People v. Murphy

Filed 9/24/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES THE PEOPLE, ) 25APCM00188 ) Plaintiff and Appellant, ) Clara Shortridge Foltz Criminal ) Justice Center Trial Court v. ) ) No. 2CJ00246-02 MADELINE MURPHY, ) ) Defendant and Respondent. ) OPINION ) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jill Feeney, Judge. Reversed. Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Dennis Kong, Head Deputy City Attorney, Meredith McKittrick, Assistant Head Deputy City Attorney, and John R. Prosser, Deputy City Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance for Defendant and Respondent. * * * 1  The People of the State of California appeal from the judgment dismissing the complaint filed against defendant Madeline Murphy. The dismissal took place after the trial court determined that defendant substantially complied with the community service condition of judicial diversion ordered pursuant to Penal Code section 1001.95 et seq.1 We agree with the People that the trial court misapplied the law and erred by dismissing the action when it is undisputed that defendant failed to comply with the imposed conditions at the end of the period of diversion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of dismissal. BACKGROUND A complaint filed on March 30, 2022 alleged that defendant, in July 2021, violated various provisions of the Los Angeles Municipal Code governing commercial cannabis establishments.2 While represented by counsel, defendant pleaded not guilty to each offense. On January 30, 2023, defendant filed a motion for misdemeanor diversion. According to the unverified motion, defendant was eligible and suitable for diversion because she had no prior felony convictions, was a single mother of a three-year old child, and was gainfully employed as a physical therapist in Orange County. Defendant maintained that during execution of a search warrant on another person, she was collaterally detained by law enforcement when she admitted to “assisting with sales for the past 9 months.”3 Defendant had 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 The complaint alleged defendant committed the following offenses: operating or participating as an employee, contractor, agent or volunteer in any unlicensed commercial cannabis activity (L.A. Mun. Code, § 104.15, subd. (a)(1), count 1); owning or operating an unlawful commercial cannabis establishment (id., subd. (b)(1), count 2); participating as an employee, contractor, agent or volunteer in an unlawful commercial cannabis establishment (id., subd. (b)(2), count 3); leasing, renting to, or otherwise allowing an unlawful commercial cannabis establishment to occupy any land (id., subd. (b)(4), count 4); erecting or maintaining a building or structure without securing all required permits and licenses (L.A. Mun. Code, § 12.21, subd. (a), count 5); opening or maintaining any place for the purpose of unlawfully selling, giving away, or using a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366, count 6); and unlawful possession for sale of cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359, subd. (b), count 7). 3 Defendant later admitted she had a supervisory role in the unlicensed business. 2 prior alcohol-related misdemeanor convictions, including a driving under the influence conviction as recently as 2017. On February 16, 2023, Judge Anne Hwang offered two years of judicial diversion on condition that defendant perform “a hefty community service requirement” of 200 hours with any organization that was approved with the Orange County Superior Court. Defense counsel urged the court to reduce the diversion period to one year, lower the community service to 100 hours, and allow defendant to perform community service with any nonprofit group. The court responded, “I have concerns about whether you’re going to take this diversion seriously and some concerns about what you’re stating your role is in this,” “I want to give you an opportunity to show that you are going to take this seriously and follow the rules of the court,” and “you are getting a real benefit here today, and that you should view it as a benefit and take it seriously.” Defendant expressed that it would be very difficult for her to perform 200 hours of community service because she was a single mother.4 The court reiterated that it was defendant’s choice to either accept the diversion offer or proceed with trial. Defense counsel represented that defendant was under a lot of stress and that she planned to move to Nevada shortly. The court agreed to allow defendant to perform the ordered community service with any reputable nonprofit organization in Henderson County. The court explained the consequences of a conviction and the benefits of the diversion being offered if defendant took it seriously. Defendant accepted the conditions of diversion. Over two years later, a hearing convened on February 18, 2025,5 before Judge Jill Feeney. Defendant had not completed the community service requirement and was “about halfway” done. Defendant represented that because of her physical limitations corroborated by a doctor’s note, it “was difficult, if not near impossible” to perform the 200 hours of service, and that she attempted to perform online community service. The court reminded defendant 4 There was no reference to any medical ailment at that time. 5 Undesignated date references are to the year 2025. 