Full Opinion

Filed 10/20/26 P. v. Miranda CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, E085915 v. (Super.Ct.No. BAF2001068) STEVEN JOE MIRANDA, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Valerie A. Navarro, Judge. Affirmed in part; vacated in part, and remanded with instructions. Jason L. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, A. Natasha Cortina and Michael J. Patty, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 1 A jury found defendant and appellant Steven Joe Miranda guilty of multiple counts of sexual abuse against several minors. With respect to the count 1 offense, the jury found defendant guilty of the continuous sexual abuse of the victim between September 2007, and September 2010. (Pen. Code, § 288.5.)1 The jury also found that as to count 1, defendant committed qualifying sex offenses against more than one victim. (§ 667.61, subd. (d).) On count 1, the court imposed a consecutive sentence of 25 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends the court’s sentence on count 1 violates constitutional proscriptions against ex post facto punishment. The People concede. We vacate the sentence on count 1 and remand the matter for resentencing on that count. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND With respect to the count 1 offense, the victim, defendant’s biological daughter, testified that she moved in with defendant when she was 12 or 13 years old. She was born on September 3, 1996. After she moved in, defendant started touching her inappropriately. He would come up behind her, and she would feel his erect penis against her backside. It happened a lot. Defendant would also touch her breasts and vagina “regularly.” Defendant escalated to touching her vagina skin-to-skin “every couple of days.” Defendant then started putting his fingers inside her vagina; sometimes he would use more than one finger. The first time he did this she was 13 or 14 years old. It happened more than 10 times. Defendant thereafter started having sexual intercourse 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. 2 with her. She was around 14 years old when it first occurred. It then happened “[o]ften.” “Twice a week sometimes.” The last time it happened she was 18 or 19 years old. The court instructed the jury, “It is alleged that the crimes occurred on or about 2007 through 2010; 2010 through 2012; 2001 through 2018; 2017; October 2019; 2012 through 2013, February 2019 and September 9, 2020. The People are not required to prove that the crimes took place exactly on those days, but only that they happened reasonably close to those days.” As pertinent on count 1, the court instructed the jury that, “The defendant is charged in Count 1 with continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years in violation of Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (a)” (CALCRIM No. 1120.) “To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: [¶] . . . [¶] The child was under the age of 14 years at the time of the acts.” (Ibid.) On September 19, 2024, the jury found defendant guilty of the continuous sexual abuse of the victim between September 2007, and September 2010 (Pen. Code, § 288.5, count 1); two counts of sexual intercourse by a person over the age of 21 with a minor under the age of 16 (Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (d), counts 2 & 3); sexual intercourse with his biological daughter (incest) (Pen. Code, § 285, count 4); sodomy by force or fear (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2)(A), count 5); rape by force or fear (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2), count 6); lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a), count 7); sodomy by force upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(3)), count 8); attempted rape of an intoxicated person (Pen. Code, 3 §§ 664, 261, count 9); attempted lewd or lascivious act upon a minor aged 14 or 15 (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288, subd. (c), count 10), a lesser included offense of that charged; and possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378, count 11). As to counts 1, 5, 7, and 8, the jury found that defendant committed the qualifying sex offenses against more than one victim. (§ 667.61, subd. (d).) As to counts 2 and 3, the jury found that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a) & 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) As to count 5, the jury found true the allegation that defendant personally used a firearm. (§§ 12022, 12022.3, 12022.5, & 12022.53.) As to count 8, the jury found true an allegation that defendant kidnapped a victim. (§209, subd. (b).) The court sentenced defendant to a total, aggregate term of imprisonment of 15 years four months, followed by 50 years to life, followed by life without the possibility of parole. With respect to the sentence on count 1, the court noted, “The subordinate indeterminate term in Count 1, for a violation of Penal Code section 288.5, the triad would normally be 6, 12, or 16. But due to the true findings in 667.61, subdivision (e), subsection (5), the Court will impose 25 years to life pursuant to Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (1). The sentence is elevated due to this true finding to 25 years to life.” II. DISCUSSION Defendant contends that the court’s sentence on count 1 violates constitutional proscriptions against ex post facto punishment. Specifically, defendant argues that prior 4 to September 9, 2010, the statute on count 1 provided for a 15-year to life sentence; thus, because the victim turned 14 years of age prior to the amendment of the statute, the court erred in imposing a 25-year to life sentence. The People concede. We agree. “Our state and federal Constitutions prohibit ex post facto laws. [Citations.] Any law that applies to events occurring before its enactment and which disadvantages the offender either by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime is prohibited as ex post facto. [Citation.]” (People v. Rojas (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1306.) “On September 9, 2010, the Governor signed into law the Chelsea King Child Predator Prevention Act of 2010 (Chelsea’s Law). (Stats.2010, ch. 219, § 1 et seq.) Chelsea’s Law significantly increases the penalties for sex crimes against minors by imposing longer determinate sentences, indeterminate sentences for some crimes, and longer parole restrictions. [Citation.]” (People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 237, fn. 4.) Currently, the continuous sexual abuse of a minor under section 288.5 is punishable in state prison for 25 years to life if the defendant has also been found to have been convicted in the same case of committing specified sex offenses against more than one victim. (§ 667.61, subds. (c)(9), (e)(4) & (j)(2).) However, prior to September 9, 2010, a person so convicted faced a sentence of 15 years to life. (Former § 667.67, subd. (b)(9); In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 713-714 [The amendment to section 667.61 added subdivision (j)(2), which increased the penalty to 25 years to life].) 5 Here, as the parties agree, on count 1, the offenses the jury found defendant had committed against the victim necessarily occurred prior to when she turned 14 years of age on September 3, 2010. Thus, the increased punishment under Chelsea’s Law effective on September 9, 2010, was not applicable, and the court erred in imposing a 25- year-to-life sentence on count 1. III. DISPOSITION The convictions are affirmed. The sentence on count 1 is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS McKINSTER Acting P. J. We concur: CODRINGTON J. FIELDS J. 6