People v. Rogers CA4/1

Filed 11/6/26 P. v. Rogers CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, D086116 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCE425670) v. EARL LAMONT ROGERS, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michelle Ialeggio, Judge. Affirmed. Aimee Solway, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier, and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  Earl Lamont Rogers (aka Earl Lamont Buggs)1 appeals the order suspending execution of a prison sentence and placing him on formal probation after a jury found him guilty of several crimes involving domestic violence and of unlawful possession of ammunition. Rogers contends the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of an uncharged prior incident of domestic violence, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request redactions from two exhibits admitted at trial, and several conditions of probation are illegal. We reject these contentions and affirm the order. I. BACKGROUND A. Facts Underlying Current Charges Debra T. dated Rogers for three-and-a-half years beginning in December 2020. They had a son together in April 2023. Debra described her relationship with Rogers as “up and down. It was an emotional, verbal, physical, abusive relationship.” In May and June of 2024, Rogers, Debra, and their son were living together in a camper. When Debra returned home from work on May 31, Rogers became angry because he thought she had been withholding information and lying about another one of her children. Rogers grabbed Debra by the throat and hit her head against a wall. The next day, they argued about finances. The argument turned physical when Rogers grabbed Debra’s throat, pinned her down, and pressed his fist against her head with “so much pressure [she] thought [her] eardrum was going to pop.” He also 1 The accusatory pleadings identified appellant by the surname Buggs and listed Rogers as a surname by which he was also known. At trial and at sentencing he was called Rogers. We use that surname in this opinion. 2 threatened to stab her, took out a switchblade, and “demonstrated on a pillow how he would stab [her].” Debra was holding their son during the attack and eventually let him go. Rogers released Debra, took the child, and broke Debra’s cell phone. He then placed telephone calls to five people, put them on speaker, and told them that Debra “was trying to frame him” and “to take his son away from him.” Debra told the callees that she “was being held against [her] will” and “just wanted [Rogers] to let [her] go.” Rogers locked the door and would not let Debra leave. Later that same day, Rogers again grabbed Debra’s throat. Rogers let Debra go to work on June 3, 2024. She told her supervisor what Rogers had done to her. Debra and the supervisor developed a plan to get Debra and her son safely away from Rogers. On June 7, Debra went to a hospital with complaints of pain and forgetfulness, and her injuries were documented. Photographs were taken of redness on Debra’s neck and bruises on her arm and forearm. A nurse contacted the sheriff’s department to report domestic violence. The following day, a deputy sheriff arrested Rogers and searched the camper and Rogers’s vehicle. The deputy found ammunition in the camper and the vehicle. B. Facts Underlying Prior Incidents of Domestic Violence Before trial, the People moved to admit evidence of prior uncharged acts of domestic violence by Rogers against Debra and against former dating partner Torrie S.2 The motion described three incidents in which Rogers 2 The People invoked Evidence Code section 1109, which is an exception to the general rule that “evidence of specific instances of [a person’s] conduct[] is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.” (Id., § 1101, subd. (a).) Section 1109, subdivision (a)(1) allows “evidence of the defendant’s commission of other domestic violence” to be admitted “in a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense 3 physically abused Debra and a recorded June 4, 2015 telephone call in which he threatened Torrie. The People also sought to introduce testimony that Debra and Torrie feared Rogers because they believed he was associated with a gang and carried a gun. Rogers’s counsel urged the court to exclude the evidence under Evidence Code section 352 because, in counsel’s view, testimony that Rogers was associated with a gang and carried a gun was “extremely inflammatory,” and the evidence of prior domestic violence was “way more prejudicial than probative” and would “cause a jury to focus more on the prior instances than the current incident alleged.” The court ruled the telephone call between Torrie and Rogers qualified as domestic violence. The court allowed the People to present evidence of the prior incidents of domestic violence against Debra and Torrie, but prohibited as unduly prejudicial any testimony about Rogers’s gang association. It ruled Torrie could not testify about Rogers’s having a gun and ordered mention of a gun redacted from the recording of the June 14, 2015 telephone call. The court allowed Debra to testify that she believed Rogers had a gun. At trial, Debra recounted three incidents of abuse that occurred before the incidents that led to the charges in this case. On one occasion, Rogers got upset when he wanted to go out and Debra’s car was low on gas. He “wrapped his hand around [her] neck and [she] almost lost consciousness.” involving domestic violence . . . if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” “[T]he statute reflects the legislative judgment that in domestic violence cases, . . . similar prior offenses are ‘uniquely probative’ of guilt in a later accusation.” (People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 532 (Johnson).) Section 1109, subdivision (d)(3) incorporates the definition of “domestic violence” in Penal Code section 13700. That definition includes placing a person with whom the defendant has a child “in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury.” (Pen. Code, § 13700, subds. (a), (b).) 