Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Perrot CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A173266 v. (Humboldt County SHAWN LEE PERROT, Super. Ct. No. CR2500764) Defendant and Appellant. Perrot was convicted of various felony offenses against child victims, including forcible rape. For these offenses, he was sentenced to a determinate prison term of 21 years, and served 16 years. Prior to his release from prison, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) initiated Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) civil commitment proceedings against him.1 1 Under Welfare & Institutions Code, § 6601, subdivision (a)(1), “[w]hen the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation determines that an individual who is in custody under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . may be a sexually violent predator, the secretary shall . . . refer the person for evaluation in accordance with this section.” A sexually violent predator is defined as “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he 1 Upon his September 2020 release from prison, Perrot was transferred to jail pending resolution of the SVP proceedings. In April 2022, the SVP proceedings were dismissed, and Perrot was released into the community on parole. In 2025, Perrot violated the terms of his parole, and the trial court imposed a custodial sanction of 120 days in jail. Before he completed his 120-day jail term, the trial court released Perrot on bond pending appeal. On appeal, Perrot contends that: (1) under Penal Code section 4019,2 he is entitled to conduct credits accrued while he was in jail pending resolution of the SVP proceedings; (2) denying him conduct credits, while granting them to other parolees whose unjustified custody was later invalidated, violates equal protection; and (3) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce any sanction (that is, his remaining jail term) because his parole term had expired at the time of the alleged violation. We affirm. I. “In June 2004, a Humboldt County jury convicted Perrot of two counts of forcible rape; three counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child of 14 or 15 years of age; five counts of unlawful sexual intercourse (statutory rape); one count of distribution of lewd material to a minor; and one count of committing a forcible lewd act (oral copulation) on a child. (People v. Perrot (May 17, 2006, A107378) [nonpub. opn.] (Perrot I).)” (People v. Perrot (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 795, 801 (Perrot II).) “He was later sentenced to a total of 21 years in prison.” (Perrot II, at p. 801.)3 or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(1).) 2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the record in Perrot II. 2 In September 2020, Perrot was released from state prison. (Perrot II, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 801.) Prior to his anticipated release date, Perrot’s parole agent at the Division of Adult Parole Operations (DAPO) reviewed his case to determine what parole conditions should apply upon his release.4 In July of 2020, Perrot was asked to sign a Notice of Parole Conditions (NOC) and Special Parole Conditions (SCOP). He refused to sign and was released to Humboldt County Jail.5 The CDCR initiated SVP civil commitment proceedings against him while he was in jail, and he remained in custody there until April 2022. At that point, the SVP proceedings were dismissed, Perrot signed the NOC and SCOP, and he was released into the community.6 The following year, in July of 2023, the DAPO filed a petition for parole revocation. (See Perrot II, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 802–803.) The trial court revoked Perrot’s parole and ordered a 60-day jail term. (Id. at p. 805.) In Perrot II, 4 See Exhibit F (Office of Grievances Decision November 16, 2022) in support of return to order to show cause in In re Perrot, Humboldt County Superior Court CR2300941, which is part of the record in Perrot II. 5 Ibid. 6 At oral argument, Perrot went beyond the record and told us the trial court “made a factual finding” that the SVP petition filed against him was based on “records that had nothing to do with me” and was ultimately dismissed because it was mistakenly filed. Because there could be any number of explanations for the dismissal other than mistake, we need not and do not accept this representation. If we apply the usual presumption of regularity in official conduct, the state may simply have determined it might have difficulty proving that Perrot suffers from the kind of “ ‘[d]iagnosed mental disorder’ ” necessary to justify his commitment as a sexual predator. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (c).) According to the Attorney General, Perrot was released to jail during a period in which he was an “SVP candidate.” We have no reason to doubt that he was legitimately considered such a candidate. 