People v. Quintero CA4/1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketD085861
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/16/26 P. v. Quintero CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085861
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. INF1900057
v.
MANUEL BENJAMIN QUINTERO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Mark E. Singerton, Judge. Affirmed.
Rex Adam Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha
Cortina and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant Manuel Benjamin Quintero of three counts
of committing lewd acts on a child under 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd.
(a),1 hereafter section 288(a).)
Quintero argues on appeal that either count 2 or count 3 must be
reversed, because there was insufficient evidence to show that his conduct
underlying those counts were separate acts of touching. Because Quintero’s
acts constituted separate violations of the statute, we disagree and affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2015, Quintero was dating C.O., the victim’s older sister, and he
became close with the victim and her family. Relevant here to counts 2 and
3, the victim testified that when she was 13 years old, Quintero gave her a
ride to her father’s home. During the ride, the victim stated that she wanted
to make money, and Quintero responded that she could do things sexually to
earn money. He then pulled into a parking lot and positioned the car facing a
wall.
The victim testified that Quintero directed her to sit on his lap facing
him. She testified that Quintero pulled up her shirt and bra. He first fondled
one of her naked breasts and sucked on the other, and then switched breasts,
sucking the first breast and fondling the other, all at the same time. When
interviewed by a detective Quintero first told the detective that he had
fondled the victim’s breasts over her clothing, but later in the interview he
agreed that he had grabbed her breasts under her shirt and sucked on her
breasts.
Quintero was charged with four counts of violations of section 288(a).
Counts 2 and 3 related to the acts described above.
1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
The court instructed the jury that “[e]ach of the counts charged in this
case is a separate crime. You must consider each count separately and
return a separate verdict for each one.”
In closing argument, the prosecutor stated as to count 2, “[t]he second
incident is the one that happens in the car. That’s the hand touch on the
breasts. Count 3 is the same incident in the car, but it’s the licking of the
breasts. So it’s a different sexual act, so it’s a separate count.”
The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to count 1, resulting in a
mistrial on that count, but the jury convicted Quintero of counts 2, 3 and 4.
At sentencing, the court imposed the midterm of six years as to count 2
and six years concurrent as to count 3; and on count 4, the court imposed a
two-year midterm sentence to run consecutively, for a total of eight years in
prison.
II. DISCUSSION
Counts 2 and 3 were based upon Quintero’s actions when he was alone
with the victim in the truck. Quintero argues that those actions constituted a
single course of conduct and therefore the evidence was insufficient to
support conviction on both counts. As we explain below, we disagree.
In People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321 (Harrison) the high court
upheld the defendant’s conviction for three acts of sexual penetration, where
three separate digital insertions occurred during the same assault. The court
rejected the contention that the three penetrations were part of a continuous
assault and therefore constituted only a single violation of section 289.
Instead, the court concluded that “each similar sexual ‘penetration’ which
occurs during a continuous sexually assaultive encounter may constitute a
separate statutory violation.” (Harrison, at p. 324).
Building on the holding and analysis in Harrison, in People v. Scott
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 (Scott), the court reached a similar conclusion as to a
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defendant who had been convicted of multiple counts of lewd conduct in
violation of section 288(a). For several counts, his convictions were based on
testimony that on specific dates, he had intercourse with the victim (the basis
for one count) and also that he had fondled her during the encounter on that
date (the basis for a second count). He argued in the trial court and on
appeal that the fondling “was part of a course of conduct ‘indivisible’ from the
sexual intercourse which also occurred on those occasions.” The court of
appeal agreed and reversed the convictions based on fondling. (Scott, at p.
340).
Our Supreme Court reversed, stating, “we reject defendant’s proposed
limit on the number of convictions that can arise during a single encounter
under section 288. Each individual act that meets the requirements of
section 288 can result in a ‘new and separate’ statutory violation.” (Scott,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 346–347). Thus, the court concluded that the fondling
of the victim on an occasion in which he also had intercourse with her was
not an indivisible course of conduct, and therefore his convictions for the
fondling counts was upheld.
So too here. Quintero’s individual act of fondling the victim’s breasts
with his hands met the requirements of a violation of section 288. Quintero’s
individual act of sucking on the victim’s breasts with his mouth also,
separately, met the requirements of a violation of section 288. Thus, the acts
each properly resulted in a separate violation of the statute.
The result is not changed by the fact that Quintero simultaneously
fondled and suckled the victim’s breasts. At noted in People v. Jimenez
(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 450, 456, “There is no requirement that there be a
delay between the completion of one act and the commencement of another.”
(Id. at pp. 456–458). See also Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 330,
“[W]here the acts are of an entirely different nature, they may result in
multiple convictions even if committed in rapid succession. Courts have long
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assumed that no minimum amount of time must separate such acts, nor must
they be punctuated by any other significant nonsexual activity.”
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support
Quintero’s convictions on count 2 and count 3.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
O’ROURKE, J.
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