4 On another occasion, Debra walked away from Rogers during an argument and tried to shut a door behind her, but he forced the door open and in doing so caused her to fall backwards onto a table. Debra sustained bruises to her arms, buttocks, and a toe for which she sought medical attention. On a third occasion, Rogers became upset and started yelling at Debra after their son rolled off a bed. While Rogers held the child, he gave Debra a black eye and a “busted” lip by repeatedly poking and shoving her in the face. Torrie testified at trial about her relationship with Rogers. She met him in 2007, and they had a daughter together in October 2014. When their daughter was born, Torrie was living in Grand Junction, Colorado, and Rogers was living in Mesa, Arizona. Rogers first met his daughter on December 18, 2014, and later moved to Parachute, Colorado, to be closer to her. Torrie authenticated a recording of the June 4, 2015 telephone call. In that conversation, Rogers asked Torrie to bring the baby to see him, but she refused because the baby was asleep. Rogers became angry, shouted obscenities at Torrie, and accused her of keeping their daughter from him. Torrie repeatedly insisted that Rogers give her 72 hours’ notice before visiting their daughter. Rogers said that if he did not “see [his] daughter this weekend, all hell’s gonna break loose,” and if Torrie kept on “making it hard for [him] to see [his] daughter, [Torrie] won’t be able to see her no more.” Rogers asked Torrie whether she thought she could not “be touched” or “set up” and whether “the law” or “the cops” could “save [her].” He said: “[I]t’s nothing to come in your house. It’s nothing to jump outta any one of those bushes over there. . . . It’s easy to walk inside your salon. . . . Do you actually believe I’m gonna get scared of police and not come for you?” Rogers called Torrie a “white devil b****” and said he was “not calling her about what 5 ni**** [she was] fu**ing with.” After Rogers made additional angry and insulting remarks, Torrie terminated the call. She was afraid he would harm her and reported the call to law enforcement. C. Criminal Action The People charged Rogers with battery of a dating partner (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1)); willful infliction of corporal injury on a dating partner (id., § 273.5, subd. (a)); assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (id., § 245, subd. (a)(4)); false imprisonment by means of violence, fraud, menace, or deceit (id., §§ 236, 237, subd. (a)); and unlawful possession of ammunition (id., § 30305, subd. (b)(1)). Rogers pled not guilty to all charges, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. Before trial, the People moved to admit evidence of the prior incidents of domestic violence by Rogers against Torrie and Debra, as stated in part II.B., ante. The People also moved to admit copies of the medical records of Debra’s June 7, 2024 hospital visit. The records contained statements Debra made to the attending physician about Rogers having a black belt in taekwondo and knowing how to inflict pain without leaving visible marks. The records also included statements Debra made to a social worker about Rogers’s abusive and controlling conduct and her plan to document her injuries, to meet with a lawyer, and to escape from Rogers with her son. The People anticipated that Rogers would attack Debra’s credibility at trial by suggesting she fabricated the domestic violence incident “to gain an advantage in family court,” and they argued that once he did so her prior consistent statements in the medical records would be admissible. At the hearing on the motion, Rogers stated he had no opposition. The trial court granted the motion. 6  At trial, Debra, Torrie, the physician who examined Debra on June 7, 2024, and the deputy sheriff who arrested Rogers testified to the events summarized in parts I.A and I.B., ante. The social worker who spoke to Debra at the hospital testified about the abuse Debra had reported and the legal and other resources the social worker had told Debra were available to domestic violence victims. The recording of the June 4, 2015 telephone call between Torrie and Rogers was played for the jury and admitted into evidence over Rogers’s objections that “he ha[d] been so dirtied up and looked like a deadbeat to the jury with what has been testified to” and the recording was “not relevant to any of the current charges.” The medical records of Debra’s June 7, 2024 hospital visit were admitted into evidence without objection. Rogers did not testify and presented no evidence. During deliberations, the jury sent the court a note stating in part: “In the medical report, it states that Mr. Rogers is a black belt in Tai Kwon Do. Please