Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Wilson CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN THE PEOPLE, B345683 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24PDCF00511) v. TERRY WAYNE WILSON, JR., Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Leonard Torrealba, Judge. Affirmed. Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent. ________________________ INTRODUCTION Terry Wayne Wilson, Jr., appeals his sentence for burglary, identity fraud, and defrauding an innkeeper. Wilson argues the trial court erred by declining to strike three prior robbery convictions under the Three Strikes Law, and that the court erred by imposing a consecutive sentence for burglary and identity theft. We affirm. The trial court duly considered Wilson’s mitigating circumstances and did not abuse its discretion by finding Wilson fell within the spirit of the Three Strikes Law. The court also did not abuse its discretion by finding the burglary and identity theft occurred on separate occasions, supporting a consecutive sentence under Penal Code section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6).1 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. The Information In October 2024, Wilson was charged with felony second degree commercial burglary (Count 2; § 459); felony unauthorized use of personal identifying information (Count 3; § 530.5, subd. (a)); misdemeanor defrauding an innkeeper by false pretense of $950 or less (Count 4; § 537, subd. (a)(1)); and felony vandalism of $400 or more in damage or destruction of property (Count 5; 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 § 594, subd. (a)).2 The information also alleged as to Counts 2 and 3 that Wilson had three prior convictions for robbery in 2017, 2022, and 2024 constituting strikes under the Three Strikes Law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12), and that these convictions also disqualified Wilson from a probationary sentence under section 1203, subdivision (e)(4). The information further alleged aggravating factors under the California Rules of Court,3 including that Wilson’s prior convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)); Wilson had served a prior prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)); and Wilson committed the charged offenses while he was on probation, parole, or other supervisory release (rule 4.421(b)(4)). B. The Trial Wilson was tried by a jury, and the prosecution introduced the following trial evidence. Wilson graduated from John Muir High School in Pasadena in 2015 or 2016. On Friday September 13, 2024, Wilson attended a football game on campus. On Monday September 16, school officials discovered a break-in on campus at the student store. A window had been broken and the room was in disarray. Missing from the student store were three blank checks, one dollar, and a school debit card for use by the student council. A school employee checked the transaction activity on the missing debit card and discovered two unusual and unrecognized charges: 2 Count 1 was dismissed after the preliminary hearing. For present purposes, we refer to the charges as counts 2 through 5. 3 Rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 3 $166.85 at the Pasadena Rose and Crown Hotel and $26.76 with “Vesta AT&T.” Surveillance footage of the campus on Sunday, September 15th at approximately 9:00 p.m. depicted a person disappearing through a window into the student store and exiting through the door. A forensic specialist with the Pasadena Police Department processed the crime scene and located fingerprints on a shard of glass and a white metal box inside the store. Forensic analysis revealed the fingerprints matched Wilson’s fingerprints in a police database as well as new fingerprints taken during Wilson’s trial. The manager of the Pasadena Rose and Crown Hotel confirmed a “check-in under the name of Terry Wilson” on September 15, 2024 at approximately 11:45 p.m. via a one-night reservation on Booking.com. Wilson provided a driver’s license with his name and paid with the debit card from John Muir High. Wilson attempted to check in again the following day for a 10-day reservation using the same debit card. Hotel staff called the police, but Wilson departed before police arrived. Wilson was arrested on September 24. C. Conviction and Sentence The jury convicted Wilson of Counts 2, 3, and 4 but acquitted him of the vandalism charge in Count 5. Following the jury verdict, Wilson waived his right to a jury trial on the prior convictions and aggravating circumstances, and the court found the alleged prior convictions and aggravating circumstances true. Before sentencing, Wilson moved to strike his prior strikes pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). Wilson argued that he was young at the time of 4 his current offense (29 years old) and at the time of his prior strikes (21 and 26 years old). Wilson also argued for Romero relief based on his “extensive mitigating life history.” Wilson explained that he was likely born with fetal alcohol syndrome; he was placed in foster care at age three; he experienced physical, verbal and sexual abuse in foster care; he suffered concussions as a high school and college football player which might indicate a traumatic brain