People v. Baldasaro CA4/2
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketE086399
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/20/26 P. v. Baldasaro CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E086399
v. (Super.Ct.No. FRE03818)
ROBERT BALDASARO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Smith,
Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Dismissed.
Kristina L. Fox, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
1
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Arlene A. Sevidal, Collette C. Cavalier, and Emily Reeves, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Robert Baldasaro appeals from the trial court’s order
denying his request for recall and resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.1. We
asked for supplemental briefing on several issues. We conclude the appeal must be
dismissed.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2001, a jury found defendant guilty of murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and
attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a), count 2). The court found true several firearm
enhancement allegations, one prior serious felony allegation, and one prior strike
allegation. (§§ 1170.12, subd. (a)-(d) & 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i), 12022, subd. (a)(1),
12022.53, subds. (b)-(d).) The court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of five
years, and a total indeterminate term of 100 years to life plus life with the possibility of
parole.
On August 21, 2024, counsel for defendant filed with the court a copy of an
Application for Commutation of Sentence that defendant had sent to the Governor, along
with a cover letter asking the court to exercise its discretion to review defendant’s case
1 All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code, unless otherwise
indicated.
2
under section 1172.1 and Assembly Bill No. 600. (Reg. Sess. 2023-2024; Stats. 2023,
ch. 446.)
On October 4, 2024, the court held a hearing. Defendant and his attorney did not
appear, but the prosecutor and a conflict panel attorney were present. The court ordered
counsel present to meet and confer with attorney Fox on whether she or the conflict panel
would be proceeding with the case. In the meantime, the court appointed the conflict
panel attorney to represent defendant.
The People filed an opposition brief.
Defendant had no contact with his counsel and was not sure if she had filed a reply
brief. Thus, he asked a friend of his, who was an attorney and parole expert, to write a
letter to the court to point out some “inaccurate information/argument” in the
prosecutor’s opposition brief, particularly with regard to defendant’s parole proceedings.
The court held a hearing on May 23, 2025. Defendant was present with his
appointed conflict panel attorney. The court indicated that it reviewed all the documents
submitted, including additional briefing defense counsel submitted that day. The court
asked defense counsel if she wanted to be heard on the request for recall and
resentencing. Defense counsel said she would submit to the court and added:
“[A]ctually we invite the Court to have a hearing, and we request the Court to conduct a
hearing and grant our request to have [defendant’s] sentenced [sic] lowered accordingly
due to the interest of justice.” The court then asked the People if they wanted to be heard.
The People submitted on their opposition, requested that the court not even hold a
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section 1172.1 hearing, and noted that the court could simply decline to exercise its
discretion and said, “that decision is not appealable.”
The court agreed that it had discretion to accept defendant’s invitation and hold a
hearing regarding his sentence but stated the following: “In the Court’s view, there has to
be something alleged to justify the Court in exercising that discretion. Sometimes there’s
a change in the law. Sometimes there’s a change in the sentencing scheme or penalties.
Sometimes there’s a change, for example, gang enhancements that were alleged or found
true prior to 2012. [¶] Those statutes have been changed, so those would all be things
that would be significant changes in the law and sentencing that would cause the Court to
have reason for the Court to exercise its discretion for resentencing. In this case, I tend to
agree with the People that there is—there are no facts that would cause the Court to
exercise its discretion to recall the sentence and have a hearing regarding resentencing.
In this case, [defendant] was the actual shooter who killed one victim and seriously
wounded a second victim. [¶] The penalties for those offenses, and the use of firearm
enhancements, are the same as they were. So given the nature of the offenses, no change
in the law or sentencing schemes, . . . and the defendant’s prior history, and the
supplemental information that was provided regarding the defendant, . . . there’s nothing
there to—that in my mind would justify exercising my discretion to recall the sentence
and resentence the defendant.”
The court concluded: “So the defendant’s request for the Court to exercise its
discretion under 1172.1 to recall the sentence and hold a hearing for resentencing is
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denied for the reasons indicated.” The court also mentioned that defendant might be
eligible for parole. Defendant said he was granted parole twice and explained the
circumstances. The court said, “I don’t have anything to do with that. That’s all between
you and the parole board.”
