People v. Stanish CA3
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketC104044
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Stanish CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
THE PEOPLE, C104044
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 24F3854)
v.
BRENNAN TYLER STANISH,
Defendant and Appellant.
The trial court denied probation and sentenced defendant Brennan Tyler Stanish to
two years eight months in prison after he pled guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse with a
minor and sexual penetration of a minor. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court
erred by concluding defendant was presumptively ineligible for probation at sentencing.
The People concede the error. We accept the People’s concession and will remand for
resentencing.
BACKGROUND
The People charged defendant with unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (Pen.
Code, § 261.5, subd. (c)), 1 sexual penetration of a minor (id., § 289, subd. (h)), and
furnishing cannabis to a minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361, subd. (b)). The People
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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further alleged the victim was particularly vulnerable. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(3).) The underlying facts of defendant’s criminal conduct are not relevant to the
issues on appeal.
Before defendant entered his plea, the trial court explained to him that the
maximum possible sentence was three years eight months in prison, and a “probationary
sentence [was] going to be under consideration.” The written plea form indicated the
same. Defendant pled guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor and sexual
penetration of a minor, and he admitted the victim was particularly vulnerable as to both
counts. The court dismissed the remaining charge consistent with the plea agreement.
After defendant entered his plea, the trial court ordered a sex offender status
evaluation under section 288.1, noting that defendant had no “restrictions or presumptive
ineligibilities.” The section 288.1 report found defendant’s criminal conduct was not
predatory or premeditated but opportunistic. It further found defendant was a low risk
and did not represent an “ongoing danger” to the community. It also offered several
favorable factors for the trial court to consider when deciding whether to grant probation
at sentencing.
The probation report stated “defendant [was] presumptively ineligible for
probation pursuant to [s]ection 1203.067[ subdivision ](a)” but that he was a favorable
candidate for probation based on mitigating and aggravating factors under California
Rules of Court, rules 4.414, 4.421, and 4.423. The proposed case plan recommended a
suspended two-year eight-month sentence, 90 days in county jail, and two years of
probation.
The trial court ordered another evaluation report under sections 1203.3 and
1203.067. That report recommended a prison sentence but also recommended certain
probation terms if defendant “is eligible for probation.” The report included conflicting
reports from three separate evaluators. A psychologist interviewed defendant and
recommended probation because defendant was not a threat to public safety. A
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correctional counselor also interviewed defendant but recommended a prison sentence.
The counselor noted that the “seriousness of his crime requires punishment more severe
than just probation.” Given the differing opinions, the facility captain interviewed
defendant to reach a final recommendation. He concluded that defendant did not show
genuine remorse and that he would pose a threat to public safety; therefore, he
recommended a prison sentence.
Defendant’s sentencing brief requested a suspended sentence and probation,
arguing that defendant was a good candidate for probation and not presumptively
ineligible. At sentencing, defense counsel argued that defendant was not presumptively
or statutorily ineligible for probation “so long as [the court made] the findings and
conduct[ed] the hearing required by Penal Code Section 1203.067.”
Before imposing defendant’s sentence, the trial court noted that it ordered a
section 1203.067 sex offender status evaluation and held a hearing to determine whether
defendant would pose a threat to the victim. After weighing aggravating and mitigating
factors and discussing the various evaluation reports, the court denied probation,
explaining: “All in balance, I do read [section] 1203.067’s language that before the
probation may be granted as a presumptive ineligibility, the factors as I have read through
them do not overcome the presumptive ineligibility for probation.” The trial court
sentenced defendant to two years eight months in prison.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by erroneously
concluding he was presumptively ineligible for probation at sentencing. The People
concede the issue and we agree.
We independently review the record to determine whether the trial court “properly
found [defendant] presumptively ineligible for probation.” (People v. Nuno (2018)
26 Cal.App.5th 43, 50.) Under section 1203.067, subdivision (a), “probation may be
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granted” to someone convicted of sexual penetration of a minor if they are otherwise
“eligible for probation.” Where a court “ ‘bases its determination to deny probation in
significant part upon an erroneous impression of the defendant’s legal status,
fundamental fairness requires that the defendant be afforded a new hearing and “an
informed, intelligent and just decision” on the basis of the facts.’ ” (Nuno, at pp. 49-50
citing to People v. Ruiz (1975) 14 Cal.3d 163, 168.)
The People concede section 1203.067 does not contain any language that would
render defendant presumptively ineligible for probation and that the trial court erred
when it denied probation based on an erroneous impression of defendant’s legal status at
sentencing. (People v. Ruiz, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 168.) The People’s concession is well
taken. As such, we will remand for a new sentencing hearing.
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for resentencing.
/s/
DAMRELL, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
MAURO, J.
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