People v. Vasquez CA6

Filed 10/30/26 P. v. Vasquez CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, H053023 (Monterey County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 23CR007357) v. MANUEL VASQUEZ, Defendant and Appellant. Jane Doe 11 alleged that defendant Manuel Vasquez—husband of her stepfather’s sister—molested her when she was in fifth or sixth grade until she was 14 years old. Among other allegations of abuse, Doe 1 stated that Vasquez twice raped her “on the Easter before COVID.”2 A jury convicted Vasquez of eight counts of forcible sexual offenses against Doe 1. 1 A pseudonym was used for the victim at trial. We refer to the victim by this pseudonym to protect her privacy interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).) 2 The prosecution initially alleged that Vasquez assaulted Doe 1 in 2019, but later amended the information to extend the relevant time frame through April 2021. At trial, the prosecution alleged that the rapes occurred at Easter 2021 (i.e., April 4, 2021). The defense alleged that because of Doe’s reference to COVID, the relevant timeframe was Easter 2019 (i.e., April 21, 2019).  In September 2021, Doe 1 reported that she had been molested by a different family member, Vasquez’s father-in-law, also described by Doe 1 as her “grandfather.”3 Around this time, Doe 1’s family became alienated from Vasquez’s family. Doe 1 reported Vasquez’s abuse in May 2023, about 18 months after she reported that she was molested by Vasquez’s father-in-law. Vasquez raises five issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred by precluding the defense from questioning witnesses about Doe 1’s failure to mention Vasquez’s sexual assaults when she made her September 2021 allegation of sexual abuse against Vasquez’s father-in-law; (2) the trial court erroneously precluded the defense from cross-examining prosecution witnesses as to the reasons for a family alienation that the defense asserted could reveal the bias of Doe 1 and other witnesses against Vasquez; (3) the trial court erroneously permitted Vasquez to be impeached with his 2009 conviction for active participation in a criminal street gang; (4) the cumulative prejudice of the first three issues deprived him of his rights to due process and a fair trial; and (5) remand is required because the record does not demonstrate his gang-related strike conviction is valid under amended Penal Code section 186.22.4 For the reasons explained below, we conclude Vasquez has not demonstrated prejudicial error as to the first four issues. However, we will vacate the true finding as to Vasquez’s prior strike conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand the matter for further proceedings. 3 Doe 1’s allegations concerned her stepfather’s father, who is Vasquez’s father- in-law. At trial, the parties and Doe 1 referred to the subject of these allegations as Doe 1’s “grandfather.” Because of the familial relationships discussed here, we refer to him as Vasquez’s father-in-law. 4 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2  I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND5 Vasquez was married to the sister of Doe 1’s stepfather. Vasquez was about 20 years older than Doe 1. Doe 1 was about the same age as Vasquez’s daughter, and the two girls were close friends. The girls would sleep over at each family’s residence. However, in September 2021, Doe 1’s family had a “falling out” with Vasquez’s family. In 2023, Doe 1 alleged in a series of law enforcement interviews that Vasquez had repeatedly sexually molested her starting when she was in fifth or sixth grade. Among other allegations, she reported that Vasquez twice raped her, once on the “Easter before COVID” and a second time the following morning. She alleged that in the two Eastertime incidents Vasquez brought her to his bedroom during a sleepover, placed a sock in her mouth to keep her from screaming, and tied her hands before raping her. She also alleged that Vasquez threatened her in various ways, which kept her from reporting Vasquez’s actions sooner. In one such threat Vasquez indicated he would have his former gang associates find Doe 1. The prosecution charged Vasquez by amended information with eight counts of forcible sexual misconduct against Doe 1: two counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 1-2); and six counts of forcible lewd acts upon a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 3-8). The two rape counts included allegations that Vasquez tied or bound the victim (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(5)). The amended information alleged Vasquez had suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) by having been convicted in 2009 of active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The information also alleged four aggravating circumstances (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (3), (8) & (11)). At trial, Doe 1 testified as to various acts of sexual abuse Vasquez committed against her, including the two alleged rapes that took place at Easter. The prosecution’s 5 We provide an overview of the facts to provide context. We further describe the record evidence relevant to each challenge in our analysis, post. 3 theory was that the rapes occurred in 2021, despite Doe 1’s report that they occurred on the “Easter before COVID.” Doe 1’s