3 we affirmed this revocation order, rejecting Perrot’s challenges to the constitutional validity of various parole conditions. (Id. at pp. 806–816.) In April 2025, after Perrot was again released into the community on parole, the DAPO filed a second petition for revocation alleging unauthorized use and activities on an electronic communication device and electronic media and failure to inform his parole agent upon activation of social media platforms. Perrot filed a motion to dismiss the second revocation petition arguing that, under section 4019, subdivision (a)(1), he should be awarded conduct credits for the period between September 2020 and April 2022 when he was “ ‘confined in or committed to a county jail’ ‘under a judgement of imprisonment,’ ” and that, taking into account conduct credits from that period, his parole term was completed on February 24, 2024. On April 23, 2025, the trial court denied Perrot’s motion to dismiss the petition. The trial court stated: “[T]he proceedings [for] which Mr. Perrot was in custody, those SVP proceedings, were civil. It was a civil commitment and not criminal. . . . And 4019 is clear that it does apply to a criminal action or proceeding. That’s under 4019 Subsection (a) . . . (1) and Subsection (a) . . . (2). [¶] So . . . the Court’s ruling . . . is to deny that motion to dismiss the petition to revoke parole.” Later that day, Perrot admitted to one of the allegations in the petition. The trial court found that he violated the terms of his parole, imposed a custodial sanction of 120 days in jail, and credited him 25 days of actual time served and 24 days of conduct credits. Perrot pursues this appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss in propria persona. He filed a successful motion for bail pending appeal under section 1272, and on May 7, 2025, was released from custody. The parties agree that the expiration of Perrot’s parole does not moot the appeal, as do 4 we. Because Perrot has not completed his 120-day jail term,7 it is technically possible for this court to grant him effectual relief. (People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 645.) II. A. Perrot’s chief claim on appeal rests on a statutory interpretation argument. As he articulates this argument, “[u]nder [Penal Code] section 3000(a)(4)(B), because [he] was not committed to the Department of State Hospitals [DSH], ‘the tolling of the parole period shall be abrogated, and the parole period shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of release from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.’ (Emphasis added.) By operation of statute,” Perrot contends, his parole began on September 11, 2020, and “[o]nce parole commenced, California law required that both actual days in custody and conduct credits earned during that period reduce the length of the parole term.” For the time he says he was “on parole” while in Humbolt County Jail—a status that is arguably an oxymoron, since parolees are generally released from custody into the community—he claims entitlement both to custody credits (§ 2900.5, subd. (a)) and good conduct credits against his parole term (id., subd. (c)). 7 On December 19, 2025, Perrot requested that this court take judicial notice of: (1) a release date calculation dated August 4, 2020 (Exhibit A); (2) a letter dated July 9, 2020, regarding credits to people in CDCR custody (Exhibit B); (3) a worksheet calculating his controlling discharge date from parole (Exhibit C); and (4) a reply filed by the Attorney General in support of CDCR’s demurrer to Perrot’s petition for writ of mandate (Exhibit D). We grant Perrot’s unopposed request as to the one-page calculation worksheet contained in Exhibit C under Evidence Code section 452 and otherwise deny it for lack of relevance to our resolution of this appeal. 5 The reasons for the unusual circumstance of Perrot’s release to jail rather than to DSH as of September 2020 are unclear. It may be that this came about because there were no available beds at a DSH hospital and he was ordered to remain in custody at Humbolt County Jail until the SVP charges against him were decided. That is what Perrot claimed at oral argument, without pointing to anything in the record to support the assertion. The People, on the other hand, argued in the trial court that “Mr. Perrot chose to sit in jail while he addressed the civil commitment[,]” but nothing in the record before us supports that assertion either.8 The lack of clarity in the record on this point must be charged against Perrot since as the appellant he bears the burden of proof to show error, and in doing so, it is elementary that he must provide a record that is complete enough for us to decide his appeal. We decline to speculate about his legal status from September 2020 to April 2022. Perrot’s precise status while he was in jail is certainly material to the error he asserts, since, without seeing the order sending him to jail—and without any way to determine why that order was made—it is difficult to discern whether, during his jail stay, he may be considered someone who was serving “a term of imprisonment” within the meaning of section 2900.5, subdivision (c). All we can discern from the limited record Perrot has given us is that (1) he refused to sign his parole conditions in July 2020; (2) an SVP petition 8 Under the SVP procedural scheme (Health & Safety Code, § 6600 et seq.), no inmate facing an SVP petition may be sent to a state hospital pending its resolution until a judge makes a finding of good cause (id., § 6602), and when such a finding is made, the judge must send the inmate to a “secure facility” (id., § 6601.5). What weight, if any, an inmate’s choice of placement should be given—a hospital or jail—is not clear under this statutory scheme. There is nothing in the present record concerning the probable cause hearing that took place in this case. 6 (which we do not have) was filed against him in late August 2020 and he was released from prison and sent to jail rather than to a DSH hospital in early September 2020 (for reasons we do not know, other than that an SVP petition was pending); (3) in April 2022, (a) the SVP petition was dismissed (for reasons that are unclear), (b) he signed his parole conditions (why at that time rather than some previous time is unclear), (c) he was released on parole into the community subject to DAPO’s supervision; and (4) following his release into the community, he has been found to have violated his parole conditions twice, once in 2023 and once in 2025. Perrot now seeks to convince us that, for the most recent