People v. Stancil CA1/2

Filed 10/21/26 P. v. Stancil CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A170563 v. (Alameda County Super. Ct. AVERY STANCIL, No. 23CR001173) Defendant and Appellant. A jury found defendant Avery Stancil guilty of intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger. On appeal, Stancil contends that: (1) the trial court erroneously denied his objection to the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of a Black prospective alternate juror; (2) the trial court erred when it found a witness unavailable and permitted her preliminary hearing testimony to be read into the record; and (3) the trial court erred when it refused to qualify a defense witness as an expert so he could tell the jury about studies he had read on plea bargaining. We affirm. BACKGROUND In February 2023, Stancil was charged by information with intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a)). 1  Stancil was tried before a jury. The victim, Jane Doe, testified, and the trial court permitted counsel to read the preliminary hearing testimony of Anne Doe, the victim in a prior case in which Stancil had pleaded no contest to sexual battery. Stancil testified in his defense. Stancil denied that he committed the charged crime and denied he committed the crime against Anne Doe that he entered the plea to. The jury found Stancil guilty. Stancil was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison. DISCUSSION A. Peremptory Challenge 1. Introduction In 2020, the Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure1 section 231.7 in response to concerns about whether the Batson/Wheeler framework2 was adequate to identify and curb improper discrimination. (People v. SanMiguel (2026) 20 Cal.5th 254, 268, 271 (SanMiguel).) Under section 231.7, if another party or the trial court objects to the use of a peremptory challenge, then “the party exercising the peremptory challenge shall state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised.” (§ 231.7, subds. (b)–(c).) The trial court must “evaluate the reasons given . . . in light of the totality of the circumstances” and “explain the reasons for its ruling on the record” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1)), and “[a]ppellate courts . . . must give scrupulous consideration to the records before them to determine whether, considering all relevant 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 This refers to the procedural framework for determining whether a litigant’s decision to peremptorily challenge a prospective juror was motivated by improper bias set forth in People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79. 2 circumstances, the proceedings failed to satisfy the principle of equal treatment embodied in section 231.7.” (SanMiguel, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 291.) This case involves a Black defendant, a Black victim, another Black victim in a prior case, other Black witnesses, and a Black prospective alternate juror. The prospective jurors filled out lengthy questionnaires, and, on the third day of voir dire, 12 jurors were selected. During the selection of alternate jurors, the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge on Ms. Wilson- Rosa, a 66-year-old woman who identified as African American, and defense counsel objected that the peremptory challenge violated section 231.7. The prosecutor stated his reasons, including his “largest concern,” which was that Ms. Wilson-Rosa “was the only [prospective juror] who did not understand why a prior allegation or conviction for sexual assault would be relevant in a case involving sexual assault particularly on a child.”3 The trial court considered the “totality of all of the circumstances” and found that Ms. Wilson-Rosa was not peremptorily challenged for an improper reason. After “scrupulous consideration” of the records before us and all relevant circumstances, we affirm the trial court’s overruling of the objection. (SanMiguel, supra, 20 Cal.5th at pp. 290-291.) 2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Section 231.7 prohibits the use of a peremptory challenge to “remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.” (§ 231.7, subd. (a).) The question is whether “there is a 3 We have omitted capitalization from our quotations of the transcript. 3 substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race [or other protected status] . . . as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).)4 If so, the trial court must sustain the objection. (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).)5 Section 231.7, subdivision (d)(3), lists some of the circumstances that the trial court may consider in making its determination.6 Section 231.7 “sets out two categories of reasons that . . . are treated as presumptively invalid unless certain conditions are met.” (SanMiguel, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 273.) The first category includes “[a]ny justification that is similarly applicable to a questioned prospective juror or jurors, who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged prospective juror, 4 An “objectively reasonable person” is one who is “aware that unconscious bias, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in the State of California.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(2)(A).) 