People v. Wilson CA3

Filed 10/29/26 P. v. Wilson CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Placer) THE PEOPLE, C099458 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 62171607) v. JEREMY DAWN WILSON, Defendant and Appellant. Defendant Jeremy Wilson was charged with torturing, forcibly penetrating, assaulting, and criminally abusing his girlfriend’s two-year-old son (victim). Over the course of 14 days, the jury heard testimony from 26 witnesses, including girlfriend and defendant’s ex-girlfriend, both of whom testified about defendant’s prior acts of sexual abuse and domestic violence. The jury also heard testimony from a domestic violence expert and watched one of victim’s forensic interviews. The jury found defendant guilty as charged and found four aggravating factors true. After finding an additional aggravating factor true, the court sentenced defendant to life without possibility of parole (LWOP) plus a consecutive life term. The court also imposed and stayed a determinate term consisting of upper term sentences and enhancements. Defendant contends the convictions should be reversed for four reasons: (1) the prior acts evidence and forensic interview should not have been admitted; (2) certain 1 inconsistent statements made by girlfriend at a separate family court hearing should have been admitted; (3) the trial court should have given a limiting instruction regarding the domestic violence expert’s testimony; and (4) the specific intent required for torture lacked substantial evidence. We disagree with these contentions. Defendant also challenges his sentence on several grounds. In supplemental briefing, he asserts another sentencing error: the trial court prejudicially erred in selecting upper term sentences by relying on an aggravating factor the jury did not find true. The People concede this error and the need to remand for full resentencing. We accept the People’s concession, mooting defendant’s other sentencing challenges. We vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for full resentencing. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Charges Defendant was charged with six crimes: (1) torture (§ 206; the torture count); (2) sexual penetration with force (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(B); the forcible penetration count); (3) assault with intent to commit a sexual offense (§ 220, subd. (a)(2)); (4) aggravated sexual assault of a child via penetration (§ 296, subd. (a)(5)); (5) sexual penetration of a child aged 10 years or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b)); and (6) child abuse likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 273a, subd. (a)). As to all counts, the prosecution alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on a child under age five within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (d). As to the forcible penetration count, the prosecution also charged defendant with three special allegations under the one strike law: (1) torture (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(3)); (2) personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(6)); and (3) personal infliction of bodily harm on a child under 14 (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(7)). 2  II. Prosecution Evidence A. The Incident Girlfriend had been dating defendant for about a year and living with him for about five months in Foresthill when the incident occurred. She never lived at defendant’s mother’s home with defendant and victim and never used the address for that home as her personal address for mail. Victim is girlfriend’s child from a previous relationship. According to girlfriend, defendant was easily annoyed by victim, “presented a lot of jealously toward” him, and treated him differently than he treated his child of the same age from another relationship. Girlfriend felt victim was afraid to be alone in defendant’s presence and had a “gut feeling that something was wrong.” According to ex-girlfriend, defendant thought (1) victim was a “pussy and a mama’s boy” and (2) girlfriend did not discipline victim well enough. On February 16, 2020, girlfriend, victim, defendant, and defendant’s child went with defendant’s brothers, brothers’ significant others, and a friend (collectively, friends) to Secret Town, a remote area in Colfax. Defendant was drinking alcohol, and girlfriend felt he was using cocaine. Girlfriend was not drinking because she thought she was pregnant. The group decided to go to girlfriend’s and defendant’s house after. Girlfriend was frustrated with this plan because she knew she had to get up early the next day, but defendant “didn’t seem to care.” Girlfriend fed the kids and got them ready for bed. She gave them baths, put them in diapers and pajamas, seeing no injuries on either child. She put them to bed around 9 or 9:30 p.m. and then went to her room to set up her new phone. Meanwhile, everyone else was outside riding a quad and shooting guns. Girlfriend was frustrated that everyone was still over and making noise. She “assumed they were drinking alcohol because they were being crazy outside.” During a span of four minutes just before midnight, she sent defendant a series of text messages expressing her anger with him. Defendant never responded to the messages. Girlfriend figured “he was for 3 certain getting them [on his Apple watch] but more than likely ignoring them.” She checked on the kids one more time and