People v. Renfroe CA2/2

Filed 11/13/26 P. v. Renfroe CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, B346883 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County v. Super. Ct. No. XSONA031863-01) BOBBY RENFROE, JR., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Judith Levey Meyer, Judge. Affirmed. Keilana Truong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and John Yang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _______________________________ In 1998, Bobby Renfroe, Jr., and a codefendant, Daniel Norman, were convicted of murder, robbery, and related crimes. Renfroe now appeals the trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1172.61 petition for resentencing. The court summarily denied the petition on the ground Renfroe was the actual killer and therefore ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Although the court erred in failing to appoint counsel for Renfroe, the error was harmless. We therefore affirm. FACTUAL BACKGROUND We draw this background from the opinion in Renfroe’s direct appeal, People v. Renfroe (Nov. 8, 1999, B123048) [nonpub. opn.] (Renfroe). (See People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 723, fn. 4.) In April 1997, defendants Renfroe and Norman robbed Jeff Perry, a known drug dealer. Perry was inside his apartment with a friend, Giacomo Candela. Defendants accosted Perry’s girlfriend at gunpoint outside the apartment door. Renfroe carried a small revolver, while Norman had a semiautomatic weapon that appeared to be an Uzi. Hearing screams outside the door, Perry and Candela rushed toward it. At the same time, either Renfroe or Norman opened the door and immediately shot Candela in the chest. They demanded money from Perry at gunpoint, and Perry gave them $4,800 from his safe. Perry and defendants went to Perry’s car to get more money, but Perry escaped. Candela died about two hours later from internal bleeding. An autopsy showed he suffered a single gunshot wound to his chest. Renfroe told a friend on the night of the incident that he shot Candela twice in the chest because he thought Candela had a gun. 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2  PROCEDURAL HISTORY In October 1997, defendants Renfroe and Norman were charged with: the murder of Candela (count 1; § 187, subd. (a)) with the special circumstances that it was committed during a residential burglary and a residential robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)); first degree residential robbery of Candela (count 2; § 211); first degree residential robbery of Perry (count 3; § 211); assault with a firearm (count 4; § 245, subd. (a)(2)); and first degree residential burglary (count 5; § 459). It was further alleged as to each of those counts that defendants personally used a firearm. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1).) As to counts 2 and 5, it was alleged defendants personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Candela. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) Norman alone was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon (count 6; former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The jury trial occurred in spring 1998. The theory of the prosecution was that Renfroe shot Candela. Among other things, evidence at trial showed no shell casings were found at the scene. That was consistent with the shooter’s use of a revolver (like the one carried by Renfroe that night), because that type of firearm does not automatically eject casings. Renfroe’s defense focused on undermining the prosecution’s evidence, particularly by discrediting the witnesses who implicated him. During a conference regarding the jury instructions, count 2 was dismissed as to both defendants pursuant to the People’s motion. The People also dismissed the great bodily injury enhancement as to Norman, because that could not “be obtained by an aiding and abetting theory” and “should be only as to [Renfroe], who personally inflicted” the injury. 3  The jury convicted both defendants. They found each guilty of: first degree murder (count 1) with personal use of a firearm and two special circumstances; first degree residential robbery (count 3); assault with a firearm (count 4); and first degree residential burglary (count 5). As to counts 3, 4, and 5, the jury determined defendants personally used a firearm. Norman was also convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon (count 6). Finally, the jury expressly found true that in count 5, Renfroe “personally inflicted great . . . bodily harm upon [Candela].” The trial court sentenced Renfroe to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) plus 33 years four months, comprising: (1) the LWOP base term for count 1, plus the upper term of 10 years for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)); (2) a consecutive one-year term for count 4, plus three years four months (ibid.); and (3) a consecutive upper term of six years for count 5, plus the upper term of 10 years (ibid.), plus three years for the great bodily harm enhancement (§ 12022.7). The court also imposed and stayed a concurrent four-year midterm on count 3 with a four-year midterm firearm enhancement. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1).) At sentencing, the court repeatedly observed Renfroe “was the dominant participant” in the Candela murder, and “was the one who . . . shot and killed [Candela].” Renfroe’s conviction was affirmed on appeal in 1999. (See Renfroe, supra, B123048.) In May 2025, Renfroe filed a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. He verified under penalty of perjury that his petition was true, averred he met the eligibility criteria, and requested appointment of counsel. 4  Later that month, the trial court summarily denied the petition without appointing counsel or receiving additional briefing. It determined Renfroe was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because “[p]ursuant to the jury instructions and verdict forms, [Renfroe] was found to be the direct shooter during a felony murder situation.” Renfroe timely appealed. (See § 1237, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a).) DISCUSSION I. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Appoint Counsel In recent years, our Legislature has eliminated liability for certain theories of murder not requiring proof of actual malice on the part of the defendant—specifically, the “natural and probable consequences” doctrine and aspects of the felony murder rule. (Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2017, ch. 1015, § 1, subds. (f)–(g); see People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223.) It also allowed defendants convicted pursuant to those eliminated theories to seek resentencing relief retroactively. (Stats. 