5 In ruling on the objection, the trial court may “not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).) 6 These include whether the “objecting party is a member of the same perceived cognizable group as the challenged juror” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(A)(i)); whether the “alleged victim is not a member of that perceived cognizable group” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(A)(ii)); whether “[w]itnesses . . . are not members of that perceived cognizable group” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(A)(iii)); “whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge failed to question the prospective juror about the concerns later stated by the party as the reason for the peremptory challenge” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(C)(i)); whether “the party exercising the peremptory challenge engaged in cursory questioning of the challenged potential juror” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(C)(ii)); and whether “the reason given by the party exercising the peremptory challenge was contrary to or unsupported by the record” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(F)). 4 but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party.” (§ 231.7, subd. (e)(13).)7 The second category includes reasons that have “historically been associated with improper discrimination in jury selection,” including “a lack of rapport or problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor.” (§ 231.7, subd. (g)(1)(B).) Subdivision (g)(2) provides that such reasons “are presumptively invalid unless the trial court is able to confirm that the asserted behavior occurred, based on the court’s own observations or the observations of counsel for the objecting party. Even with that confirmation, the counsel offering the reason shall explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner in which the prospective juror answered questions matters to the case to be tried.” (§ 231.7, subd. (g)(2).) “While reliance on an invalid reason is generally a significant consideration—and, depending on the circumstances, may prove dispositive— a court still must consider any other reasons proffered and other relevant circumstances to determine whether the strike was unlawful under section 231.7.” (SanMiguel, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 269.) Conversely, “[a] court may conclude that a . . . reason is valid and yet determine, after weighing other reasons and relevant circumstances, that an objective observer would still likely conclude that race or other protected status was a factor in the peremptory challenge.” (SanMiguel, supra, 20 Cal.5th at pp. 269-270.) 7 A peremptory change for such a reason “is presumed to be invalid unless the party exercising the peremptory challenge can show by clear and convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective juror’s race . . . [or other protected status], and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective juror's ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (§ 231.7, subd. (e).) 5  A “denial” of a section 231.7 objection “shall be reviewed by the appellate court de novo, with the trial court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence.” (§ 231.7, subd. (j).) “The appellate court shall not impute to the trial court any findings, including findings of a prospective juror’s demeanor, that the trial court did not expressly state on the record,” and it “shall not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not given to explain either the party’s use of the peremptory challenge or the party’s failure to challenge similarly situated jurors who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged juror.” (Ibid.) “Should the appellate court determine that the objection was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.” (Ibid.) 3. Procedural Background In connection with jury selection, prospective jurors filled out jury questionnaires containing 70 questions. During voir dire, one of Stancil’s attorneys disclosed to the prospective jurors that Stancil had been previously accused of a sexual crime. She stated: “[Y]ou are going to hear evidence that 18 years ago Mr. Stancill [sic] was accused in a similar case. He was accused of making an 11-year-old girl touch his penis. And you’re going to hear that he pled guilty to a lesser related offense.”8 8 The trial court told the prospective jurors that “there are certain limitations in terms of how . . . evidence [of a prior sexual offense] can be used” and read the jury instruction that the trial court would read at the end of trial. The trial court stated: “The People have presented evidence that the defendant has committed this prior sexual crime. . . . [¶] You may consider this evidence only if the people have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, in fact, committed the uncharged offense. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [I]f you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged offense, you may, but are not required, to [co]nclude from that evidence that 6  After 12 jurors were selected, the parties questioned prospective alternate jurors, including Ms. Wilson-Rosa. The prosecutor noted that Ms. Wilson-Rosa had “heard a lot of the things [they] [had] talked about so far” and asked if there was “anything [she] had strong feelings about one way or the other as [she] [was] listening in the audience.” Ms. Wilson-Rosa replied, “No.” The prosecutor asked if Ms. Wilson-Rosa had any issue with “the idea a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could be based on the testimony of just one witness.” Ms. Wilson-Rosa replied, “No.” The prosecutor noted that Ms. Wilson-Rosa shared in her questionnaire that she “sort of didn’t have any strong feelings about the criminal justice system or about how sexual assault crimes are treated in the criminal justice system,” and asked, “As you’ve been sitting here listening to this discussion, has anything stood out to you as maybe being particularly interesting or something that you didn’t think about before that you thought would work differently?” Ms. Wilson-Rosa replied, “No.” The prosecutor asked, “Is there any question in your mind as to whether you’d be able to evaluate the credibility of a child and determine whether that or all of the evidence proves this case beyond a reasonable doubt because of the allegations?” Ms. Wilson-Rosa replied, “No.” One of Stancil’s defense attorneys noted that, in her questionnaire, Ms. Wilson-Rosa “indicated . . . [she] didn’t think kids would lie about an the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses. And based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit and did commit the charged offense in this case. [¶] If you conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged offense, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all of the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged in this case. [¶] . . . Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose except the limited purpose of determining credibility.” 7 allegation like this” and asked, “Can you tell us a little bit more how you feel about that?” Ms. Wilson-Rosa replied, “Not really.” Defense counsel noted that “several other potential jurors [said], I don’t think an adolescent or a child would make up a lie about something like a rape or sexual assault,” and asked, “[I]s that how you feel based on how you answered your questions?” Ms. Wilson-Rosa replied, “No. I think they will lie. Yeah. I think they will.” Defense counsel asked, “If [a witness] . . . who’s a . . . minor . . . says . . . I was attacked, or assaulted, or raped, you’re not going to automatically believe her just because she’s young, correct?” Ms. Wilson-Rosa replied, “Exactly.” Defense counsel asked: “Is there anything else about the things . . . that you’ve heard so far that . . . brought anything to mind?” Ms. Wilson-Rosa replied, “No.”9 Stancil’s other defense attorney also questioned Ms. Wilson-Rosa. Among other things, she asked, “[H]ow do you feel about the idea once somebody has been accused of something, they may be more likely to be pigeonholed?” Ms. Wilson-Rosa replied: “I don’t feel the same. I don’t have no comments or anything like that.” Defense counsel asked, “Do you feel like . . . you would want to hear evidence of the prior to be able to make a determination about whether, in fact, it had happened, whether the district attorney had met his burden that it was more likely than not?” Ms. Wilson- Rosa replied, “No.” Defense counsel asked, “You would not want to hear that evidence?” Ms. Wilson-Rosa replied: “I have issues with that. I don’t—it’s— past is the past, so I don’t think—not involved with the case that’s coming up. I don’t—I mean what difference would it make?” Defense counsel stated that 9 Defense counsel also asked some questions about possible testimony by Stancil. 8 the “judge will read you an instruction that if the district attorney proves that the prior incident occurred by a preponderance of the evidence . . . you can use that as one factor in determining whether this case occurred,” and asked, “[W]ould you be able to follow that law?” Ms. Wilson-Rosa replied, “I think so.” a. Peremptory Challenge, Objection, and Stated Reasons The prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on Ms. Wilson-Rosa, and defense counsel objected that the challenge violated section 231.7. Defense counsel noted, “She’s Black. We only had five Black jurors . . . in the 90-some people that we had available.” Defense counsel stated: “I have objected. It’s now for [the prosecutor] to state on the record the reasons for his peremptory challenge.” 1. The Prosecutor’s Stated Reasons The prosecutor gave his reasons for using a peremptory challenge to remove Ms. Wilson-Rosa. He “start[ed] with the questionnaire.” He stated: “In reviewing Ms. [Wilson-Rosa’s] questionnaire, I saw that she did not indicate any thoughts or feelings one way, or another about criminal justice system or about sexual assault, or how sexual assault is handled in the criminal justice system, which . . . as the record will make clear, is unusual in this panel, not unique but unusual. And that . . . made her answers in court more important to my evaluation of whether I felt she would be a juror that I would be comfortable with hearing this case.” He further stated: “Also in my experience, the reason that that’s important is[,] as I’ve tried numerous sexual assault cases, I’ve seen that it’s helpful to have jurors who have some understanding or life experience about sexual assault or how it is handled in the criminal justice system because these cases are unique in many ways. 9 And the consideration that jurors make in these cases is