3 that she was ordered to perform community service, not community labor, and there were plenty of service opportunities available regardless of her physical limitations. The court rejected defendant’s requests to excuse the remaining hours of community service or to allow her to perform online community service; however, the court agreed to permit her to perform the service with “any nonprofit with 501(c)(3) status.” The prosecutor reminded the court that the maximum period of diversion had expired, and informed the court that defendant was arrested for battery in 2024, but no charges had been filed. Over the People’s objection, the court terminated diversion and set a progress hearing to consider reinstating diversion depending on defendant’s satisfaction of the community service requirements. At a hearing on April 3, defendant indicated she was only able to complete four hours of community service per week. Over the People’s objection, Judge Feeney afforded defendant two months to complete a minimum of 24 hours of community service.6 At a hearing before Judge Craig Mitchell on June 3, defendant presented a progress letter indicating that she had performed 24.5 hours of community service since the last hearing. Deferring to Judge Feeney, Judge Mitchell declined to rule on the People’s objection to reinstatement of diversion, and he continued the case. At a hearing before Judge Feeney on June 25, defendant represented that she performed an additional 16 hours of community service since the last hearing, but the court was unable to confirm this representation.7 Defendant requested that the court exercise its discretion to deem defendant to have substantially complied with the community service requirements. Over the People’s objection, the court ordered “a new, shorter grant of judicial diversion” for a period of one year, due to “these extraordinary circumstances given the amount of hours ordered and . . . defendant’s documented disability.” Defendant was ordered to complete a minimum of 30 hours of community service by the next hearing date. 6 There is no record of the oral proceedings of this hearing in the record on appeal. 7 Court records showed that defendant only completed 87.25 hours of service, while defendant represented that she completed over 150 hours of service. 4  On July 3, the People filed a petition for writ of mandate with this court seeking to vacate the order purporting to grant a new period of diversion beyond the 24-month statutory maximum.8 On July 15, this court issued an alternative writ of mandate, ordering the trial court to either show cause why a peremptory writ should not be ordered or to consider vacating the order that placed defendant on a new 12-month grant of diversion. The next day, the trial court convened a hearing and vacated the June 25 order. The defense requested a formal diversion termination hearing, arguing that defendant “has repeatedly shown the court that she has substantial health issues” and that she was in substantial compliance with the terms of diversion. The court ordered further briefing on defendant’s entitlement to a hearing on the request to terminate diversion. In her brief, defendant argued that the court had wide discretion to modify the terms of diversion, and that it should deem diversion to be substantially complied with to the best of defendant’s abilities and dismiss the case. Attached to defendant’s brief was a claim summary from the California Employment Development Department indicating defendant had an active claim, and a note from a treating physician representing that defendant “has been dealing with back pain” from March 2024 to present, and “she was physically unable to do community service previously and currently due to severe spinal stenosis,” resulting in “frequent flare ups that cause immobility.” The People’s brief argued that a formal diversion termination hearing was not necessary because the court had already determined, at the February 18 hearing, that defendant failed to 8 The factual recitation in the People’s opening brief includes a summary of the writ proceedings that are not included in the record on appeal. We take judicial notice of the petition and our order in People v. Superior Court (Murphy) (July 15, 2025, 25APCP00115) [nonpub. order] for the purpose of ensuring a complete factual summary. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d)(1), 459, subd. (a).) This information is not of substantial consequence to the determination of the action. (Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (d).) 5 comply with the conditions of diversion. Since diversion was already terminated, no additional hearing was warranted.9 The next hearing took place on August 29. Relying upon section 1001.96, which requires the defendant to complete all terms of diversion to receive dismissal, the People argued that the medical documentation did not cover the entire period of diversion, so defendant would be rewarded for waiting until after the two-year period expired, and then using her medical issues as an excuse to avoid compliance with the mandatory conditions of diversion. The court, relying upon the medical documentation provided by defendant, and over the People’s objection, found that defendant substantially complied with the community service condition, deemed diversion to be successfully completed, and dismissed the action pursuant to section 1001.95. The court explained: “before this all hit the docks, she had done . . . 