Full Opinion

Filed 10/23/26 P. v. Archuleta CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, E082960 v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1605083) RAYMOND ANTHONY ARCHULETA, ORDER MODIFYING OPINION Defendant and Appellant. NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT THE COURT: It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on October 19, 2026, be modified as follows: On page 9, the second sentence of the disposition is modified to replace the reference to “section 1172.5” with “section 1172.75.” The full sentence is therefore modified to read: “The cause is remanded to the superior court with directions to conduct a full resentencing hearing, pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (d).” This modification does not affect the judgment. RAMIREZ P. J. 1 Filed 10/19/26 P. v. Archuleta CA4/2 (unmodified opinion) Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, E082960 v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1605083) RAYMOND ANTHONY ARCHULETA, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa A. Mandel, and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 1 INTRODUCTION Defendant Raymond Archuleta appealed from the trial court’s order finding he was ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 after the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) notified the trial court that his judgment included a now-invalid prior prison term enhancement.1 At the time of Defendant’s guilty plea and original sentencing, the trial court had imposed a prison prior enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), but it struck the punishment. On appeal, Defendant argued that section 1172.75’s resentencing procedure applies to any defendant who is serving prison or jail time on a judgment that includes a now-invalid prior prison term enhancement, regardless of whether the enhancement was originally stayed, or its punishment was stricken, but we affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Supreme Court granted Defendant’s petition for review but deferred further action pending disposition of a related issue in People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 (Rhodius), and later deferred further action pending the disposition of People v. Espino (2026) 20 Cal.5th 57 (Espino). Subsequently, the Supreme Court transferred the cause to this court for reconsideration in light of the decision in Espino and we invited supplemental briefing. In light of these recent developments, we reverse and remand the cause to the superior court with directions to conduct a full resentencing. 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. 2 BACKGROUND2 We adopt the background information set forth in our prior opinion, People v. Archuleta, E082960, unpublished opinion filed on January 30, 2025 (Archuleta): “Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty in April 2017 to a criminal threat (§ 422), and he admitted personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), also referred to as a “nickel” prior), two prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)), and two prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). At sentencing, the trial court struck one of the strikes pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, and sentenced defendant to 12 years in state prison, consisting of the upper term of three years for the criminal threat, doubled for the remaining strike, plus one year for the personal use enhancement, and five years for the nickel prior. “Regarding the prison priors, the reporter’s transcript reflects as to the first prison prior the court stayed the enhancement and struck the punishment, while for the second prior, the court ‘impos[ed] it but str[uck] it.’ The minute order of the sentencing, as well as the abstract of judgment, indicate that both prison priors were stayed. “In 2022, CDCR notified the trial court that defendant’s abstract of judgment included prior prison term enhancements under subdivision (b) of section 667.5. 2 Because Defendant pled guilty and based on the nature of the issue raised on appeal, consideration of the underlying facts of this case is not necessary to determine the issue on appeal. 3 “In October 2022, the People filed an opposition to defendant’s resentencing, stating that the ‘court [had] stayed the two prison priors.’ The People argued that the court should ‘strike/dismiss his stayed prison priors,’ which ‘should be the end of the matter because there is no reduction of defendant’s sentence to begin with.’ The People further argued that ‘[i]f these priors, unnecessary to the plea, had been dismissed at the time of the plea or stricken . . . instead of stayed at immediate sentencing, defendant would not have even been referred to this court by [CDCR].’ “In January 2023, the People filed a supplemental memorandum with the court, opposing defendant’s resentencing and arguing that the ‘court should summarily deny resentencing and simply dismiss/strike the prison priors that were previously stayed, keeping the 12-year prison sentence intact.’ “In November 2023, defendant filed a motion in support of his resentencing, arguing that he was eligible ‘regardless of whether the prior was imposed and executed, stayed, or punishment stricken.’ (Capitalization omitted.) “The following month, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s eligibility for resentencing under section 1172.75. The court declined to recall defendant’s sentence and resentence him under section 1172.75. The court found that defendant was ineligible because he was not ‘serving additional time’ based on his prison priors. The court then struck defendant’s prison priors on the ground that ‘post 2004 . . . we were directed to strike, not stay’ prison priors and ordered an amended abstract of judgment to reflect the modifications. “Defendant appealed.” (Archuleta, supra, E082960.) 