In re Steele CA4/1

Filed 10/30/26 In re Steele CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA In re AARON JAHROOTZ STEELE D087757 on (San Diego County Super. Ct. No. SCN462018) Habeas Corpus. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in habeas corpus. Kelly C. Mok, Judge. Relief granted, in part; denied in part. Mytili G. Bala, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Sahar Karimi and Monique Myers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  Aaron Jahrootz Steele was found guilty of two counts of resisting an executive officer with force or violence (Pen. Code,1 § 69; counts 1 and 5); one count of misdemeanor trespass (§ 602, subd. (o)(1); count 2); and three counts of threatening a public officer (§ 71; counts 3, 4, and 6). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that Steele committed counts 5 and 6 while he was released from custody on bail or his own recognizance. (§ 12022.1, subd. (b).) The court struck the on-bail enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c), and placed Steele on felony probation for two years subject to various terms and conditions including the completion of 281 days of custodial confinement.2 Steele has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus presenting two claims of error.3 First, Steele, an unhoused Black man, argues he suffered 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Counts 1 through 4 arose out of an incident at a shopping center on December 13, 2024, and were originally charged in Case No. SCN462018 (hereafter, Case ‘018). Counts 5 and 6 arose out of a separate incident outside a gas station on January 1, 2025, and were initially charged in Case No. SCN462463 (hereafter, Case ‘463). The trial court consolidated the two cases under Case ‘018. 3 Steele has also filed a direct appeal from his judgment of conviction. (People v. Steele (D086182).) Contemporaneously with the issuance of this order, we are issuing a judicial opinion affirming, in part, his judgment. While both appeals were still pending, Steele filed a motion seeking consolidation of the present habeas corpus proceeding with the direct appeal or, alternatively, judicial notice of the record from the direct appeal. Previously, the court deferred consideration of these requests, but ordered that the habeas corpus proceeding and the direct appeal be considered at the same time. We now deny the consolidation request and grant the request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d)(1), 459, subd. (a).) 2 violations of the Racial Justice Act of 2020 (hereafter, the RJA; § 745) because (1) one of his arresting officers exhibited bias or animus towards him because of his race (id., subd. (a)(1)); and (2) he was charged or convicted of more serious offenses than similarly situated defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins (id., subd. (a)(3)). In connection with this claim, Steele requests the appointment of habeas counsel (§ 1473, subd. (e)) and discovery to support his claim (§ 745, subd. (d)). Second, Steele asserts that his trial counsel, Jordan Proctor, rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request a pinpoint instruction on mistake of fact for one of the charges of threatening a public officer (count 6). He argues his trial counsel’s failure to request the instruction was unreasonable because there was substantial evidence to support the instruction and, by his trial counsel’s own admission, he did not have a tactical reason for failing to request the instruction apart from his belief that the instruction did not apply in Steele’s case. According to Steele, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have accepted his mistake of fact defense, which would have negated the mens rea element of the crime, if his trial counsel had requested the instruction. We deny, without prejudice, Steele’s first claim for alleged violations of the RJA, subject to refiling in the San Diego County Superior Court. However, we accept Steele’s second claim and conclude that trial counsel’s failure to request a pinpoint instruction on mistake of fact was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Further, we conclude that it is reasonably probable Steele would have obtained a better result at trial if his trial counsel had requested the instruction on mistake of fact. We therefore vacate Steele’s count 6 conviction based on constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. As required by statute, we refer the matter 3 to the State Bar of California for investigation. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6086.7, subd. (a)(2); In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1265, fn. 3 (Sixto).) The prosecution may elect to retry Steele within the timeframe allowed by law. I BACKGROUND A. Prosecution Case4 1. December 13 Incident (Case ‘018) George Y. owns Felicita Village Shopping Center, a shopping center in Escondido consisting of several commercial establishments and a parking lot. The shopping center has multiple “no loitering” signs on display. Despite these signs, unhoused individuals sometimes loiter or camp out on the property. To address this situation, George regularly dons a vest with the word “security” on it, patrols the shopping center, and asks unhoused persons to leave the premises. George has had multiple encounters with Steele, an unhoused Black man, at the shopping center. In August 2024, George saw Steele sitting on the shopping center’s plumbing and electrical equipment. George asked Steele to leave the premises, and Steele complied. About two weeks later, Steele again left the property as he was being approached by George. However, during multiple subsequent encounters, George asked Steele to leave the premises and Steele ignored him. On the morning of December 13, 2024, George saw Steele at the shopping center, and immediately called the police to have him removed. Escondido Police Department Officers Jeff Bolton and Christian Baechli 4 The trial court admitted into evidence the arresting peace officers’ body worn camera footage for both incidents giving rise to Steele’s convictions. 