People v. Autman CA4/1

Filed 10/23/26 P. v. Autman CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, D086092 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD292236) v. RAZWAN S. AUTMAN, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Aaron H. Katz, Judge. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded with directions. Shay Dinata-Hanson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Monique Myers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  A jury convicted Razwan S. Autman of filing a false instrument and theft by false pretense after Autman fraudulently removed a lien on a car title and unlawfully sold the car. Following the jury’s verdict, the court sentenced Autman to two years of formal probation and 180 days of custody. Autman appeals the judgment of conviction, asserting insufficient evidence supported the jury’s guilty verdicts. He also challenges the electronic search condition imposed as a term of probation, asserting it is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), and the condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The Attorney General argues the condition is reasonable under Lent and Autman forfeited his constitutional challenges by not raising them in the trial court. However, the Attorney General concedes the search condition is impermissibly overbroad. We reject Autman’s assertion that insufficient evidence supported the convictions. However, we agree with Autman and the Attorney General that the electronic search condition is overbroad and remand for the trial court to modify the condition to more closely meet the rehabilitative goal of preventing Autman from engaging in fraudulent car purchases and sales. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2017, the victim of the fraud, L.S., met Autman at a work conference. L.S. and Autman developed what L.S. described as the start of a business relationship and a friendship. At some point, L.S. and Autman explored a romantic relationship, but they were not compatible. When L.S. met Autman, he convinced her to sell the car she was driving at the time, a Kia Forte, and buy a nicer car. Autman told L.S. he would sell the Kia for her, and they would split the proceeds. Because she lived in Barstow, a small town, she agreed with Autman that she could make more money selling the car in a larger city like San Diego. L.S. signed 2 something to authorize Autman to sell the Kia and handed the keys over to him. However, she never received her portion of the proceeds from the sale. On October 14, 2017, Autman brought L.S. to a car dealership, and convinced her to purchase a 2014 Lexus RX 350. She paid $5,000 in cash, and the balance, $33,670, was financed by Pacific Marine Credit Union. The 2017 title document generated from the sale listed Pacific Marine Credit Union as the lien holder. A few months later, Autman convinced L.S. the Lexus was too large for her, and she needed a smaller car. L.S. did not think she would be able to sell the Lexus in Barstow and when Autman told her he would sell the car for her in San Diego she agreed. She planned to leave the Lexus on a San Diego military base near the Pacific Marine Credit Union, and Autman would sell the car for her.1 Since the credit union was across the street from the base, after Autman found a buyer, they would all meet there to finalize the sale. A few months later, L.S. went to the military base and discovered the Lexus was not there. She asked Autman to return the car because it still had not been sold and Autman was frequently traveling out of state. However, Autman reassured her, telling her to “[j]ust let me handle this; you’ll get it back and we’re going to sell it. Don’t worry about it.” In the subsequent months, L.S. continued to ask for the car back, and Autman would reassure her that everything was fine and he would sell the car. He also told her he was frequently out of state. During that time, L.S. received notices that the Lexus had been ticketed by toll roads in California and other states. Concerned about the 1 At the time of the events at issue, L.S. worked for the Department of Defense. 3 car, L.S. paid the first ticket she received. The second ticket L.S. received was from outside of California. She texted Autman a picture of the ticket and he said not to worry and that he would pay for it. Frustrated, L.S. called the San Diego Police Department to report the Lexus was stolen. The police, however, told her they could not help because she had given Autman the keys. By late 2018, L.S. still did not have the Lexus and reported the car stolen to her insurance company, USAA. In making that report, she lied and described Autman as her ex-fiancé. Over the next year, L.S. continued making monthly payments on the car. L.S. and Autman spoke on the phone periodically during this time. L.S. continued asking Autman to return the Lexis and repeatedly expressed concern about needing to sell the car. L.S. also testified that sometime between 2018 and 2019, Autman convinced her to invest $15,000 in a bitcoin investment. He described the investment to her in a way that she thought she could not lose and she hoped that if they earned enough money, Autman would return the Lexus to her. L.S. testified that Autman was supposed to set up a bitcoin wallet and give her the password. However, he never gave her the password. Additionally, in the same timeframe, L.S. was involved in an unrelated lawsuit and gave Autman $3,000 for him to set up a retainer agreement with an attorney. L.S. eventually sent a text to Autman with a bill listing the money he owed her. She included a loan, the bitcoin investment, the attorney retainer fee, as well as a section labeled “car”: “$24,132 [to] pay off bank” and $7,893 for expenses incurred while the car was in storage, including the car’s tags and insurance. The bill ended with “keep the car” “just send me the money.” The document was cut off, but also stated “I will get the title.” 