People v. Brown CA2/8
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketB346308
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 P. v. Brown CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B346308
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24PSCF00451)
v.
FRED BROWN III
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Robert Serna, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Nancy Lii Ladner,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
A jury found defendant Fred Brown III (Brown) guilty of
possession of personal identifying information of 10 or more
persons with the intent to defraud, possession of personal
identifying information with the intent to defraud after suffering
a prior qualifying conviction, possession of a firearm by a felon,
and mail theft. Before sentencing, the trial court advised Brown
that he did not have a right to a jury trial on two alleged
aggravating sentencing factors—that his prior convictions were
numerous and increasing in seriousness and that he served a
prior prison term. Brown waived his right to a trial on those
factors and admitted them. Relying on those factors, the court
imposed an upper term sentence.
The parties agree, and so do we, that Brown did not make a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial on the
aggravating sentencing factors and that his lack of a valid waiver
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore
reverse Brown’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
BACKGROUND
In July 2024, Brown drove a car in the San Dimas area
with three other people and opened mailboxes without
authorization. In Brown’s car, law enforcement recovered mail
addressed to multiple people, blank checks, a loaded ghost gun, a
laptop, a printer, and a handwritten note containing an
instructional guide to committing identity theft fraud.
In May 2025, a jury found Brown guilty of possession of
personal identifying information of 10 or more persons with
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intent to defraud (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (c)(3);1 count 1);
possession of personal identifying information with intent to
defraud after a prior conviction (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(2); count 3);
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800(a)(1); count 4); and
mail theft (§ 530.5, subd. (e); count 5). The People dismissed
count 2, conspiracy to commit forgery, during trial.
Before the jury reached its verdict, the trial court advised
Brown that he did not have a right to a jury trial on the
aggravating sentencing factors alleging that he suffered
numerous prior convictions of increasing seriousness and served
a prior prison term. Brown later waived his right to a trial on
those factors and admitted them. The court accepted Brown’s
admissions and found the aggravating factors true. The jury
never made any findings concerning the aggravating sentencing
factors.
At sentencing, the trial court discussed Brown’s criminal
history, which dated back to 2004, when he was convicted of a
misdemeanor possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11359). Brown also suffered the following prior
convictions. In 2005, he was convicted of misdemeanor receiving
stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and possession of ammunition
by a prohibited person (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)). In 2007, he was
convicted of misdemeanor possession of marijuana for sale
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11359). In 2012, he was convicted of
felony possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health and
Saf. Code, § 11351), and misdemeanor possession of personal
identification information with intent to defraud (§ 530.5,
1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise noted.
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subd. (c)(1)). In 2014, he was convicted of misdemeanor driving
under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)).
Finally, in 2019, he was convicted of felony possession of a
firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)).
The trial court then sentenced Brown to a total term of
three years and eight months in prison, consisting of the upper
term of three years for count 1 plus a consecutive eight-month
term for count 5. The court stayed the sentences for Brown’s
remaining counts under section 654.
Brown appeals.
DISCUSSION
The parties agree, and so do we, that the trial court
prejudicially erred when it imposed an upper term sentence
because Brown did not knowingly and intelligently waive his
right to a jury trial on the aggravating sentencing factors.
Under section 1170, subdivision (b), when a statute
specifies three possible terms of imprisonment, “the court shall,
in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to
exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in
paragraph (2).” Under subdivision (b)(2), the court may “impose
a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) Subdivision (b)(3) provides that a court
may nevertheless consider a defendant’s prior convictions in
determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction
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without submitting the prior convictions to a jury. (Id.,
subd. (b)(3).)
A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial “is
triggered by section 1170(b)’s substantive requirements
governing imposition of an upper term sentence.” (People v.
Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 762 (Lynch).) Now, a jury must find
beyond a reasonable doubt “all facts actually relied on to impose
an upper term,” except for the fact of a prior conviction. (Id. at
p. 758.) This right extends to aggravating sentencing factors
based on the increasing seriousness of the defendant’s prior
convictions and the defendant’s prior unsatisfactory performance
on probation. (People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1083
(Wiley).) “[A] Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial
court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper
term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on
have been properly established.” (Lynch, at p. 768.)
A defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial on aggravating sentencing factors. (People v. French
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47.) That waiver, however, must be
express, and it “ ‘may not be accepted by the court unless it is
knowing and intelligent, that is “ ‘ “made with a full awareness
both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it,” ’ ” as well as
voluntary “ ‘ “in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166.)
When imposing a high term sentence for count 1, the trial
court indicated that it relied on Brown’s criminal record,
including the numerosity of his prior convictions. Although
Brown admitted two aggravating sentencing factors—that his
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prior convictions were numerous and increasing in seriousness
and that he served a prior prison term—he was never advised of
his right to a jury trial on them. Indeed, the court informed
Brown that he had no such right. Thus, Brown never made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial on those
aggravating sentencing factors.
Because Brown did not make a valid waiver of his right to a
jury trial on the aggravating sentencing factors, and because the
jury never made any findings concerning those factors, Brown’s
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated when the
court relied on them to impose the high term for count 1. (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) This error is prejudicial unless we
“can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have
found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial
court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were
otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory
requirements.” (Ibid.)
We cannot conclude that this error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. As the Supreme Court explained in Wiley, the
analysis required for determining whether a defendant’s prior
convictions increased in seriousness is “comparative and
qualitative,” which makes “it ‘ “ ‘difficult for a reviewing court to
conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to
the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same
manner as did the trial court.’ ” ’ ” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 1090.)
Although Brown suffered several prior convictions before
this case arose, those convictions span more than 15 years. None
of Brown’s prior convictions were for violent offenses, and many
of them, including two of his most recent, were misdemeanors.
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And Brown’s most recent prior conviction—felony possession of a
firearm—is the same as one of the offenses he was convicted of in
this case. On this record, we cannot conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that a jury would have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Brown’s prior convictions increased in
seriousness.
DISPOSITION
Brown’s sentence is reversed and the matter is remanded
for further proceedings on the aggravating sentencing factors
under section 1170, subdivision (b). In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
WILEY, Acting P. J.
SCHERB, J.
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