People v. Andrade

Filed 10/20/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, H052967 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C2202559) v. MARCOS ANDRES ANDRADE, Defendant and Appellant. Defendant Marcos Andres Andrade pleaded no contest to second degree robbery and admitted a prior strike conviction for participating in an armed robbery and carjacking. 1 Prior to entering his plea, Andrade filed a Penal Code section 1538.5 2 motion to suppress evidence, asserting that police obtained cell site location information from his mobile phone service provider without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of his cell phone records. On appeal, Andrade contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress because exigent circumstances did not support the warrantless search of his location data. For the reasons we explain below, we will reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 1 Andrade was charged alongside codefendant Jesus Ivan Larios. The record indicates that Larios was sentenced to 15 years four months in prison before trial but is silent as to the type of plea he entered and the charges he pleaded to. Larios is not a party to this appeal. 2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.  I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Facts of the Charged Offenses On March 1, 2022, at approximately 1:00 a.m., B.P. and A.N. were seated inside B.P.’s 2010 Toyota sedan when two men approached either side of the car, pointed guns at each of them, and ordered them to get out. 3 One of the suspects told B.P., “ ‘Get out and give me all your shit[,]’ ” and patted his pockets after he exited his vehicle. One of the suspects fled in B.P.’s car while the other suspect drove away in a white 2017 Toyota Corolla that had a Georgia license plate with a peach in the center. Neither B.P. nor A.N. sustained any injuries during the incident. At approximately 1:21 a.m. police responded to the carjacking and met the victims at the scene of the incident. B.P. and A.N. reported that several personal items were inside B.P.’s vehicle at the time of the carjacking, including both victims’ iPhones, B.P.’s car keys, B.P.’s Louis Vuitton wallet, A.N.’s suitcase of clothes, and A.N.’s black Saint Laurent (YSL) purse and wallet. Since their phones had been turned off, B.P. and A.N. were unable to track their iPhones using the “Find My iPhone” feature. At about 1:50 a.m. both B.P. and A.N.’s phones “pinged” at an address on Fontaine Street. They provided the address to the police. When police arrived at the address, they found B.P.’s unoccupied car in the parking lot of an apartment building. Police also found rumpled clothing items on the ground surrounding the vehicle. The victims’ other personal items, including their iPhones, were not recovered from B.P.’s vehicle. Police processed the physical evidence and were able to “lift four latent prints” from B.P.’s vehicle. At about 4:00 a.m., B.P. informed police that his iPhone had been turned on again and that it pinged at an address on Sierra Serena Court, which was approximately two to five miles from the Fontaine Street address. Police located the white 2017 Toyota 3 We refer to the victims and non-law enforcement witnesses by initials to protect their privacy interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4), (10).) 2 Corolla with a Georgia license plate that the suspects had used during the carjacking parked in the driveway of the Sierra Serena Court house. Around 8:00 a.m., Detective Amanda Estantino from the robbery unit was assigned to work on the case as the lead investigator. While the robbery unit investigated the case, an “officer maintained a distant view of the vehicle and relayed that information to [the robbery unit] . . . to cover any officer safety issues, or so that they understand the aspects of the investigation.” Meanwhile, Detective Estantino read the reports of the officer who responded to the scene, interviewed the two victims, and reviewed the body- worn camera of the officer who first contacted the victims. Detective Estantino also conducted a records search of the Sierra Serena address and the license plate number of the suspect vehicle. From the records search, Detective Estantino discovered that Andrade resided in the Sierra Serena house and that the suspect vehicle was registered to one of his family members. At that point, Detective Estantino determined that Andrade was a “lead.” Detective Estantino tasked Detective Arturo Mendoza “with obtaining [a] ping” from Andrade’s phone. At approximately 9:45 a.m., Detective Mendoza faxed an emergency situation disclosure form to Andrade’s cell phone carrier, Verizon Wireless, requesting Andrade’s historical and real-time cell site location information (CSLI). The time frame for the emergency request “was for the past 24 hours [of] historical records and then . . . continuous pings -- in 15 intervals for the next 48 hours -- on March 1st, 2022.” Verizon sent the requested data to Detective Mendoza’s e-mail at about 11:41 a.m. As Detective Mendoza reviewed the records, Detective Estantino prepared the statement of facts to obtain search and arrest warrants for the case. After the emergency CSLI report for Andrade’s cell phone was sent to Verizon, investigators did not actively try to locate the suspects between the time the emergency request was sent and the time the information was received. Detective Mendoza’s “sole task was [to] work on getting emergency pings on -- not just [Andrade’s] device -- but another device as well.” 3  At approximately 3:00 p.m., Detective Estantino submitted an arrest warrant application for Andrade as well as warrant requests to search the Sierra Serena Court house and the white 2017 Toyota Corolla parked in the driveway. All three warrants were signed and returned by 4:00 p.m. At about 11:35 p.m., police arrested Andrade and executed search warrants for the Sierra Serena house and the white 2017 Toyota Corolla parked in the driveway. Police found A.N.’s black YSL purse in the trunk of the suspect vehicle and a black firearm holster in Andrade’s home. 4 Andrade was subsequently charged in connection with the carjacking and armed robbery. B. Section 1538.5 Motion to Suppress Evidence Andrade