of his parole violations, the Superior Court no longer had power to hold him accountable because, if his claimed good conduct credits are taken into account for the period while he was in jail, his parole term had expired by the time the violation took place. We see a number of problems with this argument, factually and legally. Preliminarily, we are not persuaded that Perrot’s status while in jail was comparable to that of a person under a criminal sentence of imprisonment, a pretrial criminal detainee, or, indeed, anyone else in coercive detention. Because Perrot has given us nothing to disprove the Attorney General’s assertion that there was at least some element of choice in his September 2020 through April 2022 jail placement, he has failed to persuade us, factually, that he may be compared to someone who landed in jail purely under the coercive power of the state. In short, in circumstances where the Attorney General claims Perrot chose to “sit in jail” during the pendency of his SVP proceedings, we cannot discern from the record what actually explains why he was in jail rather than confined in a state hospital. 7 But that is ultimately immaterial. Whether Perrot was in jail by coercion or by choice, we do not find his statutory interpretation argument to be persuasive. We decline to hold that, while Perrot was awaiting the resolution of the SVP proceedings against him—proceedings which were civil in nature—he was serving a “term of imprisonment” within the meaning of section 2900.5, subdivision (c). His contrary argument hinges on an aggressively broad reading of the word “abrogate” in section 3000, subdivision (a)(4)(B). In response to the Attorney General’s contention that, since SVP status is civil in nature and thus that those in jail pending an SVP proceeding are not entitled to the conduct credits that criminal detainees receive, Perrot’s rejoinder is that, “[b]ecause abrogation nullifies tolling entirely, no legal effect can survive from the period during which tolling was previously believed to apply.” Under this textualist-style argument, because the “ ‘civil custody’ characterization” of his detention “depended entirely on the existence of a pending SVP petition,” the tolling that might otherwise have applied during the period he was in jail should be treated as if it “never existed.” The logic at the last step of Perrot’s statutory interpretation argument—focusing on the “legal effect” of abrogation beyond the elimination of tolling—is murky. Not only is it divorced from statutory context and structure, but it lacks any case law support. His opening brief cites three cases, People v. Sosa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 891, 896, People v. Superior Court (Lavi) (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164, 1173, and Conlan v. Bonta (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 745, 753. He first claims that Sosa “explained that when a statutory provision is abrogated, its prior legal effect is extinguished.” But there is no such case, either at the reported volume and 8 page, or so far as we can discern, anywhere else.9 Perrot next claims that Lavi “recognized that the elimination of a legal category necessarily eliminates all effects tied to that category.” The Lavi case does exist, but it recognized nothing of the sort, either at the pin-cited page or anywhere else. Finally, Perrot claims that Conlan “held that when a statute extinguishes a legal status, it extinguishes all collateral consequences attached to that status.” This is another unsupported statement of law. Conlan held nothing of the sort, either at the pin-cited page or anywhere else. Perrot, a non-lawyer, is representing himself in this case, but that is no excuse. Any attorney who gave us phantom legal citations (through use of AI or otherwise) would likely face an order to show cause re sanctions. (See Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing, LLC (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 60, 75– 79.) Perrot was advised in the order allowing him to proceed pro se that he would be held to the same standards of conduct we expect from members of the Bar, and he has not heeded that admonition. Now, to be sure, we appreciate the potential gravity of arguments about entitlement to credits from people who are or have been incarcerated. But what we do not appreciate—in this case, or in any other, criminal or civil—is having to spend valuable court time and resources giving serious consideration to arguments that ultimately turn out to be based on misrepresentations of fact (e.g., Zand v. Sukumar (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 1144) or law (e.g., Estate 9 Perhaps Perrot intended to cite In re Sosa (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 1002, which held that people who had been sentenced under the Indeterminate Sentence Law were entitled to have presentence credits applied against their term of parole. (Id. at p. 1006.) But whatever relevance the case might have for other parts of Perrot’s argument, it does not address abrogation of a statutory provision. The case at 34 Cal.3d 891 is In re Strick, but it likewise does not concern abrogation and we are unable to discern the relevance of the opinion to the issue Perrot raises. 