Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Stanish CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Shasta) THE PEOPLE, C104044 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 24F3854) v. BRENNAN TYLER STANISH, Defendant and Appellant. The trial court denied probation and sentenced defendant Brennan Tyler Stanish to two years eight months in prison after he pled guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor and sexual penetration of a minor. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by concluding defendant was presumptively ineligible for probation at sentencing. The People concede the error. We accept the People’s concession and will remand for resentencing. BACKGROUND The People charged defendant with unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (c)), 1 sexual penetration of a minor (id., § 289, subd. (h)), and furnishing cannabis to a minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361, subd. (b)). The People 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 1 further alleged the victim was particularly vulnerable. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3).) The underlying facts of defendant’s criminal conduct are not relevant to the issues on appeal. Before defendant entered his plea, the trial court explained to him that the maximum possible sentence was three years eight months in prison, and a “probationary sentence [was] going to be under consideration.” The written plea form indicated the same. Defendant pled guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor and sexual penetration of a minor, and he admitted the victim was particularly vulnerable as to both counts. The court dismissed the remaining charge consistent with the plea agreement. After defendant entered his plea, the trial court ordered a sex offender status evaluation under section 288.1, noting that defendant had no “restrictions or presumptive ineligibilities.” The section 288.1 report found defendant’s criminal conduct was not predatory or premeditated but opportunistic. It further found defendant was a low risk and did not represent an “ongoing danger” to the community. It also offered several favorable factors for the trial court to consider when deciding whether to grant probation at sentencing. The probation report stated “defendant [was] presumptively ineligible for probation pursuant to [s]ection 1203.067[ subdivision ](a)” but that he was a favorable candidate for probation based on mitigating and aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rules 4.414, 4.421, and 4.423. The proposed case plan recommended a suspended two-year eight-month sentence, 90 days in county jail, and two years of probation. The trial court ordered another evaluation report under sections 1203.3 and 1203.067. That report recommended a prison sentence but also recommended certain probation terms if defendant “is eligible for probation.” The report included conflicting reports from three separate evaluators. A psychologist interviewed defendant and recommended probation because defendant was not a threat to public safety. A 2 correctional counselor also interviewed defendant but recommended a prison sentence. The counselor noted that the “seriousness of his crime requires punishment more severe than just probation.” Given the differing opinions, the facility captain interviewed defendant to reach a final recommendation. He concluded that defendant did not show genuine remorse and that he would pose a threat to public safety; therefore, he recommended a prison sentence. Defendant’s sentencing brief requested a suspended sentence and probation, arguing that defendant was a good candidate for probation and not presumptively ineligible. At sentencing, defense counsel argued that defendant was not presumptively or statutorily ineligible for probation “so long as [the court made] the findings and conduct[ed] the hearing required by Penal Code Section 1203.067.” Before imposing defendant’s sentence, the trial court noted that it ordered a section 1203.067 sex offender status evaluation and held a hearing to determine whether defendant would pose a threat to the victim. After weighing aggravating and mitigating factors and discussing the various evaluation reports, the court denied probation, explaining: “All in balance, I do read [section] 1203.067’s language that before the probation may be granted as a presumptive ineligibility, the factors as I have read through them do not overcome the presumptive ineligibility for probation.” The trial court sentenced defendant to two years eight months in prison. Defendant timely appealed. DISCUSSION Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by erroneously concluding he was presumptively ineligible for probation at sentencing. The People concede the issue and we agree. We independently review the record to determine whether the trial court “properly found [defendant] presumptively ineligible for probation.” (People v. Nuno (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 43, 50.) Under section 1203.067, subdivision (a), “probation may be 3 granted” to someone convicted of sexual penetration of a minor if they are otherwise “eligible for probation.” Where a court “ ‘bases its determination to deny probation in significant part upon an erroneous impression of the defendant’s legal status, fundamental fairness requires that the defendant be afforded a new hearing and “an informed, intelligent and just decision” on the basis of the facts.’ ” (Nuno, at pp. 49-50 citing to People v. Ruiz (1975) 14 Cal.3d 163, 168.) The People concede section 1203.067 does not contain any language that would render defendant presumptively ineligible for probation and that the trial court erred when it denied probation based on an erroneous impression of defendant’s legal status at sentencing. (People v. Ruiz, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 168.) The People’s concession is well taken. As such, we will remand for a new sentencing hearing. DISPOSITION The sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for resentencing. /s/ DAMRELL, J. We concur: /s/ HULL, Acting P. J. /s/ MAURO, J. 4