confirmed they were asleep and then went to bed. She figured friends left around midnight because she heard a truck starting. She did not hear any other noises before waking up the next day around 6:30 a.m. When girlfriend woke, defendant was sleeping next to her and friends were no longer there. Girlfriend went to wake victim and immediately noticed a lot of bruising on his face. He was not very responsive; he “couldn’t open his eyes”; his lips were swollen and blistered; and he did not have his pajama bottoms on. Girlfriend smelt apple cider vinegar and saw a bottle of it outside victim’s room. Near victim’s bed was a miniature plastic water bottle with pink liquid in it and holes poked in the top. Girlfriend screamed for defendant. Defendant seemed just as concerned as girlfriend at first, but his demeanor changed a few minutes later, and he tried to convince girlfriend not to take victim to the emergency room. As girlfriend tried to leave for the hospital with victim, defendant kept opening the car door and “seemingly comforting” victim. Girlfriend remembered trying to pull defendant’s body out of the car so they could leave. Girlfriend drove away, called 911, and met an ambulance. Victim was “weirdly lethargic,” crying, and “seemed to be in pain.” A paramedic noticed “unusual bruising and marks” on him and what appeared to be human bite marks on his upper arms and thighs. The ambulance transported victim to the closest hospital. At the hospital, a nurse asked victim who did this to him, and victim said defendant. The nurse did not put this statement in victim’s chart because a law enforcement officer witnessed it. That law enforcement officer, the lead detective in the case (lead detective), testified he was not the officer present then, and he was not surprised that the officer who was present did not write down victim’s statement. The nurse did not tell law enforcement about victim’s statement until trial preparation. 4 Girlfriend’s mother also came to the hospital and asked victim who may have injured him. Victim said defendant’s name. According to criminalists, (1) victim’s urine tested positive for ecstasy; (2) defendant’s blood tested positive for an anti-depressant, ecstasy, and the active ingredient of marijuana; (3) defendant did not contribute to the DNA collected from one of victim’s bite wounds; but (4) there was “very strong support” for victim’s inclusion on defendant’s penile and scrotal swabs and “very strong support” for defendant’s inclusion on blood stains on victim’s pillow and victim’s shorts. Ecstasy alters the state of the mind. It typically causes increased body heart rate, pulse, and blood pressure and can cause hallucinations. There are no studies showing how ecstasy affects a young child. Dr. Jihey Yuk, a pediatrician and specialist in child abuse pediatrics, testified that victim had bruising in areas where it is very hard to get bruises accidentally and “a lot of pattern bruising” throughout his entire body. The bruising, much of which took the form of “countless circular bruises” consistent with human bite marks, was on the back of his thighs, “really close to his buttocks,” on his arms, in his ears, and on his neck. Dr. Yuk could not rule out strangulation as the cause of the neck bruising but also could not say for sure that strangulation occurred. Victim also had abnormally high liver enzymes, indicating his liver had experienced some type of injury possibly through blunt force to the outside of his body, and multiple injuries inside his mouth, indicating victim had “experienced some direct force onto the top of his tongue and also to the roof of his mouth” consistent with a hard object being shoved in his mouth. Dr. Angela Vickers, a pediatrician specializing in “child abuse neglect” testified that victim had a lot of adult bite wounds, “bruises on him from head to toe, all over his face, all over his arms and legs, and on his front and chest.” He also had multiple, actively bleeding lacerations and bruising around his anus “consistent with anal penetration with a large object.” In the pediatrician’s opinion, this was both “physical 5 abuse and sexual abuse.” A few weeks after the incident, the marks on victim’s body had “completely resolved.” Lead detective testified that victim was unlike any child he had ever seen because he “would alternate between crying, moaning, screaming, and then within seconds be almost unconscious, nonresponsive.” Girlfriend “was comforting [victim] the entire time” and was “extremely upset and tearful.” After a brief interview, she gave lead detective her phone, the password to the phone, and her house keys, and permission to search both the phone and house. The house smelled like vinegar, but lead detective did not see the apple cider vinegar bottle or Crystal Geyser water bottle where girlfriend said they would be. In victim’s room, he noticed victim’s bed sheet, comforter, and pillowcase were wet. In the main bedroom, he found a red Solo cup with salt around the rim with pink liquid inside. In the kitchen, he found a bottle of apple cider vinegar and a water bottle with a hole punched through the cap containing a small amount of clear liquid. After girlfriend took victim to the hospital, defendant dropped his daughter at ex- girlfriend’s father’s house. Ex-girlfriend’s father told defendant he heard victim had a bite mark and stated, “if that’s the case you’re done ‘cuz bite marks don’t