mother testified that one Easter when Doe 1 slept over at Vasquez’s residence, she received a call from Doe 1 in which Doe 1 sounded upset and asked her to come pick her up. Doe 1’s stepfather testified regarding relations between the two families, including the rift that occurred in 2021. An expert in the psychological aspects of child sexual abuse testified about common myths and misconceptions involving child sexual abuse victims. A former neighbor and family friend of Vasquez identified as Jane Doe 2 testified pursuant to Evidence Code section 11086 that Vasquez repeatedly sexually molested her more than 20 years earlier. Doe 2 testified that Vasquez commenced molesting her when she was between seven and nine years old and Vasquez was about seven years older than she was. Doe 2 also testified that she observed Vasquez molest his two younger nephews. Vasquez testified on his own behalf, denying the allegations by Doe 1 and Doe 2. The defense called three law enforcement officials who testified that in various interviews, Doe 1 did not disclose some of the instances of sexual abuse to which she later testified. Five witnesses opined that Vasquez had a good character for honesty, truthfulness, and sexual morality. Vasquez’s two children testified that they did not observe events related to the alleged Easter rapes. Vasquez’s wife testified for the defense to contradict aspects of Doe 1’s testimony. Doe 1 had reported that Vasquez’s wife said she was going to the gym and was not home when Vasquez raped Doe 1 on Easter night. Doe 1 also stated that Vasquez’s wife was not home during the alleged rape the next morning, as she went to pick up breakfast 6 Evidence Code section 1108 provides an exception to Evidence Code section 1101’s general prohibition against using evidence of a person’s character to prove the person’s conduct on a specified occasion. This exception “permits evidence that a defendant accused of a sexual offense has committed another sexual offense, potentially showing a propensity to do so.” (People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1089.) 4 items. To rebut these statements, Vasquez’s wife produced records from her gym indicating that the business was not open on Easter Sunday 2019 and testified that the records did not include a timestamp for her on that date. She also testified that the following day she was working, and she produced her timecard to demonstrate that she was at work at the time of the assault. She further testified that Vasquez had left for his job in Oakland the morning after Easter before 5:00 a.m., and her children would not have been left alone at the house. To rebut the prosecution’s theory that the assaults occurred on Easter 2021, Vasquez’s wife testified concerning Google location records she produced from her phone to show her whereabouts on those days. Vasquez’s two nephews testified that the abuse Doe 2 stated she observed did not occur. A psychologist testified that child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome evidence “was not intended as a diagnostic or forensic instrument to be used as a way to determine whether a child had been abused at all.” Finally, a defense investigator testified that when the investigator attempted to contact a potential witness, Doe 1’s mother called and told her to stop harassing prosecution witnesses. The investigator also testified regarding an exhibit describing the Google records Vasquez’s wife produced. In the prosecution’s rebuttal, an investigator testified that he found “unusual” elements in the defense’s Google location records. He indicated that some information was missing, and he described how the data in the records could be manipulated. The jury convicted Vasquez of all eight counts and found the tying or binding allegations true. The trial court found the prior strike allegation and three of the four alleged aggravating circumstances true. The trial court sentenced Vasquez to a total term 5 of 40 years followed by 60 years to life, which included doubled terms on each count due to the prior strike conviction. This appeal timely followed. II. DISCUSSION A. Evidence of Jane Doe 1’s September 2021 Forensic Interview Vasquez denied the allegations of sexual assault, and defense counsel attacked Doe 1’s credibility in multiple ways. On objection from the prosecution, the trial court excluded certain evidence Vasquez sought to admit in this effort. On appeal, Vasquez first argues the trial court erred by precluding the defense from eliciting evidence that Doe 1 did not accuse Vasquez of sexual assault in a forensic interview in which she made allegations that Vasquez’s father-in-law molested her, although Vasquez’s acts occurred during the same general time frame as those of his father-in-law. He contends that Doe 1’s failure to report that she was assaulted by Vasquez during her report regarding his father-in-law was relevant because “a reasonable jury could conclude from [Doe 1’s] failure to mention appellant at all during an interview about sexual abuse allegedly occurring during the same time as the charged offenses, that she was untruthful about the allegations against appellant.” The Attorney General responds that the trial court properly excluded questioning on this subject because Doe 1’s failure to reference Vasquez in her interview about a different family member was not relevant, and any asserted error was harmless. We conclude that even if the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the defense from questioning witnesses about this matter, any error was harmless. 