4 responded to the call while dressed in their agency uniforms. Upon their arrival at the shopping center, Bolton and Baechli approached Steele, who sat on the ground outside an insurance office with his personal belongings spread on the ground around him. Steele repeatedly told the officers that someone had stolen something from him. Steele later specified that his “bag” had been stolen. Rather than inquiring about the alleged theft, Bolton said, “they got no loitering signs, man. They called in about you.” Bolton and Baechli told Steele they recognized him from prior contacts with law enforcement, including an encounter in which Steele refused to give his name to Baechli. Steele responded that the officers already knew his name and knew he was not a criminal. Shortly after, Steele told the officers they had “a fake badge,” and they were “not even real.” Baechli asked Steele if they were “going down that route again,” and said that he did not know Steele’s name. In response, Steele called the officers “fake police,” said that someone had stolen something from him, and stated, “It’s Aaron, you bitch. You want me to stand up, or you gonna get too scared?” Steele then stood up, said he had not done anything wrong, and repeated his claim that someone had stolen something from him. Baechli replied, “you can’t stay here.” An increasingly agitated Steele responded, “I’m not, you bitch ass [n-word], I said somebody stole something from me, ‘cause you work with the [vulgar word] [n-words] around here. But you won’t take – dog, take that badge off, I swear to God, I’ll swing on you so fast. You not even a real police.” Baechli perceived this statement as a threat. Steele’s statement to Baechli formed the basis for count 3, the first of three charges of making a threat to a public officer. After making this statement, Steele slowly took a step towards the officers. They responded by warning Steele twice not to take another step or 5 they would use force against him. In reply, Steele said, “Whoa, whoa, if you try to use force on me, I’m gonna fucking crack your neck, dog. Stop playing with me. I’m gonna keep doing – I’m gonna put my shit in my bag and step off. I’m gonna put my shit in my bag and step off. That’s what I’m gonna do.” As Steele made these statements, Baechli turned on his Taser and pointed it towards the ground in front of Steele. At that point, Steele packed his belongings into a backpack while cursing, calling the officers vulgar names, and repeating that someone had stolen his “shit.” As Steele finished gathering his belongings, Baechli instructed him not to come back to the property. Steele walked a few feet away to a public sidewalk bordering the shopping complex, stood facing the officers from the sidewalk, and paced in a circle. After about 35 seconds, Baechli warned Steele not to come back to the property. In response, Steele claimed “the owner” said he could be there.5 Bolton said “the owner” had called the police about Steele’s loitering and did not want him there. Bolton instructed Steele to leave, and Steele replied that he was standing “on the sidewalk.” The officers told Steele they were waiting for him to leave, but if he wanted to “hang out there all day,” he could “[g]o for it,” and they could “play this game all day.” Steele remained on the sidewalk while the officers repeatedly said the owner of the shopping center wanted him to leave. As Steele stood on the sidewalk, Baechli asked him, “Why do you have a problem with the police.” Steele responded, “Because you’re harrassive” and “don’t do no work.” In response, Bolton asked Steele, “What work do you 5 At trial, an insurance agent who leased office space at the shopping center testified that he had previously assured Steele he would not call the police on him. 6 do?” (Italics added.) An exasperated Steele cursed and walked away. As he walked away, Bolton shouted after him, “Go fly your flag at the intersection. Goodbye.” Bolton also hollered at Steele to “keep going.” In response, Steele marched back towards the officers, accused them of “talk[ing] shit,” and cursed at them. He then stormed away from the officers while still remaining on the sidewalk. As Steele was seemingly about to leave the area, he spotted George inside the shopping center, walked towards him, and crossed the boundary between the sidewalk and the shopping center. At some point thereafter, Steele returned to the sidewalk. From his vantage point on the sidewalk, Steele confronted George and asked him, “Where’s the bag, I seen you take that bag. Where the bag you stole? Where’s the bag that you stole?” Baechli warned Steele to “keep walking,” and “stay off th[e] property.” Steele