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court’s Order Is Not Appealable
Defendant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his invitation for recall of
sentence and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1 and Assembly Bill No. 600. He
contends the court erred in denying his request for relief, and the matter must be
remanded for a resentencing hearing. He also contends his appointed counsel rendered
ineffective assistance (IAC) by failing to communicate with him, file a reply brief, “grasp
the factual posture of the case,” and advocate for him at the hearing. The People argue
that defendant’s appeal should be dismissed because the court’s order is nonappealable.
They assert the court’s denial of defendant’s request did not affect his substantial rights
because section 1172.1 does not permit a defendant to file a petition for recall and
resentencing under that section. Defendant replies that case law establishes the order is
appealable since the court’s denial of the request after appointing counsel, allowing
briefing, considering input from the public, and holding a hearing, affected his substantial
rights. We conclude the order appealed from is not appealable; thus, the appeal must be
dismissed.
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A. The Court’s Order Is Not Appealable
“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s
judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable by statute.” (People
v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159.) Section 1172.1 does not address the
appealability of a court’s order denying a defendant’s request for court-initiated recall
and resentencing. (People v. Olea (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 889, 897 (Olea).) Whether
defendant’s appeal can go forward turns on section 1237, subdivision (b), which
authorizes an appeal from a postjudgment order if it affects a criminal defendant’s
“‘substantial rights.’” (People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 992 (Hodge);
§ 1237, subd. (b).)
A trial court may rule on postjudgment matters only if the Legislature has
provided it with jurisdiction to do so. (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330,
337.) Section 1172.1 (former § 1170.03) provides an exception to the general rule that a
trial court loses jurisdiction once execution of sentence has begun by authorizing a recall
and resentencing procedure that may be invoked when, for example, the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommends resentencing. (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(1).) Assembly Bill No. 600 amended section 1172.1 to allow a court to
resentence a defendant “on its own motion” when “applicable sentencing laws at the time
of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law.”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1), as amended by Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2; Hodge, supra, 107
Cal.App.5th at p. 992.) Accordingly, effective January 1, 2024, section 1172.1,
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subdivision (a)(1), now provides that “the court may, on its own motion, . . . at any time if
the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently
changed by new statutory authority or case law, . . . recall the sentence and commitment
previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not
previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and provided
the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1),
italics added; Hodge, at p. 992.)
Notably, section 1172.1, subdivision (c), expressly states that “[a] defendant is not
entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section” and if a
defendant requests relief, “the court is not required to respond.” (Italics added.)
Accordingly, a defendant who files “an unauthorized request for resentencing has
no right to a ruling.” (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) Consistent with barring
a defendant’s petition, section 1172.1 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of his
or her appeal rights only “[a]fter ruling on a referral authorized by this section . . . .”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (d), italics added.) Presumably, if the Legislature had contemplated an
appealable order from a ruling on a defendant’s petition, it would not have limited the
advisement of appellate rights to rulings resulting from a referral made by a qualifying
agency or official.
In Hodge, the Court of Appeal considered an appeal from the summary denial of a
defendant’s request for recall and resentencing under section 1172.1 and held that a “trial
court’s decision not to exercise its discretion to recall [a defendant’s] sentence [does] not
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affect [a defendant’s] substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b), because the
trial court had no statutory obligation to act at all on [the defendant’s] request.” (Hodge,
supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 991.) Since “a defendant has no right to demand that the
trial court actually make such a decision,” the “trial court’s choice not to make one does
not deprive the defendant of any right, much less a substantial one.” (Id. at p. 996.)
Hodge further explained that a contrary conclusion would result in an arbitrary
rule where, if a trial court does not respond to a defendant’s request for recall and
resentencing, there would be no order to appeal, but if the court informs a defendant that
it will take no action on the request (as was the case here), the defendant would be able to
appeal that decision. (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) The court in Hodge
found “such an irrational and arbitrary result” seemed unlikely to have been intended by
the Legislature. (Ibid.)
We agree with the reasoning of Hodge and join other Courts of Appeal that have
followed it and concluded that a trial court’s decision declining to exercise its discretion
to recall a sentence under section 1172.1 on its own motion, pursuant to a defendant’s
resentencing request, is not appealable. (People v. Brammer (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th
675, 696 (Brammer); People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1044-1047
(Brinson); People v. Roy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991, 997-999 (Roy); People v.
Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 694-697 (Faustinos).) Given the plain language
of section 1172.1, subdivision (c), an order denying a defendant’s unauthorized request
for relief under the statute cannot be said to affect his substantial rights. (Faustinos, at
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p. 697 [“A defendant never has a right to a trial court initiation of a section 1172.1
resentencing. We lack any ‘discernable criteria’ to review such a decision. [Citation.] A
trial court’s discretionary decision not to initiate a proceeding on its own motion cannot
be legal error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights.”]; Hodge, supra, 107
Cal.App.5th at p. 997 [“section 1172.1 places no constraints on the trial court’s decision
declining to initiate reconsideration of a sentence on its own motion”].) In other words,
because a defendant has no right to the court’s initiation of recall and resentencing
proceedings on its own motion under section 1172.1, the order denying such relief cannot
be said to affect a defendant’s substantial rights. (See Brinson, at p. 1049.)
We note defendant’s contention in his supplemental brief that “[t]he jurisdictional
conditions required by Assembly Bill [No.] 600 exist here.” Specifically, he claims that
section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), “conferred jurisdiction because applicable sentencing
laws had, in fact, changed.” However, section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), provides “the
court may, on its own motion, . . . at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the
time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case
law, . . . recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the
defendant.” (Italics added.) While a change in a sentencing law or sentencing laws is a
reason a court may choose to recall a defendant’s sentence, such a change does not
abrogate the prerequisite in section 1172.1 that the trial court initiate the recall on its own
motion. The statute makes it clear that, if the sentencing laws have changed, then the
court may “on its own motion” recall a defendant’s sentence. (See Faustinos, supra, 109
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Cal.App.5th at p. 695.) It is undisputed that the court here did not initiate a recall “on its
own motion.” As the record establishes, and defendant himself asserts, he “invit[ed] the
Court to exercise its discretion under section 1172.1.” Thus, contrary to defendant’s
claim, section 1172.1, subdivision (a), did not confer jurisdiction for the court to act here,
since the court did not initiate a recall.
In sum, defendant did not have a right to file a section 1172.1 petition, the trial
court had no obligation to even issue an order in the first place or to advise him of any
appellate rights connected to its order, and the court’s decision on his request is not
appealable. (§ 1172.1, subds. (c) & (d); Faustinos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 697;
Brammer, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 696 [a court that receives an unauthorized
section 1172.1 petition may exercise its discretion to recall the sentence on its own
motion but “an order declining to exercise such discretion is not appealable and we lack
the authority to rule on the merits”].)2
B. Olea and Craig
Defendant relies upon two published cases that have held that when a court
engages with a defendant’s invitation to recall his sentence, takes certain procedural
steps, and the record reflects the court considered the section 1172.1 invitation on its
merits in denying it, the resulting order is appealable. In Olea, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at
p. 901, the court held the denial of the defendant’s request for resentencing under
2 In light of our conclusion that the court’s order is not appealable, we decline to
address defendant’s other arguments that the court abused its discretion in denying his
invitation and that his counsel rendered IAC and “cost [him] a chance to be re-
sentenced.”
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section 1172.1 was appealable because the circumstances “differ[ed] from Hodge, Roy,
and Faustinos such that the order issued affected Olea’s substantial rights.” (Olea, at
p. 901.) The court found it “noteworthy that the trial court took a number of procedural
steps that did not take place in the aforementioned cases, including appointment of
counsel at Olea’s request, ordering the release of subpoenaed records from the CDCR to
the defense, ordering the defense to provide copies of these records to the People, and
setting a contested hearing on Olea’s request, at which Olea appeared remotely.” (Id. at
p. 901.)
The trial court in Olea held a hearing at which it heard arguments from both
parties, “and made statements in its final ruling that reflected it had reviewed the original
sentence in full, along with the briefs and attached exhibits. Though the court indicated
that it was declining Olea’s invitation to recall and resentence him, it also stated that it
found the original sentence to be ‘just’” and explained its reasoning for that conclusion
on the record. (Olea, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 901.) “[T]he trial court chose not only
to respond, but it did so in a manner which effectively mirrored those rights afforded to a
petitioner after a resentencing request has been initiated by one [of] the enumerated
agencies in section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(1) . . . .” (Id. at p. 902.) Accordingly, “the
trial court effectively evaluated and denied Olea’s petition on the merits, thus affecting
Olea’s substantial rights.” (Ibid.; accord, People v. Craig (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1165,
1173 (Craig) [finding order appealable where trial court “took most of the same
procedural steps the superior court in Olea did”].)