1. Factual background Doe 1 first disclosed her allegations against Vasquez in April 2023. In pretrial motions, Vasquez asserted that in September 2021, Doe 1 participated in a forensic interview in which she alleged that Vasquez’s father-in-law molested her from January 6 2018 to April 2021, which was the same time frame she later alleged Vasquez molested her. The defense alleged that as a result of Doe 1’s accusations, Vasquez’s father-in-law pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 32 years in prison.7 The defense asserted that during the interview regarding Vasquez’s father-in-law, Doe 1 never stated that Vasquez molested her. The defense motion argued: “This evidence is relevant to the credibility of Jane Doe in that the jury should be allowed to know that while giving a full and unlimited statement to law enforcement about her being a victim of child molestation by one individual she did not once mention that that individual’s son-in-law, Mr. Vasquez, was also molesting her during the same time frame.” The defense requested introduction of a transcript of the interview or testimony of the sheriff’s sergeant and social worker who conducted the interview to demonstrate that Doe 1 did not mention Vasquez in this interview, but the defense also offered to stipulate to the fact of the omission. The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing that the evidence was not relevant and constituted hearsay, and that the defense had not complied with Evidence Code section 782.8 The trial court denied the defense motion. The court stated that Doe 1’s failure to mention Vasquez at an interview involving her allegations against a different family 7 Although the record does not contain a record of conviction or other documentation that Vasquez’s father-in-law was convicted and sentenced to prison, the trial court and counsel discussed this as an undisputed fact during the in limine motions and during discussions regarding the admissibility of evidence that we address later in this opinion. 8 Evidence Code section 782 “provides for a strict procedure that includes a hearing outside of the presence of the jury prior to the admission of evidence of the complaining witness’s sexual conduct.” (People v. Bautista (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 762, 782.) “Evidence Code section 782 is designed to protect victims of molestation from ‘embarrassing personal disclosures’ unless the defense is able to show in advance that the victim’s sexual conduct is relevant to the victim’s credibility.” (Ibid.) “Evidence Code section 782 requires a defendant seeking to introduce evidence of the witness’s prior sexual conduct to file a written motion accompanied by an affidavit containing an offer of proof concerning the relevance of the proffered evidence to attack the credibility of the victim.” (People v. Mestas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1514.) 7 member was not relevant unless the interviewer asked Doe 1 if someone else molested her and she said no. The trial court then stated that even if the evidence were relevant, it constituted inadmissible hearsay and the defense had not complied with the requirements of Evidence Code section 782. Finally, the trial court concluded that under Evidence Code section 352, any relevance this evidence had was substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion, the danger of undue prejudice, and the undue consumption of time this issue would require. The defense then moved for reconsideration, asserting that the court’s ruling “illegally restricts the scope of cross examination in order to test the credibility of the accuser in this matter.” The defense’s motion argued that the trial court’s Evidence Code section 352 ruling was erroneous because “[t]o deny the jury the opportunity to hear this evidence allows the witness to testify under a false aura of veracity to which no accuser is entitled.” The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. The trial court stated that when “somebody doesn’t volunteer something about what they’re not asked,” to use this as “evidence of something happening is just too far of a stretch of the imagination.” The court then found that even if evidence of the 2021 interview were relevant, such evidence would constitute inadmissible hearsay and would also warrant exclusion under Evidence Code section 352.9 At trial, the defense renewed its motion toward the end of the prosecution’s case- in-chief. The defense asserted that it should be permitted to introduce video clips of the September 2021 interview, in which the defense contended Doe 1 exhibited a demeanor different from that when she testified at trial. The trial court again denied the defense’s 9 The defense’s motion for reconsideration also asserted that Evidence Code section 782 did not apply to testimony about Doe 1’s statements in the September 2021 interview. However, the defense separately filed a submission in an attempt to comply with Evidence Code section 782. The trial court did not mention Evidence Code section 782 in denying the defense’s reconsideration motion, and this issue is not before us. 8 motion, finding the proffered evidence was not relevant and was properly excluded under Evidence Code section 352. 