122 of the 200 hours, . . . so it’s not like she had done nothing. [¶] From my perspective, that’s substantial compliance in this particular scenario. And it just seems to me wrong that if someone has some condition that prevents them from fulfilling the terms of diversion, that there’s essentially no way out other than to say they don’t get diversion. . . . [I]f I can’t extend it and if I can’t sort of deem it substantial compliance, that doesn’t seem, from my perspective, to be logical or to fit sort of with the statutory scheme.”10 DISCUSSION Section 1001.95 et seq. allows trial courts to offer diversion of a misdemeanor criminal prosecution, over the People’s objection, to any defendant whose offense is eligible for the 9 Defendant’s reply brief included an additional note from a treating physician representing that defendant “received an anterior and posterior lumbar spine fusion on 8/6/25 which requires a complex recovery period. Because of this, I recommend that patient should not go to court for at least 6 months from the date of surgery.” 10 The People filed a timely notice of appeal from the appealable judgment of dismissal. (See People v. Shaginyan (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 5 & fn. 2.) The notice of filing of the notice of appeal, the opening brief, the notice of due dates for filing the briefs, and the notice of default were served upon the bar panel attorney who represented defendant in the trial court. No respondent’s brief or request for the appointment of counsel was filed with this court, and none of the aforesaid documents were returned as undeliverable. 6 program.11 (§ 1001.95.) “Diversion is ‘“intended to offer a second chance to [certain] offenders who are minimally involved in crime and maximally motivated to reform . . . .”’” (People v. Hill (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 8 (Hill).) During the period of diversion, which may not exceed 24 months, the prosecution is suspended while the defendant satisfies any terms, conditions or programs imposed by the court. (Ibid.; § 1001.95, subd. (b).) The court has broad discretion to fashion the conditions of diversion it deems appropriate based on the unique circumstances in each case. (Hill, supra, at p. Supp. 10.) If it appears to the court that the defendant is not complying with the terms and conditions of diversion, the court shall give notice to the defendant and hold a hearing to determine whether the criminal proceedings should be reinstituted. (§ 1001.95, subd. (d).) If the court finds the defendant has not complied with the terms and conditions of diversion, the court may end diversion and order resumption of the criminal proceedings. (Ibid.) If, however, at the end of the period of diversion, the defendant completes all conditions ordered by the court, the court shall dismiss the action. (Id., subd. (c); § 1001.96, subd. (a).) A decision to dismiss charges is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Marroquin (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th Supp. 31, 36, 39.) An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable jurist could make the same decision, or where the court misapplied the law or misunderstood the scope of its discretion. (Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490.) To the extent our review requires statutory interpretation, we employ de novo review. (People v. Shaginyan, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. Supp. 8.) “Our fundamental task in construing statutes is to interpret them in a way that gives effect to the Legislature’s intent. [Citation.] ‘“Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.”’ [Citation.] We consider the statutory language in the context of the statute as a whole and its overall scheme.” (People v. Guzman (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 464, 476.) If the language of a statute is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. (Ibid.) 11 The ineligible offenses are inapplicable to this case. (§ 1001.95, subd. (e).) 7  In the case sub judice, the 24-month period of diversion expired on February 17. At the hearing the next day, after defendant represented that the community service requirement was “about halfway” done, the court found that defendant had not completed the 200 hours of community service, terminated diversion, and set a progress hearing over the People’s objection to reinstate diversion depending on defendant’s satisfaction of the community service requirements. The court declared that day was day zero of 45 for trial. As noted, the court held numerous hearings afterwards and ultimately purported to reinstate a one-year period of diversion before retracting its decision after this court issued an alternative writ of mandate. The trial court was not authorized to formulate its own diversion