People v. Wilson CA2/7
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketB345683
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Wilson CA2/7
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B345683
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24PDCF00511)
v.
TERRY WAYNE WILSON, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Leonard Torrealba, Judge. Affirmed.
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Deepti Vaadyala,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Terry Wayne Wilson, Jr., appeals his sentence for burglary,
identity fraud, and defrauding an innkeeper. Wilson argues the
trial court erred by declining to strike three prior robbery
convictions under the Three Strikes Law, and that the court
erred by imposing a consecutive sentence for burglary and
identity theft.
We affirm. The trial court duly considered Wilson’s
mitigating circumstances and did not abuse its discretion by
finding Wilson fell within the spirit of the Three Strikes Law.
The court also did not abuse its discretion by finding the burglary
and identity theft occurred on separate occasions, supporting a
consecutive sentence under Penal Code section 1170.12,
subdivision (a)(6).1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Information
In October 2024, Wilson was charged with felony second
degree commercial burglary (Count 2; § 459); felony unauthorized
use of personal identifying information (Count 3; § 530.5, subd.
(a)); misdemeanor defrauding an innkeeper by false pretense of
$950 or less (Count 4; § 537, subd. (a)(1)); and felony vandalism of
$400 or more in damage or destruction of property (Count 5;
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
§ 594, subd. (a)).2
The information also alleged as to Counts 2 and 3 that
Wilson had three prior convictions for robbery in 2017, 2022, and
2024 constituting strikes under the Three Strikes Law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12), and that these convictions also
disqualified Wilson from a probationary sentence under section
1203, subdivision (e)(4). The information further alleged
aggravating factors under the California Rules of Court,3
including that Wilson’s prior convictions were numerous and of
increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)); Wilson had served a
prior prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)); and Wilson committed the
charged offenses while he was on probation, parole, or other
supervisory release (rule 4.421(b)(4)).
B. The Trial
Wilson was tried by a jury, and the prosecution introduced
the following trial evidence.
Wilson graduated from John Muir High School in Pasadena
in 2015 or 2016. On Friday September 13, 2024, Wilson attended
a football game on campus. On Monday September 16, school
officials discovered a break-in on campus at the student store. A
window had been broken and the room was in disarray. Missing
from the student store were three blank checks, one dollar, and a
school debit card for use by the student council. A school
employee checked the transaction activity on the missing debit
card and discovered two unusual and unrecognized charges:
2 Count 1 was dismissed after the preliminary hearing. For
present purposes, we refer to the charges as counts 2 through 5.
3 Rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
3
$166.85 at the Pasadena Rose and Crown Hotel and $26.76 with
“Vesta AT&T.”
Surveillance footage of the campus on Sunday, September
15th at approximately 9:00 p.m. depicted a person disappearing
through a window into the student store and exiting through the
door. A forensic specialist with the Pasadena Police Department
processed the crime scene and located fingerprints on a shard of
glass and a white metal box inside the store. Forensic analysis
revealed the fingerprints matched Wilson’s fingerprints in a
police database as well as new fingerprints taken during Wilson’s
trial.
The manager of the Pasadena Rose and Crown Hotel
confirmed a “check-in under the name of Terry Wilson” on
September 15, 2024 at approximately 11:45 p.m. via a one-night
reservation on Booking.com. Wilson provided a driver’s license
with his name and paid with the debit card from John Muir High.
Wilson attempted to check in again the following day for a 10-day
reservation using the same debit card. Hotel staff called the
police, but Wilson departed before police arrived. Wilson was
arrested on September 24.
C. Conviction and Sentence
The jury convicted Wilson of Counts 2, 3, and 4 but
acquitted him of the vandalism charge in Count 5. Following the
jury verdict, Wilson waived his right to a jury trial on the prior
convictions and aggravating circumstances, and the court found
the alleged prior convictions and aggravating circumstances true.
Before sentencing, Wilson moved to strike his prior strikes
pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th
497 (Romero). Wilson argued that he was young at the time of
4
his current offense (29 years old) and at the time of his prior
strikes (21 and 26 years old). Wilson also argued for Romero
relief based on his “extensive mitigating life history.” Wilson
explained that he was likely born with fetal alcohol syndrome; he
was placed in foster care at age three; he experienced physical,
verbal and sexual abuse in foster care; he suffered concussions as
a high school and college football player which might indicate a
traumatic brain injury; he had been transient or unhoused
throughout his adult life; he had an “extensive history of
psychiatric treatment” for post-traumatic stress disorder, major
depressive disorder, and a previous suicide attempt; he had a
history of substance and alcohol abuse; and his children and their
mother had recently been displaced by a wildfire.