2. Legal principles and standard of review “No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.” (Evid. Code, § 350.) “Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible.” (Id., § 351.) “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Id., § 210.) “ ‘The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends “logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference” to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 337 (Harris).) “In determining the credibility of a witness, the jury may consider any matter that has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing . . . .” (Ibid.) “Unless precluded by statute, any evidence is admissible to attack the credibility of a witness if it has a tendency in reason to disprove the truthfulness of the witness’s testimony.” (People v. Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67, 99, overruled on another ground in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 637-643.) Under Evidence Code section 352, “[t]he court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” However, “ ‘Evidence Code section 352 must bow to the due process right of a defendant to a fair trial and his right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his defense.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Stewart (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 755, 785.) We review a trial court’s rulings concerning relevance and the application of Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 407-408 (Gonzalez).) A trial court’s decision to exclude evidence 9 “ ‘ “will not be disturbed unless there is a showing that the trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 445.) “Evidentiary rulings are generally subject to harmless error review under the standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d. 818, 836 . . . , which requires us to determine ‘if a reasonable probability exists that the jury would have reached a different result’ ” in the absence of the error. (People v. Partida (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51, 76.) However, erroneous evidentiary rulings that completely exclude evidence of an accused’s defense are reviewed for harmless error under the standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman), which asks whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the jury’s verdict. (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1102-1103; People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1104, fn. 4 (Bacon).) 3. Analysis We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion here. We disagree with the trial court’s ruling that the evidence of Doe 1’s omission of Vasquez’s sexual abuse when she reported that his father-in-law molested her was not relevant. This information had “a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of [Doe 1’s] testimony at the hearing . . . .” (Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 337.) The vicious nature of the sexual assault perpetrated by Vasquez, which included bondage of a teen girl, and the familial relationship between Vasquez and his father-in-law, could cause a jury to question why she did not report these serious offenses to law enforcement and the social worker when she had the opportunity. Her omission thus raised the question of whether the subsequent accusations against Vasquez were fabricated, or whether the omission could be fairly explained by the prosecution. However, we agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the evidence, if somewhat probative, would have been substantially more prejudicial 10 than probative under Evidence Code section 352 if admitted. Inevitably, the jury would have focused its attention on the status and outcome of the allegations against Vasquez’s father-in-law. If this evidence were admitted, presumably the prosecution could then introduce evidence related to Vasquez’s father-in-law’s conviction to rebut any inference that Doe 1 fabricated her September 2021 allegations. As the trial court stated, admitting evidence of Doe 1’s allegations against Vasquez’s father-in-law would lead to “a trial within a trial of an entire[ly] different child molest.” This would be the case even if the parties agreed to stipulate that Doe 1 did not mention Vasquez’s acts in her September 2021 forensic interview. In addition, while evidence that Doe 1 failed to report Vasquez’s abuse in her September 2021 forensic interview could bear somewhat on her credibility, it did not constitute evidence of a false statement by Doe 1, and thus its probative value was limited. (See People v. Miranda (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1424 [“Prior rape complaints do not reflect on credibility unless proven to be false”].) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the danger of confusion of the issues and undue consumption of time substantially outweighed the probative value of this evidence. (See People v. Tidwell (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1457-1458 [no error in excluding evidence of victim’s prior rape complaints where there was no conclusive evidence the prior complaints were false, and admitting the evidence would have resulted in an undue consumption of time as the parties attempted to bolster their views as to the truthfulness or falsity of the prior complaints].) Even if the evidence were improperly excluded, we determine that any error was harmless. Vasquez argues that the trial court’s ruling amounted to a violation of his constitutional right to effective cross-examination, because “a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of [Doe 1’s] credibility if the proposed line 11 of cross-examination had been permitted.”10 Vasquez does not convincingly argue that the trial court’s ruling “amount[ed] to a complete preclusion of a defense” because the defense was still permitted to present evidence and argument that Doe 1 did not timely disclose the abuse by Vasquez. (Bacon, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1104, fn. 4.) Thus, Vasquez appears “ ‘to inflate garden-variety evidentiary questions into constitutional ones.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) However, even assuming the trial court’s ruling violated Vasquez’s constitutional rights—either his right to present a defense or his right to effective cross-examination—Vasquez was not prejudiced under the Chapman beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The defense conducted vigorous cross-examination and introduced substantial evidence to demonstrate that many of Doe 1’s prior statements were inconsistent with her trial testimony. For example, on cross-examination, Doe 1 admitted that at one interview she told investigators about the two rapes that occurred at Easter, and not the remaining alleged acts of molestation forming the basis of other charges against Vasquez. The defense also called three law enforcement officials to testify that Doe 1 did not report significant aspects of the alleged sexual abuse in her various police interviews. In closing, the defense argued that numerous discrepancies and omissions in Doe 1’s earlier statements to law enforcement demonstrated her testimony was not credible. The jury rejected the defense argument by finding the charges true. Vasquez argues that evidence Doe 1 failed to mention him in her September 2021 interview was likely to impact the jury because her allegations against his father-in-law covered the same time span as Vasquez’s acts of molestation. But as the trial court noted, investigators did not ask Doe 1 at the September 2021 interview if anyone else had 10 The parties dispute whether Vasquez’s claim properly encompasses only the federal constitutional right to cross-examination or both state and federal constitutional guarantees. However, the parties agree that the state and federal constitutional guarantees applicable to the instant situation mirror each other. 12 molested her, and thus the omission of any mention of Vasquez’s assaults by this young teen was easily explained. The testimony of the prosecution’s expert on the psychological aspects of child sexual abuse also addressed the failure of children alleging sexual abuse to timely report, or to report fully, the events they experience. Nor are we persuaded that the jury’s conclusion as to Doe 1’s credibility would have changed based on this single omission, given the number of discrepancies between Doe 1’s police interviews and her trial testimony that defense counsel raised to the jury. Vasquez argues that allowing the defense to raise Doe 1’s omission would have shed greater light on the asserted discrepancy as to whether the alleged rapes against Doe 1 took place in 2019 (the “Easter before COVID”) or in 2021. But the defense thoroughly explored this issue at trial. The defense questioned both Doe 1 and law enforcement officials about Doe 1’s statement that the rapes occurred on the Easter before COVID and not, as alleged by the prosecutor, in 2021. Vasquez does not show how Doe 1’s failure to mention Vasquez during her interview about Vasquez’s father-in- law provides evidence that the alleged conduct by Vasquez took place in 2019 as opposed to 2021. In any event, the defense’s case attempted to demonstrate the asserted rapes could not have occurred either in 2019 or 2021, and the jury rejected the defense argument. Finally, we observe that the prosecution case included the testimony of Doe 2 that Vasquez had molested her, and other members of his own family, years before he assaulted Doe 1. This corroborative evidence strongly supported Doe 1’s assertion that she had been molested and raped by Vasquez, tending to prove that Vasquez similarly victimized others, and that his molests of Doe 1 were not unprecedented. Vasquez does not challenge the trial court’s admission of this evidence under Evidence Code section 1108. Considering the totality of the evidence, we conclude that even assuming the trial court erred and violated Vasquez’s constitutional right to cross-examine Doe 1 13 on the omission of any mention of Vasquez at the interview regarding his father-in-law, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that any such error did not affect the jury’s verdict.11 B. Questioning Prosecution Witnesses as to Reason for Family Alienation Vasquez next argues that the trial court erred by prohibiting the defense from cross-examining prosecution witnesses regarding the effect of Doe 1’s allegations of molest against Vasquez’s father-in-law. Although the record does not include any official documentation, it appears based on the statements of counsel and the trial court that as a result of Doe 1’s reports, Vasquez’s father-in-law was convicted of one or more sex offenses. This created a rift between Doe 1’s family and Vasquez’s family. Vasquez asserts that evidence of his father-in-law’s conviction and the family division could demonstrate that prosecution witnesses, including Doe 1 and her family, had a bias, interest, or other motive that caused them to fabricate the allegations that Vasquez assaulted Doe 1. The Attorney General contends that the trial court properly prohibited such questioning under Evidence Code sections 350 through 352, and alternatively Vasquez was not prejudiced by any error. We agree with the Attorney General. 