People v. Scott CA1/3

Filed 10/30/26 P. v. Scott CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A173449 v. CHRISTOPHER SCOTT, (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 23NF014579A) Defendant and Appellant. Defendant Christopher Scott appeals from the denial of his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial. Defendant’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) identifying no issues and requesting this court to review the record and determine whether any arguable issue exists on appeal. After examining the record, we requested and received supplemental briefing relating to People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1 (Kopp), which was decided during the pendency of this appeal. We conclude defendant must be afforded the opportunity to assert an excessive fines objection in the trial court in light of Kopp. Accordingly, we vacate the restitution fine and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and Kopp. 1  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On September 4, 2023, defendant took, with force, a piece of luggage belonging to a passenger on a BART train. He was charged by felony complaint with first degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (a)).1 After the preliminary hearing, the district attorney filed an information charging defendant with first degree robbery. On October 19, 2023, the trial court granted defendant’s bail motion and placed him on supervised release on his own recognizance (O.R.). On December 4, 2023, defendant failed to appear for a scheduled pretrial conference, and the court revoked his supervised O.R. In August 2024, the district attorney received a speedy trial demand (§ 1381) from defendant. On or around September 12, 2024, defendant was brought back to court on his section 1381 demand. On September 23, 2024, an amended felony information was filed, alleging in addition to the robbery count that defendant had two or more serious or violent felony convictions (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)), and circumstances in aggravation (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)). The matter was called for a jury trial on November 13, 2024, the last day for trial to commence pursuant to the section 1381 demand. The prosecutor informed the trial court that it had just learned of additional discovery in the form of video surveillance footage. Defense counsel requested a continuance of two days to allow him to review the footage so that he could provide effective assistance. Over defendant’s objection, the trial court found good cause for the request and continued the trial for two days. 1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2  When trial commenced on November 15, 2024, defendant brought a motion to remove his counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden), which the trial court denied. On November 20, 2024, defense counsel moved for a mistrial and declared doubt as to defendant’s competence to stand trial pursuant to section 1367. The court granted the motion for a mistrial. Defendant was examined and deemed competent to stand trial on January 14, 2025. On February 19, 2025, the trial court heard and denied defendant’s second Marsden motion. Defendant also brought a motion under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta) to represent himself. After giving defendant detailed advisements regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the court granted the Faretta motion and appointed stand-by counsel. Also on February 19, 2025, defendant filed a section 1382 motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial. On March 6, 2025, the trial court denied the motion, and on May 12, 2025, defendant filed a notice of appeal challenging that ruling. Subsequently, defendant filed a number of motions (e.g., to disqualify the district attorney, for dismissal/relief from the tactical errors of the courts, for advisory counsel and appointment of new standby counsel), all of which the court denied. Jury trial commenced on June 10, 2025. Defendant again requested removal of standby counsel, which the trial court denied. Defendant then agreed to enter a change of plea. He entered an open plea of no contest to count one for first-degree robbery, transit passenger. The court reviewed the change of plea form with defendant line by line, and defendant indicated that he waived his right to a probation report because he wanted sentencing to proceed. The court also confirmed with defendant that he understood he was 3 waiving his right to resolve any pending motions. Defendant stipulated that there was a factual basis to the plea based on the preliminary hearing. The court accepted the plea and the admissions for defendant’s priors and enhancements. The trial court sentenced defendant to the lower term of three years (§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(B)), doubled because of defendant’s strike (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), for a total of six years in state prison, with 373 total days of credit (325 actual days and 48 days of conduct credits). Regarding restitution, the court confirmed with the prosecutor that there was no direct victim restitution before stating, “There is a $300 fine that is imposed pursuant to 1202.4,” as well as a parole revocation fund fee that would be stayed. The court additionally noted there was a total of $70 in court operations and conviction assessment fees before asking defendant, “What is your financial situation?” Defendant responded, “Destitute. I was wondering if I could waive restitution.” The court agreed to “waive the $70 in fees. The $300 fee I will keep that on there and you can work that off in prison.” Defendant then responded, “Okay.” In July 2025, after being notified by appellate counsel that the trial court had pronounced judgment and sentence, we issued an order “treat[ing] the notice of appeal has having been filed immediately after the rendition of judgment” and allowed the appeal to “proceed as normal.” Defendant’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief that set forth the facts and procedural history of the case and requested that we review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.) Counsel advised defendant of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days from the date that he filed the opening brief, and defendant timely filed a supplemental brief. 