filed a section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence. Andrade argued that, prior to the charged offenses (on February 24, 2022), the police had illegally detained and questioned him collateral to a probation search, eliciting his phone number. Andrade further argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated on March 1, 2022, because police obtained his historical and real-time CSLI from Verizon without a warrant. The motion asserted that investigators sent an “Emergency Situation Disclosure Form” to Verizon requesting “exigent ping location information, subscriber information, . . . historical call data records” and “continuous pings and electronic historical call data.” With respect to the location data, investigators requested 24 hours of historical location information and 48 hours of continuous ping data in 15-minute intervals. Andrade asserted that the information obtained during the February 24, 2022, detention and the location data obtained through the warrantless request for his phone records were used to support subsequent search warrants in the case that “led to real evidence” including the firearm holster, the black Saint Laurent YSL bag, and both 4 Both victims’ iPhones and the keys to B.P.’s car were found at co-perpetrator Larios’s residence. 4 victims’ cell phones. The defense motion included as attachments two search warrants Detective Estantino later obtained for Andrade’s phone record and location data. The People opposed Andrade’s motion. The prosecution argued that the February 24, 2022, probation search was lawful and the detention and questioning of Andrade was justified. The prosecution additionally argued, in relevant part, that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of Andrade’s phone and location records because officers “were investigating an armed robbery and carjacking that had occurred mere hours before,” and the suspects “were armed with firearms, and had fled the scene with the victim’s car, as well as several of their personal items. . . .” As such, “it was reasonable for the police to speedily locate the suspects in order to prevent the destruction of evidence, as well as the suspects’ escape, and to protect the public from additional danger.” The prosecution further argued that police obtained a search warrant for Andrade’s phone records within three days of obtaining the emergency electronic information (§ 1546.1, subd. (h)). At the hearing on Andrade’s section 1538.5 motion to suppress, the People presented testimony from, among others, Detective Mendoza and Detective Estantino. Detective Mendoza first explained that police submit emergency situation disclosure forms to the carrier of a specific cellular device to obtain information like subscriber information, historical CSLI, and real-time CSLI. Detective Mendoza explained that some factors police consider in submitting the form are whether the case involves a violent felony, if weapons were used, and whether there is an imminent threat of either great bodily injury or death. Detective Estantino testified that she believed “an emergency request . . . for exigent circumstances” was warranted based on risk to public safety, the potential for destruction of evidence, and the suspects’ flight. Detective Estantino explained: “[T]he subjects were still outstanding and armed. We did not know why the robbery had occurred. Based on my training and experience as a robbery detective, robberies are 5 violent and they’re random and inconsistent which means that these type of robberies could occur more than once.” Detective Estantino further stated: “It was early morning. We don’t know if they were going to conduct additional robberies. They were armed. If there was somebody who could have been injured during another robbery we hadn’t known about. There could be [a]n argument of the subjects fully to avoid prosecution or arrest or destroying evidence. . . . [T]the victims’ vehicle hadn’t been located at the point yet, and we had found -- like -- burned vehicles in robbery investigations.” On cross- examination, Detective Estantino conceded that contrary to her testimony on direct examination, B.P.’s car had been located by the time the case was assigned to her. Detective Estantino determined that “an emergency ping could provide information that’s -- allowing investigators to locate evidence quickly and the location of outstanding suspects as well as call detail records which are historical records that can assist in placing the rights -- the suspect’s device at the scene of a crime to ensure that we are following the right lead and there’s no other suspect out there outstanding.” Detective Estantino explained that it could take hours, days, or even weeks to obtain information when a signed search warrant is submitted to Verizon whereas the company responded to exigent ping requests immediately. However, on cross-examination, Detective Estantino acknowledged that the trial court signed and returned the search and arrest warrants she later submitted within an hour and agreed this was the typical timeframe to obtain a signed search warrant. Detective Estantino also conceded that Verizon would not object to officers “sending along a warrant signed by a judge along with their form that says it’s an exigent request.” On December 4, 2024, the trial court denied Andrade’s motion to suppress. The trial court concluded that the February 24, 2022, detention was justified and “eliciting the name and contact information from [Andrade] did not violate his Fourth Amendment 6 right.” 