confirm this.” The court responded: “The medical records have been admitted into evidence, but you will not receive any additional evidence outside of what you have already heard, and was admitted during trial.” The jury found Rogers guilty of all charges. The court sentenced him to prison for an aggregate term of four years, four months, suspended execution of the sentence, and granted formal probation for three years. The court reviewed the conditions of probation, which included service of 365 days in jail and conditions related to compliance with a curfew; search of electronic devices; participation in treatment, therapy, and counseling; and drugs, alcohol, and related assessment and treatment. Several conditions applied “if directed by the P.O.” Rogers did not object to any of the conditions. When the court asked Rogers’s counsel whether it had overlooked anything or 7 whether he had any questions, counsel said nothing and Rogers himself asked only about the time he would have to serve in custody. II. DISCUSSION Rogers seeks reversal of the order suspending execution of sentence and granting probation and remand for a new trial on three grounds. First, he contends the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting the recording of the June 4, 2015 telephone call he placed to Torrie. Second, Rogers contends his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request certain redactions from the recording and from Debra’s hospital records. Third, Rogers contends many of the conditions of probation are invalid. We consider each ground in turn. A. Admission of Recording of Telephone Call Rogers’s first ground for reversal is that the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting the recording of his June 4, 2015 telephone call with Torrie “under Evidence Code section 1109 as a prior act of domestic abuse because the threats contained in the recording did not fit the relevant definition of domestic violence.” Specifically, Rogers argues he did not put Torrie “in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury” (Pen. Code, § 13700, subd. (a), italics added) because his threats were “contingent and prospective” and “he resided in a different state or city” when he made the call. Rogers alternatively argues that even if the recording were admissible, the court should have excluded it under Evidence Code section 352 because the call was “extraordinarily inflammatory,” “had no legitimate tendency to prove any disputed fact,” and “served only to invite the jury to decide the case on the basis of anger, moral condemnation, and character-based reasoning.” We reject these arguments. 8  Rogers did not preserve for appeal his argument that the telephone call did not qualify as a prior act of domestic violence admissible under Evidence Code section 1109. We may not reverse a judgment for error in admitting evidence unless the record contains “an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion.” (Id., § 353, subd. (a), italics added.) “If the defendant objects that the evidence to be offered will show the commission of an uncharged offense, the People bear the burden of demonstrating admissibility. [Citation.] While no particular form of objection is required [citation], the objection must be made in such a way as to alert the trial court to the nature of the anticipated evidence and the basis on which exclusion is sought, and to afford the People an opportunity to establish its admissibility.” (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 906.) Rogers did not satisfy the specificity requirements for an objection. Before trial, Rogers objected that the telephone call should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because it was more prejudicial than probative and would cause the jury to focus more on prior uncharged conduct than on current charged conduct. At trial, he additionally objected to relevance. Rogers never objected in the trial court that the threats in the telephone call did not put Torrie “in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury” (Pen. Code, § 13700, subd. (a)) because the threats were “contingent and prospective” and “he resided in a different state or city” when he made the call. Had Rogers made that objection, the People might have been able to establish the imminence of the harm by eliciting testimony from 9 Torrie about Rogers’s location and his ability to carry out the threats.3 Having failed to object, Rogers forfeited the argument that the June 4, 2015 telephone call did not meet the definition of domestic violence for purposes of Evidence Code section 1109. (People v. Megown (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 157, 169 [defendant who never contended in trial court that prior acts did not constitute domestic violence within meaning of Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1) forfeited contention on appeal]; People v. Dallas (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 940, 957, fn. 20 [same as to prior acts of child abuse within meaning of Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(3)].) We reject Rogers’s contention that his objections sufficed to preserve the definitional issue for appeal because, he says, the trial court knew what it was being asked to decide. “An evidentiary objection made on one ground in a trial court does not preserve a challenge based upon a different ground in an appellate