Wilson also argued for concurrent sentencing on all counts
under section 654. In Wilson’s view, the offenses “constitute[d]
an indivisible course of conduct,” “all within a short period of
time and all with the same objective to pay for the hotel room.”
The People opposed Wilson’s requests. As to Wilson’s
Romero motion, the People argued that Wilson did not fall
outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. The People noted that
Wilson first committed a series of six robberies in 2017, then
committed two carjackings in 2021 less than a year after he was
paroled, and that the present offenses occurred 75 days after
Wilson was paroled for the 2021 offenses. The People also
identified that, pursuant to a plea agreement for his 2021
offenses, Wilson had previously received Romero relief from his
prior strike convictions.
The People further argued Wilson should be sentenced
consecutively, citing section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6). The
People argued that given Wilson’s prior strike offenses, the
5
statute required consecutive sentencing because Wilson’s
“current conviction [was] for more than one felony count not
committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same
set of operative facts.” (§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(6).) In the People’s
view, “Wilson’s burglary of John Muir High School and his
unauthorized use of the school’s debit card were different and
distinct physical acts” committed at “different locations and at
different times.” The People contended that Wilson’s intent was
not merely to take the debit card and pay for the hotel room.
Rather, evidence that the student store was “ransacked”
indicated “Wilson broke into the student store because he
believed he would find items of value” and evidence that Wilson
also used the debit card for a purchase with “Vesta AT&T”
showed he “generally intended to use the debit card to pay any
expenses, not just those related to a hotel room.”
At sentencing, the People conceded that the sentences for
Count 3 (identity theft) and Count 4 (defrauding an innkeeper)
should run concurrently “since they were completed with the
same act,” but they maintained that Wilson should be
consecutively sentenced for the burglary in Count 2. Requesting
argument from both sides, the court inquired whether it could
exercise its discretion to run all sentences concurrently or
whether consecutive sentencing on Count 2 was mandatory under
section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6). The People submitted that
consecutive sentencing was required unless the court struck the
prior strike offenses. In response, defense counsel argued that
the court had discretion under “local court rules” and “in the
interest of justice” to run all sentences concurrently. When the
court asked about the language in section 1170.12, subdivision
(a)(6), Wilson’s counsel stated the “[d]efense’s position is [the
6
offenses are on] the same occasion . . . [and] from the same set of
operative facts,” but conceded “if the court finds that [the
offenses] are [not] on the same occasion, and are not arising from
the same operative set of facts, then the court can impose a
consecutive sentence.”
The court also heard argument on the mitigating
circumstances supporting Wilson’s Romero motion. Defense
counsel provided greater detail on the abuse Wilson suffered as a
child, including that when Wilson was in foster care at five or six
years old, “the foster mother’s son started sexually abusing him”
which “went on for a year.” Counsel argued that “after a history
and lifetime of abuse, Mr. Wilson’s body is constantly in a flight
or fight mode, meaning his executive functioning is different than
a normal person,” and “Mr. Wilson’s previous cases, [which were]
much more serious, and the facts of this case indicate that he has
attempted to try and rehabilitate.” Wilson’s counsel also raised
that Wilson was “well-behaved” and “respectful during the trial,”
that he was acquitted of one of the charged offenses, and that he
took “full responsibility for his actions in this case.” Wilson’s
counsel further argued that during Wilson’s previous
incarceration, he participated in fire camp which is “reserved for
inmates who are responsible, well-behaved, [and] do not indicate
a danger to the public.”
The court sentenced Wilson to a total term of 48 months,
comprised of the low term of 16 months on Count 2, doubled to
32 months for the prior strikes, plus a consecutive middle term of
eight months on Count 3, also doubled to 16 months for the prior
strikes. The court imposed and stayed (pursuant to section 654)
a six-month sentence on Count 4. The court observed that “the
People did strike a strike in the former felony [case] . . . [¶] . . .
