In re N.Y. CA3

Filed 11/2/26 In re N.Y. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Placer) In re N.Y., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C106087 Law. (Super. Ct. No. 52-010224) THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. N.Y., Defendant and Appellant. Minor N.Y. admitted one count of attempted criminal threats under Penal Code sections 422 and 664 for threatening to “shoot up” his school.1 Six weeks later, he filed a motion to withdraw his plea, asserting that he should be permitted to set aside his admission and receive informal probation pursuant to section 422.3, a law concerning criminal threats in schools and other sensitive locations that took effect after his offense but before his plea. The juvenile court denied the motion and placed N.Y. on non- wardship probation. 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 1  On appeal, N.Y. argues that, under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), the lesser punishment authorized under section 422.3 retrospectively applies to him. We disagree and affirm. BACKGROUND In December 2025, the People filed a juvenile wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that N.Y. committed one felony count of attempted criminal threats (§§ 422, subd. (a), 664) and one felony count of criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)). According to the detention report, on December 11, 2025, N.Y. threatened another student at school, saying, “ ‘If I am failing another class, I am going to shoot up the school and shoot you first.’ ” On January 15, 2026, N.Y. admitted the attempted criminal threats count as a misdemeanor in exchange for dismissal of the other count. Before the disposition hearing, N.Y. filed a motion to set aside his plea, asserting that he was entitled to the ameliorative benefits of Senate Bill No. 19 (2025-2026 Reg. Sess.), which had become effective on January 1, 2026. That legislation enacted section 422.3, which prohibits willful threats to commit a crime at various sensitive locations, including schools. (§ 422.3, subd. (a).) Because the statute provides that eligible minors who violate its provisions must be referred to services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654, N.Y. claimed that it was “an ameliorative change to the law for minors” and that he was entitled to the benefit of that change under Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740. The People disagreed, arguing that section 422.3 established an entirely new offense and did not modify or amend section 422. The juvenile court denied N.Y.’s motion, reasoning that section 422.3 created a new and separate crime and did not reduce the punishment for offenses under section 422. The court placed N.Y. on six months of non-wardship probation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 725, subdivision (a). N.Y. filed a timely notice of appeal. 2  DISCUSSION Section 422, subdivision (a) provides that “Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or for their immediate family’s safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.” Section 422.3, subdivision (a) states: “Except as provided in subdivision (b), any person who willfully threatens, by any means, including, but not limited to, an image or threat posted or published on an internet web page, to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person or persons at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, or medical facility with specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, if the threat on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person or persons threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if that threat causes a person or persons to reasonably be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of others at these locations, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.” (Stats. 2025, ch. 594, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2026.) Subdivision (b) of the statute provides that “[i]f a person who commits an act in violation of subdivision (a) is under 18 years of age, the person shall be referred to services pursuant to Section 654 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, if eligible. If ineligible, the offense shall be punished as a 3 misdemeanor.” Subdivision (c) states that “[t]his section does not preclude or prohibit prosecution under any other law, except that a person shall not be convicted for the same threat under both this section and Section 422.” N.Y. contends that section 422.3 applies retrospectively to his case and requires us to reverse the juvenile court’s order denying his motion to set aside his plea. He maintains that the new law reduced the punishment for threats at schools by minors, and it therefore applies to him retroactively under Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740. We are not persuaded by this claim. We first consider whether section 422.3 “expressly or impliedly addresses” the retroactivity claim that N.Y. asserts. (People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 19 (Burgos); see also People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 690 [looking first to language of statute claimed to apply retroactively].) We conclude that it does, because the text and history of the law make clear that section 422.3 was intended to create a new offense, not to address or lessen punishment for offenders charged under section 422. Looking to the text, section 422.3 begins by proscribing certain types of threats, prescribing the elements of a crime, and setting out the applicable punishment. (§ 