unique in many ways to sexual assault for many reasons.” The prosecutor next stated: “In court, . . . [Ms. Wilson-Rosa] did not express any thoughts or feelings at all when she was questioned by me[;] I also found this unusual in this group and also in my experience. Most jurors, after sitting through this much discussion about sexual assault or this type of case would at least have some thoughts, or questions, or feelings about the topics that we have discussed. That was unusual and it indicated to me a lack of emotional involvement or sort of a lack of engagement with the questioning, which I also considered to be essential for an ideal juror in a case like this. I want a juror who’s engaged and thinking about these topics. And given all the complex legal areas and social areas we have discussed, I also found that unusual, the sort of lack of any thoughts, or ideas, or feelings about any of the very controversial topics we have discussed.” The prosecutor noted: “After the questioning, I didn’t really have my mind made up one way or another. And I think it was primarily when the defense started questioning the juror that my concern sort of became more serious.” The prosecutor next stated: “[Ms. Wilson-Rosa] wrote in her questionnaire that she did not believe kids lie about allegations of sexual assault or rape. She was asked to explain in her questionnaire, but she did not. And I think I asked her about that. . . . [B]ut she didn’t indicate any thoughts or concerns about that issue until she was asked about it by defense counsel. When she was asked about it by defense counsel, she, I think, very quickly switched her answer to, no, I think they would. And I think she repeated a couple times they would. . . . My hearing of her answer is when asked whether a child would lie by defense counsel, she said they would and then repeated that at least once or twice. [¶] That indicated to me that this 10 juror could or would be swayed by defense counsel if she was a seated juror in this case. It indicates a lack of conviction in her beliefs about children and about whether a child would make up something like this which, of course, is the essential issue for this case.” The prosecutor next stated: “In defense counsel’s questioning, . . . [Ms. Wilson-Rosa] also indicated she didn’t have much experience with kids . . . . [M]y tak[e] away from that was that she didn’t have much experience . . . judging their credibility and didn’t know how that would play out in this case. I found that unusual considering she does have a daughter, albeit her daughter is older. [¶] I also have found, in trying sexual assault cases, that it is helpful to have jurors who have had or currently have close relationships with children. That indicated to me that this juror did not or did not believe she did. It would be harder for someone who didn’t have experience with children or identified as not having close experience with children to judge the credibility of a child, . . . which again is the biggest factor in this case.” The prosecutor next stated: “But I think the largest concern that I had about this juror was her response to the questions by defense counsel about the possibility of a prior allegation. Up until that question, this juror seemed fairly calm, did not express any emotion or strong feelings, or any feelings really about anything. And as soon as defense counsel asked about the prior allegation, this juror became more animated than she had been during any other questions and more vocal, and said that she was very confused about why that was coming up, and that it happened back then. Why are we even dealing with it now? Why are we hearing about it now?” The prosecutor further stated: “That was concerning to me for number reasons. One, the court spent a fair amount of time explaining the law in this area and how this evidence could be used and why we were talking about it. I spent quite a bit 11 of time as did defense counsel talking about this issue. I think her reaction to that information was unique. I think out of all of the other jurors who were questioned about this, she was the only one who did not understand why a prior allegation or conviction for sexual assault would be relevant in a case involving sexual assault particularly on a child. That was incredibly concerning to me, having worked in this area for a long time. This is a big factor for jurors and also for sexual assault in general. . . . So that initial very strong appearing [sic] resistance to the idea of why we would even be dealing with this indicated to me she just doesn’t understand sexual assault, particularly against children, and that her reaction indicates that she would be a juror that would be less inclined to believe a victim of sexual assault. It didn’t even matter to her at all. In fact, she seemed somewhat offended by the idea of bringing up a prior incident involving sexual assault.” The prosecutor also stated: “[T]he victim in this case . . . and all of the primary witnesses are Black. The prior victim in this case [i.e., Anne Doe] . . . is also Black.” 