1. Factual background Doe 1’s mother testified in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, generally outlining the family structure and recounting the call she received one Easter in which Doe 1 sounded upset and asked her mother to come get her. The prosecutor asked Doe 1’s mother: “At some point did your family stop spending so much time together?” She replied that at first, the family did not interact much during the pandemic, and she then testified that “in September of 2021 there was just a fallout where we just -- everybody stopped talking.” 11 The trial court also found the proffered evidence constituted inadmissible hearsay, and the court stated that testimony on this point would be independently inadmissible on this basis. On appeal, Vasquez does not argue that testimony or evidence on this issue is not hearsay or that an exception to the hearsay rule applies. As we conclude there was no prejudicial error in excluding the evidence, we do not address the hearsay issue. 14 Doe 1’s mother then began to testify that the fallout involved Vasquez’s wife, at which point the trial court had counsel approach the bench. After the sidebar discussion, the prosecutor asked Doe 1’s mother whether “in September of 2021 an issue came up between your family and your husband’s father,” to which Doe 1’s mother replied affirmatively. In response to further questions, Doe 1’s mother stated that this issue caused her to stop speaking to her mother-in-law and to Vasquez and Vasquez’s wife, but that there was no quarrel between her family and Vasquez, including between Doe 1 and Vasquez. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Doe 1’s mother: “So there was an incident in 2021 that you say resulted in . . . your family no longer having any contact with Mr. Vasquez’s family; correct?” Doe 1’s mother agreed. Defense counsel then asked more questions about the family rift, and Doe 1’s mother replied that the issue involved Vasquez’s wife breaking off contact with Doe 1’s side of the family and aligning herself with her father. After further exploring this issue, defense counsel asked whether in a previous statement she told law enforcement that Vasquez’s wife’s father “was sentenced last year in June.” The prosecutor objected, citing motions in limine. In a session outside the jury’s presence, the trial court stated that it had twice earlier ruled that Vasquez’s father-in-law’s issues “may not be brought up in front of the jury,” and it admonished defense counsel for “still [bringing] up the father-in-law’s conviction in front of the jury without bringing it to my attention . . . .” Defense counsel did not dispute that the trial court had so ruled.12 Instead, defense counsel argued that this line of questioning was relevant “to show the timing of when she says this falling out occurred is incorrect.” The trial court reaffirmed its earlier ruling, stating: “Neither side 12 On appeal, the parties do not cite to the ruling the trial court made in this regard. Our review of the record disclosed no such specific ruling regarding Vasquez’s father-in- law having been convicted. Regardless, the parties at trial and on appeal have not disputed that the trial court ruled as it stated it did. 15 at this time may bring up the father-in-law’s conviction, the father-in-law’s sentence, the father-in-law’s charges. I still have not heard any relevance based upon that.” The court said defense counsel “could have gotten around that any other way,” stating: “It is such a peripheral issue as to when they stopped talking. The minimal relevance is so small and yet the prejudice is so great, which we’ve already talked about.” Defense counsel continued to press the issue, arguing that the timing of the family rift was relevant and the issue of Vasquez’s father-in-law’s legal proceedings “goes to the issue of [Doe 1’s mother] influencing her daughter to bring these allegations against Mr. Vasquez.” The trial court again reaffirmed its earlier ruling, stating that the line of questioning was not relevant, and even assuming it had “minimum relevance,” “the prejudice of bringing up the father-in-law’s incident still clearly outweighs the . . . the arguments of relevance and under [Evidence Code section] 352 I will continue to exclude it and you may not go into it.” Vasquez’s counsel then urged the trial court to allow it to explore “how Mr. Vasquez himself and his family reacted toward Jane Doe 1 when she disclosed to them what the grandfather had done to her.” Defense counsel argued that this subject was “relevant to show that the family does not have an antipathy toward