4  On July 17, 2019, Autman went to Legacy, a car registration business in San Diego. Legacy was authorized by the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to help process car registrations. At Legacy, Autman provided documents showing the transfer of the title for the Lexus from L.S. into his name. The transfer document was purportedly signed by L.S. in two locations on the first page of the vehicle/vessel transfer and reassignment form certifying under penalty of perjury that the document was true. Additionally, on the second page, in a section of the document titled “statement of facts,” it stated: “The wife gave it as a gift to her husband. No fraud intended” with another signature by L.S. at the bottom of that page, also under penalty of perjury. The title document did not include Pacific Marine Credit Union as the lien holder. L.S. testified that the three signatures were not hers. N.O., the sole owner and operator of Legacy, testified at trial. N.O. told the jury she processed the transfer of title document for the Lexus. N.O. owned the business for about a year. While she was the owner, Legacy was investigated by the DMV for improperly registering 12 cars that all listed a particular address with a smog exemption. She surrendered her license during the investigation and at its conclusion, the DMV revoked her license. At the time of the trial, she no longer worked in the car registration field. She remembered Autman, who registered two or three cars through Legacy, but she did not remember this particular transaction. While operating Legacy, N.O. registered about 100 cars. In processing the transfer of title for the Lexus, N.O. did not sign or fill out any part of the title transfer document. She testified that her practice was not to sign or fill out title transfer documents unless she had a power of attorney. If she did mark the title document in any way, she would note it on the form. N.O. also 5 testified it was her regular practice to include the phrase, “no fraud intended” in the statement of facts because the DMV had trained her to include it. N.O. stated that after a customer completed the title transfer form, she submitted the information through a computer program to the DMV. In this case, the computer program should have rejected the Lexus’s title transfer because the car had a lien that was not reflected on the title document, and the form was missing additional documents required to transfer title when there is a lien. N.O. also testified that she did not know how to override the system to cause an incomplete or incorrect document to be accepted. She relied on the computer system or title document to show the lien. The DMV did not require her to check the veracity of the title transfer document’s information and the form did not have to be completed in her presence. Two weeks after the title transfer at Legacy, Autman registered the Lexus in Arizona in his name, again claiming under penalty of perjury that the vehicle was not subject to any lien. On August 6, 2019, four days after registering the Lexus in Arizona and using the Arizona title, Autman sold the car for $16,500 to K&S Auto Sales (K&S), a San Diego car resale company. A K&S employee testified that if there had been a lien on the title, K&S would have paid the lienholder and not Autman. Because no lien was listed on the title document, K&S paid Autman. On September 4, 2019, K&S sold the Lexus to an unrelated third party and registered the car in California. L.S. testified that the last time she physically saw the Lexus was when she left it at the military base in 2018. She told the jury she continued to make the Lexus’s monthly loan payments until the loan was paid off on July 28, 2023. She made the payments because the loan was in her name, so she felt it was her responsibility to pay it, and she did not want to ruin her credit. 6  A district attorney investigator, who investigated the case while previously employed as a DMV investigator, testified that based on his training and experience, it is “not a normal registration occurrence” for someone to have a lien removed from the car, and then register it again within two or three weeks in another state. The investigator referred to the practice as a “title wash” and explained it as a “fraudulent way to make a title appear to be a clean title.” He stated, “A clean title typically would be a title free from any liens. [It] may also mean that the title is—possesses the seller’s—the name of the actual person selling it. A clean title is something that you would typically see on a normal registration transaction that didn’t have any other issues with the registration.” According to the investigator, the Lexus was “title washed” by Autman at Legacy. The investigator also testified that while investigating Autman, he learned of a complaint filed by a bank about a separate incident in which the car dealership accidently mailed Autman the title instead of the lienholder bank. Autman did not make any payments on the Lexus’s lease. He chose not to testify on his own behalf or call any defense witnesses, and rested on the state of the evidence. In closing, Autman’s counsel argued the evidence showed N.O. filled out the transfer of title form, not Autman. He asserted N.O. had a documented history of committing fraud against the DMV, the writing on the title transfer looked like her writing, the statement of facts included language she was known to use, and the document mistakenly referred to L.S. as Autman’s wife. Autman’s counsel also asserted Autman was unaware of the fraudulent removal of the lienholder because L.S. had told him to keep the car, and he had received the title in the mail. 7  Autman was charged with filing a false instrument (Pen. Code, § 115, subd. (a), count 1)2 and theft by false pretenses (§ 532, subd. (a), count 2). Thereafter, over Autman’s objection, the trial court granted the People’s request to consolidate the case with another pending case against Autman unrelated to the fraud involving the Lexus, adding a third count for grand theft of personal property (§ 487, subd. (a), count 