2017, ch. 1015, § 4; Delgadillo, at p. 223 & fn. 3.) A defendant, like Renfroe, seeking resentencing first files a petition, which includes a declaration stating he meets all the eligibility conditions: that a charging document allowed the prosecution to proceed against him using an imputed malice theory, he was convicted of murder, and he “could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3).) The trial court then quickly screens the petition to determine its facial compliance with section 1172.6. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 968–970 (Lewis).) “[P]etitioners who file a complying petition requesting counsel are to receive counsel 5 upon the filing of a compliant petition.” (Id. at p. 963; see People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 559 (Patton).) Renfroe’s petition facially complied with the requirements of section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(1), and he requested counsel. That triggered the trial court’s obligation to grant his request for counsel. (See Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 562; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 963.) Rather than doing so, the court prematurely decided Renfroe was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. That was error because at this stage, the petition’s “ ‘substantive merit’ is not the question.” (Patton, at p. 562.) We therefore agree with the parties that the court erred in summarily denying Renfroe’s facially sufficient petition without granting his request for counsel. Nevertheless, we affirm the trial court’s order because Renfroe has not shown any prejudice. II. The Error Was Harmless When a section 1172.6 petition is summarily denied, the petitioner “ ‘has the burden of showing “it is reasonably probable that if [he or she] had been afforded assistance of counsel[,] his [or her] petition would not have been summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974, second brackets added; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Renfroe cannot carry that burden here because the record shows he is Candela’s actual killer and therefore ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. When “the record of conviction conclusively establishes . . . the petitioner was the actual killer,” he is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14 (Lopez); see also § 189, subd. (e)(1).) “[W]e may look to the jury’s verdicts, and the factual findings they 6 necessarily reflect, to determine whether the record of conviction refutes the factual allegations in [Renfroe’s] petition” regarding eligibility. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 465.) If the jury made a factual finding the petitioner was the actual killer, we must give effect to that finding. (Ibid.; see also People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 715–716 [discussing principles of issue preclusion].) Doing so does not involve “ ‘ “weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion,” ’ ” but “simply ‘distinguish[es] petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless’ based on [existing] findings.” (Curiel, at p. 465.) The jury’s unanimous verdict that Renfroe “personally inflicted great . . . bodily harm upon [Candela]” means it necessarily found he was Candela’s actual killer. Candela’s only injury was one gunshot wound to the chest. There was no evidence of any other injury, let alone any great bodily injuries. Renfroe argues the jury was never asked to identify “the type of injury [Renfroe] personally inflicted,” nor to “determine which defendant discharged the firearm.” But that is beside the point here. On this record, the jury’s finding that Renfroe “ ‘personally inflicted great bodily injury’ on [Candela]’ ” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 55 (Harden)) means the jury necessarily found Renfroe shot Candela and was his actual killer. Moreover, the People’s theory of the case was that Renfroe was the shooter. The prosecutor made that argument to the jury, and the theory was supported by witness testimony and physical evidence. Although Renfroe’s trial counsel generally attempted to discredit the People’s evidence and witnesses, counsel never suggested that even if Renfroe participated in the crimes, he was not the shooter. (See People v. Bratton (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1104.) 7  In these circumstances, there is no theory on which the jury could have convicted Renfroe on the great bodily injury enhancement without also finding he was Candela’s actual killer. (See People v. Morales (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1132 [petitioner perpetrated the attempted murder where the only factual basis was the shooting of the victim with a semiautomatic rifle, and the jury found petitioner guilty of assault with an assault weapon and found the discharge allegation true].) Renfroe points out Norman was also involved in the crimes, but he never explains how the jury could have attributed the actual shooting to Norman while still finding Renfroe personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Candela. Harden supports our conclusion. (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 54–56.) It is true that in that case, the reviewing court did not rely solely on the great bodily injury enhancement but referred to other instructions and verdicts to conclude the jury necessarily found Harden was the actual killer. (Ibid.) That was necessary because the victim had suffered two injuries, and Harden’s counsel argued a juror could have found the great bodily injury “enhancement true on a theory that Harden only fractured [the victim’s] ribs and someone else strangled him.” (Id. at p. 55.) But here, the only injury upon which the jury could premise the great bodily injury enhancement was Candela’s single fatal gunshot wound, so the jury necessarily found Renfroe actually killed Candela. (See Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 56 [“the only path to convicting [the defendant] of first degree felony murder with special circumstances and a personal-infliction-of- great-bodily-injury enhancement was based on a finding she actually killed [the victim]”]; see also People v. Garrison (2021) 8 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 743 [“there was no evidence . . . supporting any other scenario” besides the defendant as the actual killer].) Because the jury in Renfroe’s criminal trial found he was Candela’s actual killer, Renfroe is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. (See Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) The trial court’s error in failing to appoint counsel was harmless. (See People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 893 [failure to appoint counsel was harmless where petitioner was ineligible for relief as a matter of law].) DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. RICHARDSON, J. WE CONCUR: LUI, P. J. CHAVEZ, J. 9