lie.” Defendant responded that they “were kind of rough playing, bite playing.” Later that day, ex- girlfriend asked defendant if he told her father that the bite marks were going to match defendant’s teeth. Defendant said that “he playfully bites him just messing around” and “it wasn’t malicious.” In total, the jury heard from 20 prosecution witnesses. It also heard victim’s first forensic interview, as described in more detail below. B. Sexual Abuse and Domestic Violence Evidence During motions in limine, the prosecution moved to admit evidence that defendant had sexually abused girlfriend and committed domestic violence against girlfriend and 6 ex-girlfriend. Over defendant’s objection, the trial court allowed the evidence under Evidence Code sections 1108, 1109, and 1101, subdivision (b). Girlfriend testified that defendant was verbally and physically abusive to her during their relationship. He called her names like slut, choked her during sexual intercourse, pushed her to the floor and hit her head with his fists, hit her eye and ruptured blood vessels in her eye, locked her in and out of the house, and forced her to have sex with him. She claimed defendant “had a rape fantasy”: he “liked it when [she] told him no” and “went harder.” She admitted there were times when she consented to choking during sex, but as time passed, she “didn’t really feel like [she] had a say.” Whenever they fought or argued, defendant would apologize a lot, buy her flowers, and show up at her work the next day with lunch. Defendant’s ex-girlfriend testified that she lived with defendant while pregnant with his daughter. Defendant was controlling and emotionally and physically abusive during their relationship. He belittled her, grabbed her by the neck seven or eight times, shoved her against the wall, hit her in the face causing a black eye, tried to put her inside a garbage can calling her “human trash,” and pushed her down into a couch. The abuse escalated after their daughter was born. Ex-girlfriend thought defendant resented her for not working and was angry all the time because they could not make ends meet. A domestic violence expert testified that domestic violence “can be emotional, psychological, financial, sexual abuse, and other forms of coercion with the primary motivation having power and control over that intimate partner.” Abusive tactics include using children as conduits for abuse. Strangulation is the “ultimate form of power and control,” and “there’s a big overlap between strangulation and strangulation during sex as a form of power and control.” The expert also described the cycle of violence in domestic violence situations as including a tension-building phase, an acute episode, and then a honeymoon phase. The trial court later instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 332 regarding expert witness testimony. 7  III. Defendant’s Evidence Defendant testified, asserted his innocence, and claimed girlfriend and many other prosecution witnesses were lying. Contrary to girlfriend’s testimony, girlfriend stayed with him at his mother’s address “almost every night of the week” before they moved in together, and she used his mother’s address as her personal address for mail as evidenced by a letter addressed to her there. On the day of the incident, girlfriend was drinking at Secret Town. After they got home, he saw her making margaritas for herself and others. She liked her strawberry margarita mix and liked her margaritas with salt on the rim. He also saw girlfriend using drugs that day. After putting the kids to bed, girlfriend asked him if there was any cocaine left. When he told her there was not, she “wasn’t happy” and told him she “wanted everybody to leave.” He did not remember anyone riding quads and would not allow anyone to fire guns in the dark. He had no knowledge of receiving girlfriend’s text messages and did not remember wearing an Apple watch that day. He remembered that a Crystal Geyser water bottle was used to check for leaks in his sister’s tires that night. He never handled that bottle after sister left. After friends left, he went inside the house, laid on the couch, and watched TV for less than an hour. He was “buzzed” but nowhere near “blackout stage.” He then went to bed and fell asleep. He never went to victim’s room after friends left. The next day, he woke up to girlfriend screaming his name. Using his military first aid training, he confirmed victim’s esophagus and tongue were not swollen. He agreed that victim needed medical attention and intended to go to the hospital with girlfriend, but he was not able to get himself or his daughter dressed in time. Girlfriend put victim in the car but forgot to strap him in the car seat, so defendant went in the back seat and made sure he was strapped in. He asked girlfriend to wait a minute so he could get dressed and get his daughter. He was concerned about girlfriend’s ability to drive because she was panicking. He never told girlfriend that victim did not need to go to the 8 hospital. He never saw a water bottle near victim’s bed with a hole in the top, nor did he see a vinegar bottle in the house that morning. After girlfriend left for the hospital, she started accusing him of hurting victim. Because of those accusations, he found the ecstasy they had bought together and took it with him to get it out of the house. He ingested some after dropping his daughter off at ex-girlfriend’s