began walking away, but then reentered the parking lot through a driveway located about 50 feet from the spot where the officers originally initiated contact with him. Baechli told Steele he could not be anywhere in the “entire mall,” but Steele said, “Nah,” claimed he could be there, and continued questioning George about his missing bag from the interior of the shopping center driveway. Steele returned to the sidewalk and began pacing along the sidewalk near the parking lot driveway. At that point, Bolton told Steele, “You can leave or you can get arrested, it’s your choice.” Steele asked why he was being arrested and Bolton said, “For trespassing. Refusing to leave.” Steele and Bolton then argued about whether Steele was trespassing, and Steele claimed the officers needed a “piece of paper” barring him from the property. During this portion of the interaction, Steele straddled the boundary between the sidewalk and the shopping center driveway. 7  Bolton then asked Steele if he was willing to leave. Steele replied that he was “already off the property.” Bolton again said Steele could leave or he would be arrested for trespassing. He then asked Steele three additional times whether he would leave. Steele replied that he had already “left that place,” and Bolton said, “So no? You’re not gonna leave?” In response, Steele set his backpack down on the sidewalk and said, “Bitch [n-word], take your badge off so I can punch you in the face, man. Come over here. Come over here.” Steele’s statement to Bolton formed the basis for count 4, the second charge of making a threat to a public officer. Bolton perceived Steele’s act of setting down his bag as pre-assaultive behavior because it freed his hands to exert force. Therefore, Bolton drew his Taser, aimed it at Steele, and radioed to dispatch that he was holding a suspect at Taser point. Bolton then asked Steele if he wanted to “play this game.” Steele picked up his backpack, called Bolton a vulgar name, and asked him, “What is that supposed to do? I’m not even on the property.” Steele stood about 15 feet away from the officers, continued arguing with them, claimed he had already left the property, and asked why the officers were pursuing him. Meanwhile, Bolton kept his Taser pointed towards Steele. A backup patrol vehicle arrived at the scene and parked next to Steele. As officers exited the vehicle, Steele started walking away from the shopping center. Baechli and one of the backup officers, Sergeant Andrew Maxwell, warned Steele to stop and take a seat or else force would be used against him, but Steele disregarded these commands and continued walking. He also yelled, “I’m on the sidewalk. Man, you’re being ridiculous. You’re following me. I already left the place.” At this point, Bolton intended to arrest Steele, 8 take him to the police station a few miles away, and issue him a citation for trespassing. The officers closed in on Steele and tried to move his arms behind his back to handcuff him, but Steele clenched his fists, tensed up, and exerted his strength to keep his arms from being moved behind his back. To counteract these measures, Bolton held onto Steele’s backpack and Maxwell used a leg sweep maneuver to escort Steele to the ground. According to Bolton, the leg sweep was performed for Steele’s own safety and to prevent him from continuing to move away from the officers. Steele was noncompliant after he was brought to the ground. He tensed up, tried pulling away, and flailed his legs. Therefore, Bolton held Steele’s head to the ground while two other officers controlled his limbs. The officers then rolled Steele onto his stomach, handcuffed him, and seated him upright on a nearby curb. Once Steele was seated upright, he quickly jumped to his feet and kicked Baechli. Bolton pushed Steele back down to the ground and Baechli pinned his head to the ground at a 90-degree angle. While Steele was pinned down, he pinched Baechli hard enough to draw blood. Meanwhile, other officers placed Steele in a WRAP, a nylon mesh device that wrapped around Steele’s torso and prevented him from kicking, running away, or injuring himself or others. The officers booked Steele into custody shortly afterwards. 2. January 1 Incident (Case ‘463) Steele was arraigned in Case ‘018 and released on his own recognizance. He failed to appear for a readiness conference on December 27, 2024, and the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. On January 1, 2025, San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputy Shawn Gurren and several other deputies approached Steele outside a gas station to execute 9 the warrant. The deputies wore their agency uniforms and drove marked patrol vehicles. Gurren handcuffed Steele, who complied with being handcuffed but was not forthcoming about identifying himself. Steele asked the deputies if they had a warrant for his arrest, and they said they did. Thereafter, Steele stated multiple times that he “went to court” on the 27th. After the deputies repeatedly asked Steele to identify himself, he finally provided the deputies with his name and date of birth. Steele asked the deputies what he was being arrested for and Deputy Gurren responded that Steele had a felony warrant. Steele replied, “No, I don’t. I just – I just went to court on the 27th. My name didn’t show up on the thing.” The deputies then walked Steele to a patrol vehicle to perform a