9 of Kempton (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 189). Perrot is skating close to this line, and should bear that in mind in considering what he wishes to say in any petition for rehearing. When pressed about the dearth of case law support for his position at oral argument, Perrot conceded there is none, and ultimately resorted to the position that his argument boils down to a “reasonable interpretation” of section 3000, subdivision (a)(4)(B). We are not convinced it is reasonable on this record. Perrot has failed to provide any support for his proffered interpretation in any statute that affirmatively authorizes ameliorative prison credits (§§ 4019, 2900.5), which is undoubtedly why he relies so heavily on the word “abrogate” in section 3000, subdivision (a)(4)(B). Only by offering up a novel argument that strains the abstract meaning of that word to its limit is he able to achieve his desired result indirectly, using a sort of interpretive “bank shot” based on a statute that is not designed to address credits. Because neither the record nor the case law Perrot relies upon supports his statutory interpretation argument, we reject it. He has not sustained his burden to show error. B. As a back-up argument, Perrot makes an equal protection claim. He contends that that denying him conduct credits, while granting them to other parolees whose unjustified custody was later invalidated, violates equal protection. We disagree. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) The leading case here is People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 847 (Hardin). As the Hardin court explained, “[t]his provision is 10 ‘essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “ ‘At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures that the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some justification.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The Hardin court clarified the governing analytical framework for evaluating equal protection claims. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 851.) It explained: “In the past, our cases have set out a two-part inquiry to evaluate equal protection claims. ‘We first ask whether the state adopted a classification affecting two or more groups that are similarly situated in an unequal manner. [Citation.] If we deem the groups at issue similarly situated in all material respects, we consider whether the challenged classification’ is adequately justified. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 848.) Departing from this two-part inquiry in certain cases, our Supreme Court held that, “when plaintiffs challenge laws drawing distinctions between identifiable groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the distinctions drawn are inconsistent with equal protection, courts no longer need to ask at the threshold whether the two groups are similarly situated for purposes of the law in question.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 850.) In such cases, “[t]he only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard of review.” (Id. at pp. 850–851.) Hardin did not, however, change the framework in “cases that do not involve challenges to classifications appearing on the face of the law.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 851.) In as applied equal protection challenges, we continue to “ask whether a person has been treated differently from another person similarly situated is typically how we determine whether a person has been treated differently on the basis of 11 group membership or another actionable basis.” (Ibid.) Here, because Perrot does not challenge a classification appearing on the face of section 4019, the question we ask at the first step of the analysis here is “ ‘whether the state adopted a classification affecting two or more groups that are similarly situated in an unequal manner.’ ” (See Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 847, 851.) We conclude that, on this record, it did not. Perrot asserts that he is similarly situated to “[p]arolees whose custodial holds are dismissed” as unjustified who receive conduct credits under section 4019.10 But he does not identify any subdivision of section 4019 that treats members of this group differently by awarding them conduct credits. Instead, Perrot relies primarily on two cases, neither of which discusses section 4019 or otherwise demonstrates that members of this group are awarded the conduct credit that he seeks. The first case, In re Reina (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 638, did not involve parolees who received conduct credits for custodial holds that were ultimately dismissed as unjustified. (See id. at p. 640.) And while the defendant in the second case, In re Kemper (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 434, was at one point placed in custody on a parole hold on charges that were later dismissed, the holding in that case does not address conduct credit for a 10 In his reply brief, Perrot asserts that he was similarly situated, for credit purposes, to other parolees and detainees whose custody occurs during a running sentence or parole term and whose credits may affect the duration of restraint. To the extent that he is referring to a different group than the group he identified in his opening brief, he forfeited the argument by raising it for the first time in reply. (See Malmquist v. City of Folsom (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1205, fn. 6 [arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited].) For the same reason, he forfeited all other arguments that he raised for the first time on reply, including his argument that returning him to custody for the unserved portion of his parole- revocation sanction would be an abuse of discretion. 