3). After the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Autman of counts 1 and 2, and acquitted him of count 3. The court subsequently sentenced Autman to two years of formal probation, with 180 days to be served through the CPAC program, if eligible, or otherwise in jail. Autman filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction. DISCUSSION I Autman first argues the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s findings that he knowingly filed a false or fraudulent document when he registered the Lexus at Legacy and in Arizona, and the finding that he knew he was making a false statement when he sold the Lexus to K&S. A “In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court’s role is a limited one. ‘ “The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738–739.) This court “evaluate[s] the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of 2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 8 solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Ramos (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.) We do not “reweigh the evidence; the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within the province of the trier of fact.” (People v. Stewart (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 790.) Further, we must presume in support of the judgment every fact that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035) and disregard any evidence that does not support the judgment as having been rejected by the trier of fact for lack of sufficient veracity (People v. Ryan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1316). If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890.) B Autman argues the testimony of L.S. and N.O. failed to show that he knew the registration documents for the Lexus were forged, that he caused them to be filed, or that he knew he was making false statements when he sold the vehicle to K&S without informing it of the existence of the lien on the car. Specifically, he challenges the credibility of these witnesses. He asserts that L.S.’s testimony was unreliable because she admitted that she lied to her insurance company about her relationship with Autman, continued to give Autman money after reporting that he stole the Lexus, contradicted herself about the existence of a notarized document giving Autman permission to sell her Kia, and “failed to mention she had written to [Autman] to say he [could] ‘keep the car,’ and that she would ‘get the title.’ ” Similarly, he asserts N.O.’s 9 testimony was unreliable because she did not initially admit that the DMV had revoked Legacy’s license to operate. Autman also argues the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions because the investigator suspected N.O. filled out the registration documents fraudulently and testified that he did not have evidence Autman “had written on the re-registration forms” or that Autman had the ability to process the documents through the DMV’s system. Further, Autman asserts that N.O. never testified that Autman “asked her to push through the particular re-registration.” Finally, Autman points to the investigator’s statement that titles can be sent to the wrong person by mistake. Autman argues these facts show that he had a mistaken belief that the title belonged to him and “the only reasonable conclusion” the jury could have drawn “was one of innocence.” These arguments are without merit. They amount to a request for this court to reevaluate the evidence presented to the jury, which is not our role. (See People v. Martinez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 400, 412 [“it is not within our province to reweigh the evidence or redetermine issues of credibility”].) As the Attorney General asserts, regardless of the evidence supporting Autman’s defense, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he filed a false document and knowingly sold the car to K&S without disclosing the existence of the lien. “Section 115 makes it a felony to knowingly procure or offer ‘any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public’ state office. (§ 115, subd. (a); see People v. Schmidt (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1055.) A defendant violates this provision by either ‘procuring or offering a false instrument for filing,’ or ‘by procuring or offering a forged instrument for filing.’ (Schmidt, at p. 1056.) Section 115 was crafted ‘to prevent the 10 recordation of spurious documents knowingly offered for record’ and to protect the integrity of judicial and public records.” (People v. Miller (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1051, 1057.) Count 1 was based on the July 17, 2019 title transfer into Autman’s name without including the lienholder, Pacific Marine Credit Union, and without L.S.’s permission. Autman asserts on appeal, as he did in the trial court, that the fraud was perpetrated by N.O., not him, based on her history of fraudulent transactions with the DMV and the supposition that she filled in the title transfer document, not him. The jury, however, rejected Autman’s version of events and concluded he perpetrated the filing of the false document. Although N.O. testified she did not remember this particular registration, she stated that she did not complete registration documents for Legacy’s customers. Further, when she was presented with the fraudulent documents to review, she testified that she did not alter or sign them. In addition, the evidence showed that Autman registered the vehicle two weeks later in Arizona, again without disclosing the lien, and then immediately sold the car in California. The investigator testified this was indicative of title fraud, sufficiently supporting the jury’s finding that Autman fraudulently registered the Lexus. Count 2 was premised on Autman’s sale of the vehicle to K&S without disclosing the existence of L.S.’s ownership and the lien. Under section 532, the prosecution was required to prove Autman: (1) made or caused to be made a false statement about his financial