search for weapons and contraband. As they did so, Steele again told the deputies that he “went to court” on December 27, “but it wasn’t on the docket.” Steele added, “[t]here was no evidence ….” The deputies positioned Steele so that he faced the patrol vehicle. Steele repeatedly demanded to see a warrant and the deputies advised him they would show him a warrant at the jailhouse. Steele also repeated that he “went to court, and [his] name didn’t pop up on the docket.” The deputies began searching Steele, who repeatedly demanded a warrant, tensed and thrashed his body, and tried turning his body to face the deputies. The deputies construed Steele’s act of turning around as pre- assaultive behavior. During their search of Steele, the deputies recovered a pocketknife from his waistband and asked if he had any other weapons on him. Steele grew visibly more distressed and told one of the deputies, Deputy Ethan Hatch, “Stop reachin’ on my balls like that, slim, for real. I’ll fuckin’ run and elbow your bitch ass for not havin’ a … you think this shit a game.” Steele then tried elbowing Hatch, who had to dodge his head to avoid the 10 blow. Steele’s statement to Hatch that he would elbow him formed the basis for count 6, the third charge of making a threat to a public officer. As the deputies placed Steele in the patrol vehicle, Steele kicked Hatch three times and continually claimed that the deputies needed a warrant. Steele also repeatedly kicked at one of the backseat windows of the patrol vehicle. After the deputies transported Steele to the jailhouse, they showed him the arrest warrant in hopes it would de-escalate him. However, Steele remained aggressive and threatened one of the deputies, saying, “I’ll fuck you up … nah, for real, I’ll fuck you up. … [I]f you don’t get my shit off the ground, bro. I’m gonna fuckin’ broke kick yo’ bitch ass [n-word] so hard.” Faced with this resistance, the deputies used a leg sweep maneuver to take Steele to the ground and place him into a WRAP device. B. Defense Case Steele took the witness stand in his own defense. Regarding the December 13 incident, Steele testified that he had briefly walked away from the shopping center before the police officers arrived and, upon his return, he realized his bag had been stolen or was missing. Steele stated he did not understand why the officers approached him that morning, and he felt they were ignoring his theft complaint. He also testified that the officers did not initially communicate to him that they wanted him to leave the property entirely, nor did they advise him why he needed to leave. He claimed he threatened to crack the officers’ necks because they had “mistreated and disrespected” him. He also stated that he threatened to punch Bolton in the face because he wanted to “go mano a mano” with Bolton, who was not acting “within the scope of [his] law enforcement” duties. Steele also testified that he went to the Vista courthouse for his readiness conference for Case ‘018 on December 27, 2024, but he did not 11 know which courtroom to enter and therefore checked the court monitors for information about his case. The monitors did not list his case, so he believed the case had been dismissed for insufficient evidence.6 With respect to the January 1 incident, Steele testified that he had no idea why the deputies were approaching him. Steele testified that he requested a warrant because he had gone to the Vista courthouse on December 27 and checked the court monitors for his case. The prosecutor asked Steele how he felt when Deputy Hatch searched him, and Steele testified that he felt “extremely uncomfortable” because Hatch touched him near his groin. The prosecutor also asked Steele what was going through his mind when he threatened Hatch, and Steele replied, “That was m[e] defending myself from being touched on.” The prosecutor then asked Steele if he recalled being in the patrol car, and Steele replied, “I felt abducted, so that’s why the extra – that’s what the extra [was] for. The extra [was] for it to be alarming so that somebody realizes that this is completely illegal, like whatever’s happening to me is completely illegal, which has happened before.” Further, when Steele was asked whether he felt justified “in kicking and throwing [his] elbow,” Steele replied, “Yes. I felt like I was [being] abducted.” 6 The parties stipulated that the “television monitors in the lobby area of the San Diego Superior courthouse in Vista, California, only display traffic, family, and civil matters. The monitors do not display criminal matters. On December 27, 2024, the information booth in the lobby did not have an attendant due to staffing shortages. On December 27, 2024, the Court was open to the public and operating on a regular schedule.” 