In re C.B. CA2/6

Filed 10/26/26 In re C.B. CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX In re C.B., a Person Coming 2d Crim. No. B345627 Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. CM1112A) (Los Angeles County) THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.B., Defendant and Appellant. C.B. appeals an order of the juvenile court sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging he committed two counts of carjacking (Pen. Code,1 § 215; counts 1 & 3), two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211; counts 2 & 4), and that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the 1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. offenses. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) He was declared a ward of the court and placed in a short-term community development program. The court set a maximum term of confinement of 28 years, eight months. We conclude the juvenile court miscalculated the maximum term of confinement because it should be 22 years. We also conclude the court properly included punishment for the two robbery counts. Thus, we modify the maximum term of confinement but otherwise affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Counts 1 and 2 In February 2025, Shubh Patel drove to an address he obtained on a dating app called Hinge, to meet a woman named Mia. He parked his vehicle, got out, and saw C.B. coming toward him. C.B. asked to borrow Patel’s cell phone to call “a ride or Uber.” Patel responded that his cell phone was dead. After Patel refused, C.B. then produced a firearm and demanded Patel’s phone and wallet. C.B. pointed the firearm and gave Patel a “pat-down.” Patel complied because he was “scared.” After he took Patel’s phone and wallet, C.B. told Patel to take him to his vehicle. Patel took C.B. to his parked vehicle. C.B. asked him how to open the car door and Patel showed him. C.B. then asked him to go to the driver’s side and open the door for him, and Patel complied. C.B. asked Patel how to put the car “in drive and turn it on.” Patel showed him how to operate the car. C.B. said “not to be smart or get out of the car or anything.” C.B. then ordered Patel to “take a few steps back” and said, “don’t go too far” or he was going to “shoot [him].” C.B. drove off with the car. 2  Counts 3 and 4 A few days later, Jack Sarduna drove his father’s vehicle to an address to meet a woman he met on the Hinge dating app named Mia. He went to the address, knocked on the door, and Mia told him to come in. He heard “a shout or a cry.” He said a man, later identified as C.B., “was beckoning [him] to come over” to the sidewalk. C.B. said he was the owner of the house. Sarduna walked with C.B. and shook his hand. C.B. then “pulled a gun on [him].” C.B. said, “give me all your money fool.” Sarduna gave C.B. his wallet and phone. Sarduna also gave C.B. his car keys after C.B. demanded them. C.B. asked Sarduna “how do you open the car[?]” As an ambulance approached, C.B. started the car and drove off. 602 Petition The People filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging that C.B. committed two counts of robbery and two counts of carjacking. They alleged C.B. personally used a firearm in the commission of the offenses. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) After contested evidentiary hearings, the juvenile court sustained the petition and found C.B. committed the four counts alleged in the petition and found the firearm enhancement allegations true. C.B. was placed in a five to seven month camp community placement program. With respect to whether the robberies could be “merged” with the carjackings, the court found: “The act of the robberies is when he takes the car, keys, and wallet of each victim. That was a completed robbery. He then directs each victim back to their cars and in both instances have [sic] the victim stand near and direct him how to start the 3 vehicles and how it [sic] should be driven. That is when the carjacking occurs.” DISCUSSION Maximum period of confinement C.B. contends the juvenile court erred when it calculated the maximum term of confinement at 28 years and eight months. The People correctly concede the point. “A court shall not commit a juvenile to any juvenile facility for a period that exceeds the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (a)(2).) Subordinate terms for felonies consist of one-third of the middle term and “one-third of the term imposed for any specific enhancements applicable to those subordinate offenses.” (§ 1170.1, subd. (a); see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (d)(3).) The term for the personal use of a firearm is ten years. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) Thus, the parties agree C.B.’s correct maximum period of confinement is 22 years, calculated as follows: 1) fifteen years for the principal count of carjacking (count 1), consisting of the middle term of five years under section 215, subdivision (b), plus 10 years for the personal firearm use enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b); 2) five years for the subordinate count of carjacking (count 3) with the firearms enhancement, consisting of one-third of the middle term (one year eight months) and one- third of the enhancement (three years four months); and 3) two years for the subordinate counts of robbery (counts 2 and 4), consisting of one third the middle term of three years under section 213, subdivision (a)(2) for each count. 4  Section 654 C.B. contends the maximum period of confinement should be reduced to 20 years by excluding punishment for the two robberies under section 654 because they were “based on one continuous course of conduct against the same victims not separated in time or place.” We are not persuaded. “Section 654 precludes multiple punishment for ‘a single act or indivisible course of conduct.’ [Citation.] ‘ “The divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon the intent and objective of the defendant. . . . [I]f the evidence discloses that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, the trial court may impose punishment for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jones (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1, 18-19 (Jones).) When the facts are undisputed, the application of section 654 is a question of law we review de novo. (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 312.) “A trial court’s express or implied determination that two crimes were separate, involving separate objectives, must be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.) Although C.B. committed the robberies close in time to the carjacking offenses, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that C.B. had separate objectives. C.B. asked each victim for their wallet and phone against their will, while armed. Because it was not necessary for C.B. to take these items to accomplish the carjackings, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that C.B. intended to deprive the victims of these items in addition to 5 their vehicles. And once in possession of their phones and wallets, the court could reasonably conclude that C.B. had time between the offenses “to reflect on his actions and renew his intent to steal” the vehicles. (Jones, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 19.) Patel testified C.B. asked him to take him to his car after he had taken Patel’s phone and wallet. And Sarduna testified C.B. asked him for “all” his “money” and later asked for his keys when he heard “something” in Sarduna’s pocket. We conclude the juvenile court did not err in including punishment for counts 2 and 4 when setting the maximum term of confinement. DISPOSITION The judgment (adjudication and disposition order) is modified to reflect a maximum term of confinement of 22 years. (§ 1260.) The judgment is affirmed as so modified. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. BALTODANO, J. We concur: CODY, P. J. YEGAN, J. 6  Sharonda P. Bradford, Judge Superior Court County of Los Angeles ______________________________ Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.