7
[s]o based on all of that and based on the facts of the case, the
court’s going to deny the Romero request. Defendant has already
been given an opportunity where his strikes were stricken.” The
court stated it selected the low term on Count 2 due to Wilson’s
“severe” childhood trauma; his “courteous” and “professional”
behavior during trial; and the fact that the burglary occurred “in
the middle of the night when nobody else was at harm.”
The court addressed Wilson after sentencing and stated:
Mr. Wilson, I will say and I considered this
very strongly, that your conduct in court was a
pleasure. You were courteous and professional and
the court really does appreciate it. I understand your
trauma from childhood but . . . [¶] . . . [a]t some point
you have to address these issues because people in
the public deserve to be protected. . . . [¶] You
committed this crime within only 90 days of being
released on parole. That’s a bad sign. Stealing is not
acceptable. . . . There’s victims involved. There’s cost
involved. And sometimes depending on the situation,
people get endangered and that can lead to worse
things. [¶] You are a third striker for the rest of
your life now. [¶]
Wilson timely appealed.
8
DISCUSSION
A. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Wilson’s
Romero Motion
Wilson argues the trial court erred by declining to dismiss
his prior strike convictions in light of his mitigating
circumstances.
1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Section 1385 permits the court to “dismiss an enhancement
if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).)
In Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497, our Supreme Court held “a
court may exercise the power to dismiss granted in section 1385”
with respect to prior felony conviction allegations under the
Three Strikes law. (Id. at p. 504.)
“ ‘[I]n ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious
and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding under the
Three Strikes law . . . “in furtherance of justice” pursuant to
Penal Code section 1385(a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the
court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature
and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies.’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 377 (Carmony); accord, People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) The court must consider “ ‘ “both . . . the
constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society
represented by the People, in determining whether there should
9
be a dismissal.” ’ ” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530, italics
omitted.)
“[A] trial court’s refusal or failure to dismiss or strike a
prior conviction allegation under section 1385 is subject to review
for abuse of discretion.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 375.)
“ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly
show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.
[Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is
presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a
particular sentence will not be set aside on review.” ’ ” (Id. at
pp. 376-377.) Moreover, “an appellate court may not substitute
its judgment about appropriate sentencing for that of the trial
court, but instead must give due regard to the discretion vested
in that court. [Citations.] The appellate court can find a
reversible abuse of discretion only if it concludes that no
reasonable judge would have agreed with the trial court’s
decision. [Citations.] Unless that standard is met, the appellate
court must affirm the decision, even if it ‘ “might have ruled
differently” ’ on the Romero motion ‘ “in the first instance.” ’ ”
(People v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 258.)
“[A] trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to
strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited
circumstances. For example, an abuse of discretion occurs where
the trial court was not ‘aware of its discretion’ to dismiss
[citation], or where the court considered impermissible factors in
declining to dismiss [citation]. Moreover, ‘the sentencing norms
[established by the Three Strikes law may, as a matter of law,]
produce[] an “arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd” result’
under the specific facts of a particular case. [Citation.] [¶] But
10
‘[i]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree
about whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations.”
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378, brackets in original.)
Even so, “the abuse of discretion standard is neither ‘empty’
[citation] nor are all recidivists the kind of career criminals
appropriately considered under that scheme. Cumulative
circumstances, including that a defendant’s crimes were related
to drug addiction and the defendant’s criminal history did not
include actual violence, may show that the defendant is outside
the spirit of the Three Strikes law.” (People v. Avila (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140-1141.)
2. Wilson Does Not Demonstrate an Abuse of Discretion
Wilson argues the trial court abused its discretion by
declining to strike his prior strikes because “the court relied
almost exclusively on the fact that [Wilson had] previously been
granted Romero relief in a prior case” and thus “misappli[ed] . . .
the governing legal standard.” Wilson also argues he presented
mitigating evidence which “show[ed] that [he] was outside of the
Three Strikes Scheme,” including his “upbringing, developmental
challenges, and untreated trauma”; the “comparatively minor”
and non-violent nature of his present convictions; and his
acceptance of responsibility.