court.” (People v. Robinson (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1345, 1356.) In ruling that the June 4, 2015 telephone call qualified as an act of domestic violence, the trial court mentioned Evidence Code section 1109 and Penal Code section 13700 and stated that there was “immediacy throughout the [call],” but that did not excuse Rogers’s failure to object. After stating its ruling, the court asked, “[A]nything further that either side wants to place on the record or any questions?” If Rogers’s counsel believed the call did not qualify as domestic violence, that was the time to say so. Instead, he 3 Although the record is not entirely clear on where Rogers was when he telephoned Torrie on June 4, 2015, the recording of the call played at trial suggests he was in Grand Junction. During the call, Rogers asked Torrie, “[W]hen [their daughter] wakes up, you gonna bring her?” Torrie asked, “Bring her where?” Rogers answered, “Grand Junction.” Torrie asked, “What?” Rogers said, “I’m in Junction.” Later in the call, Torrie said, “you’re here working.” 10 answered, “No, your Honor.” Rogers acknowledges that “[t]he purpose of the forfeiture rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected.” (People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941, 946.) Application of the forfeiture rule here serves that purpose. Rogers preserved his alternative claim that the recording of the telephone call should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 by seeking exclusion on that ground in the trial court. Section 352 allows a court to “exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” Rogers contends the trial court erroneously admitted the recording because it “was significantly more prejudicial than probative.” Rogers claims the telephone call was highly emotional and contained racially provocative language, but it had no tendency to prove the charges against him because his relationships with Debra and Torrie were vastly different, the incidents of domestic violence against them were dissimilar, and the incidents occurred nine years apart. Reviewing the court’s ruling for abuse of discretion (People v. Merchant (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1192 (Merchant)), we find no error. By incorporating Evidence Code section 352, “section 1109, subdivision (a)(1) makes evidence of past domestic violence inadmissible only if the court determines that its probative value is ‘substantially outweighed’ by its prejudicial impact.” (Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 531.) The principal factor affecting the probative value of evidence of a prior uncharged act is its similarity to the act underlying the charged offense. (Ibid.) The probative value of the evidence must be balanced against: (1) the 11 inflammatory nature of the evidence; (2) the possibility of confusing the issues; (3) the remoteness in time of the prior act; and (4) the amount of time involved in introducing and refuting the evidence. (People v. Thomas (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 612, 630.) The prior incident of domestic violence against Torrie bore sufficient similarity to the current incident of domestic violence against Debra to make evidence of the prior incident probative of Rogers’s guilt of the current charges. In both incidents, Rogers became angry and threatened or inflicted violence on the mother of his child when he believed the mother was trying to keep or take the child away from him. (Cf. Merchant, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 1193 [prior act evidence that showed defendant’s pattern of control in romantic relationships was probative of guilt of current charges involving such conduct]; Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 533 [probative value of prior domestic violence incidents was great when prior and current incidents strongly suggested defendant had problem with anger management against female intimate partners when he felt rejected or challenged by them].) Although Rogers’s relationship with Debra lasted longer and was more intimate than his relationship with Torrie, those differences do not eliminate the probative value of the evidence of domestic violence against Torrie. Despite the differences, the evidence “was highly probative because it shared broad similarities with the charged conduct.” (Merchant, at p. 1192.) Also supportive of admissibility of the prior incident evidence is the fact that it came from a different victim, “which reduced the danger of fabrication” (Johnson, at p. 533) and “strengthen[ed] its probative value on propensity” (Merchant, at p. 1194, italics omitted). On the prejudice side of the scale, the June 4, 2015 telephone call contained inflammatory racial epithets (“white devil b****” and “ni****”). 12 But Rogers’s use of those epithets did not tend to evoke an emotional bias against him or invite the jury to prejudge him based on extraneous factors. (Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 534 [discussing meaning of “prejudice” in Evid. Code, § 352].) Rather, the language showed his tendency to become abusive toward the mother of his child when he believed she was trying to keep the child away from him. “ ‘Painting a person faithfully is not, of itself, unfair.’ ” (Johnson, at p. 534.) The evidence of Rogers’s prior abuse of Torrie did not unduly confuse the issues concerning his abuse of Debra that underlay the current charges because the incidents were separated by time and involved different victims and witnesses. (Id. at p. 533.) Nor did introduction of that evidence “necessitate undue consumption of time.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) The telephone call lasted approximately 16 minutes, and Torrie’s testimony took up 16 pages of the trial transcript. Finally, although nine years had passed between the incident involving Torrie and the incident involving Debra that led to the charges in this case, evidence of acts occurring less than 10 years before the charged offense is presumptively admissible. (Id., § 1109, subds. (a)(1), (e); Johnson, at p. 537.) For the reasons discussed above, we conclude the probative value of the recording of the June 4, 2015 telephone call between Rogers and Torrie was not substantially outweighed by a probability that its admission would cause undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or consumption of time. (Evid. Code, § 352.) The trial court’s decision to admit the recording was not so “palpably arbitrary, capricious and patently absurd” as to constitute an abuse of discretion. (People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1314.) B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel As a second ground for reversal, Rogers claims he was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. (U.S. Const., 6th & 13 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) He complains his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to and to seek redactions of certain content of two exhibits the People introduced at trial. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland) [appellant claiming violation of federal right to effective assistance of counsel must show deficient performance by counsel]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216 [same for violation of state right].) Specifically, Rogers faults counsel for failing to seek exclusion of: (1) several entries in Debra’s medical records4 documenting statements she made to the attending physician or to a social worker, which he argues constitute inadmissible hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1200); and (2) the racial epithets he used in the telephone call with Torrie, which he argues were more prejudicial than probative (id., § 352). Rogers argues counsel’s failures prejudiced the defense because there was a reasonable probability of a better outcome at trial absent the failures. (See Strickland, at p. 687 [appellant claiming violation of federal right to effective assistance of counsel must show prejudice]; Ledesma, at pp. 217–218 [same for violation of state right].) The burden to obtain reversal for ineffective assistance of counsel “is difficult to carry on direct appeal.” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 437.) When an appellant challenges a tactical decision by trial counsel, such as whether to object to arguably inadmissible evidence (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 415–416), there is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 4 Rogers’s appellate counsel did not request transmittal of the medical records to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.224, 8.320(e).) We requested and obtained them from the trial court. (Id., rule 8.224(d).) 14 (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689; Lucas, at p. 437.) The appellant may overcome that presumption and obtain reversal on direct appeal “ ‘only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ” (People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 676 (Jasso).) Relying on the third ground, Rogers claims that “[t]here could be no strategic reason for trial counsel not to object to the introduction of [the] inadmissible hearsay [in the medical records,] which bolstered [Debra’s] credibility,” or to the introduction of the “racially inflammatory language” in the telephone call with Torrie. We are not persuaded. As for the medical records of Debra’s visit to the hospital on June 7, 2024, trial counsel reasonably could have concluded that a hearsay objection and a request for redactions would have served no useful purpose. The entries by the social worker that Rogers faults trial counsel for failing to seek to exclude documented the social worker’s conversation with Debra about the recent incidents of domestic violence by Rogers, Debra’s meeting with a lawyer to develop a plan to document her injuries and to escape from Rogers with her son, and the legal and other resources available to help Debra execute the plan. Those entries largely duplicated testimony that Debra and the social worker gave at trial. Counsel may have decided the admission of hearsay that was merely cumulative to properly admitted testimony was harmless and not worth an objection. (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1061 [failure to object to cumulative evidence was harmless].) The entry by the physician that Rogers faults counsel for failing to seek to exclude documented Debra’s report that Rogers “is a black belt in [t]aekwondo and knows how to inflict pain without leaving marks.” Neither 15 Debra nor the physician testified to those facts at trial. “[D]efense counsel reasonably might have chosen for tactical reasons not to object [to the hearsay in the medical records] because [Debra was] available for recall . . . and thus could have testified directly about these matters.” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1121.) As for the racial epithets in the June 4, 2015 telephone call Rogers placed to Torrie, trial counsel reasonably could have decided a request for redactions was unlikely to be granted. Counsel asked the court to exclude the entire call and any related testimony from Torrie on the ground the evidence was “way more prejudicial than probative.” The court found the evidence had “very high” probative value and denied that request, but the court did exclude as unduly prejudicial any mention by Torrie of Rogers’s gang association or gun possession and ordered mention of a gun redacted from the call. Given those rulings, it was unlikely the court would order redactions of the racial epithets even if asked to do so. As we explained earlier, the call was probative of Rogers’s guilt of the current charges because in both instances of domestic violence he became angry and threatened violence against the mother of his child when he believed the mother was trying to keep or take the child away from him. Rogers’s use of racial epithets showed the abusive and threatening nature of the call that made it admissible as a prior act of domestic violence. (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1), (d)(3); Pen. Code, § 13700, subds. (a), (b).) Although we agree with Rogers that such racially inflammatory language could offend the jury, his use of that language to describe others was not unduly prejudicial within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352 because it did not tend “to evoke an emotional bias against [him] because of extraneous factors unrelated to the issues.” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 128.) Since the trial 16 court was unlikely to order redactions of the racial epithets from the call, we reject Rogers’s claim that “there could be no strategic reason not to object to racially inflammatory language in that recording.” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387 [counsel need not “make motions or objections that counsel reasonably determines would be futile”].) In sum, we conclude that because the decision whether to object to certain evidence “is inherently tactical” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 502 (Hillhouse)) and trial counsel could have had tactical reasons for not objecting to the racially inflammatory language in the telephone call and the hearsay in the medical records, “[t]his is not one of the ‘rare’ cases in which we can resolve [the claim of ineffective assistance] on direct appeal” (Jasso, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 676). C. Conditions of Probation Rogers’s third and final ground for reversal is that several of the probation conditions the trial court imposed are unlawful. The conditions he challenges relate to curfew; search of electronic devices; participation in treatment, therapy, and counseling; use and possession of alcohol and controlled substances; and assessment and treatment for substance use. Rogers argues those conditions are invalid because they have no relationship to the crimes of which he was convicted, involve conduct that is not itself criminal, and are not reasonably related to prevention of future criminality. (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent).) He also argues the conditions requiring him to participate in treatment, therapy, or counseling, including for substance use, if directed by the probation officer unconstitutionally delegate judicial power to the probation officer. (See Cal. Const., art. III, § 3 [“The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may 17 not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution”].) Rogers asks us to strike the invalid probation conditions or, alternatively, to remand the matter for further proceedings. Rogers did not preserve for appeal his challenge based on Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481. Failure to object to a probation condition in the trial court on the ground that it is unreasonable under Lent forfeits the claim for appeal. (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 404, fn. 7; People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237 (Welch).) “A timely objection allows the court to modify or delete an allegedly unreasonable condition or to explain why it is necessary in the particular case. The parties must, of course, be given a reasonable opportunity to present any relevant argument and evidence. A rule foreclosing appellate review of claims not timely raised in this manner helps discourage the imposition of invalid probation conditions and reduce the number of costly appeals brought on that basis.” (Welch, at p. 235.) The rationale for the forfeiture rule applies to this case. After the trial court announced the conditions of probation it was imposing, the court asked Rogers’s counsel whether it had overlooked anything or whether he had any questions. Rogers himself asked only about the amount of time he would have to serve in custody, and counsel said nothing. On this record, Rogers forfeited this challenge. Rogers resists our conclusion by asserting his trial counsel had no opportunity to object to any particular probation condition at the sentencing hearing. That assertion is contrary to the record. As we stated above, the trial court invited comment from Rogers’s counsel, but