5 The trial court further concluded that “the emergency information disclosure sent to Verizon[] was justified under an exigent circumstance exception to the Fourth Amendment.” The trial court found: “The crime was only committed shortly before the request. The crime involved armed robbery and carjacking. The suspects were outstanding after fleeing with a stolen car with personal property located inside that car. This posed an emergency situation for the police to act before any destruction of evidence, and to prevent the suspects from further escape.” C. Plea and Sentencing Andrade entered into a negotiated plea disposition and pleaded no contest to second degree robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (c)) and admitted a prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The trial court sentenced Andrade to two years in prison, doubled to four years under the “Three Strikes” law. Andrade appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. II. DISCUSSION Andrade contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidence derived from his cell phone’s location records. He asserts that the request for his historical and real-time CSLI records constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment and no exigent circumstances justified investigators’ failure to obtain a warrant. We agree with Andrade, and therefore we will reverse the judgment and remand the matter. A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures and require that items seized pursuant to a search warrant be described with particularity. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) 6 Warrantless searches 5 Andrade does not challenge this aspect of the trial court’s ruling on appeal. 6 “The California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (§ 1546 et seq.) likewise requires, in pertinent part, that ‘[a]ny warrant for electronic information’ 7 are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to a few specifically established exceptions. (People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1041 (Ovieda).) “The burden is on the People to establish an exception applies. [Citations.]” (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1213 (Macabeo).) The United States Supreme Court “has recognized that exigent circumstances may exist where there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed but ‘an emergency leaves police insufficient time to seek a warrant.’ ” (Ovieda, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1041, quoting Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016) 579 U.S. 438, 456.) As such, the presumption of invalidity can be overcome if the People demonstrate that one of the following “established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement” applies: hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, imminent destruction of evidence, the need to prevent a suspect’s escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons. (People v. Ormonde (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 282, 291 (Ormonde).) “In California, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional standards. [Citation.]” (People v. Troyer (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, 605.) “A defendant may move to suppress evidence under section 1538.5 on grounds that a search without a warrant was unreasonable. . . . In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] And in determining whether, on the facts so found, the search was reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citation.]” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, (§ 1546.1, subd. (d)) ‘shall describe with particularity the information to be seized by specifying, as appropriate and reasonable, the time periods covered, the target individuals or accounts, the applications or services covered, and the types of information sought.’ (Id., subd. (d)(1).)” (DiMaggio v. Superior Court (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 875, 887, fn. omitted.) 8 120.) “[W]e affirm so long as the ruling is correct no matter the lower court’s reasoning.” (In re Randy C. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 933, 937-938.) B. CSLI Data Andrade contends that investigators’ request for the real-time and 24-hour historical CSLI data from his cell phone constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Attorney General agrees that the request constituted such a search, but argues that the search was justified by exigent circumstances. We also agree that law enforcement’s request for Andrade’s CSLI data was a search governed by the Fourth Amendment. In Chatrie v. United States (2026) 609 U.S. 605 (Chatrie), the United States Supreme Court recently held that police officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired location data from Google because an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone location information. (Chatrie, at pp. 611, 637- 638.) 7 In doing so, the high court emphasized the rationale of its previous decision in Carpenter v. United States (2018) 585 U.S. 296 (Carpenter), where it held that an investigating officer’s request for seven days of historical CSLI records constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because “individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements.” (Carpenter, at pp. 316-317.) Chatrie and Carpenter make clear that the request for historical CSLI data was a Fourth Amendment search. There are no published federal or California decisions that directly address Andrade’s contention that the investigating officer’s request for his real-time CSLI records constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In Carpenter, 7 While this case was pending on appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Chatrie. We sent a letter to the parties requesting that they address at oral argument whether Chatrie provided any guidance as to whether police conducted a Fourth Amendment search by requesting Andrade’s cell cite location information from his wireless phone carrier. 