While we recognize the extensive mitigating evidence
Wilson presented, we cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion by denying Wilson’s Romero motion or that it
misapplied the governing standard. Before sentencing, the court
received and considered sentencing memoranda from Wilson and
the prosecution laying out the relevant considerations, including
Wilson’s childhood physical and sexual abuse, his history of
11
homelessness and substance abuse, his medical and psychiatric
history, his criminal history, and his family circumstances. At
sentencing, the court heard arguments from both parties, where
Wilson’s counsel argued these mitigating circumstances and
provided greater details about the abuse Wilson suffered as a
child. The court ultimately denied the Romero motion “based on
the facts of the case” and specifically noted that Wilson had
previously received Romero relief in his most recent strike
conviction. Indeed, the court found at sentencing that Wilson
had numerous convictions of increasing seriousness, and that he
committed the present offenses while on parole. And after
sentencing, the court further explained it was a “bad sign” that
Wilson committed the crime “within only 90 days of being
released on parole.” The court also stated that “[s]tealing is not
acceptable” because of the “victims” and “costs” and the chance
that “people get endangered and [it] can lead to worse things.”
The court did not abuse its discretion by finding Wilson fell
within the spirit of the Three Strikes Law due to his history of
theft-related offenses and the fact that the present offenses
occurred less than three months after Wilson’s release from
prison. (See People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843, 857
(Mendoza) [no abuse of discretion in denying Romero motion
where “the trial court gave primary weight to Defendant’s
extensive criminal history” which reflected “a career criminal
who is unable to remain out of prison for more than a few years
at a time”]; People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 640
[“Due to his continuous history of criminal conduct, [defendant]
‘appears to be “an exemplar of the ‘revolving door’ career criminal
to whom the Three Strikes law is addressed.” ’ ”].)
12
Wilson argues that his traumatic background warranted
Romero relief. Wilson also argues that “the present offenses were
comparatively minor” because he “committed the offenses at
night and did not physically harm anyone,” and he “used the
stolen debit card only for basic necessities” due to his “financial
hardship.” Indeed, the court cited these mitigating
circumstances when it selected the low term on Wilson’s base
offense, Count 2. Nevertheless, while the court “underst[ood]
[Wilson’s] trauma from childhood,” the court also believed “[a]t
some point [Wilson had] to address th[o]se issues because people
in the public deserve to be protected.” The court did not abuse its
discretion by determining, as to the Romero motion, that Wilson’s
criminal history outweighed the mitigating factors that Wilson
presented. (See People v. Taylor (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1102,
1113 [no abuse of discretion denying Romero motion despite
defendant’s age and poor health where “the trial court considered
the probation report, records presented by the defense, including
[defendant’s] health records, and evidence presented at trial” and
“noted [defendant’s] ‘lengthy’ and ‘fairly consistent’ criminal
history and found he fell squarely within the three strikes law”];
People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893, 906 [same, where
“[d]efendant has manifested a persistent inability to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law” and his “past criminal
history was extensive and serious,” despite that defendant’s
current offenses were “neither violent nor serious” and his “prior
offenses were the result of his drug addiction”]; cf. People v.
Mendoza, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 857 [although trial court
referred to criminal history as “controlling” in Romero analysis,
“this statement can be interpreted as the trial court’s
13
identification of the factors it relied on most heavily in conducting
the analysis”].)
Given the trial court’s weighing of the relevant factors,
Wilson does not establish an abuse of discretion. “An appellate
court is not authorized to substitute its judgment of the relative
weights of aggravating and mitigating factors properly
considered by the trial court. [Citations.] . . . ‘Where the record
demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and
reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the
law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling.’ ” (People v. Zichwic
(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 944, 961, overruled on another ground by
U.S. v. Jones (2012) 565 U.S. 400.)
B. The Court Did Not Err By Sentencing Wilson Consecutively
on Counts 2 and 3 Under Section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6)
1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Section 1170.12 provides: “Notwithstanding any other law,
if a defendant has been convicted of a felony and it has been pled
and proved that the defendant has one or more prior serious or
violent felony convictions, [within the meaning of the Three
Strikes Law], the court shall adhere to each of the following: . . .