12  II DISCUSSION Steele filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging two claims: (1) violations of the RJA (all counts); and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to request a pinpoint instruction on mistake of fact (count 6). We asked the People to file an informal response to the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The People filed an informal response addressing Steele’s RJA claim, but not his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Steele filed a reply in support of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Thereafter, we issued an order to show cause limited to the issue of whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request a mistake of fact instruction. We also informed the parties that the People’s informal response and Steele’s reply would be deemed the return and traverse, respectively, unless the parties filed a timely objection. Neither party filed a timely objection. Therefore, the informal response and the reply are deemed to be the return and traverse. A. Claim I: RJA Violations (All Counts) In his first claim, Steele alleges he suffered RJA violations because a police officer involved in his arrest exhibited bias or animus against him because of his race (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)), and he was charged or convicted of more serious offenses than similarly situated defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins (id., subd. (a)(3)). In support of this claim, Steele asserts that Officer Bolton exhibited behaviors “suggestive of potential racial bias” when he allegedly taunted and followed Steele after he already had left the Escondido shopping center. Steele also argues that data produced by the City of Escondido in response to a Public Records Act request 13 “buttress[es] this conclusion,” as it shows that “Bolton arrests Black individuals at nearly twice the rate of other Escondido police officers.” Steele is not entitled to relief on his RJA claim from this court at present. Although our court has original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10), we may decline to exercise that jurisdiction when the petitioner did not first seek relief from the superior court. (In re Hillery (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 293, 294; Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 895 [“A higher court ‘has discretion to deny without prejudice a habeas corpus petition that was not filed first in a proper lower court.’ ”].) In general, a petition raising factual issues “ ‘should be tried in superior court rather than in an appellate court.’ ” (Hillery, at p. 294.) That is because “[t]he superior court that rendered the judgment is best equipped to consider the claim in the first instance, to hold an evidentiary hearing when necessary, and to grant relief if appropriate.” (Robinson, at p. 895.) Here, it is undisputed that Steele did not present his RJA claim to the trial court. Further, Steele does not present extraordinary circumstances warranting a departure from the typical requirement that habeas corpus petitioners must first seek relief in the trial court. The petition is therefore denied without prejudice as to Steele’s RJA claim, subject to refiling in the San Diego County Superior Court. B. Claim II: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Count 6) As noted, Steele also requests vacatur of his count 6 conviction on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. For reasons we shall explain, we accept Steele’s argument and vacate his count 6 conviction. 1. Legal Standards “The right to counsel is a fundamental right of criminal defendants; it assures the fairness, and thus the legitimacy, of our adversary process. 14 [Citation.] The essence of an ineffective-assistance claim is that counsel’s unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect.” (Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 374 (Kimmelman).) “Construed in light of its purpose, the right [to counsel] entitles the defendant not to some bare assistance but rather to effective assistance. [Citations.] Specifically, it entitles him to ‘the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate.’ ” (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215.) “In order to establish ineffective representation, the defendant must prove both incompetence and prejudice. [Citation.] There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance,’ [citation]; the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel’s representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy. [Citation.] The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential. [Citation.] The defendant shows that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s ineffectiveness by demonstrating that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ [Citations.] And, in determining the existence vel non of prejudice, the court ‘must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.’ ” (Kimmelman, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 381, fn. omitted, citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688–689, 694–695 (Strickland).) “Because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on a presumptively final criminal judgment, [the petitioner] bears the burden of 15 proving his entitlement to relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” (In re Gay (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1059, 1072 (Gay).) “ ‘We independently review prior testimony [citation], as well as all mixed questions of fact and law [citation]. Whether counsel’s performance was deficient, and whether any deficiency prejudiced the petitioner, are both mixed questions subject to independent review.’ ” (In re Hardy (2007) 41 Cal.4th 977, 993–994.) 