injury; he had been transient or unhoused throughout his adult life; he had an “extensive history of psychiatric treatment” for post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and a previous suicide attempt; he had a history of substance and alcohol abuse; and his children and their mother had recently been displaced by a wildfire. Wilson also argued for concurrent sentencing on all counts under section 654. In Wilson’s view, the offenses “constitute[d] an indivisible course of conduct,” “all within a short period of time and all with the same objective to pay for the hotel room.” The People opposed Wilson’s requests. As to Wilson’s Romero motion, the People argued that Wilson did not fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. The People noted that Wilson first committed a series of six robberies in 2017, then committed two carjackings in 2021 less than a year after he was paroled, and that the present offenses occurred 75 days after Wilson was paroled for the 2021 offenses. The People also identified that, pursuant to a plea agreement for his 2021 offenses, Wilson had previously received Romero relief from his prior strike convictions. The People further argued Wilson should be sentenced consecutively, citing section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6). The People argued that given Wilson’s prior strike offenses, the 5 statute required consecutive sentencing because Wilson’s “current conviction [was] for more than one felony count not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts.” (§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(6).) In the People’s view, “Wilson’s burglary of John Muir High School and his unauthorized use of the school’s debit card were different and distinct physical acts” committed at “different locations and at different times.” The People contended that Wilson’s intent was not merely to take the debit card and pay for the hotel room. Rather, evidence that the student store was “ransacked” indicated “Wilson broke into the student store because he believed he would find items of value” and evidence that Wilson also used the debit card for a purchase with “Vesta AT&T” showed he “generally intended to use the debit card to pay any expenses, not just those related to a hotel room.” At sentencing, the People conceded that the sentences for Count 3 (identity theft) and Count 4 (defrauding an innkeeper) should run concurrently “since they were completed with the same act,” but they maintained that Wilson should be consecutively sentenced for the burglary in Count 2. Requesting argument from both sides, the court inquired whether it could exercise its discretion to run all sentences concurrently or whether consecutive sentencing on Count 2 was mandatory under section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6). The People submitted that consecutive sentencing was required unless the court struck the prior strike offenses. In response, defense counsel argued that the court had discretion under “local court rules” and “in the interest of justice” to run all sentences concurrently. When the court asked about the language in section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6), Wilson’s counsel stated the “[d]efense’s position is [the 6 offenses are on] the same occasion . . . [and] from the same set of operative facts,” but conceded “if the court finds that [the offenses] are [not] on the same occasion, and are not arising from the same operative set of facts, then the court can impose a consecutive sentence.” The court also heard argument on the mitigating circumstances supporting Wilson’s Romero motion. Defense counsel provided greater detail on the abuse Wilson suffered as a child, including that when Wilson was in foster care at five or six years old, “the foster mother’s son started sexually abusing him” which “went on for a year.” Counsel argued that “after a history and lifetime of abuse, Mr. Wilson’s body is constantly in a flight or fight mode, meaning his executive functioning is different than a normal person,” and “Mr. Wilson’s previous cases, [which were] much more serious, and the facts of this case indicate that he has attempted to try and rehabilitate.” Wilson’s counsel also raised that Wilson was “well-behaved” and “respectful during the trial,” that he was acquitted of one of the charged offenses, and that he took “full responsibility for his actions in this case.” Wilson’s counsel further argued that during Wilson’s previous incarceration, he participated in fire camp which is “reserved for inmates who are responsible, well-behaved, [and] do not indicate a danger to the public.” The court sentenced Wilson to a total term of 48 months, comprised of the low term of 16 months on Count 2, doubled to 32 months for the prior strikes, plus a consecutive middle term of eight months on Count 3, also doubled to 16 months for the prior strikes. The court imposed and stayed (pursuant to section 654) a six-month sentence on Count 4. The court observed that “the People did strike a strike in the former felony [case] . . . [¶] . . . 