father’s house. He admitted he did push girlfriend one time but not in the manner she described. He denied ever having physical contact with ex-girlfriend against her will. He admitted putting ex-girlfriend in an empty garbage can once, but she laughed it off. According to defendant’s brother and his wife, girlfriend was drinking alcohol on the day of the incident. While they were at Secret Town, girlfriend slipped and fell on victim, possibly leaving bruise marks on victim. When friends got back to defendant’s and girlfriend’s house, the drinking continued, and everyone drank from red Solo cups. Girlfriend drank margaritas and used cocaine. Defendant’s sister arrived around 11 p.m., wanting help with her car tires, so friends inspected the tires for leaks using a Crystal Geyser water bottle with a hole punched in the top that was filled with water and dish soap. Brother and defendant continued to drink well after midnight. Defendant retained a professor and consultant on forensic biology to review the lab results in the case. Based on the DNA results, there was no “smoking gun for a criminal act.” Defendant’s DNA “was not found past trace levels on any of the evidence,” and such trace levels would be expected from people living in a home together. Only three foreign cells were found on the bite wound sample, which is unusual for a wound caused by someone’s mouth, and the sample was not tested for an enzyme found in the human mouth. IV. Verdict and Sentence The jury found defendant guilty of all six counts and found all special allegations true. After a separate trial, the same jury found four aggravating factors true: (1) the 9 counts involved great violence, or a high degree of viciousness, or callousness; (2) victim was particularly vulnerable; (3) defendant held and took advantage of a position of trust or confidence; and (4) defendant engaged in conduct that indicates a serious danger to society. During the sentencing hearing, the court noted it had considered the circumstances in aggravation described in California Rules of Court, rule 4.421, including the circumstances the jury found true and the fact “defendant’s prior record of convictions ... are ... of increasing seriousness” (the increasing seriousness factor). In support of the increasing seriousness factor, the court stated defendant had “only sustained one misdemeanor conviction in the past, but he now has strike convictions that demonstrate an almost ‘zero to one hundred with nothing in between’ pattern of criminal conduct.” That “one misdemeanor conviction” was from 2012 for driving under the influence. The court then sentenced defendant to LWOP on the forcible penetration count and a consecutive life term on the torture count. It imposed and stayed certain upper terms after weighing the aggravating factors found true by the jury against factors in mitigation. It also imposed and stayed other upper terms after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors without expressly limiting itself to the aggravating factors the jury found true. Defendant timely appeals. DISCUSSION I. Sexual Abuse and Domestic Violence Evidence A. Uncharged Sexual Abuse Acts Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the uncharged sexual abuse acts against girlfriend because the acts “were very different” from the acts on victim. Specifically, the uncharged acts involved two adults, clear sexual intent, and consent that purportedly morphed into nonconsent, while the charged acts involved a 10 child, no consent, and “little to no evidence of a sexual intent.” We see no abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 1108. 1 Subject to Evidence Code section 352, Evidence Code section 1108 permits a jury to consider prior incidents of sexual misconduct for the purpose of showing a defendant’s propensity to commit offenses of the same type. (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a).) In weighing admissibility of that evidence under Evidence Code section 352, five factors are particularly significant: (1) whether the uncharged conduct is similar enough to the charged behavior to tend to show the defendant did in fact commit the charged offense; (2) whether the propensity evidence is stronger and more inflammatory than evidence of the defendant’s charged acts; (3) whether the uncharged conduct is remote or stale; (4) whether the propensity evidence is likely to confuse or distract the jurors from their main inquiry; and (5) whether admission of the propensity evidence will require an undue consumption of time. (People v. Nguyen (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1117.) The weighing of those factors is “entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial [court] who is in the best position to evaluate the evidence.” (People v. Fitch (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 172, 183.) On appeal, we do not disturb the trial court’s decision “ ‘except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124.) Defendant has not shown such abuse of discretion. He focuses on the probative value of the evidence and specifically the differences between the charged and uncharged acts. But he overlooks the fact that “ ‘ “[m]any sex offenders are not ‘specialists,’ and 1 Given this conclusion, we need not address the trial court’s determination that the evidence was also admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). (People v. Holford (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155, 182, fn. 18.) Defendant does not argue additional error occurred because the court also found the evidence admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). 