2. Deficient Performance Steele contends that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance because he failed to request a pinpoint instruction on mistake of fact for count 6, which arose out of Steele’s threat to elbow Deputy Hatch. According to Steele, the court would have been required to give a mistake of fact instruction, if his counsel had requested it, because there was substantial evidence to support the instruction. Further, Steele argues his counsel did not have a tactical reason for failing to request the instruction, apart from his mistaken belief that the law did not support the instruction. As an initial matter, we agree with Steele that the trial court would have been required to instruct the jury on mistake of fact for count 6 if his trial counsel had requested the instruction. “A mistake of fact that disproves the required intent for a crime is a defense to criminal liability. [Citation.] Generally, ‘a mistake of fact defense is not available unless the mistake disproves an element of the offense.’ [Citation.] Put another way, a mistake of fact instruction is only appropriate where the defendant’s mistaken belief negates an element of the crime. [Citation.] The trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to give a mistake of fact instruction. [Citation.] The court is, however, required to give such an instruction on request, where a defendant presents substantial evidence on mistake of fact and the instruction is legally correct.” (People v. Speck (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 784, 791 (Speck).) 16  “ ‘For general intent crimes, the defendant’s mistaken belief must be both actual and reasonable, but if the mental state of the crime is a specific intent or knowledge, then the mistaken belief must only be actual.’ ” (Speck, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th p. 793; see People v. Braslaw (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1249 (Braslaw) [“As a specific intent crime, [defendant’s crime] … is subject to a good faith, unreasonable mistake of fact defense.”]; People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335, 350 (Givan) [“an unreasonable mistake of fact may be asserted in a specific intent crime, … so long as the defendant had an actual mistaken belief”].) Threatening a public officer in violation of section 71 is a specific intent crime, as it requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to influence the performance of the officer’s official duties. (People v. Hopkins (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 36, 40–41.) Thus, a mistake of fact instruction would have been warranted, upon request, if there was substantial evidence that Steele threatened Hatch because he actually believed that he was being illegally abducted by the arresting deputies. Based on our review of the record, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support a finding that Steele subjectively, albeit unreasonably, believed he was being abducted. The body worn camera footage from the deputies shows that the deputies approached Steele outside of a gas station and advised him that he had a felony warrant. In response, Steele denied he had a felony warrant. Steele also repeatedly said he went to the courthouse on December 27, 2024, but his “name didn’t show up on the thing,” and his case “wasn’t on the docket.” At trial, Steele also explained that he went to the Vista courthouse for his readiness conference for Case ‘018, but he did not see his name on the courthouse monitors, so he left believing his case had been dismissed for lack of evidence. 17  Steele also testified at trial that he had “no idea” why the deputies were approaching him at the gas station, given that he had “put [his] best foot forward” and appeared at the courthouse for his readiness conference. For that reason, Steele testified that he “asked the[] [deputies] repeatedly for a warrant.” The body worn camera footage corroborates Steele’s testimony on this point. Indeed, it shows that Steele adamantly demanded that the arresting deputies produce a warrant, which they did not. The footage also shows that when the deputies failed to produce a warrant, and instead began searching Steele for weapons and contraband, Steele threatened Deputy Hatch and physically resisted the arrest. Steele then kicked Deputy Hatch and a backseat window in the patrol vehicle. When asked if he recalled being in the patrol vehicle and kicking its windows, Steele testified, “Yeah … I felt abducted, so that’s why the extra – that’s what the extra is for. The extra is for it to be alarming so that somebody realizes that this is completely illegal, like whatever’s happening to me is completely illegal.” Shortly after, the prosecutor asked Steele if he “felt justified in kicking and throwing [his] elbow,” and Steele replied, “Yes. I felt like I was abducted.” Considered together, this evidence constituted substantial evidence that Steele believed Case ‘018 had been dismissed and the deputies who were arresting him on the bench warrant were abducting him or detaining him illegally. Undeniably, it would have been highly unreasonable for Steele to believe he was being abducted by the deputies. However, for a specific intent crime like a violation of section 71, an instruction on mistake of fact is warranted, upon request, so long as there is substantial evidence that the defendant subjectively harbored the mistaken belief at issue. (Speck, supra, 18 74 Cal.App.5th p. 793; Braslaw, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1249; Givan, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 350.) Here, that threshold