7 [s]o based on all of that and based on the facts of the case, the court’s going to deny the Romero request. Defendant has already been given an opportunity where his strikes were stricken.” The court stated it selected the low term on Count 2 due to Wilson’s “severe” childhood trauma; his “courteous” and “professional” behavior during trial; and the fact that the burglary occurred “in the middle of the night when nobody else was at harm.” The court addressed Wilson after sentencing and stated: Mr. Wilson, I will say and I considered this very strongly, that your conduct in court was a pleasure. You were courteous and professional and the court really does appreciate it. I understand your trauma from childhood but . . . [¶] . . . [a]t some point you have to address these issues because people in the public deserve to be protected. . . . [¶] You committed this crime within only 90 days of being released on parole. That’s a bad sign. Stealing is not acceptable. . . . There’s victims involved. There’s cost involved. And sometimes depending on the situation, people get endangered and that can lead to worse things. [¶] You are a third striker for the rest of your life now. [¶] Wilson timely appealed. 8 DISCUSSION A. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Wilson’s Romero Motion Wilson argues the trial court erred by declining to dismiss his prior strike convictions in light of his mitigating circumstances. 1. Governing Law and Standard of Review Section 1385 permits the court to “dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) In Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497, our Supreme Court held “a court may exercise the power to dismiss granted in section 1385” with respect to prior felony conviction allegations under the Three Strikes law. (Id. at p. 504.) “ ‘[I]n ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law . . . “in furtherance of justice” pursuant to Penal Code section 1385(a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 (Carmony); accord, People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) The court must consider “ ‘ “both . . . the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society represented by the People, in determining whether there should 9 be a dismissal.” ’ ” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530, italics omitted.) “[A] trial court’s refusal or failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction allegation under section 1385 is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 375.) “ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 376-377.) Moreover, “an appellate court may not substitute its judgment about appropriate sentencing for that of the trial court, but instead must give due regard to the discretion vested in that court. [Citations.] The appellate court can find a reversible abuse of discretion only if it concludes that no reasonable judge would have agreed with the trial court’s decision. [Citations.] Unless that standard is met, the appellate court must affirm the decision, even if it ‘ “might have ruled differently” ’ on the Romero motion ‘ “in the first instance.” ’ ” (People v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 258.) “[A] trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances. For example, an abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court was not ‘aware of its discretion’ to dismiss [citation], or where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss [citation]. Moreover, ‘the sentencing norms [established by the Three Strikes law may, as a matter of law,] produce[] an “arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd” result’ under the specific facts of a particular case. [Citation.] [¶] But 10 ‘[i]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378, brackets in original.) Even so, “the abuse of discretion standard is neither ‘empty’ [citation] nor are all recidivists the kind of career criminals appropriately considered under that scheme. Cumulative circumstances, including that a defendant’s crimes were related to drug addiction and the defendant’s criminal history did not include actual violence, may show that the defendant is outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law.” (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140-1141.) 2. Wilson Does Not Demonstrate an Abuse of Discretion Wilson argues the trial court abused its discretion by declining to strike his prior strikes because “the court relied almost exclusively on the fact that [Wilson had] previously been granted Romero relief in a prior case” and thus “misappli[ed] . . . the governing legal standard.” Wilson also argues he presented mitigating evidence which “show[ed] that [he] was outside of the Three Strikes Scheme,” including his “upbringing, developmental challenges, and untreated trauma”; the “comparatively minor” and non-violent nature of his present convictions; and his acceptance of responsibility. While we recognize the extensive mitigating evidence Wilson presented, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by denying Wilson’s Romero motion or that it misapplied the governing standard. Before sentencing, the court received and considered sentencing memoranda from Wilson and the prosecution laying out the relevant considerations, including Wilson’s childhood physical and sexual abuse, his history of 11 homelessness and substance abuse, his medical and psychiatric history, his criminal history, and his family circumstances. At