Full Opinion

Filed 11/19/26 P. v. Murphy CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, F089283 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. BF186089A) v. DAVID CASEY MURPHY, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Brian M. McNamara, Judge. John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Galen N. Farris, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- A jury convicted defendant David Casey Murphy of several offenses arising from four separate incidents. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 29 years. On appeal, Murphy contends: (1) the trial court violated his federal due process rights and Penal Code section 654 1 by failing to stay the sentence on count 17 (felon in possession of ammunition), (2) the court erroneously doubled the base terms after dismissing his prior strike conviction, and (3) federal due process requires his conviction for possession of methamphetamine for sale to be vacated because it is a lesser included offense of transportation of methamphetamine for sale. We reject these claims and affirm the judgment. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In a consolidated, amended information, the Kern County District Attorney charged Murphy with four counts of felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts 1, 4–5, 16), three counts of felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); counts 2, 10, 17), two counts of possession of methamphetamine while armed with a loaded, operable firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); counts 6, 11), two counts of possession of methamphetamine for sale (id., § 11378; counts 7, 13), and one count each of transportation of heroin (id., § 11352; count 8), transportation of cocaine base (id., § 11352; count 14), 2 possession of fentanyl for sale (id., § 11351; count 3), possession of heroin for sale (id., § 11351; count 9), transportation of methamphetamine for sale (id., § 11379, subd. (a); count 12), possession of cocaine base for sale (id., § 11351.5; count 15), misdemeanor driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a); count 18), and misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 19). The information also alleged, as to counts 3, 7, 12 through 15, and 17, Murphy was a principal armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 The trial court later granted the prosecutor’s motion to amend count 14 to transportation of fentanyl under Health and Safety Code section 11352. 2 and, as to counts 3 through 17, he committed the charged offenses while released on bail or his own recognizance (§ 12022.1). Finally, as to each felony count, the information alleged Murphy had suffered a prior “strike” conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and alleged four aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of Court, 3 rule 4.421(a)(2), (a)(10), (b)(2), (c)). The trial court later granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss counts 6, 8, and 9, and Murphy pled no contest to count 18. The jury found Murphy guilty of all remaining counts, with the exception of count 15, of which he was found not guilty. The jury also found true the enhancement allegations that Murphy was a principal armed with a firearm as to counts 3, 7, 12 through 14, and 17, but not true as to count 15 (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In a bifurcated trial, the trial court found true the prior strike conviction allegation and all on-bail enhancement allegations. The court granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss the aggravating factor under rule 4.421(c), and found true the aggravating factors under rule 4.421(a)(2) and (a)(10). The court found not true the aggravating factor under rule 4.421(b)(2). The trial court sentenced Murphy to an aggregate term of 29 years, as follows: on count 14 (transportation of fentanyl), 10 years, plus two years for each of the three on-bail enhancements (§ 12022.1); on count 1 (felon in possession of a firearm), one year four months; on count 3 (possession of fentanyl for sale), two years, plus four months for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)); on count 5 (felon in possession of a firearm), one year four months; on count 7 (possession of methamphetamine for sale), one year four months; on count 10 (felon in possession of ammunition), one year four months; on count 12 (transportation of methamphetamine for sale), two years; on count 16 (felon in possession of a firearm), one year four months; on 3 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court. 3 count 17 (felon in possession of ammunition), one year four months; on count 18 (misdemeanor driving with a suspended license), 180 days county jail, concurrent; on count 19 (misdemeanor resisting a peace officer), 180 days county jail, concurrent. The court stayed the sentences on counts 2, 4, 11, and 13, as well as the remaining firearm enhancements, pursuant to section 654 and rule 4.447. Finally, the court imposed a consecutive eight-month sentence arising from a conviction in an unrelated case. Murphy filed a timely notice of appeal. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Murphy does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. Accordingly, we recite only those facts relevant to a resolution of the issues. Around 2:00 a.m. on May 26, 2023, Bakersfield Police Officer Angelika Kroeger was on patrol with her partner in Oildale. From their patrol car, the officers saw a vehicle stopped in a traffic lane with no hazard lights on. A group of about six people were gathered around the passenger side of the vehicle. Kroeger noticed “signs of drug activity” in the form of a hand-to-hand exchange by someone in the group leaning into the passenger window. As the officers made a U-turn, the vehicle started traveling southbound away from them. The officers followed the vehicle to a red traffic light. At the traffic light, the vehicle surpassed the limit line and crossed into the intersection, which constituted a Vehicle Code violation. The officers continued to follow the vehicle in their patrol car and attempted to initiate a traffic stop by turning on their overhead lights and siren. However, the vehicle continued traveling for a time before stopping. Once the vehicle pulled over, the officers made contact with Murphy and obtained his identification. Kroeger conducted a records check which revealed Murphy had a suspended driver’s license. The officers asked Murphy to step out of the vehicle and prepared it for impound. Murphy was “semi-uncooperative” with the officers’ orders and resisted their attempts to handcuff him or conduct a patdown search. After Murphy was arrested and placed in the patrol vehicle, Kroeger searched his vehicle and found an unzipped backpack on the front passenger seat. In the laptop sleeve 4 of the backpack, Kroeger found a Sig Sauer pistol loaded with nine live rounds of ammunition. In the front pocket of the backpack, Kroeger found two magazines. Both magazines contained ammunition; one was a 10-round Sig Sauer magazine capable of use with the recovered pistol; the other was a six-round Smith & Wesson magazine. DISCUSSION I. Section 654 Murphy contends the trial court violated his federal due process rights and section 654 by failing to stay the sentence for count 17 (felon in possession of ammunition) because the conduct underlying that count was already punished by the sentence for count 16 (felon in possession of a firearm). We disagree. A. Applicable Law Section 654, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” “Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an ‘act or omission’ may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective.” (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) If a defendant had multiple independent criminal objectives, he may be separately punished for offenses committed in pursuit of each objective, even if the offenses shared common acts or were part of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. (People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639.) “Whether a defendant harbored multiple criminal objectives is a question of fact, the trial court’s determination of which must be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Jones (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1, 12.) Murphy’s failure to object on this basis in the trial court does not forfeit the issue on appeal. (People v. McCoy (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1338.) 5 B. Analysis Murphy argues he had the same intent, i.e., to possess a loaded firearm, for the conduct underlying count 16 (felon in possession of a firearm) and count 17 (felon in possession of ammunition). Murphy relies on People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132 to support this contention. Lopez, however, is distinguishable. In Lopez, the defendant possessed two loaded handguns and was convicted of felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (b)) and felon in possession of ammunition (former § 12316, subd. (b)(1)). (People v. Lopez, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 134–135.) The Lopez court concluded the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for these offenses, reasoning that “[w]here … all of the ammunition is loaded into the firearm, an ‘indivisible course of conduct’ is present and section 654 precludes multiple punishment.” (Id. at p. 138.) Here, however, all of the ammunition was not loaded into the firearm. Rather, Murphy’s backpack held one loaded pistol, plus two additional magazines containing ammunition. Murphy’s possession of the Sig Sauer magazine containing ammunition demonstrates an intent not only to use the Sig Sauer pistol, but also to reload the pistol if he so desired. Furthermore, his possession of the Smith & Wesson magazine containing ammunition demonstrates an intent to load and use a separate firearm. Therefore, since Murphy pursued multiple criminal objectives in possessing the pistol and the magazines, the trial court did not violate section 654 when it imposed consecutive sentences on counts 16 and 17. (Cf. People v. Sok (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 88, 100, fn. omitted [having sentenced the defendant for felon in possession of a firearm, the trial court erred under section 654 by failing to stay the sentences for felon in possession of ammunition because “the ammunition at issue in those two counts was either loaded into [the defendant’s] handgun or had been fired from that gun”].) Having found no error, we reject Murphy’s related due process claim. II. Prior Strike Conviction 6 Murphy contends the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing because the trial court dismissed his prior strike conviction but erroneously doubled the base terms pursuant to the Three Strikes law. Alternatively, Murphy argues that, to the extent the record indicates the court did not