Full Opinion

Filed 11/16/26 P. v. Quintero CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, D085861 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. INF1900057 v. MANUEL BENJAMIN QUINTERO, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Mark E. Singerton, Judge. Affirmed. Rex Adam Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. A jury convicted defendant Manuel Benjamin Quintero of three counts of committing lewd acts on a child under 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a),1 hereafter section 288(a).) Quintero argues on appeal that either count 2 or count 3 must be reversed, because there was insufficient evidence to show that his conduct underlying those counts were separate acts of touching. Because Quintero’s acts constituted separate violations of the statute, we disagree and affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 2015, Quintero was dating C.O., the victim’s older sister, and he became close with the victim and her family. Relevant here to counts 2 and 3, the victim testified that when she was 13 years old, Quintero gave her a ride to her father’s home. During the ride, the victim stated that she wanted to make money, and Quintero responded that she could do things sexually to earn money. He then pulled into a parking lot and positioned the car facing a wall. The victim testified that Quintero directed her to sit on his lap facing him. She testified that Quintero pulled up her shirt and bra. He first fondled one of her naked breasts and sucked on the other, and then switched breasts, sucking the first breast and fondling the other, all at the same time. When interviewed by a detective Quintero first told the detective that he had fondled the victim’s breasts over her clothing, but later in the interview he agreed that he had grabbed her breasts under her shirt and sucked on her breasts. Quintero was charged with four counts of violations of section 288(a). Counts 2 and 3 related to the acts described above. 1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 The court instructed the jury that “[e]ach of the counts charged in this case is a separate crime. You must consider each count separately and return a separate verdict for each one.” In closing argument, the prosecutor stated as to count 2, “[t]he second incident is the one that happens in the car. That’s the hand touch on the breasts. Count 3 is the same incident in the car, but it’s the licking of the breasts. So it’s a different sexual act, so it’s a separate count.” The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to count 1, resulting in a mistrial on that count, but the jury convicted Quintero of counts 2, 3 and 4. At sentencing, the court imposed the midterm of six years as to count 2 and six years concurrent as to count 3; and on count 4, the court imposed a two-year midterm sentence to run consecutively, for a total of eight years in prison. II. DISCUSSION Counts 2 and 3 were based upon Quintero’s actions when he was alone with the victim in the truck. Quintero argues that those actions constituted a single course of conduct and therefore the evidence was insufficient to support conviction on both counts. As we explain below, we disagree. In People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321 (Harrison) the high court upheld the defendant’s conviction for three acts of sexual penetration, where three separate digital insertions occurred during the same assault. The court rejected the contention that the three penetrations were part of a continuous assault and therefore constituted only a single violation of section 289. Instead, the court concluded that “each similar sexual ‘penetration’ which occurs during a continuous sexually assaultive encounter may constitute a separate statutory violation.” (Harrison, at p. 324). Building on the holding and analysis in Harrison, in People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 (Scott), the court reached a similar conclusion as to a 3 defendant who had been convicted of multiple counts of lewd conduct in violation of section 288(a). For several counts, his convictions were based on testimony that on specific dates, he had intercourse with the victim (the basis for one count) and also that he had fondled her during the encounter on that date (the basis for a second count). He argued in the trial court and on appeal that the fondling “was part of a course of conduct ‘indivisible’ from the sexual intercourse which also occurred on those occasions.” The court of appeal agreed and reversed the convictions based on fondling. (Scott, at p. 340). Our Supreme Court reversed, stating, “we reject defendant’s proposed limit on the number of convictions that can arise during a single encounter under section 288. Each individual act that meets the requirements of section 288 can result in a ‘new and separate’ statutory violation.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 346–347). Thus, the court concluded that the fondling of the victim on an occasion in which he also had intercourse with her was not an indivisible course of conduct, and therefore his convictions for the fondling counts was upheld. So too here. Quintero’s individual act of fondling the victim’s breasts with his hands met the requirements of a violation of section 288. Quintero’s individual act of sucking on the victim’s breasts with his mouth also, separately, met the requirements of a violation of section 288. Thus, the acts each properly resulted in a separate violation of the statute. The result is not changed by the fact that Quintero simultaneously fondled and suckled the victim’s breasts. At noted in People v. Jimenez (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 450, 456, “There is no requirement that there be a delay between the completion of one act and the commencement of another.” (Id. at pp. 456–458). See also Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 330, “[W]here the acts are of an entirely different nature, they may result in multiple convictions even if committed in rapid succession. Courts have long 4 assumed that no minimum amount of time must separate such acts, nor must they be punctuated by any other significant nonsexual activity.” Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Quintero’s convictions on count 2 and count 3. III. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. KELETY, J. WE CONCUR: MCCONNELL, P. J. O’ROURKE, J. 5