Jane Doe 1 per se, shown by the fact that they all rallied behind her and supported her when she accused [Vasquez’s father-in-law] of molesting her.” The trial court rejected this argument, stating: “Whether his family loves her, hates her, despises her, goes out with her on birthdays and buys her birthday presents, none of that’s relevant to the issues today.” Later that same day of trial, Doe 1’s stepfather testified for the prosecution that the two sides of the family stopped speaking to each other in 2021. Doe 1’s stepfather did not testify as to the reason the two sides stopped talking, but he did agree that it “had nothing to do with” Vasquez, and instead involved Vasquez’ father-in-law. Doe 1 also testified that she stopped talking to Vasquez’s daughter frequently “later in the year of 2021” due to “the falling out between [their] families. 16  As discussed in the first issue above, before Vasquez testified, defense counsel renewed its motion to admit evidence that Doe 1 did not mention Vasquez in the September 2021 interview in which she reported the molestation by Vasquez’s father-in- law. In the same discussion, defense counsel sought to admit evidence of Doe 1’s molestation by Vasquez’s father-in-law, arguing that the trial court could take judicial notice of the criminal conviction and the jury could “give whatever weight they believe that has in terms of possibly explaining her behavior.” Vasquez’s counsel argued this evidence could be relevant to show that Doe 1’s mother was upset at Vasquez’s wife for “cover[ing] up” for Vasquez’s father-in-law. Defense counsel argued that if this evidence were not admitted, the jury would view Doe 1 sympathetically and would not have evidence that would “allow them to scrutinize the testimony of” Doe 1. The trial court denied defense counsel’s request, stating Vasquez’s father-in-law’s actions involved “an unrelated offense.” Vasquez testified that the relationship between his daughter and Doe 1 was close, but the relationship changed when the girls were in high school. Defense counsel asked Vasquez if he knew “what happened in the closeness of their relationship,” and the trial court sustained an objection, citing its previous rulings. After a sidebar, defense counsel rephrased the question, asking if “at some point your daughter and your niece were no longer best friends . . . .” Vasquez replied affirmatively. On cross-examination, Vasquez agreed that his side of the family and Doe 1’s side of the family “were close for a number of years.” He testified that he and Doe 1 got along well, and there “was never any falling out” between him and Doe 1. He agreed when the prosecutor asked him to confirm that “to this day there hasn’t been any arguments between your family and Jane Doe 1’s family that involved you,” stating that any issues between the two sides of the family concerned Vasquez’s father-in-law. Vasquez testified that “there was never actually any arguments at all” between the two sides of the family in that “[t]hey stopped talking to us,” and he agreed that the situation 17 was “never any big thing.” He testified that by 2023, when Doe 1 reported her allegations concerning Vasquez, it had been almost two years since he had seen her, and “[n]othing bad had happened” between them. 2. Legal principles and standard of review The law concerning relevance and Evidence Code section 352 is as stated in the first issue above. We review the trial court’s exclusion of evidence under these provisions for abuse of discretion. (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 407-408.) 3. Analysis We decide the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to permit defense counsel to elicit testimony concerning the reason for the rift in September 2021 between Vasquez’s family and Doe 1’s family—specifically, Doe 1’s report to the authorities that Vasquez’s father-in-law had molested her and his resulting conviction. The trial court could reasonably conclude that this evidence had no tendency to prove or disprove any disputed fact of consequence in Vasquez’s case. Vasquez argues this evidence was relevant because it “was probative to whether [Doe 1], her mother, or father had a bias, interest, or other motive to lie about the allegations made against” him. The defense theory would have required the jury to conclude that because Doe 1 accused Vasquez’s father-in-law of molesting her, her family members pressured her to accuse Vasquez of committing similar acts. This assertion is speculative at best. Additionally, the defense was permitted to raise that the rift occurred, and we are not persuaded that the reason for the rift is any more probative than the fact of the rift. As Vasquez acknowledges, “the jury was permitted to know that a split between the family developed, [and] that it pertained to [Doe 1’s] grandfather and had nothing to do with appellant . . . .” Witnesses, including Vasquez, testified that that a rift in the family occurred in September 2021. The defense was free to use this evidence to argue that 18 prosecution witnesses were biased against Vasquez or that Doe 1’s family had a motive to pressure her into making her allegations. Vasquez argues that as a result of the trial court’s ruling, he “was precluded from cross-examining [Doe 1] whether her testimony was influenced by other family members.” Not so. Vasquez po