11 commit a variety of offenses which differ in specific character.” ’ ” (People v. Soto (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 966, 984.) Here, the uncharged sexual offenses against girlfriend tended to show that defendant enjoyed exerting power over people close to him through sex acts. And the difference in age between girlfriend and victim suggests defendant does not differentiate based on age in exerting that power. (See People v. Escudero (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 302, 311.) While differences in the types of victims or the use of force or coercion may have decreased the probative value of the uncharged acts, those differences did not negate that value. Also, while similarity of the acts is a relevant factor in the equation, it is not dispositive. (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 41.) As to the other factors, defendant’s briefing is lacking. In a single sentence, he contends girlfriend’s prior testimony raised substantial doubt as to how the uncharged acts occurred. But he does not further develop this contention or cite supporting authority, nor does he address the other factors balanced under Evidence Code section 352. We do not conduct that analysis for him. (See People v. Baugh (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 739, 750 (Baugh) [appellate court does not examine undeveloped claims or supply arguments for the litigants].) His dissimilarity arguments do not compel us to find an abuse of discretion. At a minimum, defendant contends girlfriend’s testimony “should have been sanitized to exclude inflammatory details” that were more prejudicial than probative. Specifically, he takes issue with girlfriend’s comments that defendant had a rape fantasy, would often choke her during sex, and liked it when she said no. In defendant’s view, these comments created bias against defendant. But defendant failed to preserve this contention. Although he generally objected to the admission of the prior acts evidence and specifically to the acts against girlfriend based on a dissimilarity concern, he did not argue that the testimony should be sanitized because it was overly inflammatory. (See, e.g., People v. Disa (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 654, 669 [before trial, defense counsel argued for exclusion under section 352 and asked if there was a way to sanitize the evidence].) 12 The trial court is not required to parse the proffered testimony to determine the potential for undue influence absent a specific objection and request from counsel. (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 366 (Thomas).) A general objection to the admission of any evidence of a prior act does not preserve a claim as to specific pieces of the evidence. (Id. at pp. 366-367.) B. Uncharged Domestic Violence Acts Focusing again on dissimilarity, defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting uncharged acts of domestic violence against girlfriend and ex-girlfriend. He contends those acts – which he describes as “hitting, shoving, [and] name calling” – were too different from the “systematic attack” on victim to be probative. Again, we disagree. 2 Evidence Code section 1109 permits the admission of a defendant’s other acts of domestic violence, both charged and uncharged, for the purpose of showing propensity to commit such crimes. (People v. Brown (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1233.) Before admitting the evidence, the trial court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect under Evidence Code section 352. (Brown, at p. 1233.) We review the trial court’s determination to admit domestic violence evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 358.) We disagree with defendant’s contention that the uncharged acts were so dissimilar that they were of marginal probative value. A trial court could reasonably 2 Because we conclude this evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1109, we need not address whether it was also admissible under Evidence Code section 1101. (Holford, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 182, fn. 18.) Defendant does not argue additional error occurred because the court also found the evidence admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). 13 conclude that the uncharged acts were indicative of defendant’s violent propensity toward cohabitants. Even assuming differences decreased the probative value of the uncharged acts, defendant does not mention the individual prejudice factors or analyze how those factors substantially outweighed the probative value. (See People v. Thomas (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 612, 630 [listing prejudice factors].) Because we do not conduct that analysis for him, we consider this contention forfeited. (Baugh, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 750.) Defendant separately takes issue with girlfriend’s testimony that defendant strangled her, asserting this evidence was overly prejudicial given the lack of evidence that victim’s attack included strangulation. Defendant failed to assert this contention in the trial court. As covered, a general objection to the admission of evidence of a