422.3, subd. (a) [“any person who” makes certain willful threats at specified locations with the specified intent “shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170”].) And subdivision (c) of the statute provides that the law does not supplant or amend section 422. (§ 422.3, subd. (c) [§ 422.3 “does not preclude or prohibit prosecution under any other law, except that a person shall not be convicted for the same threat under both this section and Section 422”].) These provisions make clear that section 422.3 creates a new source of potential criminal liability; it does not modify or ameliorate the punishment for violations of a preexisting crime. The legislative committee reports accompanying section 422.3 further support this conclusion. (See In re J.W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 211 [“court may consult contemporary 4 legislative committee analyses” to “determine the purpose of legislation”].) As described in those reports, Senate Bill No. 19 was intended to “create[] a new crime of threatening to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, or medical facility.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Unfinished Business Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 19 (2025-2026 Reg. Sess.) as amended Oct. 11, 2025, p. 1; see also Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 19 (2025-2026 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 25, 2025, p. 2 [same].) The analyses explain that the “new crime is very similar to the existing criminal threats statute,” but that “[s]ome prosecutors argue[d] that the current criminal threats statute does not fit well into instances of threats to locations in general rather than to specific persons.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Unfinished Business Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 19, supra, as amended Oct. 11, 2025, p. 5; Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 19, supra, Mar. 25, 2025, p. 6.) “[T]he creation of this new crime” was thus intended to “give[] prosecutors additional charging options and judges additional sentencing options.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Unfinished Business Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 19, supra, as amended Oct. 11, 2025, p. 6; Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 19, supra, Mar. 25, 2025, p. 7.) As these explanations demonstrate, section 422.3 was intended to add to, not supplant or lessen punishment for, section 422. The principles set forth in Estrada also do not suggest that section 422.3 retroactively benefits offenders charged under section 422 as N.Y. claims. In Estrada, our Supreme Court “held that an amendment to a statute that reduces the punishment for a particular criminal offense gives rise to an inference that the statute applies retroactively to all judgments not yet final on appeal.” (Burgos, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 12.) “When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. It is an inevitable inference that 5 the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply.” (Ibid.) This inference has been applied to statutes “that create[] an affirmative defense, contract[] a criminal offense, or otherwise lessen[] punishment in some meaningful manner”; to laws that “give trial courts discretion to impose lesser punishment”; and to statutes that “create[] a concrete avenue for certain individuals charged with a criminal offense to be treated more leniently or avoid punishment altogether.” (Id. at p. 13.) But Estrada does not apply “to any statute that reduces punishment in any manner.” (Burgos, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 15.) It applies “only to statutes that ‘are analogous to the Estrada situation’ and by their nature implicate ‘Estrada’s logic.’ ” (Id. at p. 16.) “ ‘[T]he rule and logic of Estrada is specifically directed to a statute that represents “ ‘a legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime’ ” [citation] because such a law supports the inference that the Legislature would prefer to impose the new, shorter penalty rather than to “ ‘satisfy a desire for vengeance’ ” [citation].’ ” (Id. at p. 15.) “The further any particular amendatory act is from a clear reduction of punishment, or removal of a class of defendants from the criminal system altogether, the less ‘inevitable’ and ‘obvious’ [citation] and more speculative the inference of retroactivity becomes.” (Id. at p. 21.) “Estrada’s rationale does not apply here.” (People v. Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 691.) Section 422.3 does not reduce the punishment for convictions or adjudications under section 422, create discretion to reduce such punishments, narrow the scope of criminal liability under section 422, or remove a class of defendants from the criminal justice system. Rather, as explained above, section 422.3 creates an entirely new and separate offense with different elements and punishments. Because section 422.3 is not intended to lessen the punishment for a conviction or adjudication under section 422, there could be no implied inference that the Legislature found the penalty for section 422 6 offenses too severe, and therefore no suggestion that the sanctions for violations of section 422.3 should be applied retroactively (or otherwise) to a conviction or adjudication under section 422. (See Burgos, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 12.) DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s judgment is affirmed. /s/ FEINBERG, J. We concur: /s/ EARL, P. J. /s/ BOULWARE EURIE, J. 7