sentencing, the court heard arguments from both parties, where Wilson’s counsel argued these mitigating circumstances and provided greater details about the abuse Wilson suffered as a child. The court ultimately denied the Romero motion “based on the facts of the case” and specifically noted that Wilson had previously received Romero relief in his most recent strike conviction. Indeed, the court found at sentencing that Wilson had numerous convictions of increasing seriousness, and that he committed the present offenses while on parole. And after sentencing, the court further explained it was a “bad sign” that Wilson committed the crime “within only 90 days of being released on parole.” The court also stated that “[s]tealing is not acceptable” because of the “victims” and “costs” and the chance that “people get endangered and [it] can lead to worse things.” The court did not abuse its discretion by finding Wilson fell within the spirit of the Three Strikes Law due to his history of theft-related offenses and the fact that the present offenses occurred less than three months after Wilson’s release from prison. (See People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843, 857 (Mendoza) [no abuse of discretion in denying Romero motion where “the trial court gave primary weight to Defendant’s extensive criminal history” which reflected “a career criminal who is unable to remain out of prison for more than a few years at a time”]; People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 640 [“Due to his continuous history of criminal conduct, [defendant] ‘appears to be “an exemplar of the ‘revolving door’ career criminal to whom the Three Strikes law is addressed.” ’ ”].) 12 Wilson argues that his traumatic background warranted Romero relief. Wilson also argues that “the present offenses were comparatively minor” because he “committed the offenses at night and did not physically harm anyone,” and he “used the stolen debit card only for basic necessities” due to his “financial hardship.” Indeed, the court cited these mitigating circumstances when it selected the low term on Wilson’s base offense, Count 2. Nevertheless, while the court “underst[ood] [Wilson’s] trauma from childhood,” the court also believed “[a]t some point [Wilson had] to address th[o]se issues because people in the public deserve to be protected.” The court did not abuse its discretion by determining, as to the Romero motion, that Wilson’s criminal history outweighed the mitigating factors that Wilson presented. (See People v. Taylor (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1113 [no abuse of discretion denying Romero motion despite defendant’s age and poor health where “the trial court considered the probation report, records presented by the defense, including [defendant’s] health records, and evidence presented at trial” and “noted [defendant’s] ‘lengthy’ and ‘fairly consistent’ criminal history and found he fell squarely within the three strikes law”]; People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893, 906 [same, where “[d]efendant has manifested a persistent inability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law” and his “past criminal history was extensive and serious,” despite that defendant’s current offenses were “neither violent nor serious” and his “prior offenses were the result of his drug addiction”]; cf. People v. Mendoza, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 857 [although trial court referred to criminal history as “controlling” in Romero analysis, “this statement can be interpreted as the trial court’s 13 identification of the factors it relied on most heavily in conducting the analysis”].) Given the trial court’s weighing of the relevant factors, Wilson does not establish an abuse of discretion. “An appellate court is not authorized to substitute its judgment of the relative weights of aggravating and mitigating factors properly considered by the trial court. [Citations.] . . . ‘Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling.’ ” (People v. Zichwic (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 944, 961, overruled on another ground by U.S. v. Jones (2012) 565 U.S. 400.) B. The Court Did Not Err By Sentencing Wilson Consecutively on Counts 2 and 3 Under Section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6) 1. Governing Law and Standard of Review Section 1170.12 provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, if a defendant has been convicted of a felony and it has been pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior serious or violent felony convictions, [within the meaning of the Three Strikes Law], the court shall adhere to each of the following: . . . If there is a current conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts, the court shall sentence the defendant consecutively on each count pursuant to this section.” (§ 1170.12, subds. (a), (a)(6).) Section 667, subdivision (c)(6), similarly provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, if a defendant has been convicted of a felony and it has been pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior serious or violent felony convictions as defined [by the Three Strikes Law] . . . [i]f there is 14 a current conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts, the court shall sentence the defendant consecutively on each count . . . .” (§ 667, subds. (c)(6).) Because this provision is “virtually identical to section 1170.12, subdivision . . . (a)(6),” our Supreme Court has interpreted these two statutory sections in tandem. (People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 590 (Deloza); see id. at pp. 591-595 [applying People v. Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal.4th 508 (Hendrix), addressing section 667, subd. (c)(6), and section 1170.12, subd. (a)(6)].) Section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6), (along with section 667, subdivision (c)(6)) thus mandates consecutive sentences for three strike defendants convicted of multiple felonies unless the offenses were “committed on the same occasion” and “ar[ose] from the same set of operative facts.” (§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(6); see Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 595-596; Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 512-513.) Mandatory consecutive sentencing is “consistent with the focus of the three strikes law, which is recidivism.” (Deloza, at p. 594.) For purposes of these sections, “the term ‘same occasion’ refers at least to a close temporal and spatial proximity between the acts underlying the current convictions.” (Id. at p. 595.) “ ‘[A]rising from the same set of operative facts” entails “sharing common acts or criminal conduct that serves to establish the elements of the current felony offenses of which defendant stands convicted.” (People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 233 (Lawrence).) Nevertheless, sentencing courts “retain discretion to impose concurrent sentences for felonies . . . committed on the same occasion or arising from the same set of operative facts.” (People v. Torres (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 185, 201; accord, 15 Lawrence, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 233 [“where a sentencing court determines that two or more current felony convictions were either ‘committed on the same occasion’ or ‘aris[e] from the same set of operative facts’ . . . , consecutive sentencing is not required under the three strikes law, but is permissible in the trial court’s sound discretion”]; Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 596 [trial court “retained discretion to impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences” where felony offenses were “clearly committed on the ‘same occasion’ ”].) As stated, we review discretionary sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 428, fn. 8; accord, People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 756.) “ ‘ “A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Brown (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 481, 485; accord, People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080.) Additionally, “[d]efendants are entitled to ‘sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court,’ and a court that is unaware of its discretionary authority cannot exercise its informed discretion.” (People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228; accord, People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8.) “Remand for resentencing is not required, however, if the record demonstrates the trial court was aware of its sentencing discretion. [Citations.] Further, remand is unnecessary if the record is silent concerning whether the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion. 16 Error may not be presumed from a silent record.” (People v. Brown, at pp. 1228-1229; accord, People v. Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1421; see also People v. Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517 [“ ‘The general rule is that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.’ ”].) “ ‘To prove an abuse of discretion, “ ‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. . . .’ ” [Citation.] To meet this burden, the defendant must “affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion.” ’ ” (People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988; accord, People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.) 2. Wilson’s Consecutive Sentence Was Not an Abuse of Discretion Wilson argues the court misunderstood its discretion under section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6), and that the court lacked substantial evidence to find that his offenses did not occur on the same occasion or arise from the same set of operative facts. Wilson contends the trial court “fail[ed] to recognize its discretion” to impose a concurrent sentence. Wilson argues the court “inquired several times whether it had any discretion to sentence [him] concurrently” and the court’s “questioning implies that the trial court seriously contemplated sentencing [him] concurrently.” In Wilson’s view, remand is necessary because “there is no clear indication it would have denied a concurrent sentence had it been aware of its full discretion.” Wilson does not affirmatively demonstrate the trial court misunderstood its discretion to impose a concurrent or 17 consecutive sentence. Rather, the record demonstrates the court understood its discretion and made the requisite factual findings