he made none. We also note the probation officer wrote in her report that she reviewed the general conditions of probation with Rogers; he “agreed to abide by those conditions as well as any other specific conditions set forth by the [c]ourt”; 18 and he understood “testing, search, and counseling conditions may be imposed as conditions of probation and [was] willing to follow these conditions should probation be granted.” We are satisfied that Rogers and his counsel had “a reasonable opportunity to present any relevant argument and evidence” on the validity of the probation conditions the court imposed. (Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 235.) Rogers invites us to reach the merits of his challenge to the probation conditions despite any forfeiture for failure to object to them because “that failure deprived [him] of effective assistance of counsel.” He argues “[t]here could be no legitimate reason for failing to object to improper conditions” but does not further develop the argument factually or legally. We need not consider such an undeveloped argument. (People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 128; Woods v. Horton (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 658, 677.) In any event, the record suggests two satisfactory reasons why trial counsel may not have objected to the probation conditions: (1) Rogers told the probation officer he was willing to comply with them; and (2) counsel reasonably could have concluded that without all the conditions the court would not have granted probation and instead would have sentenced him to prison as recommended by the probation officer and requested by the prosecutor. (People v. Kendrick (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 769, 779.) On this record, Rogers has not established that counsel’s failure to object to the probation conditions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel warranting relief on direct appeal. (Jasso, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 676; Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 502.) The parties agree that no objection in the trial court was required for Rogers to preserve his appellate claim that the probation conditions requiring participation in substance abuse or mental health treatment programs if 19 directed by the probation officer unconstitutionally delegated judicial power to the probation officer. Failure to object does not forfeit a challenge to a “facial constitutional defect in the relevant probation condition” because the challenge “ ‘present[s] “pure questions of law that can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887, 889.) On the merits, Rogers argues the conditions are invalid because they “gave probation unfettered discretion to select almost any type of counseling, rehabilitation, or treatment program – ‘psychiatric.’ ‘individual,’ ‘group,’ ‘dual diagnosis,’ or ‘cognitive behavioral’ programming.” He says the conditions “must be modified to require the trial court — not the probation department — to specify the nature and type of any treatment Rogers may be required to complete.” We disagree. The challenged conditions are a reasonable delegation of authority. A trial court that grants probation is required to delegate authority to the probation officer by “plac[ing] the defendant or probationer in and under the charge of the probation officer of the court, for the period or term fixed for probation.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j).) The “ ‘court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation.’ ” (In re David C. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657, 669.) When a court orders participation in rehabilitative programs as a condition of probation, as a practical matter the probation officer must have discretion to select the particular program. “The trial court is poorly equipped to micromanage selection of a program, both because it lacks the ability to remain apprised of currently available programs and, more fundamentally, because entry into a particular program may depend on mercurial questions of timing and availability.” (People v. 20 Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 308.) Delegation of authority to require participation in a particular rehabilitative program does not “place the defendant completely at the mercy of the probation department.” (Ibid.) The probation officer must exercise the delegated authority reasonably. (People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240–1241.) If Rogers comes to believe his probation officer has not done so, he may “seek judicial intervention—by moving to modify the probation order, if nothing else—if and when the probation officer seeks to exercise the delegated authority.” (Penoli, at p. 308; see People v. Keele (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 701, 708 [trial court retains jurisdiction to review reasonableness of probation officer’s actions and to modify conditions of probation].) We further note that Rogers has not challenged a related probation condition requiring him to “[p]articipate and comply with any assessment program if directed by the [probation officer].” His acquiescence in that condition effectively concedes that the trial court properly delegated the authority to select tests designed to identify his rehabilitative needs. It would make little sense to withhold a concomitant delegation