2. Defense Counsel’s Response In response to the prosecutor’s “statements that . . . [Ms. Wilson-Rosa] didn’t have an opinion about the criminal justice system which he found unusual,” defense counsel stated: that “XXXX XXXXX, who’s . . . seated on the jury, . . . did not have an opinion about the criminal justice system.”10 Defense counsel also “point[ed] out that XXXXXX XXXXXX, [who is] seated in the jury wrote ‘no opinion at this time’ . . . when asked about the criminal justice system.” Defense counsel also stated that he “had no opinion about 10 In the transcript, the first and last names of seated jurors were obscured with an X for each letter. 12 sexual assault cases” and pointed out that he “identifies as a white man.” Defense counsel also stated: “XXXXX XXX, who’s seated on the jury wrote, ‘I don’t know. I have no experience in the matter’ when he was asked how sexual assault cases were held.” Defense counsel pointed out that he “identifies as an Asian man.” Defense counsel pointed out that “XXXX XXXX identifies as an Asian woman” and stated: “[She] . . . just wrote ‘no difference’ when she was asked how sexual assault cases were held. And I can go on. There’s a number of people on the jury wrote that and the People passed on all of them.” Defense counsel stated: “[A]dditionally the next statement, do you believe a child would lie or make up a charge of rape or assault. He said the fact that she wrote no, and then changed it to yes showed that she would be persuaded by defense counsel. A number of people wrote no in their questionnaires including XXXXX XXX, [who’s] also seated on the jury who identifies as an Asian man and said that he did not believe. Then I questioned[] him he changed his answer to, yes, a child could lie. The People passed on him.” Defense counsel also stated: “XXXXXX XXXXXXXX, who’s seated on the jur[y] wrote, no, he did not believe a child would lie. He identifies as a white man, as [does] XXXX XXXXX and then changed it to yes, a child could lie. The People passed on both of them.” Defense counsel then stated: “A number of the jurors do not have children. And again, the People had more than enough peremptories to excuse those people, but . . . none of those parties were Black women.” Defense counsel then stated: “[The prosecutor] indicated that [Ms. Wilson-Rosa] became animated when discussing the prior. I think it would be more accurate to say she was confused. And a number of jurors were confused.” Defense counsel also stated: “Mr. XXXXXXX, who’s also seated on 13 the jury, asked can we get the instructions back with us so we can really read them over?” Defense counsel noted that “in most cases we do not bring priors in” and stated that Ms. Wilson-Rosa’s “not understanding why a prior would be relevant” was not “different from any other juror.” Defense counsel stated that Ms. Wilson-Rosa was “probably in the other courtroom for most of it” and “may have heard the court reading the instruction” but wouldn’t have heard questions or answers. Defense counsel stated, “[The prosecutor’s] . . . statements . . . about her . . . being confused . . . are . . . presumptively invalid reasons.” Stancil’s counsel asserted that “any reason . . . [the prosecutor has] given have all applied to other multiple prospective jurors who [the prosecutor] passed on . . . .” 3. The Prosecutor’s Response In response, the prosecutor stated that he had not used the words that defense counsel had “put in [his] mouth.” The prosecutor also stated that the other jurors’ comments about the prior sexual assault allegation “were completely different” from those made by Ms. Wilson-Rosa and that a number of jurors who defense counsel had exercised challenges against had indicated that evidence of the prior sexual assault allegation “would be so strong that it would make it difficult for them to be fair in this case.” b. The Trial Court’s Ruling on the Objection The trial court stated: “[T]oday is day three. . . . So, we have heard a lot of jurors. . . . I think Ms. [Wilson-Rosa] is juror number 100 on the list. . . . [¶] . . . [I]n looking at [section] 231.7 . . ., the court is required to evaluate the reasons given to justify a peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances. And I think talking about the distinctions between several different jurors that we have talked to over the last two-and-a-half full days, there are a lot of distinctions in terms of not just one point or the other. We 14 had significant and lengthy conversations with a number of different jurors about these issues, which is understandable because they’re difficult issues. [¶] I do think that in looking at the totality of all of the circumstances, I do not find that there’s a prima facie showing that Ms. [Wilson-Rosa] was peremptorily challenged for an improper reason, that is, based on her race, her ethnicity or gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, religious affiliation or any perceived membership in a protected group. So . . . that’s the court’s finding based on the totality of everything. And so, I would not find that she was dismissed or peremptorily challenged for an improper reason. So the court is going to make that finding.” 