If there is a current conviction for more than one felony count not
committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same
set of operative facts, the court shall sentence the defendant
consecutively on each count pursuant to this section.” (§ 1170.12,
subds. (a), (a)(6).) Section 667, subdivision (c)(6), similarly
provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, if a defendant has
been convicted of a felony and it has been pled and proved that
the defendant has one or more prior serious or violent felony
convictions as defined [by the Three Strikes Law] . . . [i]f there is
14
a current conviction for more than one felony count not
committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same
set of operative facts, the court shall sentence the defendant
consecutively on each count . . . .” (§ 667, subds. (c)(6).) Because
this provision is “virtually identical to section 1170.12,
subdivision . . . (a)(6),” our Supreme Court has interpreted these
two statutory sections in tandem. (People v. Deloza (1998)
18 Cal.4th 585, 590 (Deloza); see id. at pp. 591-595 [applying
People v. Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal.4th 508 (Hendrix), addressing
section 667, subd. (c)(6), and section 1170.12, subd. (a)(6)].)
Section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6), (along with section 667,
subdivision (c)(6)) thus mandates consecutive sentences for three
strike defendants convicted of multiple felonies unless the
offenses were “committed on the same occasion” and “ar[ose] from
the same set of operative facts.” (§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(6); see
Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 595-596; Hendrix, supra,
16 Cal.4th at pp. 512-513.) Mandatory consecutive sentencing is
“consistent with the focus of the three strikes law, which is
recidivism.” (Deloza, at p. 594.) For purposes of these sections,
“the term ‘same occasion’ refers at least to a close temporal and
spatial proximity between the acts underlying the current
convictions.” (Id. at p. 595.) “ ‘[A]rising from the same set of
operative facts” entails “sharing common acts or criminal conduct
that serves to establish the elements of the current felony
offenses of which defendant stands convicted.” (People v.
Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 233 (Lawrence).)
Nevertheless, sentencing courts “retain discretion to
impose concurrent sentences for felonies . . . committed on the
same occasion or arising from the same set of operative facts.”
(People v. Torres (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 185, 201; accord,
15
Lawrence, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 233 [“where a sentencing court
determines that two or more current felony convictions were
either ‘committed on the same occasion’ or ‘aris[e] from the same
set of operative facts’ . . . , consecutive sentencing is not required
under the three strikes law, but is permissible in the trial court’s
sound discretion”]; Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 596 [trial court
“retained discretion to impose either concurrent or consecutive
sentences” where felony offenses were “clearly committed on the
‘same occasion’ ”].)
As stated, we review discretionary sentencing decisions for
abuse of discretion. (See People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416,
428, fn. 8; accord, People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847,
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v.
Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 756.) “ ‘ “A court abuses its
discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by
applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its
decision on express or implied factual findings that are not
supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Brown (2026)
121 Cal.App.5th 481, 485; accord, People v. Gerson (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080.)
Additionally, “[d]efendants are entitled to ‘sentencing
decisions made in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the
sentencing court,’ and a court that is unaware of its discretionary
authority cannot exercise its informed discretion.” (People v.
Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228; accord, People v.
Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8.) “Remand for
resentencing is not required, however, if the record demonstrates
the trial court was aware of its sentencing discretion. [Citations.]
Further, remand is unnecessary if the record is silent concerning
whether the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion.
16
Error may not be presumed from a silent record.” (People v.
Brown, at pp. 1228-1229; accord, People v. Bolian (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1421; see also People v. Martinez (1998)
65 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517 [“ ‘The general rule is that a trial
court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the
applicable law.’ ”].) “ ‘To prove an abuse of discretion, “ ‘[t]he
burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that
the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. . . .’ ”
[Citation.] To meet this burden, the defendant must
“affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood its
sentencing discretion.” ’ ” (People v. Fredrickson (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988; accord, People v. Lee (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.)
2. Wilson’s Consecutive Sentence Was Not an Abuse of
Discretion
Wilson argues the court misunderstood its discretion under
section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6), and that the court lacked
substantial evidence to find that his offenses did not occur on the
same occasion or arise from the same set of operative facts.
Wilson contends the trial court “fail[ed] to recognize its
discretion” to impose a concurrent sentence. Wilson argues the
court “inquired several times whether it had any discretion to
sentence [him] concurrently” and the court’s “questioning implies
that the trial court seriously contemplated sentencing [him]
concurrently.” In Wilson’s view, remand is necessary because
“there is no clear indication it would have denied a concurrent
sentence had it been aware of its full discretion.”