condition; (2) knew that statement was false; (3) made the statement intending that the statement be relied on; and (4) made the statement to obtain payment of cash. (People v. Montalvo (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 597, 623.) Here, the jury reasonably concluded, based on the evidence presented at trial, that Autman falsely represented he owned 11 the Lexus free and clear, K&S bought the Lexus in reliance on that false representation and Autman intended such reliance, and Autman made the statement to obtain, and in fact did obtain, $16,500 in cash as a result. Again, the jury rejected the defense presented by Autman, that he believed he did own the Lexus and that any fraud was perpetrated by N.O. Instead, the jury concluded that he obtained that title fraudulently and sold the car to K&S knowing it had a fraudulent title. Substantial evidence supported these findings. II Autman next asserts that the electronic search condition imposed as a condition of his probation is unreasonable under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481. He further contends that the condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The Attorney General responds that the condition is reasonable and Autman forfeited his constitutional challenges to the condition by failing to object in the trial court. However, the Attorney General concedes the condition is overbroad and should be tailored to meet the rehabilitative goal of preventing Autman from engaging in fraudulent car purchases and sales. A The probation department submitted its recommendations to the court prior to sentencing. The probation report summarized Autman’s prior involvement in fraudulent car sales, two of which involved the listing of cars for sale on the internet. The probation department recommended probation and several supervision conditions, including precluding Autman from engaging “in the sales of any vehicles” (condition 14.d) and requiring him to “[s]ubmit person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, and recordable media including electronic devices to search at any time with 12 or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by [probation officer] or law enforcement officer” (condition 6.n). At the sentencing hearing, Autman’s counsel objected to the electronic search condition, condition 6.n, asserting there was no “specific nexus in this case to those type of electronic devices.” Defense counsel recognized there had been phone and text communications between Autman and L.S., but argued there had been no alleged criminal conduct through an electronic device. The court responded that the condition was a reasonable way for the probation department to enforce the condition precluding Autman from engaging in car sales and Autman had used his phone to communicate about the fraud. Thereafter, the court sentenced Autman to two years of probation and imposed both condition 6.n and condition 14.d, as suggested by the probation report. 13  B “The Legislature has placed in trial judges a broad discretion in the sentencing process, including the determination as to whether probation is appropriate and, if so, the conditions thereof.” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Under this grant of discretion, a trial court may impose any “reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.” (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) “[W]e ‘ “review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion.” ’ [Citation.] Specifically, we review a probation condition ‘for an indication that the condition is “arbitrary or capricious” or otherwise exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.’ ” (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118 (Ricardo P.).) In Lent, the Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to determine whether a probation condition is reasonable and, therefore, statutorily-valid. “A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality ….’ ” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) “This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) “Additionally, ‘[a] probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.’ (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 (Sheena K.).) ‘The 14 essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.’ (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.) ‘[W]e review constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo.’ ” (People v. Salvador (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 57, 62–63 (Salvador).) C Autman argues that all three prongs of the Lent test are satisfied in his case. The Attorney General responds that the condition is sufficiently related to the crimes committed by Autman, and the condition concerns conduct that is reasonably related to Autman’s future criminality.3 We agree with the Attorney General that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing condition 6.n. As to the first Lent prong, although the fraud itself was not committed using electronic means, Autman used his cell phone to communicate with L.S. about the Lexus, continuing to suggest to her that he was managing the sale and then eventually washing the car’s title and engaging in the fraud for which he was convicted. Although the nexus between the offenses and Autman’s use of electronic devices “is somewhat attenuated,” it is not “altogether absent.” (Salvador, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 64.) “Applying the abuse of discretion standard of review, we cannot say the trial court’s finding of a nexus was arbitrary or capricious, or outside the bounds of reason.” (Ibid.) 3 The Attorney General does not challenge Autman’s assertion the condition relates to conduct that is not in itself criminal. 