years to life for the [premeditated attempted] murder plus [25] years [to life] for the firearm enhancement.” (Neely, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 798.) “A second box is created to include the [two] determinate sentence crimes. Applying section 1170.1, the court would select a base term for each 19 of the crimes, set the crime with the greatest base term as the principal term, impose the full base term as the sentence for the principal term crime, and impose one-third of the middle term as a consecutive sentence for any subordinate term crimes. Should the court choose to run one or more of the determinate terms concurrently, it would impose the full selected base term and order it to be served concurrently with the principal term.” (Neely, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 798–799.) Here, the record suggests that the court intended to designate count 7 as the principal term, given the fact that the court imposed the full middle term for count 7 and one-third of the middle term for the other determinate count, count 6. Thus, for count 7, it imposed a sentence of two years for the base term and one year for the related firearm enhancement. “The consecutive sentence for [count 6] would have been eight months (one-third of the two-year middle term).” (Id. at p. 799.)5 “After these calculations, the second box would be complete and contain the total sentence for all the determinate sentence crimes. The court would add the term of the second box to the term of the first box to arrive at the total aggregate sentence.” (Neely, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 799.) In doing so, the court “determine[s] whether the aggregate determinate term will run concurrently with or consecutively to the indeterminate term.” (Ibid.) “In general, when a defendant is sentenced to consecutive determinate and indeterminate terms, the determinate term is served first.” (In re Brown (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 969, 981; see also § 669, subd. (a).) The trial court in the present case failed to adhere to these sentencing principles. Instead of separately calculating the determinate and indeterminate terms—and then deciding whether to run the aggregate 5 We do not discuss counts 2 through 5, as the court stayed the punishments for those convictions under section 654. 20 determinate term concurrent or consecutive to the indeterminate term—the court adopted an unsanctioned mix-and-match approach. It ran one subsidiary component of the determinate term (count 7, the ostensible principal term) concurrently “with the other charges,” including the indeterminate term. Then, it ran another subsidiary component of the determinate term (count 6, the ostensible subordinate term) consecutive to the indeterminate term, producing an unauthorized and unlawful aggregate sentence of 32 years eight months to life. This was error. “To permit correction of the trial court’s error[], the case must be remanded for resentencing. Moreover, because the trial court misapplied the sentencing rules for crimes subject to different sentencing schemes, the trial court must be given the opportunity to revise all of its discretionary sentencing choices.” (Neely, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 799.) Because we are remanding the matter for a new sentencing hearing, we do not address Jackson’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to reduce the firearm enhancement for count 1 (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) to a lesser firearm enhancement (§ id., subd. (a)). 21 IV DISPOSITION The judgment of conviction is reversed and the matter is remanded solely for resentencing purposes. McCONNELL, P. J. WE CONCUR: DATO, J. AMIN, J. 22