prior act does not preserve a claim as to specific pieces of the evidence. (Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 366-367.) C. Domestic Violence Expert Instruction Expert testimony on intimate partner battering, including its effect on the behavior of domestic violence victims, is admissible except when offered to prove the charged abuse occurred. (Evid. Code, § 1107, subd. (a).) Here, a domestic violence expert testified on the cycle of violence in domestic violence cases. He also testified that the primary motivation of the abuser is having power and control, and strangulation is the ultimate form of power and control. Relying on People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, defendant contends the trial court had a sua sponte duty to provide a limiting instruction that this expert’s testimony could not be used to prove the charged offenses. We disagree. To be sure, Housley imposed a sua sponte duty to give this type of limiting instruction in “all cases” where an expert testifies about an analogous psychological syndrome involving child abuse. (Housley, at p. 959.) But we agree with People v. Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063 that Housley’s reasoning is unpersuasive. (Mateo, at pp. 1073-1074.) 14  Generally, absent a request from defendant, a trial court has no sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction. (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 516.) The Legislature imposes only one mandatory instruction on expert testimony. (§ 1127b.) That instruction is captured in CALCRIM No. 332, which was given here. “No further instruction on the subject of opinion evidence need be given.” (§ 1127b; see also Evid. Code, § 355.) The Housley court relied on the decision in People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385 at page 394, which concluded that when an expert testifies about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, the jury should be instructed on the proper parameters of the evidence. But “[w]hether the Bowker court intended to hold that the limiting instruction must be given sua sponte is unclear, as the opinion does not expressly discuss the point.” (Mateo, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1073.) That lack of clarity was eliminated when the same court subsequently held that the limiting instruction must be given only if requested. (Ibid., citing People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116; People v. Sanchez (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 735; People v. Bothuel (1998) 205 Cal.App.3d 581, 587-588.) Housley also conflicts with our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073: “If the prosecution offers the battered women’s syndrome evidence, an additional limiting instruction might also be appropriate on request.” (Id. at p. 1088, fn. 5.) Reviewing the issue independently (Mateo, at p. 1071), we conclude a limiting instruction on domestic violence expert evidence must be specifically requested. 3 Anticipating this conclusion, defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request such a limiting instruction. We disagree. Defendant contends 3 Buried in his argument on the need for a limiting instruction, defendant contends the expert’s testimony was inadmissible. This contention is improperly presented. “We do not consider [] loose and disparate arguments that are not clearly set out in a heading.” (Provost v. Regents of University of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1294.) 15 “there is no reasonable tactical basis for not requesting a limiting instruction here.” But we can think of at least one: “competent counsel could rationally conclude that it would be counterproductive to request an instruction highlighting expert testimony supporting the victim's credibility.” (Mateo, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1076; see People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 495 [counsel may well not have desired the court to emphasize the evidence].) This means defendant has failed to show deficient performance, defeating his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691–692; People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212.) D. Girlfriend’s Family Court Statements At a separate family court hearing about ten months after the incident, girlfriend testified that defendant’s physical abuse “wasn’t something that happened too often,” “probably once a month,” and there was “a handful of times that [defendant] would push or shove [her] or yell at [her].” When asked how often defendant forced her to have sex with him, she responded, “One time.” Trial counsel attempted to use these family court statements to impeach girlfriend’s abuse testimony. He asked her if she remembered being asked in family court how often defendant physically abused her from October 2019 forward. Girlfriend responded that she could not remember the exact verbiage. Trial counsel asked if she could “recall [her] answer of ,” but then the court interjected, “Hold on. She doesn’t remember the question.” The court allowed trial counsel to provide girlfriend the hearing transcript to see if it refreshed her recollection, but it did not. Trial counsel then asked girlfriend whether defendant had physically abused her from October forward. She responded, “A couple times a week.” Trial counsel was about to describe what girlfriend stated at family