15  And while the trial court did not make any findings as to future criminality, we agree with the Attorney General that Autman’s online and electronic communication activities have “more than just an abstract or hypothetical relationship” to potential criminality. (Salvador, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 64.) The requirement that “a probation condition must be ‘ “reasonably related to future criminality” ’ contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1122.) However, “ ‘conditions of probation aimed at rehabilitating the offender need not be so strictly tied to the offender’s precise crime’ [citation] so long as they are ‘reasonably directed at curbing [the defendant’s] future criminality’ [citation]. For example, courts may properly base probation conditions upon information in a probation report that raises concerns about future criminality unrelated to a prior offense.” (Ibid.) Although the trial court did not make an express finding, Autman’s history of fraudulent car sales online was documented in the probation report. This history was a “substantial and particularized justification” for the electronic search condition imposed in this case and it cannot be said that “nothing in the record suggests [Autman] has ever used an electronic device or social media in connection with criminal conduct.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1126; see also id. at p. 1122.) Accordingly, the electronic search condition was related to his potential for future criminality, and the condition was reasonable under Lent. D Autman also asserts that the electronic search condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it is not sufficiently tailored to the rehabilitative purposes of his probation. The Attorney General 16 responds that Autman forfeited this challenge by failing to raise it in the trial court, and that he has also not adequately briefed the issue in this court. The Attorney General, however, also concedes the condition is unconstitutionally overbroad and asserts that if this court reaches the merits of this issue, the case should be remanded for the trial court to narrowly tailor the condition to meet its purpose of ensuring Autman does not engage in car sales while on probation. Because of this concession, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of Autman’s constitutional challenges. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [“An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party.”].) “Vagueness considers whether a condition is sufficiently precise to give the probationer fair warning of what conduct is required or prohibited.” (In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 260; accord Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) “The rule of fair warning consists of ‘the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to potential offenders’ [citation], protections that are ‘embodied in the due process clauses of the federal and California Constitutions. (U.S. Const., Amends. V, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7).’ ” (Sheena K., at p. 890.) “A probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness.” (Ibid.) Here, when the electronic search condition is evaluated with “context and common sense,” and “ ‘given the “meaning[s] that would appear to a reasonable objective reader” ’ ”––as probation conditions must be interpreted––it is clear what is being asked of Autman. (People v. Rinehart 17 (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1123, 1129.) Put simply, Autman must permit a warrantless search of all of his electronic devices. “[A] probation condition should not be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague ‘ “ ‘if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 501.) The search condition, while broad, provides “fair warning” to Autman as to its scope and avoids the potential for arbitrary enforcement. Thus, the condition is not unconstitutionally vague. We agree with the parties, however, that the condition is unconstitutionally overbroad, and on remand should be tailored in the manner suggested by the Attorney General to meet the rehabilitative purposes of Autman’s probation. “A probation condition imposing limits on constitutional rights must be closely tailored to its legitimate objective to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. (… Sheena K.[,supra] 40 Cal.4th [at p. ]890 ….) ‘ “The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.” ’ ” (People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946.) As the Attorney General states, “[a]s written, the electronic search condition permits the search of all of [Autman’s] electronic devices, applications, and communications with anyone for any purpose, including his medical records, which are wholly unrelated to his criminality.” Thus, the condition is overbroad. However, the condition can be remedied by modifying it to be limited to searches of Autman’s electronic devices that are reasonably likely to reveal if he is involved in the purchase or sale of cars for a business purpose. (See, e.g., People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 727, 729 18 [finding electronic search condition requiring probationer to submit to search of any “computers and all other electronic devices belonging” to him overly broad and remanding to trial court “to impose a valid condition more narrowly tailored to the states’ interests”]; In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 298 [holding probation condition requiring juvenile to provide probation officer with access to electronic passwords unconstitutionally overbroad and remanding for trial court “to limit authorization of warrantless searches of … cell phone data and electronic accounts to media of communication reasonably likely to reveal whether he is boasting about drug use or otherwise involved with drugs”].) Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for the limited purpose of modifying probation condition 6.n. DISPOSITION The matter is remanded for the trial court to tailor the electronic search probation condition, 6.n., to relate to its purpose of preventing Autman from engaging in the purchase or sale of cars for a business purpose. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. MCCONNELL, P. J. WE CONCUR: DATO, J. KELETY, J. 19