dismiss the prior strike, the court abused its discretion in failing to do so. The People contend the court struck the prior strike conviction only with respect to a separate case (case No. BF201748A), for which sentence was imposed on the same date. The People also argue Murphy’s failure to seek relief under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 in this case forfeits the claim on appeal. Alternatively, to the extent we find the court’s Romero ruling ambiguous, the People submit we remand the matter for the court to clarify its ruling and resentence Murphy if necessary. We agree with the People; the trial court did not strike the prior strike conviction with respect to this case and Murphy’s claim of error on that point is forfeited for failure to file a Romero motion with respect to this case below. A. Additional Background In addition to the counts from the instant case (case No. BF186089A), the trial court at sentencing also addressed the plea agreement from Murphy’s unrelated case (case No. BF201748A). The court stated: “There was a filed plea agreement which included BF201748A. I’ll ask that everything in that which happened on December 11th, 2024, only to that case be stricken.” [¶] … [¶] “If you’re willing to enter this plea, as to [c]ount [t]wo, violation of Health and Safety Code [section] 11378 in BF201748A, in return it will be a third of mid term times two for 16 months consecutive to [BF186089A], Romero to be granted at the time of sentencing which ultimately means eight months consecutive.” The trial court then heard the prosecutor’s motion to reduce a felony in a second separate case (case No. BF191867C) to a misdemeanor. Following that motion, the court asked, “With that, any input as to certainly the Romero motion that’s before the [c]ourt?” The prosecutor replied: 7 “The People are objecting to the [c]ourt granting a Romero motion. The strike is about 24, 25 years old. The People recognize that, however [Murphy] did not remain crime free since getting that strike. In essence based on BF186089[A] having four cases consolidated into it and [Murphy] pleading in two additional cases, that’s essentially six cases, Your Honor, that [Murphy] has committed since receiving this strike in the early 2000s.” The trial court stated: “[T]he [c]ourt has read and considered and under the plea agreements as well, I’ve considered the current charges and exactly what [the prosecutor] has said on this issue, [Murphy]’s criminal record, background, character prospects in the interest of justice, the [c]ourt finds [Murphy] is outside the spirit of the [T]hree [S]trikes law and—sorry, yeah, and grants the defense motion at this time.” The trial court clarified: “With that, that will apply to the following cases which we discussed, certainly the BF201748A. [¶] Let me check the other ones. [¶] … [¶] Yes, covered that.” The trial court then asked defense counsel if there was anything else he wanted to bring to the court’s attention, and defense counsel said no. The court then turned to corrections to the probation report and said: “It should be B[F]201748A. And it should say below it instead of one year, four months that should be stricken. It should be eight months consecutive.” The trial court then imposed terms, explicitly noting Murphy’s prior strike conviction (except with respect to counts 14 & 3), and imposing doubled base terms for each felony conviction in this case (case No. BF186089A) without objection or questions from defense counsel. It then turned to case No. BF201748A and imposed one-third the midterm without doubling the base term. 8 B. Applicable Law A trial court has discretion to dismiss a prior strike conviction alleged under the Three Strikes law if the dismissal is in the furtherance of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (a).) In exercising its discretion, the trial court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a prior strike for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375.) C. Analysis Murphy argues the trial court erred by dismissing the prior strike conviction under Romero, and then still doubling the base terms under the Three Strikes law. (See § 667, subd. (e).) However, the record indicates the court dismissed the prior strike conviction under Romero as to case No. BF201748A only. While the court said, “Let me check the other ones,” presumably referring to other cases, the court did not indicate its Romero ruling would apply to any other case, including the instant case where the base terms were doubled on each felony count. We find no ambiguity in the court’s Romero ruling. In the event we interpret the record this way, Murphy alternatively contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Romero motion to dismiss the prior strike. However, it is clear Murphy never made a Romero motion with respect to the instant case at the time of sentencing. Accordingly, his claim of error is forfeited. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 375–376 [“any failure on the part of a defendant to invite the court to dismiss under section 1385 following Romero waives or forfeits his or her right to raise the issue on appeal”]; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351 [“the right to challenge a criminal sentence on appeal is not unrestricted. In order to encourage prompt detection and correction of error, and to reduce the number of unnecessary 9 appellate claims, reviewing courts have required parties to raise certain issues at the time of sentencing. In such cases, lack of a timely and meaningful objection forfeits or waives the claim”].) III. Lesser Included Offense Murphy contends federal due process requires his conviction for count 13 (possession of methamphetamine for sale) to be vacated because it is a lesser included offense of count 12 (transportation of methamphetamine for sale). Upon considering the issue de novo, we disagree with Murphy’s claim. (People v. Villegas (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 642, 646 [“The issue of whether multiple convictions are proper is … reviewed de novo”].) A. Applicable Law While section 954 generally permits multiple convictions, an exception to this rule “ ‘prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.’ ” (People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227 (Reed), quoting People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034.) To determine whether one offense is included within another, we apply the elements test. (Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1227.) Under this test, “if the statutory elements of the greater offense include all of the statutory elements of the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included in the former.” (Ibid.) In other words, “an offense is necessarily included if the crimes are defined in such a way as to make it impossible to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser.” (People v. Miranda (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1467.) B. Analysis We turn to the offenses at issue. To convict a defendant of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), a prosecutor must prove (1) the defendant possessed a controlled substance, (2) the defendant knew of its presence, (3) the defendant knew of the substance’s nature as a controlled substance, (4) when the defendant possessed the controlled substance, he intended to sell it or that 10 someone else sell it, (5) the controlled substance was methamphetamine, and (6) the controlled substance was in a usable amount. (People v. Montero (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1175–1176; CALCRIM No. 2302.) To convict a defendant of transportation of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379), a prosecutor must prove (1) the defendant transported for sale a controlled substance, (2) the defendant knew of its presence, (3) the defendant knew of the substance’s nature as a controlled substance, (4) when the defendant transported the controlled substance, he intended to sell it or that someone else sell it, (5) the controlled substance was methamphetamine, and (6) the controlled substance was in a usable amount. (People v. LaCross (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 182, 185; CALCRIM No. 2300.) While the elements of these two offenses are similar, there is a caveat: a person can transport drugs that are in the exclusive possession of another. (People v. Rogers (1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, 134, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Martinez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 647, 650–651.) For example, it is possible for the driver of a vehicle to transport drugs locked inside a briefcase for which he does not have the key. In that instance, the driver is transporting the drugs, but he does not have control over them. (People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 417 [“one may become criminally liable for possession for sale or for transportation of a controlled substance, based upon either actual or constructive possession of the substance,” and “[c]onstructive possession exists where a defendant maintains some control or right to control contraband that is in the actual possession of another”].) Thus, transportation of a drug does not require possession of the drug. It therefore follows that transportation of methamphetamine for sale does not subsume all the elements of possession of methamphetamine for sale, and the latter is not a lesser included offense of the former. Murphy argues a footnote in Rogers suggests otherwise. The footnote states, “In cases where [the] defendant’s possession is incidental to, and a necessary part of, the transportation charged, and no prior, different or subsequent possession is shown, the offense of possession is deemed to be necessarily included in the offense of 11 transportation, and [the] defendant may not be convicted of both charges.” (People v. Rogers, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 134, fn. 3.) However, more recent cases, including our Supreme Court’s decision in Reed, have expressed doubt about the accusatory pleading rule described in the Rogers footnote. (Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1229, fn. 2 [“The continuing validity of the [accusatory pleading] rule stated in these old cases[, including Rogers,] is dubious in light of more recent events”], citing People v. Watterson (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 942, 944–947 and People v. Thomas (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 299, 304– 306.) Murphy acknowledges we are bound by our high court’s decision in Reed to the extent it concluded the elements test is the only applicable test. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) There was no error and no due process violation. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. HARRELL, J. WE CONCUR: LEVY, Acting P. J. MEEHAN, J. 12