9 the United States Supreme Court declined to “decide whether there is a limited period for which the Government may obtain an individual’s historical CSLI free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how long that period might be.” (Carpenter, 585 U.S. at p. 310, fn. 3; see id. at p. 316 [“We do not express a view on matters not before us[,] including real-time CSLI”]; People v. Bowen (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 130, 138 (Bowen) [noting no published California cases address “whether obtaining real-time CSLI constitutes a search”].) Still, the high court’s holding in Chatrie is largely predicated on the danger of intrusion into an individual’s right to privacy in their physical movements and concerns regarding excessively pervasive governmental surveillance. The reasoning in Chatrie persuades us that there is no reasonable distinction to be drawn between law enforcement’s requests for historical and real-time CSLI. Nor has the Attorney General attempted to distinguish between the two requests. We thus conclude that a warrant supported by probable cause is required when law enforcement seeks either historical or real-time CSLI data, unless an exception to the warrant requirement or the exclusionary rule applies. C. Exigent Circumstances Andrade contends that no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of his location data. The Attorney General asserts that investigating officers reasonably requested emergency disclosure of Andrade’s CSLI records because there was an urgent need to locate him to prevent the destruction of evidence and to protect public safety. We conclude that the warrantless request for Andrade’s location data was not justified under the exigent circumstances exception. “[T]he exigent circumstances test involves a two-step inquiry: first, factual questions as to what the officer knew or believed and what action he took in response; second, a legal question whether that action was reasonable under the circumstances.” (People v. Duncan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 91, 97.) “ ‘As a general rule, the reasonableness of 10 an officer’s conduct is dependent upon the existence of facts available to him at the moment of the search or seizure which would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. [Citation.] And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably, due weight must be given not to his unparticularized suspicions or “hunches,” but to the reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in the light of his experience; in other words, he must be able to point to specific and articulable facts from which he concluded that his action was necessary.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 97-98.) “[A]n officer’s subjective intent plays no role in the Fourth Amendment inquiry.” (Ovieda, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1052.) “[T]here is no bright line rule for determining whether exigent circumstances exist; rather, courts must approach each claim of an extraordinary situation by looking at the totality of the particular circumstances known to the searching officer.” (People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1160.) 1. Imminent Risk to Public Safety At the motion to suppress hearing, Detective Estantino testified that she believed it was necessary to obtain Andrade’s phone records quickly because there was “an ongoing threat to public safety.” Detective Estantino explained that she had “investigated multiple robberies where the same individuals continuously rob different victims throughout our city into different jurisdictions on the same night into the morning and continue through the week.” Detective Estantino stated that in this case, investigators did not know “if the suspects were going to conduct additional robberies.” Detective Estantino testified that robberies are “highly-violent” and “opportunistic” crimes that “can turn violent very quickly and turn into a murder or an assault or an accidental shooting.” Detective Estantino asserted the suspects in this case “had displayed a firearm during a robbery for an unknown reason in a remote area of San Jose,” they “were still outstanding and armed,” and had “already proven that they can use that weapon because it was used during the robbery in question and it’s already shown a propensity of violent [sic] and it 11 can only escalate.” Detective Estantino stated that investigators did not know “[i]f there was somebody who could have been injured during another robbery we hadn’t known about.” On these facts, Detective Estantino did not act reasonably in requesting Andrade’s location data from Verizon without a warrant. To support her belief that there was a risk to public safety, Detective Estantino explained the offenses involved an armed robbery in which the suspects used a weapon to forcibly take the victims’ personal items. “However, the seriousness of the offense does not, by itself, give rise to an exigent circumstance. Even a homicide does not warrant a blanket exception to the Fourth Amendment on that basis. [Citation.]” (Ormonde, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 291; see also Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 394-395 [“We decline to hold that the seriousness of the offense under investigation itself creates exigent circumstances of the kind that under the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless search”].) Thus, the mere fact that Andrade participated in an armed robbery does not itself give rise to exigency. Detective Estantino did not provide any specific or articulable facts to support her belief that there was an ongoing risk to public safety. Nor do the facts in the record support such a belief. Neither Andrade nor his co-perpetrator Larios fired any shots at the victims during the commission of the robbery and the record demonstrates that B.P. and A.N. were not harmed during the incident. Critically, there was little risk that Andrade would commit other robberies without law enforcement officers’ knowledge. Law enforcement had located the suspect vehicle in the driveway of Andrade’s house three hours after the incident and police were also closely monitoring the vehicle while the robbery unit conducted its investigation. With law enforcement observing Andrade’s residence and the vehicle he had used in the carjacking, the record provides no reason to believe Andrade could have committed additional crimes without law enforcement knowing about them and being able to intervene. To conclude that the warrantless search of Andrade’s location records “was justified based on [Detective Estantino]’s past 12 experience with [robberies] “would be tantamount to creating a [robbery] exception to the warrant requirement.” (Ormonde, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 291.) Given the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that there was no exigency in this case based on risk to public safety. 2. Imminent Destruction of Evidence and Hot Pursuit We also conclude the People did not demonstrate a reasonable belief that exigency existed based on a concern for imminent destruction of evidence. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective Estantino testified that destruction of evidence was a concern because “the victims’ vehicle was taken [and] their personal items were taken. There was potential for those items to be destroyed or burned where we -- it could be beyond our ability to maybe do a phone extraction or get DNA or trace or locate the vehicle if it’s burned.” Detective Estantino further testified that there was a need to prevent the suspect’s flight, stating: “[I]ndividuals who commit violent crimes may often flee or hide to prevent being arrested or located by law enforcement . . . . They may attempt to hide or flee so that they can maybe sell the phones to get money or get the opportunity to fence those items for profit.” “Where destruction of evidence is the basis for the claim of exigent circumstances, courts have found relevant ‘ “(1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant; (2) reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be removed; (3) the possibility of danger to police officers guarding the site of the contraband while a search warrant is sought; (4) information indicating the possessors of the contraband are aware that the police are on their trail; and (5) the ready destructibility of the contraband . . . .” ’ [Citations.] The absence or presence of a particular factor is not conclusive.” (People v. Ortiz (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 286, 292-293.) “In the case at bar it is clear there was . . . no likelihood of flight or destruction of evidence.” (People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 276 (Ramey).) Detective Estantino’s testimony that the material evidence in this case could be destroyed is belied by the 13 record. Police had located both the victim and suspect vehicles hours before Detective Estantino was assigned to the case. As to B.P.’s car, police had “processed the vehicle for physical evidence” and were able to “lift four latent prints” from the vehicle. Police were also monitoring the suspect vehicle and there was no evidence or testimony presented demonstrating that officers faced any danger guarding the location while the robbery unit conducted its investigation or that the vehicle was in any imminent danger of being destroyed. Moreover, police found several items of clothing in the parking lot around B.P.’s vehicle and there was no evidence that the clothes were damaged. Further, there was some indication that the victims’ missing cell phones were still intact because both phones pinged following the robbery. Thus, police were not faced with an emergency situation that required swift action to prevent the destruction of evidence. To the extent the trial court determined that exigency existed to prevent the suspects from escaping, the finding is unsupported. In denying Andrade’s motion to suppress, the trial court found that exigency existed because Andrade had not been “apprehended” at the time police requested the Verizon phone records, which “posed an emergency situation for the police . . . to prevent the suspects from further escape.” (Italics added.) However, as the trial court’s finding indicates, the suspects had fled before police responded to the scene of the incident. Moreover, there was little risk that Andrade would “further escape” given the suspect vehicle was parked in the driveway of Andrade’s home and police were monitoring the home and vehicle. “When speed is essential, the exigencies of the situation may justify a warrantless entry and search, but this was not such a case.” (People v. Baird (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 237, 245.) Our review of the record has persuaded us that the evidence here does not support a determination that investigators in this case reasonably believed they were confronted with an “emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.” (Ramey, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 276.) Accordingly, we conclude that the 14 trial court erred in deciding that the warrantless search of Andrade’s location data was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment. We direct the trial court to vacate that aspect of its December 4, 2024, ruling on Andrade’s motion to suppress. D. Exclusionary Rule Andrade asserts that the evidence and fruits derived from the warrantless search of his location data should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. We agree as to the location data itself and otherwise remand for the trial court to decide, in the first instance, whether other evidence should be suppressed under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. (See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 484-485; Murray v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 533, 536-537; People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1081.) At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective Estantino testified that when a signed search warrant is submitted to Verizon through the normal process, it could take hours, days, or even weeks to obtain information whereas the company responded to exigent ping requests “[u]sually immediately.” On cross-examination, the defense asked Detective Estantino: “Would Verizon object to you sending along a warrant signed by a judge along with their form that says it’s an exigent request?” Detective Estantino responded: “No. But if we have certain criteria that meets an emergency circumstance, in that point we did, Verizon would evaluate our request and determine themselves if that meets the criteria and agree to send the records, in which they did. And to be California compliant we did -- we have to submit a search warrant for those records within 72 hours, which we did. And when we have a statement of facts, which is a running continued statement of facts of the investigation, we don’t wait, we would rather just submit it as soon as we are available to submit those warrants.” “Exclusion of evidence due to a Fourth Amendment violation is not automatic. As the high court stated: ‘The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be free from 15 “unreasonable searches and seizures,” but it is silent about how this right is to be enforced. To supplement the bare text, this Court created the exclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.’ (Davis v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 231-232.) ‘The rule . . . operates as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” ’ (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 (Leon).)” (Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 1219-1220.) “[T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 144.) Consequently, “the exclusionary rule should not be applied where exclusion cannot be expected to serve ‘as an incentive for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth Amendment.” [Citations.]’ (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 919, fn. 20, italics added.)” (People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22, 48.) Preliminarily, we reject the Attorney General’s assertion that “Detective Estantino’s compliance with and reliance on section 1546.1[, subdivision (h)] justified the emergency request for [Andrade]’s cell phone records under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.” Section 1546.1, subdivision (h) states in relevant part: “If a government entity obtains electronic information pursuant to an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to a person, that requires access to the electronic information without delay, the government entity shall, within three court days after obtaining the electronic information, file with the appropriate court an application for a warrant or order authorizing obtaining the electronic information or a motion seeking approval of the emergency disclosures that shall set forth the facts giving rise to the emergency, and if applicable, a request supported by a sworn affidavit for an order 16 delaying notification under paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of [s]ection 1546.2.” (Italics added.) The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule permits the introduction of evidence “when an officer reasonably acts in objective good faith” because “the deterrent purpose of the rule is not served” in such circumstances. (Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1220; see also Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1, 14 [“the exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct”].) We have already determined that this case did not present an emergency involving imminent risk to human life. Given there was no “emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to a person,” law enforcement could not reasonably believe that submitting a search warrant within three days after obtaining Andrade’s electronic information excused the initial warrantless request for his location data. (§ 1546.1, subd. (h).) Since the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply, the location data obtained through the warrantless search of Andrade’s cell phone must be suppressed. Exclusion of the evidence here is consistent with the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule. The record demonstrates that Detective Estantino was aware she needed a warrant to obtain Andrade’s phone records because she began to draft the statement of facts for the warrant while she waited for Verizon to respond to the exigency request. Detective Estantino acknowledged that the court typically approves search warrants quickly and that Verizon would not object to her sending a signed warrant with an exigent request form. Nevertheless, investigators bypassed the warrant requirement and instead went directly to Verizon without a proper justification to do so. Further, investigators had the likely location of the suspects under surveillance while waiting for Verizon to send the phone records. (Cf. Bowen, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 139 [reasoning that exigent circumstances justified officers’ warrantless request for the “real- time ping of [the] defendant’s cell phone” partly because “police were actively looking for [the] defendant when they received the CSLI”].) Under these circumstances, it 17 appears that investigators in this case submitted the emergency request to Verizon for general investigative purposes, in contravention of the Fourth Amendment. (See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1296 [The Fourth Amendment protects “against general and exploratory searches” by requiring a warrant that describes with particularity the items to be seized].) Thus, applying the exclusionary rule in this case would act to deter similar searches that are devoid of articulable facts to support a request for a defendant’s location data. As for which other evidence recovered by the police should be suppressed as the fruits of the illegally obtained location data, the trial court never reached that question, having concluded the warrantless search for the location data was justified. Moreover, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing was limited, and the parties did not address the substance of the warrant affidavits that apparently referenced the illegally obtained location data. The appellate record also does not contain all the arrest and search warrant documents that led to the collection of incriminating evidence. Under these circumstances, we remand this matter with directions for the trial court to conduct further proceedings to decide whether evidence other than the location data of Andrade’s cell phone should be suppressed as the fruits of the illegally obtained location data. (See People v. Werner (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1213.) We further direct the trial court to permit Andrade to withdraw his no contest plea. III. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the portion of its December 4, 2024 order denying Andrade’s motion to suppress the cell site location information of his cell phone obtained without a warrant, enter a new order suppressing that information, conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion, and permit Andrade to withdraw his no contest plea. If Andrade elects not to withdraw his no contest plea, the trial court shall reinstate the judgment. 18  _______________________________ Greenwood, P. J. WE CONCUR: ___________________________________________ Grover, J. ______________________________________ Danner, J. H052967 People v. Andrade Trial Court: Santa Clara County Superior Court