court, when the trial court interjected, “Hold on, sir. No, she does not recall that. That’s not proper impeachment. The [c]ourt finds there’s a good faith belief on her part that she doesn’t recall. [¶] In order to impeach her there has to be a finding 16 by the [c]ourt that she’s evading the answer. I don’t find that, sir. Move on, please.” Girlfriend similarly did not recall her responses to questions at family court about sexual abuse or choking. Trial counsel filed a motion arguing the family court statements were admissible. The court did not find girlfriend evasive or untruthful in her comments and statements, so it denied the motion. In closing arguments, trial counsel argued girlfriend “was all over the place” on direct and cross-examination, giving various examples, including the family court statements. He argued girlfriend provided answers in those statements “that contradicted what she testified to here and contradicted what she told [lead detective].” Trial counsel referred to those statements again later in his closing argument and suggested that the jury could throw out a witness’s entire testimony if it found people lied by saying, “ ‘I don’t recall’ or giving another statement that’s inconsistent with earlier statements.” He then referred to girlfriend’s testimony that there were “a number of sexual assaults” and her family court statement that “it only happened once” and asked whether that made girlfriend believable. Defendant contends the statements girlfriend made in family court were admissible under Evidence Code section 1235 and the trial court prejudicially erred by not allowing trial counsel to repeat them at trial. In his view, had the jury heard those statements, it “might have rejected her testimony” altogether and acquitted defendant of all charges. We need not decide whether the trial court erred because any error was harmless. Even though trial counsel was not permitted to repeat girlfriend’s family court statements, his cross-examination allowed the jury to infer that those statements were different from girlfriend’s statements at trial, perhaps even more different than they actually were. Also, the jury heard other evidence that questioned girlfriend’s credibility. She testified she never used a particular address as her personal mailing address, but defendant provided evidence to the contrary. She also testified she was not drinking on 17 the day of the incident because she thought she might be pregnant, but multiple people testified she was drinking during the day, specifically margaritas in the evening from a red Solo cup, a red Solo cup with pink liquid and salt around the rim was found in her bedroom the next day, and margarita ingredients were found in the kitchen. 4 Independent of girlfriend’s testimony, the jury heard plentiful evidence of defendant’s guilt, including: laboratory evidence; ex-girlfriend’s testimony regarding the bite marks, defendant’s attitude toward victim, and defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence; ex-girlfriend’s father’s testimony regarding the bite marks; lead detective’s testimony regarding girlfriend’s cooperativeness; nurse’s and girlfriend’s mother’s testimony regarding victim’s identification of defendant; and defendant’s own admission that he removed the ecstasy evidence. It is not reasonably probable that the family law testimony would have swayed the jury to acquit defendant of the charges. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [prejudice standard]). 5 II. Victim’s Forensic Interview Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting victim’s forensic interview. We disagree. A. Additional Background During motions in limine, the trial court granted defendant’s motion requiring the prosecution to instruct its witnesses not to volunteer any statements or other information 4 Based on the evidence, we fail to see how the jury would have received a significantly different impression of girlfriend’s credibility had the family court statements been admitted, so we reject defendant’s contention that their exclusion violated his confrontation rights. (See People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 925-926.) 5 Defendant contends the error violated his constitutional rights to present a defense so we should apply the error standard in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. We disagree. The application of ordinary rules of evidence like Evidence Code section 1235 does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense. (See People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 957.) 18 while giving testimony. The court clarified that witnesses “obviously can testify to what they’re called in to testify for.” Lead detective was present for this ruling. Lead detective testified he had heard from more than one source that victim had made statements identifying defendant as the perpetrator. On cross-examination, lead detective admitted he did not know if what victim was saying was true. When asked whether he wanted to find other witnesses to corroborate statements attributed to victim, lead detective said, “at that point [he] already had video of him saying it. So the fact he said it to somebody else later would not be useful to me if the person that it applies to has already said it.” He later specified that he “already had a recorded interview with [victim], so ... additional statements he had made at that point just be ad