supporting consecutive sentencing on Counts 2 and 3. As Wilson identifies, the court solicited argument from the parties on whether it could run all sentences concurrently or whether consecutive sentencing was mandatory. The court noted the “mandatory” “wording” of section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6). Wilson’s counsel correctly advised the court that under this provision, “if the court finds that [the offenses] are [not] on the same occasion, and are not arising from the same operative set of facts, then the court can impose a consecutive sentence.” Defense counsel then urged the court to find the offenses were on the same occasion and shared the same operative facts. By imposing consecutive sentences on Counts 2 and 3, the trial court implicitly found that Wilson’s offenses did not arise from the same occasion or same set of operative facts. The record does not affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood its discretion under section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6). Substantial evidence supported the court’s implied finding that the offenses did not occur on the same occasion or arise from the same set of operative facts. Lawrence, supra, 24 Cal.4th 219, is instructive on this point. In that case, our Supreme Court considered whether the trial court could impose consecutive sentences under section 667, subdivision (c)(6), for the defendant’s petty theft, trespass, and assault and battery offenses. (See id. at pp. 224-225, 233-234.) The defendant “fled the scene of his first crime, the theft of a bottle of brandy from a market[,]” and committed the next offenses of trespass and assault at a private “home, a one to three-block distance from the site of his first crime . . . and most likely within two or three 18 minutes of his theft from the market.” (Id. at p. 228.) The Supreme Court concluded based on the “two separate locations” of the crimes, “two entirely separate groups of victims,” and the fact that the defendant “chose to commit new and different offenses” that the offenses did not occur on the same occasion and did not arise from the same set of operative facts. (Id. at pp. 228, 233-234.) By contrast, in Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th 585, at pages 595 to 596, our Supreme Court concluded that a robbery of four victims did occur on the same occasion and from the same set of operative facts. (See id. at pp. 595-596.) There, the defendant “entered a furniture store, robbed four victims, and left. His robberies were committed in one location, and were apparently brief in duration. They were committed essentially simultaneously against the same group of victims, i.e., persons in the furniture store.” (Ibid.) In Wilson’s case, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that his burglary and identity theft offenses did not occur on the same occasion. Like the offenses in Lawrence, and unlike those in Deloza, Wilson’s burglary of the student store and his use of the stolen card at the hotel occurred at different locations and at different times. The trial evidence indicated Wilson burgled the store at approximately 9:00 p.m. and he checked into the hotel over two hours later around 11:45 p.m., a “number of miles” away. The temporal and spatial separation between Wilson’s offenses was well beyond the “two or three minutes” and “one to three-block distance” between offenses in Lawrence. (Lawrence, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 228.) As in Lawrence, Wilson’s offenses also impacted different sets of victims: whereas the burglary affected the high school and its 19 student council, the identity theft impacted the hotel. Additionally, the trial evidence supported that Wilson’s offenses did not arise from the same set of operative facts. We assess the operative facts by considering the “ ‘nature and elements of the current charged offense’ ” (here, the school burglary) and the subsequent offenses (the identity theft). (Lawrence, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 232.) “ ‘[W]here the elements of the original crime have been satisfied, any crime subsequently committed will not arise from the same set of operative facts underlying the completed crime; rather such crime is necessarily committed at a different time. For instance, with the crime of burglary, where the offense is complete when there is an entry into a structure with felonious intent, “regardless of whether the felony or theft committed is different from that contemplated at the time of entry, or whether any felony or theft actually is committed” [citation], the commission after the first burglary of a crime or burglary of another structure necessarily will arise out of different operative facts than those underlying the original offense.’ ” (Id. at pp. 232-233.) Here, Wilson’s burglary of the student store was complete when he broke into the store with the intent to commit a felony. As the Lawrence court reasoned, the completion of the burglary at the moment of entry supports the trial court’s finding that Wilson’s later use of the stolen debit card at the hotel did not arise from the same operative facts as the burglary. 20 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. MARTINEZ, P. J. We concur: FEUER, J. STONE, J. 21