4 In our prior opinion, we held that Defendant was not entitled to a full resentencing because the punishment for both the enhancements had been stricken and therefore had not been “imposed and executed” within the meaning of section 1172.75, to qualify for a resentencing hearing. (Archuleta, supra, E082960.) On April 16, 2025, the Supreme Court granted review, deferring further action pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1050. (People v. Archuleta (Apr. 16, 2025, S289560) [2025 Cal. LEXIS 2184.) Following the decision in Rhodius, on September 17, 2025, the Supreme Court issued an order holding this matter for a new lead case, and that further action was deferred pending the disposition of a related issue in Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th 57. (People v. Archuleta (Sept. 17, 2025, S289560) [2025 Cal. LEXIS 6047.) On July 2, 2026, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Espino, holding that even where punishment for a prison prior enhancement has been stricken, a defendant is entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75. (Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th at pp. 60, 66.) On September 30, 2026, the Supreme Court transferred the matter back to this court with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of Espino. (People v. Archuleta (Sept. 30, 2026, S289560) [2026 Cal. LEXIS 5621.) We vacated our prior decision and invited the parties to submit supplemental briefing. Both parties have now done so, and the People agree that we should remand for a full resentencing under section 1172.75, subdivision (d). 5 DISCUSSION As of January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5, subdivision (b), to eliminate sentence enhancements for prior prison terms unless the enhancements related to prior terms for sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1; People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 567.) The purpose of the statute is to “reduce the societal and fiscal burdens of incarceration” by “eliminat[ing] prior-prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except for ‘sexually violent offense[s].’ ” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1054.) Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), which was added to implement Senate Bill No. 136, states, “Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, . . . is legally invalid.” The statute requires the CDCR and county correctional administrators to identify “persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement” under section 667.5, subdivision (b). (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Upon receipt of the list, the sentencing court must verify that the “the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a).” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) If so, the sentencing court must recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. (Ibid.) At the hearing to determine eligibility for resentencing, a sentence less than the original sentence must be imposed due to the elimination of the enhancement, unless the court finds a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. “[T]he phrase ‘lesser sentence’ need not refer to a shorter sentence; rather, it can be understood to mean that the new sentence must eliminate whatever adverse effects flow from the now-invalid 6 prior prison term enhancement, even if those effects do not take the form of a longer term of imprisonment.” (Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 62, citing Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) The court must also apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1)-(2).) Following the enactment of section 1172.75, conflicting interpretations were issued by the Courts of Appeal, resulting in diverse outcomes, which we do not need to address here. (See Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 1057, 1066, fn.2.) The Supreme Court’s opinion in Rhodius clarified that “It is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature also intended for section 1172.75 to accomplish this purpose through its full resentencing procedures for defendants whose judgments contain now-invalidated section 667.5(b) enhancements, regardless of whether the enhancements were stayed or executed.” (Id., at p. 1065.) This left the question of whether resentencing was required for defendants as to whom the enhancement was imposed but the punishment therefor was stricken, a question answered in the affirmative in Espino: “The question in this case is whether an enhancement was ‘imposed’ even though the sentencing court struck the punishment for the enhancement. The answer is yes.” (Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 60.) The court explained “It is true that the potential effects are not the same as when an enhancement is stayed. (See Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1061 [‘when a sentence is stayed, the trial court retains the ability to “lift the stay and impose the term under certain circumstance[s], such as if an alternately imposed term is invalidated’ ”].) But that does 7 not mean the potential effects are nonexistent, or that the Legislature would have believed them to be so.” (Espino, at p. 65.)3 The opinion in Espino concluded by holding that while the punishment for the defendant’s prison prior enhancement had been stricken, it had been imposed, and was now invalid, rendering the defendant entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75, again citing Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at page 1068. In the present case, the punishment for both the enhancements was similarly stricken. As such, Defendant is in the same position as the defendant in Espino and is entitled to the same relief. Both parties agree that the cause must be remanded to the superior court for a full resentencing hearing pursuant to the mandate of Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th at pages 60 and 66. We therefore reverse the order denying Defendant’s petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, and remand the matter to the superior court to conduct a full resentencing hearing, pursuant to Espino. 3 For persons committed to state prison, the CDCR relies on the information contained in the sentencing minutes and the abstract of judgment to determine the defendant’s release date, eligibility for educational programs, as well as to determine where the defendant should be housed, based on a classification score determined by ascribing points for various elements of the sentence. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3075 [initial intake], 3077 [criteria for county assessment program], 3078.3 [criteria for alternative custody program exclusion], 3269 [criteria considered for inmate housing assignments], 3375 [classification process], 3375.1 [inmate placement based on classification score].) Inclusion of now-invalid enhancements can result in errors in a defendant’s classification score, and impact the availability of rehabilitative or educational programs for the inmate, among other things. 8 DISPOSITION The order finding that Defendant is ineligible for resentencing is reversed. The cause is remanded to the superior court with directions to conduct a full resentencing hearing, pursuant to section 1172.5, subdivision (d). NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAMIREZ P. J. We concur: McKINSTER J. MENETREZ J. 9