program outside of the parameters enacted by the Legislature, including the 24-month maximum period in subdivision (b) of section 1001.95. (People v. Marroquin, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. Supp. 37; see People v. Municipal Court (Gelardi) (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 692, 698; see also People v. Tapia (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9.) Thus, the court was left to either dismiss the action or continue with regular criminal proceedings. Dismissal is permitted only if the defendant has “[c]omplete[d] all conditions ordered by the court” (§ 1001.96, subd. (a)), and “complied with the imposed terms and conditions . . . at the end of the period of diversion” (§ 1001.95, subd. (c), italics added). It is undisputed that defendant did not complete the 200 hours of community service ordered by the court as of the termination of diversion on February 18. Substantial compliance with the conditions of misdemeanor diversion is not contemplated by section 1001.95 et seq., in contrast to other diversion and supervision statutes. (E.g., § 1001.36, subd. (h) [trial court must dismiss criminal charges at the end of the period of mental health diversion “if the defendant has substantially complied with the requirements of diversion”]; § 1170.9, subd. (h)(1)(B) [authorizes mental health diversion for veterans if “[t]he defendant is in substantial compliance with the conditions of that probation”]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786, subd. (c)(1) [a juvenile’s “satisfactory completion of an informal program of supervision . . . shall be deemed to have occurred . . . if the person has not failed to substantially comply with the reasonable orders of supervision”].) 8 When the Legislature omits words or phrases used in similar statutory schemes, we presume it did so intentionally. (People v. Wimer (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 113, 132.) While the court has discretion whether to end diversion and resume the criminal proceedings if it finds that the defendant has not complied with the terms and conditions of diversion (§ 1001.95, subd. (d)), this discretion does not extend to the post-diversion period. In other words, once diversion terminated by operation of law and defendant inarguably failed to comply with the terms and conditions during the period of diversion, the court lacked authority to dismiss the action under sections 1001.95 and 1001.96.12 Accordingly, dismissal “was in excess of the confines and constraints set by the Legislature.” (People v. Marroquin, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. Supp. 40.)13 12 Our decision should not be read to limit whether the court can modify the conditions of diversion during the maximum 24-month term. Even if we were to assume that substantial compliance was authorized, the court’s finding of substantial compliance was an abuse of discretion in this case. The terms of judicial diversion are an “offer,” meaning a defendant is “free to reject them and allow the prosecution to proceed in the usual manner.” (Hill, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. Supp. 10.) In the pre-and- post diversion hearings, defendant repeatedly asked the court to reduce the community service requirement. The court expressed concern with whether defendant was taking the diversion seriously. Defendant had 24 months to complete community service (not community labor) with any authorized program, and this requirement could have completed by volunteering for less than two hours per week. There is no indication in the record that defendant was physically unable to complete community service. The medical documentation reflects that defendant’s back ailments began in March 2024—more than one year after diversion commenced. If defendant was unable to perform the service requirement, it was her duty to request modification of the conditions, not to passively wait until after diversion expired to request dismissal based on a finding of substantial compliance with the conditions of diversion. Defendant’s actions and inaction reflected an indifference towards satisfying the conditions of diversion. On this record, there was no basis to find that defendant substantially complied with the conditions of diversion. 13 Although not raised by the parties, the judgment cannot be affirmed in reliance on the court’s general authority to dismiss an action in furtherance of justice under section 1385. (Nazir v. Superior Court, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 491 [“a court may dismiss an action . . . in furtherance of justice in any situation where the Legislature has not clearly evidenced a contrary intent”].) The Legislature expressed a contrary intent in misdemeanor diversion cases by allowing dismissal of the action only if the defendant complies with and completes all imposed terms and conditions ordered by the court. (§§ 1001.95, subd. (c), 1001.96, subd. (a).) 9  DISPOSITION The judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the matter is remanded for the trial court to reinstate criminal proceedings. _________________________ P. McKay, P. J. We concur: _______________________ _________________________ Hobbs, J. Jaskol, J. 10