was satisfied.7 Next, we consider whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Steele alleged that his trial counsel had “no tactical reason for not requesting a pinpoint instruction on mistake of fact.” The People filed an informal response, which has been deemed to be the return, but their informal response did not discuss Steele’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Instead, it focused solely on his RJA claim. “ ‘[T]he [habeas] petition states the grounds for the claimed illegality of the restraints on the petitioner’s liberty, [and] the return must be responsive to these grounds. [Citation.] [¶] The return, which must allege facts establishing the legality of the petitioner’s custody, “becomes the principal pleading” [citation] and is “analogous to the complaint in a civil proceeding” [citations]. Thus, the return “is an essential part of the scheme” by which relief is granted in a habeas corpus proceeding. [Citation.]’ [Citations.].) As a result, an order to show cause ‘serves only the limited function of requiring the filing of a return.’ ” (In re Duval (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 401, 407 (Duval).) The return must “ ‘ “allege facts tending to establish the legality of petitioner’s detention.” [Citations.] Those facts are not simply the existence of a judgment of conviction and sentence when the petitioner challenges his restraint in prison. The factual allegations of a return must also respond to 7 Notably, the trial court stated on the record that Steele’s behavior at trial caused the court to “believe that [he had] undiagnosed and untreated mental health issues that contributed to his behavior.” The court later added that the “mental health issues … [were] apparent to th[e] court,” and the “mental health issues, being undiagnosed and apparently untreated[,] … led to the incident.” 19 the allegations of the petition that form the basis of the petitioner’s claim that the confinement is unlawful.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 407–408.) “However, ‘[i]f the People do not file a return, they forgo the opportunity to participate in the court’s determination of the merits of the petitioner’s claim.’ [Citations.] As a result, ‘[i]f the People decline to file a return, and the court accepts the undisputed factual allegations of the petition as true, petitioner has in effect been relieved of the burden of proving the factual allegations set forth in the petition.’ ” (Duval, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 408.) By failing to address Steele’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in their informal response/return, the People have impliedly admitted Steele’s allegation that his trial counsel had no tactical reason for failing to request the instruction at issue. (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 479 [“[w]hen the return effectively admits the material factual allegations of the petition and traverse by not disputing them, we may resolve the issue without ordering an evidentiary hearing”]; Duval, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 408 [“because the People did not file a return here, they did not dispute the material factual allegations in the petition.”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551(e) [“Any material allegation of the petition not controverted by the return is deemed admitted for purposes of the proceeding.”].) On this basis, we conclude that counsel’s error was professionally unreasonable. Further, together with the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Steele provided our court with a declaration from his appellate counsel describing and including a copy of an email exchange between his appointed appellate counsel and his trial counsel. In that email exchange, Steele’s appellate counsel directly asked his trial counsel whether he had “a reason for not requesting a pinpoint instruction on mistake of fact” in Steele’s case. Trial counsel replied, “No, I [did] not have a reason for not requesting a pinpoint 20 instruction on mistake of fact.” According to Steele’s appellate counsel, she followed up on this response by asking trial counsel if he would agree to provide a declaration for Steele’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Trial counsel declined the request, but told appellate counsel, “ ‘I didn’t believe mistake of fact was applicable based on my review of the law, so I didn’t have a reason to request it.’ ” This declaration verifies Steele’s claim that his trial counsel had no tactical reason for failing to request the instruction at issue.8 On the record before us, we conclude that trial counsel’s failure to request a pinpoint instruction on mistake of fact fell below prevailing professional norms. “ ‘[T]he duty of counsel to a criminal defendant includes careful preparation of and request for all instructions which in his judgment are necessary to explain all of the legal theories upon which his defense rests.’ ” (People v. Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261, 270.) As discussed, a mistake of fact instruction was warranted because there was substantial evidence that Steele subjectively believed that the deputies were abducting him or otherwise detaining him illegally. Further, the People do not dispute that his trial counsel had no tactical reason for failing to request the instruction. Trial counsel’s failure