Wilson does not affirmatively demonstrate the trial court
misunderstood its discretion to impose a concurrent or
17
consecutive sentence. Rather, the record demonstrates the court
understood its discretion and made the requisite factual findings
supporting consecutive sentencing on Counts 2 and 3. As Wilson
identifies, the court solicited argument from the parties on
whether it could run all sentences concurrently or whether
consecutive sentencing was mandatory. The court noted the
“mandatory” “wording” of section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6).
Wilson’s counsel correctly advised the court that under this
provision, “if the court finds that [the offenses] are [not] on the
same occasion, and are not arising from the same operative set of
facts, then the court can impose a consecutive sentence.” Defense
counsel then urged the court to find the offenses were on the
same occasion and shared the same operative facts. By imposing
consecutive sentences on Counts 2 and 3, the trial court implicitly
found that Wilson’s offenses did not arise from the same occasion
or same set of operative facts. The record does not affirmatively
demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood its discretion
under section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6).
Substantial evidence supported the court’s implied finding
that the offenses did not occur on the same occasion or arise from
the same set of operative facts. Lawrence, supra, 24 Cal.4th 219,
is instructive on this point. In that case, our Supreme Court
considered whether the trial court could impose consecutive
sentences under section 667, subdivision (c)(6), for the
defendant’s petty theft, trespass, and assault and battery
offenses. (See id. at pp. 224-225, 233-234.) The defendant “fled
the scene of his first crime, the theft of a bottle of brandy from a
market[,]” and committed the next offenses of trespass and
assault at a private “home, a one to three-block distance from the
site of his first crime . . . and most likely within two or three
18
minutes of his theft from the market.” (Id. at p. 228.) The
Supreme Court concluded based on the “two separate locations”
of the crimes, “two entirely separate groups of victims,” and the
fact that the defendant “chose to commit new and different
offenses” that the offenses did not occur on the same occasion and
did not arise from the same set of operative facts. (Id. at pp. 228,
233-234.)
By contrast, in Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th 585, at pages 595
to 596, our Supreme Court concluded that a robbery of four
victims did occur on the same occasion and from the same set of
operative facts. (See id. at pp. 595-596.) There, the defendant
“entered a furniture store, robbed four victims, and left. His
robberies were committed in one location, and were apparently
brief in duration. They were committed essentially
simultaneously against the same group of victims, i.e., persons in
the furniture store.” (Ibid.)
In Wilson’s case, substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that his burglary and identity theft offenses did
not occur on the same occasion. Like the offenses in Lawrence,
and unlike those in Deloza, Wilson’s burglary of the student store
and his use of the stolen card at the hotel occurred at different
locations and at different times. The trial evidence indicated
Wilson burgled the store at approximately 9:00 p.m. and he
checked into the hotel over two hours later around 11:45 p.m., a
“number of miles” away. The temporal and spatial separation
between Wilson’s offenses was well beyond the “two or three
minutes” and “one to three-block distance” between offenses in
Lawrence. (Lawrence, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 228.) As in
Lawrence, Wilson’s offenses also impacted different sets of
victims: whereas the burglary affected the high school and its
19
student council, the identity theft impacted the hotel.
Additionally, the trial evidence supported that Wilson’s
offenses did not arise from the same set of operative facts. We
assess the operative facts by considering the “ ‘nature and
elements of the current charged offense’ ” (here, the school
burglary) and the subsequent offenses (the identity theft).
(Lawrence, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 232.) “ ‘[W]here the elements
of the original crime have been satisfied, any crime subsequently
committed will not arise from the same set of operative facts
underlying the completed crime; rather such crime is necessarily
committed at a different time. For instance, with the crime of
burglary, where the offense is complete when there is an entry
into a structure with felonious intent, “regardless of whether the
felony or theft committed is different from that contemplated at
the time of entry, or whether any felony or theft actually is
committed” [citation], the commission after the first burglary of a
crime or burglary of another structure necessarily will arise out
of different operative facts than those underlying the original
offense.’ ” (Id. at pp. 232-233.) Here, Wilson’s burglary of the
student store was complete when he broke into the store with the
intent to commit a felony. As the Lawrence court reasoned, the
completion of the burglary at the moment of entry supports the
trial court’s finding that Wilson’s later use of the stolen debit
card at the hotel did not arise from the same operative facts as
the burglary.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
21