Full Opinion

Filed 11/4/26 P. v. Skidmore CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A175319 v. CARL ALBERT SKIDMORE, (Sonoma County Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. SCR458973) Carl Albert Skidmore appeals from the trial court’s denial of his postconviction motion to vacate his sentence. His appellate counsel has filed a brief identifying no issues as grounds for relief, pursuant to the procedure established in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 222, 231–232 (Delgadillo). Skidmore then filed a supplemental brief. We reject his contention that his sentence is unauthorized. BACKGROUND In January 2008, the Sonoma County District Attorney filed an information charging Skidmore with three counts of rape of a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(1); counts I–III);1 forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count IV); continuous sexual abuse of a minor (§ 288.5, subd. (a); counts V, VIII); sexual penetration by force or duress (§ 289, subd. (a)(1); count VI); forcible lewd acts on a child under age 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 1 count VII); and lewd acts on a child under age 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts IX, X). As relevant here, with respect to counts IV–IX, the information alleged under the One Strike Law (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (d)) that Skidmore had a prior conviction for violating section 288, subdivision (a), in 1985. Section 667.61, subdivisions (a) and (d)(1), provides that where a defendant is convicted of a sex offense enumerated in section 667.61, subdivision (c) (including violations of §§ 261, 288, 288.5, and 289), the defendant shall receive an enhanced sentence of 25 years to life in prison if the defendant has previously been convicted of an enumerated offense (including a violation of § 288, subd. (a).) On January 29, 2008, a jury found Skidmore guilty on all counts except for counts V and VIII. As to counts V and VIII, the jury found Skidmore not guilty, but with respect to count VIII, the jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of committing a lewd act on a child. The jury also found the section 667.61 allegations to be true, and the trial court found that Skidmore had previously been convicted of violating section 288, subdivision (a), in 1985. Applying section 667.61, subdivisions (a) and (d), the trial court sentenced Skidmore to an aggregate sentence of 290 years to life in state prison consecutive to 25 years in prison. On November 17, 2025, defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentence. His motion argued that because his prior conviction for violating section 288, subdivision (a), was committed before section 667.61 was enacted, it could not serve as the basis for an enhanced sentence. DISCUSSION Where, as here, the appellant has filed a supplemental brief in compliance with the procedures established in Delgadillo, we issue an opinion addressing the arguments presented in that brief. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) Skidmore asserts that his sentence is unauthorized because it violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. His argument lacks merit. 2 As an initial matter, the courts of appeal are divided over whether a trial court has jurisdiction to correct an unauthorized sentence when a defendant files a resentencing motion after his conviction has become final. (Compare People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 989–990 [holding that a trial court has jurisdiction to vacate unauthorized sentence at any time], with People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 634–642 [holding that the unauthorized sentence doctrine excuses forfeiture, but does not provide an independent basis for jurisdiction]; People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 381–382 [same].) Where the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the defendant’s resentencing motion, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the motion. (See Burgess, at p. 382.) To the extent we lack jurisdiction over Skidmore’s appeal, however, we have jurisdiction pursuant to our discretion to treat his appeal as a habeas corpus petition. (See In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 839 [explaining that habeas corpus jurisdiction is available “to review claims that a criminal defendant was sentenced to serve an illegal sentence”], disapproved of on another ground by Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th 842; see also People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 63 [treating purported appeal from denial of resentencing motion as habeas corpus petition].) In furtherance of judicial economy, we construe his appeal as a habeas petition and reach the merits of his challenge.2 Skidmore contends that his sentence is unconstitutional because in 1988, at the time he was convicted of his prior offense, the offense was not yet a basis for enhanced sentencing under the One Strike Law (§ 667.61), which was not enacted until 1994. (See Stats. 1994, ch. 14, § 1 [enacting Sen. Bill No. 26X (1993–1994 1st Ex. Sess.), eff. Nov. 30, 1994].) It is well established, however, that “[n]o constitutional bar prevents the application of” a sentencing enhancement “to a [current] offense solely because the prior conviction which serves as a basis for enhancement was committed before” 2 Because Skidmore himself did not style his appeal as a habeas corpus petition, the instant matter shall not count against him for purposes of determining whether any subsequent habeas corpus petition that he may file is a successive petition. 3 the enhancement provisions became applicable. (People v. Jackson (1985) 37 Cal.3d 826, 833, overruled on another ground in People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 347–348). The ex post facto prohibition does not apply because, “[i]n the context of habitual criminal statutes, ‘increased penalties for subsequent offenses are attributable to the defendant’s status as a repeat offender and arise as an incident of the subsequent offense rather than constituting a penalty for the prior offense.’ ” (Jackson, at p. 833.) In rejecting an analogous ex post facto challenge over a century ago, McDonald v. Massachusetts (1901) 180 U.S. 311 [45 L.Ed. 542] similarly held that a habitual criminal “statute, imposing a punishment on none but future crimes, is not ex post facto.” (Id. at p. 313; see Parke v. Raley (1992) 506 U.S. 20, 27 [121 L.Ed.2d 391] [explaining that “we have repeatedly upheld recidivism statutes ‘against contentions that they violate constitutional strictures dealing with . . . ex post facto laws”]; People v. James (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1151 [“use of a prior conviction suffered before the effective date of the three strikes law as a prior strike does not violate the prohibition in either the California or United States Constitution against ex post facto laws”]; People v. Bowden (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 387, 391 [same]; People v. Hatcher (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1527–1528 [rejecting ex post facto challenge because “courts have repeatedly upheld the use of a prior conviction occurring prior to the adoption of an enhancing provision”]; Gonzales v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1309 [“the constitutionality of ‘retroactive’ application [of an enhancement statute] is well settled”].)3 In 2008, when Skidmore was convicted of the offenses for which he received the challenged sentence, the One Strike Law had already been in effect for years. 3 Skidmore’s citation to People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1 is inapposite. Garcia did not involve an ex post facto question, and the quote Skidmore attributes to the case does not appear in the opinion. 4 DISPOSITION Treating Skidmore’s appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the petition is denied. Burns, J. WE CONCUR: Simons, Acting P. J. Chou, J. A175319/People v. Carl Albert Skidmore 5