4. Analysis We begin our inquiry with the reason that the prosecutor identified as his “largest concern,” which was that Ms. Wilson-Rosa “was the only [prospective juror] who did not understand why a prior allegation or conviction for sexual assault would be relevant in a case involving sexual assault particularly on a child.” Stancil suggests this reason is presumptively invalid under section 231.7, subdivision (e)(13), because Ms. Wilson-Rosa’s answers about the prior conviction were similar to those given by other jurors. We are not persuaded. As we have discussed, under section 231.7, subdivision (e)(13), the presumption of invalidity applies only if the justification provided by the prosecutor was similarly applicable to other jurors who were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by the prosecutor. But the trial court found that “there [were] a lot of distinctions” between the different jurors. Substantial evidence supports the application of the trial court’s finding to the jurors referenced by Stancil on this point. 15  “MR. XXXXXXX” (Juror 10)11 was distinguishable because, unlike Ms. Wilson-Rosa, he was not inclined to ignore a prior conviction. When defense counsel asked whether Ms. Wilson-Rosa would want to hear evidence of the prior to be able to make a determination about whether it more likely than not happened, Ms. Wilson-Rosa answered no and stated: “I have issues with that. . . . [P]ast is the past, . . . not involved with the case that’s coming up. . . . I mean what difference would it make?” Juror 10 expressed an opposite “gut feeling.” He stated: “On some level—it seems to me that a prior conviction demonstrates a proclivity. And that is in some way a factor in judging the character of the defendant and plays a role in weighing the evidence. What role does it have? If I’m instructed to ignore it, I’ll ignore it. But my gut feeling is it’s not to be ignored. I’m not sure how to deal with that.” Thus, unlike Ms. Wilson-Rosa, Juror 10 did not express issues with the relevance of the prior offense; he found it to be relevant (“not to be ignored”) and sought guidance on the role the prior offense should play in weighing the evidence. 11 The reporter’s transcript obscures the seated jurors’ names by referring to them by a sequence of X’s reflecting the number of letters in their first and last names, while the questionnaire answers are identified by juror number. We can see that Mr. XXXXXXX is Juror 10 by matching information in the voir dire testimony of “MR. XXXXXXX” with Juror 10’s questionnaire answers, including, for example, uniquely identifying information regarding the juror’s partner’s occupation. Likewise, we can determine which jurors referred to by X’s correspond to which juror numbers based on identifying information and corresponding answers to questionnaires and in voir dire. In his opening appellate brief, Stancil refers to jurors by X’s, while the Attorney General identifies them by juror number. In his reply, Stancil adopts the Attorney General’s reference to jurors by number. We provide both the X’s used by Stancil and the juror number. 16  In addition to Juror 10, Stancil cites five transcript pages and asserts that “other jurors also expressed questions [about the prior] and MS. XXXXXXXXX asked for clarification.”12 But the three prospective jurors who asked questions were all distinguishable from Ms. Wilson-Rosa because, in the cited pages, none expressed issues with the relevance of the prior offense. The juror who was then in seat 14 merely asked for a repeat of a question, and the jurors who were then in seats 13 and 12 asked questions related to proving the prior offense. Even if their questions reflected some confusion about the prior offense, they did not disagree with the relevance of the prior offense, as Ms. Wilson-Rosa had. Stancil also contends that the presumption of invalidity under section 231.7, subdivision (g), applies because the “prosecutor clearly relied on Ms. Wilson-Rosa’s demeanor, noting . . . that she became animated when discussing the prior evidence.” We disagree. As we have noted, under section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1)(B), “a lack of rapport or problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor” is a presumptively invalid reason for a peremptory challenge unless certain conditions are met. (Italics added.) While Stancil is correct that the prosecutor’s statement that Ms. Wilson-Rosa “became more animated” when defense counsel asked about the prior allegation was based on Ms. Wilson-Rosa’s behavior, the prosecutor did not say that her animated behavior was problematic. Rather, the prosecutor’s concern was with her statements, which set her apart as “the only [prospective juror] who did not understand why a prior allegation or conviction for sexual assault would be relevant in a case involving sexual assault particularly on a child.” 12 Stancil’s reference to “MS. XXXXXXXXX” appears to be an error, as there was no juror by that name. 17  Stancil further contends that the presumption of invalidity under section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1), applies because the prosecutor noted that Ms. Wilson-Rosa “seemed to behave as though sexual assault of a child ‘didn’t even matter to her at all.’ ” (Italics added.) Here, we conclude that section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1), does not apply to the prosecutor’s statement because it was not behavior-based. As discussed above, when defense counsel asked about the prior offense, Ms. Wilson-Rosa stated: “I have issues with that. . . . [P]ast is the past, . . . not involved with the case that’s coming up. . . . I mean what difference would it make?” The prosecutor was referring to Ms. Wilson- Rosa’s answer about the prior offense, rather than any observation about her behavior, when he later said that, “It didn’t even matter to her at all.” In addition to concluding that the prosecutor’s “largest concern” was not presumptively invalid under section 231.7, subdivisions (e)(13) or (g)(1), we further conclude that this reason was valid. A prosecutor who plans to introduce evidence of a prior offense has a valid reason to want to remove a prospective juror who expresses issues with the relevance of the prior offense. It directly bears on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in this case. While our conclusion that the primary reason stated by the prosecutor was valid is not dispositive of the lawfulness of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge, it is a significant consideration in our totality-of-the- circumstances inquiry. With that in mind, we have evaluated the other reasons proffered by the prosecutor. The first reason stated by the prosecutor was that, in her questionnaire, Ms. Wilson-Rosa “did not indicate any thoughts or feelings one way, or another about criminal justice system or about sexual assault, or how sexual assault is handled in the criminal justice system,” which was “unusual 18 in this panel” but “not unique” and “made her answers in court more important to [his] evaluation of whether [he] felt she would be a juror that [he] would be comfortable with hearing this case.”13 Stancil contends that this reason is presumptively invalid under section 231.7, subdivision (e)(13), because Ms. Wilson-Rosa’s answers were similar to those given by other jurors who expressed no opinion about the criminal justice system or sexual assault cases. We disagree. Substantial evidence supports the application of the trial court’s finding that there were a lot of distinctions between the different jurors to the four jurors cited by his trial counsel, that is, “XXXXX XXX” (Juror 1), “XXXX XXXXX” (Juror 5), “XXXXXX XXXXXX” (Juror 7), and “XXXX XXXX” (Juror 11). Jurors 5, 7, and 11 were distinguishable because, unlike Ms. Wilson- Rosa, they expressed general opinions about the criminal justice system in their questionnaires. Juror 5 wrote, “It is important and needs to be impartial and above politics and partisan nonsense.”14 Juror 7 wrote, “Sometimes it works and sometimes it does not.”15 (Capitalization omitted.) 13 Stancil contends that the prosecutor engaged in cursory questioning of Ms. Wilson-Rosa and failed to question her about this reason. But, as to this reason, the prosecutor asked: “You sort of didn’t have any strong feelings about the criminal justice system or about how sexual assault crimes are treated in the criminal justice system, at least you shared in your questionnaire. As you’ve been sitting here listening to this discussion, has anything stood out to you as maybe being particularly interesting or something that you didn’t think about before that you thought would work differently?” 14 In objecting to the peremptory challenge, Stancil’s trial counsel incorrectly stated that Juror 5 did not have an opinion about the criminal justice system. 15 In objecting to the peremptory challenge, Stancil’s trial counsel incorrectly stated that Juror 7 had written “ ‘no opinion at this time’ ” when 19 Juror 11 wrote, “Generally fair, but could still be manipulated by attorneys who can outsmart their opposite parties.” By contrast, in response to the same question about her general opinions about the criminal justice system, Ms. Wilson-Rosa wrote: “NONE.” Juror 1 was distinguishable from Ms. Wilson-Rosa because of their different responses to the question in the questionnaire about whether they “feel that allegations of child molest [sic], rape, or any other sexual assault should be treated differently from other crimes.” Ms. Wilson-Rosa answered, “NO.” In contrast to Ms. Wilson-Rosa’s one-word answer, Juror 1 expressed the view that some crimes should be treated differently. He wrote: “I have no idea. I think all crimes should be treated case by case. Stealing a candy bar is certainly different than murder, so in that case, yes I do think they should be treated differently.” The next reason stated by the prosecutor was that, when he questioned Ms. Wilson-Rosa, she “did not express any thoughts or feelings” about the controversial topics they had discussed, which “was unusual and . . . indicated . . . a lack of emotional involvement or sort of a lack of engagement with the questioning.”16 Stancil contends that this reason is presumptively invalid under section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1), because the prosecutor relied asked about the criminal justice system. (Capitalization omitted.) Rather, that was Juror 7’s answer to a different question about what he thought about how sexual assault cases are handled in the criminal justice system. 16 Stancil contends that the prosecutor engaged in cursory questioning of Ms. Wilson-Rosa and failed to question her about this reason. But, as to this reason, the prosecutor asked: “As you’ve been sitting here listening to this discussion, has anything stood out to you as maybe being particularly interesting or something that you didn’t think about before that you thought would work differently?” 20 on Ms. Wilson-Rosa’s demeanor by noting her “lack of emotional involvement.” We conclude that section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1), is inapplicable because this reason