Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 P. v. Brown CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT THE PEOPLE, B346308 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24PSCF00451) v. FRED BROWN III Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robert Serna, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Nancy Lii Ladner, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _______________________________________ INTRODUCTION A jury found defendant Fred Brown III (Brown) guilty of possession of personal identifying information of 10 or more persons with the intent to defraud, possession of personal identifying information with the intent to defraud after suffering a prior qualifying conviction, possession of a firearm by a felon, and mail theft. Before sentencing, the trial court advised Brown that he did not have a right to a jury trial on two alleged aggravating sentencing factors—that his prior convictions were numerous and increasing in seriousness and that he served a prior prison term. Brown waived his right to a trial on those factors and admitted them. Relying on those factors, the court imposed an upper term sentence. The parties agree, and so do we, that Brown did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial on the aggravating sentencing factors and that his lack of a valid waiver was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore reverse Brown’s sentence and remand for resentencing. BACKGROUND In July 2024, Brown drove a car in the San Dimas area with three other people and opened mailboxes without authorization. In Brown’s car, law enforcement recovered mail addressed to multiple people, blank checks, a loaded ghost gun, a laptop, a printer, and a handwritten note containing an instructional guide to committing identity theft fraud. In May 2025, a jury found Brown guilty of possession of personal identifying information of 10 or more persons with 2 intent to defraud (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (c)(3);1 count 1); possession of personal identifying information with intent to defraud after a prior conviction (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(2); count 3); possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800(a)(1); count 4); and mail theft (§ 530.5, subd. (e); count 5). The People dismissed count 2, conspiracy to commit forgery, during trial. Before the jury reached its verdict, the trial court advised Brown that he did not have a right to a jury trial on the aggravating sentencing factors alleging that he suffered numerous prior convictions of increasing seriousness and served a prior prison term. Brown later waived his right to a trial on those factors and admitted them. The court accepted Brown’s admissions and found the aggravating factors true. The jury never made any findings concerning the aggravating sentencing factors. At sentencing, the trial court discussed Brown’s criminal history, which dated back to 2004, when he was convicted of a misdemeanor possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359). Brown also suffered the following prior convictions. In 2005, he was convicted of misdemeanor receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and possession of ammunition by a prohibited person (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)). In 2007, he was convicted of misdemeanor possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359). In 2012, he was convicted of felony possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health and Saf. Code, § 11351), and misdemeanor possession of personal identification information with intent to defraud (§ 530.5, 1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted. 3 subd. (c)(1)). In 2014, he was convicted of misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)). Finally, in 2019, he was convicted of felony possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court then sentenced Brown to a total term of three years and eight months in prison, consisting of the upper term of three years for count 1 plus a consecutive eight-month term for count 5. The court stayed the sentences for Brown’s remaining counts under section 654. Brown appeals. DISCUSSION The parties agree, and so do we, that the trial court prejudicially erred when it imposed an upper term sentence because Brown did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial on the aggravating sentencing factors. Under section 1170, subdivision (b), when a statute specifies three possible terms of imprisonment, “the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).” Under subdivision (b)(2), the court may “impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) Subdivision (b)(3) provides that a court may nevertheless consider a defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction 4 without submitting the prior convictions to a jury. (Id., subd. (b)(3).) A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial “is triggered by section 1170(b)’s substantive requirements governing imposition of an upper term sentence.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 762 (Lynch).) Now, a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt “all facts actually relied on to impose an upper term,” except for the fact of a prior conviction. (Id. at p. 758.) This right extends to aggravating sentencing factors based on the increasing seriousness of the defendant’s prior convictions and the defendant’s prior unsatisfactory performance on probation. (People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1083 (Wiley).) “[A] Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.” (Lynch, at p. 768.) A defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on aggravating sentencing factors. (People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47.) That waiver, however, must be express, and it “ ‘may not be accepted by the court unless it is knowing and intelligent, that is “ ‘ “made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it,” ’ ” as well as voluntary “ ‘ “in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166.) When imposing a high term sentence for count 1, the trial court indicated that it relied on Brown’s criminal record, including the numerosity of his prior convictions. Although Brown admitted two aggravating sentencing factors—that his 5 prior convictions were numerous and increasing in seriousness and that he served a prior prison term—he was never advised of his right to a jury trial on them. Indeed, the court informed Brown that he had no such right. Thus, Brown never made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial on those aggravating sentencing factors. Because Brown did not make a valid waiver of his right to a jury trial on the aggravating sentencing factors, and because the jury never made any findings concerning those factors, Brown’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated when the court relied on them to impose the high term for count 1. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) This error is prejudicial unless we “can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements.” (Ibid.) We cannot conclude that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Supreme Court explained in Wiley, the analysis required for determining whether a defendant’s prior convictions increased in seriousness is “comparative and qualitative,” which makes “it ‘ “ ‘difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.’ ” ’ ” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1090.) Although Brown suffered several prior convictions before this case arose, those convictions span more than 15 years. None of Brown’s prior convictions were for violent offenses, and many of them, including two of his most recent, were misdemeanors. 6 And Brown’s most recent prior conviction—felony possession of a firearm—is the same as one of the offenses he was convicted of in this case. On this record, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown’s prior convictions increased in seriousness. DISPOSITION Brown’s sentence is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings on the aggravating sentencing factors under section 1170, subdivision (b). In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. VIRAMONTES, J. WE CONCUR: WILEY, Acting P. J. SCHERB, J. 7