4  After examining the record, we requested and received supplemental briefing on Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th 1. DISCUSSION In his notice of appeal, defendant requested a certificate of probable cause, but we see no indication that the trial court executed and filed a certificate for this appeal with the clerk of the court. (See § 1237.5, subd. (b).) In the absence of a certificate of probable cause, our review is limited to issues occurring after entry of the plea that do not affect its validity. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1096; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(3).) Postplea claims, including sentencing issues, that do not challenge the validity of the plea are exempt from the certificate requirement. (People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 379; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2).) While this appeal was pending, our Supreme Court held in Kopp that “[a]lthough fines may properly be imposed as punishment for crime,” the excessive fines analysis under the state and federal Constitutions is the “proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines,” such as a restitution fine under section 1202.4. (Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 23, disapproving People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157.) The trial court here imposed a restitution fine despite indications of defendant’s financial hardship (e.g., stating his financial situation was “Destitute”). Granted, as the People point out, once the trial court indicated its intention to waive $70 in fees and impose the minimum restitution fine, defendant responded, “Okay,” and submitted on the issue without further objection. Nevertheless, because neither defendant nor the court had the benefit of Kopp’s reasoning at the time of sentencing, we conclude defendant must be afforded the opportunity to assert an excessive fines objection and 5 develop a factual record on the considerations relevant to that claim. (Kopp, at p. 23 [remanding to give defendant opportunity to assert excessive fines analysis and argue how facts of the case inform such inquiry].)2 “[T]he ‘touchstone’ ” of this inquiry “ ‘is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.’ ” (Ibid.) Four considerations inform that inquiry: “(1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the penalty; (3) the penalties imposed in similar statutes; and (4) the defendant’s ability to pay.” (People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728.) The People raise several arguments in their supplemental brief on Kopp as to why the restitution fine imposed in this case was not unconstitutionally excessive. We direct the trial court on remand to consider these and any other properly presented arguments on the excessive fine issue. Beyond Kopp, we are satisfied based on our examination of the record that no other arguable issues exist. In his first supplemental brief, defendant argues: (1) his speedy trial right was violated; (2) defense counsel failed to properly represent him, e.g., counsel refused to acknowledge defendant’s request to ask for dismissal and created an unhealthy relationship; (3) given the Marsden and Faretta motions, the court should have “acknowledge[d] that I was asking for help 2 Kopp additionally held that equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing “ancillary costs” (e.g., court facilities fees under Government Code section 70373 and court operations fees under section 1465.8). (Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 23, 30–31.) Here, the trial court did not impose ancillary costs on defendant. 6 and I suffer from mental health issues”; and (4) this court should find an “error to address even a R.J.A.” These claims are, in substance, challenges to the validity of the plea, and thus, a certificate of probable cause was required to raise them. As no such certificate appears in the record, we do not consider them. (See People v. Sanders (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 839, 847 [guilty plea forecloses defendant from asserting on appeal claimed violation of right to speedy trial]; People v. Stubbs (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 243, 244–245 [defendant required to obtain certificate of probable cause in order to raise claim he received ineffective assistance of counsel prior to plea]; People v. Lobaugh (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 780, 786 [concluding defendant, who did not obtain certificate of probable cause, was precluded from raising pre-plea Marsden issue on appeal].) DISPOSITION We vacate the restitution fine ($300) and remand the matter to the trial court solely for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th 1. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. _________________________ Fujisaki, J. WE CONCUR: _________________________ Tucher, P. J. _________________________ Rodríguez, J. People v. Scott (A173449) 7