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In his reply brief and supplemental brief, defendant argues that the court here took
several procedural steps, as in Olea and Craig; thus, under the holdings of those cases, he
has a right to appeal the court’s denial of his request to recall his sentence. However,
Olea and Craig are distinguishable. At the hearing in Olea, defense counsel argued the
merits of why the defendant deserved a reduced sentence, including numerous mitigating
factors, such as his childhood trauma, efforts at rehabilitation he had made in prison, and
changes to his thought processes. (Olea, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 896.) The Olea
court ultimately denied the defendant’s request to recall and resentence him, noting that it
found the original sentence to be just, considering his “‘extremely abhorrent and
shocking actions.’” (Ibid.) Similarly, in Craig, the defendant argued the merits of why
he deserved resentencing, including that he was young at the time of the offense, and he
had done a lot of rehabilitative work since that time. The prosecutor referred to the
defendant’s prison file and pointed out his rule violations, recounted the details of the
crime, and expressed doubt in his plan for employment. The Craig court discussed the
facts of the case and declined to resentence the defendant because it was not impressed
that he had a job waiting for him, did not find it persuasive that he was young at the time
of the offense and had since rehabilitated himself, and believed he should be held to his
plea agreement. (Craig, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1169-1170.)
In contrast, the parties’ arguments in the instant case focused on whether the court
should accept defendant’s invitation to recall his sentence and hold a resentencing
hearing in the first place. Defense counsel stated, “[W]e invite the Court to have a
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hearing, and we request the Court to conduct a hearing and grant our request to have
[defendant’s] sentence[] lowered accordingly due to the interest of justice.” The People
“request[ed] the Court not to even hold a hearing under 1172.1” and stated, “The Court is
not required to hold any hearing at all. The Court can simply decline to exercise its
discretion and that decision is not appealable.” The court agreed that it had discretion to
accept defendant’s invitation to recall his sentence and have a resentencing hearing.
However, it denied “the defendant’s request for the Court to exercise its discretion under
1172.1 to recall the sentence and hold a hearing for resentencing” and briefly referenced
“the nature of the offenses, no change in the law or sentencing schemes . . . the
defendant’s prior history, and the supplemental information that was provided regarding
the defendant.”3
The trial court’s actions and statements do not indicate it was exercising its
discretion to recall and resentence defendant “on its own motion.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(1).) Instead, the court expressly stated that “defendant’s request for the Court to
exercise its discretion under 1172.1 to recall the sentence and hold a hearing for
resentencing is denied.” Moreover, we cannot say the court’s comments in declining
3 We note defendant’s claim in his supplemental brief that the court “identified
changed sentencing laws as a qualifying basis, evaluated whether such changes and other
facts existed, weighed the offense and [defendant’s] role, his prior history, the
postconviction information, and ultimately found ‘nothing’ justified recall.” However,
we do not read the court’s brief comments as such. To the extent defendant is claiming
the “changed sentencing laws” the court identified “as a qualifying basis” were the gang
enhancement laws the court mentioned, the court merely referenced those as an example
of a change in the law that could justify a court in exercising its discretion to recall a
sentence. (“Sometimes there’s a change in the sentencing scheme or penalties . . . for
example, gang enhancements that were alleged or found true prior to 2012.”)
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defendant’s invitation amounted to a decision on the merits which included the
postconviction factors set forth in section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(5), which a court is
required to apply where it has decided to recall and resentence a defendant on its own
motion.4
We conclude this is not a case where the trial court effectively evaluated and
denied defendant’s invitation after conducting the equivalent of a hearing on the merits.
Thus, Olea and Craig are inapposite.
Moreover, we agree with the People, that by making a court’s thorough and
careful exercise of its discretion in determining whether to accept a defendant’s invitation
for the court to resentence him on its own motion subject to review, but its decision to
ignore the invitation or otherwise not respond to it not appealable, a court is
“disincentiviz[ed]” from taking a critical look at such invitations and exercising its
discretion in a transparent way. We respectfully decline to do so.
Here, after looking at the matter carefully, the court plainly did not recall the
defendant’s sentence on its own motion. Since defendant had no right to bring such a
request, its denial could not have affected his substantial rights.
4 Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(5), provides: “In recalling and resentencing
pursuant to this provision, the court shall consider postconviction factors, including, but
not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while
incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that
reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.”
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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