12 period of custody while on parole. (See id. at pp. 437–440.) It also rests on the now outdated requirement that, in equal protection cases challenging classifications in the parole system, the state must demonstrate a compelling interest to justify classifications that result in deprivations of liberty.11 Thus, Perrot’s reliance on Reina and Kemper is misplaced. We have a hard time envisioning any remotely similar group in the civil realm. At oral argument, Perrot pointed to jailed parolees charged with civil contempt for refusing to testify in parole revocation proceedings where the charges are ultimately dropped, but we reject that comparison out of hand. Not only does it fail to take into account the risks to public safety that those who are charged with having committed qualifying SVP offenses pose, but since Perrot has provided no factual support for his contention that this hypothetical comparator group in fact receives both custody and conduct credits. Moving our focus to the criminal realm, Perrot attempts to claim he is similarly situated to “any individual who completes their prison sentence and is extradited [sic]12 to county jail to face new charges, only to have those charges dismissed.” We do not know, precisely, who he is describing here. We might imagine such a group—say, inmates released from CDCR to jail 11 In re Kemper, supra, 112 Cal.App.3d at p. 439 (relying on People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 244]; see In re Thai (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 1, 20 (“the holding in Olivas has been limited by subsequent decisional law”). 12 Extradition is a process under which a country or a state asks another country or state to surrender and move a prisoner across international or state lines for criminal prosecution in the requesting jurisdiction. (See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer (1933) 290 U.S. 276, 286 [international]; Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police (1917) 245 U.S. 128, 130 [domestic].) Since nothing in Perrot’s case involves that process, persons subject to it cannot provide a basis for comparison. We presume Perrot means to use the word “transfer.” 13 on an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) hold—but we have no obligation to develop Perrot’s argument for him by undertaking our own research, looking for some group of individuals who are sent to jail following release from CDCR’s custody who are entitled to both day-for-day custody credits and good time credits for their time in jail detention. We are left to speculate whether any such group exists. People v. Yang (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 120, a case Perrot mentions in a string cite for the general principle that “California courts have repeatedly invalidated credit schemes that award custody or conduct credits to one group of detainees while withholding the same credits from another group that is not meaningfully different for purposes of the statute,” is somewhat illuminating, but only in order to demonstrate what Perrot has not shown here. In Yang, our colleagues in Division Three upheld an equal protection challenge by a defendant who was hospitalized prior to trial on the ground he was incompetent to stand trial (IST) under section 1368. Defendant Yang pointed out that the Legislature has made specific provision for pretrial IST defendants who are being treated for restoration of competence while in jail. (People v. Yang, supra, 78 Cal. App.5th at pp. 125–128.) He argued, successfully, that it was an equal protection violation to withhold conduct credits from him during the period he was in the hospital for restoration of sanity, while granting such credits to pretrial IST detainees who are being treated in jail. (Id. at pp. 128–138.) Perrot points to no such arbitrary classification on this record when we compare him to some other group.13 13 We tend to agree with the Attorney General that, if anything, Yang undercuts Perrot’s position since it demonstrates that, where the 14 Without knowing that there is a constitutionally comparable group who receives the conduct credits Perrot claims he was wrongfully denied— and who exactly is in it—the question whether there is a rational basis for the differential treatment is almost impossibly abstract. We note, however, that the Legislature has recognized the heightened safety risks posed by people who face SVP petitions, and that recognition may furnish a rational explanation for its enactment of a statutory scheme under which the only ameliorative treatment SVP detainees meeting this description are entitled to receive upon the withdrawal of a petition is fully set forth in section 3000(a)(4)(B) as that statute was interpreted by the trial court, even though others who are detained in jail until the withdrawal of other kinds of charges might be treated better under other statutes. Thus, Perrot has not carried his burden at the second, justification step of the equal protection analysis as well. Accordingly, Perrot has not shown error, either as a matter of statutory interpretation or constitutional right.14 Legislature wishes to authorize conduct credits for jail detainees who have some sort of dual status during pre-conviction or post-conviction incarceration, it has expressly and specially enacted authorizing legislation to accomplish that goal. But while the AG’s point here is suggestive of the correct analysis, it is not dispositive since the Legislature has also specifically provided for the opposite. See section 4019, subd. (i)(1) [parolees receive no conduct credits for flash incarceration].) 14 We see no need for distinct treatment of the third strand of Perrot’s arguments on appeal—that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce any parole revocation sanction against him because his parole term had expired when the alleged violation took place—since the premise of this argument is that, either as a statutory matter or as a constitutional matter, he was entitled to credits that he did not receive. That premise fails, for the reasons we have already explained. 15 III.DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. STREETER, J. WE CONCUR: BROWN, P. J. GOLDMAN, J. 16